MD11Fr8Dog

Sent: Mon, Jul 8, 2013 2:19 am
Subject: FSAP from bunkie on UAL 885
On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain XXXXX met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain XXXXX and F/O XXXXX went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay.

otari99

As an outsider looking in (I'm an Electrical Engineer), I wonder what role and responsibility, if any, the control tower plays relative to monitoring aircraft trajectory?

Please excuse my ignorance on this.

Thanks.

Captain Bligh

Dude. You are truly a professional and I can't wait to have the opportunity to fly with you after SLI.

rickair7777

On a visual approach, absolutely no responsibility. They don't have the SA or expertise, and they have other things to do (manage aircraft separation). And frankly getting that low and slow on a visual is ludicrously bad piloting (for an airline), almost stretching credibility...I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't seen it. Even then I wouldn't have believed it if it wasn't for the long history of "Power Distance" CRM issues in Asian cockpits.

On an instrument approach, if the tower has a radar feed from approach, they may get automated altitude alerts if you descend below published mins on an approach segment, and they would then alert you. But it's still not their primary responsibility.

Bilsch

Thanks for posting that Fr8Dog.

I was wondering how the crew and pax of 885 were coping. That had to have been an agonizing experience watching that unfold.

Globerunner513

Tossing this in here for the 'hand flying' discussion.

Children of Magenta - YouTube

Captain Bligh

Hilariously completing my inditement of the media's denial of cultural accident causes, WSJ had removed this 5 year old article as people were beginning to comment on it and it's relevance to Asiana 214. Wow. We really do live in the information age.

Adlerdriver

Really? I know you personally have got thousands of hours in jets with no auto-throttles and now they're a safety issue? Come on. Why not auto-land out of every approach if it's safer? Every airline out there probably has an MEL available for auto-throttles. Should the pilots still refuse the jet?

I always scoff the pilots that don't disconnect the automation and manually fly the jet (when it's appropriate). They owe that to their fellow crewmembers and passengers, IMO. It's their responsibility to be proficient flying their aircraft to include basics like airspeed control via manual manipulation of the throttles. I honestly can't remember the last time I landed with auto-throttles on. I've also flown two jets from ANC-OAK in the last year with the A/T MELed - and it really didn't matter to me because I do it all the time. If your airspeed isn't in your crosscheck exactly the same amount no matter the status of your auto-throttles, then you need to stop using them until it is, IMO. Off my soapbox now.

MD11Fr8Dog

I'm not UAL. This had been making the rounds and I posted after someone asked the question!

USMCFLYR

Time compression.
IF the reports are correct - ARFF was on station in 3 MINUTES.
Now I don't fly into KSFO, so I am not sure when the emergency responders are stationed on the airfield and if they have some prepositioned (like the military often does out on the field) on the airfield or if they come from one of the 3 stations (number 3 looking like the closest from the airfield diagram); but considering the location of the mishap - it would seem to have been a pretty quick response time from dead calm to catastrophe

Thanks to the FO for the insightful write up and MD11Fr8Dog for reposting.

otari - I see that rickair7777 noted that they have no responsibility in the visual approach arena and don't have the SA; but I'll disagree - at least with the SA part from my own experience. I'll let some ATC types answer the question as to whether there is responsibility within the terminal area of the runway(s), but I often fly approaches well below the normal glidepath and have been cautioned before on low/shallow approaches. Some times the controllers forget what we are doing and we certainly try and let them know - sometimes pre-briefed and again real time just to erase some of the worry they express. I'll agree that I bet the tower controllers were probably not aware of the last part of the approach and had their attention elsewhere, but I'll bet a dollar that some controller didn't look at that approach and say to himself [they look extremely low, but it isn't my job]

F15andMD11 -
Exactly what metric of *usual* airline flying does a pilot have the opportunity to portray the above line? The last 200' of a stabilized ILS approach? I truly don't know. If these boards are to be believed, a very large majority of heavy international flying is done on the AP.