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Old 07-24-2013, 11:46 AM
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Default Safety Recommendations

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

Advisory Note: Inthe Section 2, Analysis, reference is made to the FAA CFR14 regulations, so,for those Safety Recommendations addressed both to FAA and EASA, they arewritten as follows: “FAA in co-operation (or in coordination) with EASA to”. Inthis case FAA will act as the focal point and as the responsible authority forreplying to the Safety Recommendations, which will be coordinated with EASA.

4.1 SR 25/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to review the single, universal, CFR14 fire protectioncertification standard that covers all transport category aircraft as a singledesign category and develop a dedicated protection certification standard forthe cargo compartments of aircraft designed or modified as dedicated freighteror freighter/passenger combi aircraft to include the mandatory installation offire suppression systems of cargo aircraft with Class E cargo compartments.

4.2 SR 26/2013: The FAA and EASA are requested to provideoperators of cargo aircraft of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excessof 45,500 kg with the option to modify existing Class E cargo compartments,through a process of FAA or EASA recommended modifications, to control a classE cargo fire without requiring a crewmember to enter the compartment throughthe use of an active fire suppression system.

4.3 SR 27/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to mandate the requirement for cargo aircraft certifiedunder FAA 14CFR or the equivalent EASA certification requirements to have amethod of detecting the early development of fire through the detection ofthermal radiation, originating within class E cargo compartments, through theinstallation of Multi-Source Sensors [MSS] which utilise a process ofthermal/heat detection in conjunction with smoke/fumes sampling.

4.4 SR 28/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to review the certification requirement for crewalerting to provide a visual means of indicating the specific location of afire to the crew.

4.5 SR 29/2013: GCAA recommends that PHMSA standardisethe battery packaging regulation to be in harmony with the ICAO TechnicalInstructions [TI]. The requirement is the complete harmonization of the U.S.HMR with the ICAO TI’s for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Good by Airregarding lithium batteries. This includes incorporation of quality managementprovisions provided in Part 2; 9.3.1 e.

4.6 SR 30/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to develop standards for containers with suppressionsystems, superior heat and fire resistance and resiliency to withstand asuppression-caused pressure pulse and still contain a suppression agent inaccordance with NTSB recommendations contained in NTSB A-12-68,69,7098. 98 NTSBA-12-68,69,70 Develop fire detection system performance requirements for theearly detection of fires originating within cargo containers and pallets and,once developed, implement the new requirements. (A-12-68) Develop firedetection system performance requirements for the early detection of firesoriginating within cargo containers and pallets and, once developed, implementthe new requirements. (A-12-69) Develop fire detection system performancerequirements for the early detection of fires originating within cargocontainers and pallets and, once developed, implement the newrequirements. (A-12-70)

4.7 SR 31/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to implement certification rule changes to requirecontainers or Unit Load Devices (ULDs) which meet the standards inrecommendation 4.6, develop a design standard that enables the container or ULDto be capable of internally containing or suppressing a fire agent inaccordance with NTSB recommendations contained in NTSB A-12-68,69,70.

4.8 SR 32/2013: The FAA to develop an Advisory Circular[AC] addressing the use of fire containment covers for cargo stored on palletsthat could be used to cover palletized cargo or cargo containers.

4.9 SR 33/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to provide a requirement for mandatory full-face oxygen.

4.10 SR 34/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to recommend the adoption of a rotary single pieceselector for oxygen quick donning anti-smoke oxygen masks.

4.11 SR 35/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to require the use of Evidence Based Training Programs[EBTP] in line with the requirement of ICAO Document 9995 - Manual of EvidenceBased Training. In particular, require operators to implement the developmentof evidence based simulator training using objective FOQA accident and seriousincident data of smoke filled cockpit environments for crew emergency training.

4.12 SR 36/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to mandate the implementation of vision assurancedevices or technology for improved pilot visibility during continuous smoke,fire, fumes in the cockpit emergencies. This could include off the shelf devicesor developing mask mounted thermal imaging cameras with the capability to seethrough smoke/fumes with sufficient clarity to view the primary cockpitinstrumentation.

4.13 SR 37/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to develop or redesign all transport aircraft checklistspertaining to Smoke Fire Fumes events to be consistent with the Integrated,Non-alerted Smoke Fire Fumes Checklist template presented in the RoyalAeronautical Society’s specialist document Smoke, Fire and Fumes in TransportAircraft: Past History, Current Risk and Recommended Mitigations, secondedition 2013, prepared by the Flight Operations Group of the Royal AeronauticalSociety.

4.14 SR 38/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to review the capability of Portable Electronic Device(PED) Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) which are used for non-alerted smoke firefumes events to be viewed in smoke filled cockpits.

