yoke jerker

it looks like skybus was growing the pax numbers almost exponentially in greensboro.

jan 3500
feb 13000
mar 25000
april 42000

greensboro may numbers for overall airport enplanements should come in around 80 or 90k.

they do seem to have been on target with what they could have done.

did they end with 4 planes at the base?

i never thought they could have reached their goal of 1.5 million a year, but they certainly seemed to have capable of at least a million pax with 10 planes or so.

so, i am just curious... was it the marketing plan or just that the oil prices spooked the credit markets and they pulled all their financing? with the filing they did seem to run up alot of short term expenses that should have been paid out of operating capital.

Fishfreighter

How about:

ZERO!

bbtp

i'm sure there were some management mistakes (as we've heard from a couple of sx pilots on the site). but, seriously, is it a big shock that any airline, let alone an upstart, succummed to the price of oil.

it's pretty ironic that the incumbents all attacked their business plan of a la carte pricing and minimal service outside of the flights themselves -- now the incumbents are quickly moving in that exact direction. not to mention the fact that the service on a skybus flight was generally much more friendly than the service from old cranky FAs on most of the other airlines out there. so as far as that portion of the business model goes, i'd say it hasn't necessary been validated, but imitation is a pretty sincere form of flattery.

as far as other aspects of the model? secondary airports - i think some of their best loads/rasm was from the "secondary airports" they served (like punta gorda and pease); while some of their more poorly performing routes (like KC and Mil) were to "primary airports." again, that doesn't mean you can necessarily make a living by avoiding major airports, but it suggests that it's not crazy to attempt it.

skybus MAY have been able to survive some management mistakes OR (less likely) the rocketing price of fuel and a slowing economy - but it's not hard to see how it failed to survive both. i'm bummed - not just for all the employees, but for the customers and the industry (i'll catch the spears on that one).

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yoke jerker

it would be good to know just exactly what they losing on a daily basis or monthly. that could have suggested adding more in fees, raising the fees or higher prices. it looks like they were clearly doing what they planned in greensboro.

spirit has branded themselves as an ULCC. i don't know what they pay their pilots, but they seem to be doing well. builing alot of int'l traffic in central and south america could bode well.

look at Allegiant.... one would have to argue it was safer to use old equipment without all that debt service in this kind of environment that shiny new ones....you can burn less than 6000 lbs an hour at altitude at .72 ...they're well managed...

correcting

Who the hell cares how many passengers boarded their planes. If you can't make any money flying them, then it doesn't matter.

They stimulated those pax loads because of what they were offering: airfares WAAAAAAAY below cost.

Molon Labe

The business model of Skybus was unsound. The idea of coming in with the fare structure that they had was out of the question even though their employees worked for free.

yoke jerker

ACA thought their plan was sound based on 25 barrel oil. forget disparaging the pilot pay for a minute and consider they had a plan that worked on a spread sheet.
my point was the demand they stimulated appears to been sufficient to meet the 12 planes they had planned for GSO. gorwing revenues on target would have alllowed for further expansion.
a simple online chat about one aspect of the operation does not a ****ing contest make.

jetlag7

Yes. I was taking a plane out of GSO (for another company) the morning after SX announced they were shutting-down ops. All Four 319's were quietly parked at their gates that day.

Actually, the ACA/Independence plan was for $37/barrel oil. (At the time, 30-year historical oil prices had never exceeded $30.) When they shut their doors 18-months later, oil was trading at $47/barrel.

As for disparaging the pilot pay?? You're kidding right?? From launch to closure, Independence CRJ pilots were the second-highest paid CRJ pilots in the world ($1 less than the Comair scales at the time). As for the Airbus pilots, they weren't the highest paid, but weren't the lowest either. (Captain pay topped-out at $137/hr -- still room for improvement but certainly not "lowering the bar" like the embarassing $65,000/yr Captain pay at SX.)

Of course, all of that is irrelevant now. Both companies are LOOOOONG gone and ain't commin' back.

Regardless of what their business plans looked like on paper, both companies failed for the simple fact they weren't charging enough money for tickets to keep up with expenses.

stepchild

I disagree, their business model was risky but their management fight was unsound. Changing your profitability date within a year of flying was too much. CE750 had the inside track on this as I never made it to training, BK before I retired.

Their presentation was good, very personal and upfront. They stressed the risk many times.

I think it could have worked but that is OBE now. The price of oil was mentioned, although only up to $100.

stepchild

Yoke,

I have spoken with two prior ACA types and they said it wasn't oil, it was UAL flying every route cheaper than they did.