UPS Accident - BHM
05-03-2014, 07:08 PM
#592
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Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: Seat 0B
Posts: 2,300
I have watched nearly every episone of Air Emergency and tv shows of the like and even go on the NTSB's website and study accidents as case studies and to better myself as an airman. However, this one really bothered me. Reading the transcripts really bothered me. What a tragedy, what a tragedy. RIP to the crew.
05-07-2014, 11:25 AM
#594
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Joined APC: Jun 2010
Position: Want(ed) to be an Airline Pilot
Posts: 43
ATC's contribution
Does anyone consider ATC's input regarding this accident?
Just round numbers here but at 8000', 24 miles out would give ya a better chance of a 3-1 descent and getting slowed down and configured.
Is there no criteria for a stablized descent in ATC operations?
Just round numbers here but at 8000', 24 miles out would give ya a better chance of a 3-1 descent and getting slowed down and configured.
Is there no criteria for a stablized descent in ATC operations?
05-07-2014, 03:38 PM
#595
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Joined APC: Mar 2008
Position: FAA 'Flight Check'
Posts: 13,837
Originally Posted by BE02Driverz
Does anyone consider ATC's input regarding this accident?
Just round numbers here but at 8000', 24 miles out would give ya a better chance of a 3-1 descent and getting slowed down and configured.
Is there no criteria for a stablized descent in ATC operations?
Just round numbers here but at 8000', 24 miles out would give ya a better chance of a 3-1 descent and getting slowed down and configured.
Is there no criteria for a stablized descent in ATC operations?
The NTSB.
Seriously though....the NTSB will have a team looking at everything that ATC did/or did not do that morning.
Here is a excerpt from their investigative processes website:
The Go Team's immediate boss is the Investigator-in-Charge (IIC), a senior investigator with years of NTSB and industry experience. Each investigator is a specialist responsible for a clearly defined portion of the accident investigation. In aviation, these specialties and their responsibilities are:
OPERATIONS: The history of the accident flight and crewmembers' duties for as many days prior to the crash as appears relevant.
STRUCTURES: Documentation of the airframe wreckage and the accident scene, including calculation of impact angles to help determine the plane's pre-impact course and attitude.
POWERPLANTS: Examination of engines (and propellers) and engine accessories.
SYSTEMS: Study of components of the plane's hydraulic, electrical, pneumatic and associated systems, together with instruments and elements of the flight control system.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: Reconstruction of the air traffic services given the plane, including acquisition of ATC radar data and transcripts of controller-pilot radio transmissions.
WEATHER: Gathering of all pertinent weather data from the National Weather Service, and sometimes from local TV stations, for a broad area around the accident scene.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE: Study of crew performance and all before-the-accident factors that might be involved in human error, including fatigue, medication, alcohol. Drugs, medical histories, training, workload, equipment design and work environment.
SURVIVAL FACTORS: Documentation of impact forces and injuries, evacuation, community emergency planning and all crash-fire-rescue efforts.
OPERATIONS: The history of the accident flight and crewmembers' duties for as many days prior to the crash as appears relevant.
STRUCTURES: Documentation of the airframe wreckage and the accident scene, including calculation of impact angles to help determine the plane's pre-impact course and attitude.
POWERPLANTS: Examination of engines (and propellers) and engine accessories.
SYSTEMS: Study of components of the plane's hydraulic, electrical, pneumatic and associated systems, together with instruments and elements of the flight control system.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: Reconstruction of the air traffic services given the plane, including acquisition of ATC radar data and transcripts of controller-pilot radio transmissions.
WEATHER: Gathering of all pertinent weather data from the National Weather Service, and sometimes from local TV stations, for a broad area around the accident scene.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE: Study of crew performance and all before-the-accident factors that might be involved in human error, including fatigue, medication, alcohol. Drugs, medical histories, training, workload, equipment design and work environment.
SURVIVAL FACTORS: Documentation of impact forces and injuries, evacuation, community emergency planning and all crash-fire-rescue efforts.
05-07-2014, 04:19 PM
#596
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Joined APC: Jan 2014
Position: Separating and expediting
Posts: 70
Originally Posted by USMCFLYR
Absolutely.
The NTSB.
Seriously though....the NTSB will have a team looking at everything that ATC did/or did not do that morning.
The NTSB.
Seriously though....the NTSB will have a team looking at everything that ATC did/or did not do that morning.
We are taught rules of thumb for a particular position, like "get them level at 3,000 by here or you'll never be able to slow them down on final," but none of those are from regulations, just experience from being told unable. As always, if ATC gives you some clearance, it doesn't mean it's doable. We just know things like our minimum vectoring altitude and that the procedure is to maintain that altitude until established, then "cleared approach." You could be way high or way fast, but we're not taught to consider that when giving the approach. We consider it the pilot's decision whether or not to accept it.
I just can't see ATC taking any blame here.