4.15 SR 39/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to provide cargo crews with a revised Fire Main Decknon-normal checklist guidance for when and how to transition from the current22-25,000 feet fire suppression altitude to the landing phase where descendingearly may contribute atmospheric oxygen to a latent fire during descent. Thisprocedure should provide a method to verify or otherwise assess the conditionof the fire and to evaluate the risk to the aircraft if a descent is initiatedso as not to jeopardise the safety of the crew by following the checklistinstruction as directed.

4.16 SR 40/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to mandate a certification requirement for continuoussmoke testing for flight deck smoke evaluation tests where the smoke isrequired to be continuously generated throughout the test for cockpit smokeclearance and develop a mitigation procedure through regulation on how toeffectively manage continuous smoke in the cockpit.

4.17 SR 41/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA and Boeing to evaluate the Boeing 747Freighter/Combi/BCF modified aircraft for single points of failure where thecritical systems protection of the aircraft is dependent on a single safetygate which is the cargo compartment liner at or contiguous with fire zone three:this is the area under the control cable truss assembly, the ECS ducting andthe supplementary oxygen system supply line from the forward lower deck cargohold to the crew oxygen storage boxes. If a deficiency in the current level ofcritical systems protection is determined, provide regulatory oversight tomitigate the risk of control and systems damage that can result from largecargo fires.

4.18 SR 42/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to review the certification and design of Boeing 747Freighter/Combi/BCF aircraft distribution of oxygen from the supplementaryoxygen bottles to the flight deck oxygen masks primarily provided throughcorrosion resistant steel (CRES) 21-6-9 tubes. In particular, to review thecritical systems protection requirements for the area connecting the CRESsupply line, via a PVC hose and connector, to the oxygen mask stowage box[MXP147-3] and provide regulatory oversight to mitigate the risk of control andsystems damage that can result from large, catastrophic cargo fires.

4.19 SR 43/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA are requested to charter an Advisory and RulemakingCommittee (ARAC) to review the adequacy of current issue papers on theprotection of critical systems from cargo fires and develop regulations andassociated guidance material (e.g. Advisory Circulars) to codify the existingand proposed requirements.

4.20 SR 44/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to require operators to implement smoke, fire, fumestraining in a dedicated smoke simulator/full immersion training device allowingcrews to experience actual levels of continuous smoke in a synthetic trainingdevice or other equivalent ground-based training device as an integral processin crew emergency recurrent training.

4.21 SR 45/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to implement specific Standard Operating Procedures[SOP] for scenario based multi-crew pilot incapacitation where one or more crewmembers are incapacitated resulting in a single pilot crew environment.

4.22 SR 46/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to implement a specific recommendation that failures ofaircraft systems (such as the air conditioning packs) necessary for the continuedsafe flight and landing during an aircraft cargo fire event be considered inthe aircraft level safety analysis and during the development of cargo fireemergency procedures. This should consider failures of dependent systems andthe continued cascading failure of systems which are factors in large cargofires.

4.23 SR 47/2013: FAA and EASA regulatory certificationstandards to consider the development of a quantitative framework for assessingthe degradation of cargo compartment liner polymer matrix or the currentindustry standard panel material properties and the resulting degradation inthe structural integrity of these structures when subjected to extreme heat,vibration and/or thermo-mechanical energy.

4.24 SR 48/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA to develop a test method to determine flame penetrationresistance of cargo compartment liners to extreme heat at the currentcertification requirement temperature combined with additional input loads suchas vibration, multi-axial loading, intermittent pressure pulses,thermo-mechanical loadings based on differential materials coefficients,acoustic vibration and ballistic damage.

4.25 SR 49/2013: The FAA in co-operation or incoordination with EASA and Boeing to evaluate the Boeing 747 Freighter/Combiaircraft Class E cargo compartment for a structural-acoustic coupling phenomenain the aircraft fuselage. Structural-acoustic coupling phenomenon in anaircraft fuselage is a known characteristic. In large Class E cargocompartments, the structural and acoustic modes can be derived for vibrationanalysis. Structural and acoustic analysis could determine possible occurrencesof vibration in the fuselage structure during predetermined phases of flightwhere the vibro-acoustic signatures can be used to determine the principlesources and transmitting paths of the vibration. Further investigation can beperformed by the manufacturers of large cargo aircraft and/or the operators ofthese aircraft to investigate the vibration and acoustic signatures of thecargo areas for harmonic acoustic vibration resulting from the combination ofengine and fuselage vibration. Currently there is no data for the class E cargocompartments of the B744F, If such data was available through a process ofacoustic mapping for structural-acoustic coupling, this data could be used toexpand the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria Para. 38.3.4.3 Test T.3: Vibrationtest and verification data. This could through a process of acoustic mappingthe cargo compartment interior and measuring the vibro-acoustic interior vibration and vibration andresonance of the airframe structure. Refer to GCAA SR 4.33