05-07-2014, 06:42 PM
#597
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Joined APC: Mar 2008
Position: FAA 'Flight Check'
Posts: 13,837
Originally Posted by ATCBob
Well, the NTSB might say something about ATC here, but the FAA may or may not agree or abide by it. I can say we have no current requirement in our regulations (7110.65) to ensure an aircraft will have a stabilized approach. We just don't know what all the criteria are. Instead we rely on the pilot to tell us what they need, or if they are unable something.
We are taught rules of thumb for a particular position, like "get them level at 3,000 by here or you'll never be able to slow them down on final," but none of those are from regulations, just experience from being told unable. As always, if ATC gives you some clearance, it doesn't mean it's doable. We just know things like our minimum vectoring altitude and that the procedure is to maintain that altitude until established, then "cleared approach." You could be way high or way fast, but we're not taught to consider that when giving the approach. We consider it the pilot's decision whether or not to accept it.
I just can't see ATC taking any blame here.
We are taught rules of thumb for a particular position, like "get them level at 3,000 by here or you'll never be able to slow them down on final," but none of those are from regulations, just experience from being told unable. As always, if ATC gives you some clearance, it doesn't mean it's doable. We just know things like our minimum vectoring altitude and that the procedure is to maintain that altitude until established, then "cleared approach." You could be way high or way fast, but we're not taught to consider that when giving the approach. We consider it the pilot's decision whether or not to accept it.
I just can't see ATC taking any blame here.
I'm not sure if you meant to quote me or the poster actually asking the question about what ATC's role in providing certain services might be; but my answer to the question was that the NTSB will have a team assigned to review ATC's role during the mishap - whether or not they find anything casual is just speculation on anybody's part. The poster asked if someone was looking at ATC. The answer is yes.
05-07-2014, 07:21 PM
#598
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Joined APC: Jan 2014
Position: Separating and expediting
Posts: 70
Originally Posted by USMCFLYR
ATCBob -
I'm not sure if you meant to quote me or the poster actually asking the question about what ATC's role in providing certain services might be; but my answer to the question was that the NTSB will have a team assigned to review ATC's role during the mishap - whether or not they find anything casual is just speculation on anybody's part. The poster asked if someone was looking at ATC. The answer is yes.
I'm not sure if you meant to quote me or the poster actually asking the question about what ATC's role in providing certain services might be; but my answer to the question was that the NTSB will have a team assigned to review ATC's role during the mishap - whether or not they find anything casual is just speculation on anybody's part. The poster asked if someone was looking at ATC. The answer is yes.
05-07-2014, 08:09 PM
#599
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Joined APC: Aug 2010
Position: Toilet warmer.
Posts: 337
Since change is a foregone conclusion in the 135 world, the level of risk, due to unfamiliarity, is always higher and consequently, a pilots alertness has to be too. In the 121 world, where many of the same airports and approaches are utilized ad nauseam for years, a deviation from "the norm" could demand a greater level of awareness than a crew is prepared to exercise appropriately beforehand.
Last edited by Hawker Driver; 05-07-2014 at 08:19 PM.
08-10-2014, 07:03 AM
#600
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Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: 757 Capt
Posts: 2,418
Docket update-hopefully the final will be out shortly.
To respond to a few posters back, did not ride the autopilot all the way down. Clicked off the autopilot shortly before impact, have to think PF only reacted to the rwy versus the PAPI. Blackhole approach and sometimes the mind sees what it expects to see, and IMO Crew expectation was they were above the normal path and thus the 4 reds made absolutely no sense
Personally, no issues with ATC here. It is not ATCs job to fly my airplane, and there are frequently separation issues that result in delayed descents. (Not likely here due to the local time\min traffic). It is my job as the PF to manage it, and accept it or work out an alternate course. In this flight, it seems to have been an expected event. Slam dunk approach, and had either of them ensured the FMS was sequenced appropriately, would have been succesful.
Few years back, a Capt I flew with related a story-and a mindset. The gist of it was that "If I'm on final and saying What's going on? I'm going around"
Accident ID DCA13MA133 Mode Aviation occurred on August 14, 2013 in Birmingham, AL United States Last Modified on June 12, 2014 16:06 Public Released on February 20, 2014 08:02 Total 134 document items
To respond to a few posters back, did not ride the autopilot all the way down. Clicked off the autopilot shortly before impact, have to think PF only reacted to the rwy versus the PAPI. Blackhole approach and sometimes the mind sees what it expects to see, and IMO Crew expectation was they were above the normal path and thus the 4 reds made absolutely no sense
Personally, no issues with ATC here. It is not ATCs job to fly my airplane, and there are frequently separation issues that result in delayed descents. (Not likely here due to the local time\min traffic). It is my job as the PF to manage it, and accept it or work out an alternate course. In this flight, it seems to have been an expected event. Slam dunk approach, and had either of them ensured the FMS was sequenced appropriately, would have been succesful.
Few years back, a Capt I flew with related a story-and a mindset. The gist of it was that "If I'm on final and saying What's going on? I'm going around"
Accident ID DCA13MA133 Mode Aviation occurred on August 14, 2013 in Birmingham, AL United States Last Modified on June 12, 2014 16:06 Public Released on February 20, 2014 08:02 Total 134 document items
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