4.26 SR 50/2013: The NTSB, FAA and/or EASA fire testdivisions to perform a test on lithium batteries to determine the ignitionproperties for lithium type batteries when subjected to external sources ofmechanical energy, including acoustic energy in flight range modes, acousticharmonic modes and a separate test to determine the susceptibility of lithiumbatteries to vibration from a mechanical source. The purpose of this testing isto determine the safe limits for the air carriage of lithium type batteries indynamic aeroelastic, vibrating structures where the battery electrolytecomposed of an organic solvent [and dissolved lithium salt] could becomeunstable when exposed to these forms of mechanical energy.

4.27 SR 51/2013: ICAO to review the hazardous materialsclassification for Class 9 materials packaging where the reconsideration oflithium batteries and other energy storage devices that are currentlyclassified as a Class 9 hazardous material be subjected to a higher level ofhazardous material classification as at present time, it is not clear that thecurrent Class 9 hazard communication or quantity limits adequately reflect theinherent risks to aviation safety.

4.28 SR 52/2013: ICAO to develop a SARP for package levelprotection of batteries being shipped to include protection from thermaldegradation and damage to individual cells or cell combinations in thermalrunaway, and to retard the propagation of lithium battery initiated fires toother packages in the same cargo stowage location as well as to increase theamount of time it would require for the contents of the package containinglithium batteries to provide an additional source of fuel for on-board firesinitiated by other sources.

4.29 SR 53/2013: ICAO is requested to establish a taskforce or working group of manufacturers, operators, and regulators to develop aconcept and safety case for audible emergency checklists for non-normalemergency situations and provide a feasibility working paper for industryconsideration.

4.30 SR 54/2013: ICAO is requested to establish a taskforce or working group of manufacturers, operators, and regulators to develop aconcept and safety case for alternative vision assistance systems for thesmoke, fire and fumes events non-normal emergency situations and provide afeasibility working paper for industry consideration on the implementationrequirements and required standards.

4.31 SR 55/2013: ICAO Flight Recorder Panel to expeditethe ICAO SARP on Airborne Image Recording Systems [AIRS] amendment to Annex 13to progress of this subject due to the potential benefit to air accidentinvestigation.

4.32 SR 56/2013: ICAO Safety Information Protection TaskForce to expedite the ICAO SARP’s required for video data protection.

4.33 SR 57/2013: ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel to amend theICAO Technical Instructions regarding the safe carriage of lithium batteries.Specifically, the request is to establish a dedicated task force within the DGpanel, including the representation of qualified stakeholders, to study thesafe carriage of lithium batteries and other potentially hazardous cargo anddevelop recommendations to the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, The Manual ofTests and Criteria Revision 5, Lithium Metal and Lithium Ion Batteries,38.3.4.3, Test T3-Vibration. Structural-acoustic coupling phenomenon in anaircraft fuselage is a known characteristic. In large Class E cargocompartments, the structural and acoustic modes can be derived for vibrationanalysis. Structural and acoustic analysis can determine possible occurrencesof vibration in the fuselage structure during predetermined phases of flightwhere the vibro-acoustic signatures can be used to determine the principlesources and transmitting paths of the vibration. Given the active failure modesof lithium batteries, the battery risk factors concerning possiblesusceptibility to various extraneous forms of mechanical energy, for examplevibration, possibly in a harmonic form, could be an initiating action risk.ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel is requested to evaluate data relative to the UNManual of Tests and Criteria, Lithium Metal and Lithium Ion Batteries,38.3.4.3, Test T3-Vibration and advise the UNECE Committee of Experts/WorkingParty on the Transport of Dangerous Goods if additional criteria should beadopted for the carriage lithium metal and lithium ion batteries by airtransport. Refer to GCAA SR 4.25

4.34 SR 58/2013: GCAA to produce an In-Flight EmergencyResponse Manual [IFERM] for the use of ATCO and all ANS providers. The GeneralCivil Aviation Authority (GCAA) to issue a manual providing formal guidance forATCO’s to enhance responses to in flight emergencies. The manual should supportCAR Part VIII, subparts 4 (ATS) and 8 (SAR).

4.35 SR 59/2013: GCAA to require all ATC units beequipped with a dedicated transceiver which can be directly tuned to allfrequencies in the aviation band(s) for use in emergency situations.

4.36 SR 60/2013: GCAA to assist and/or support theprovision for mutual radar data sharing between Bahrain and the UAE FlightInformation Regions.
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