Originally Posted by
dera
The thing to remember with Colgan was that they were nowhere near a stall when the stick shaker went off. They were in a plane with no ice, but they had selected the vref ice speeds, so the stick shaker went off at higher speeds than their configuration/energy state warranted.
With the complete lack of awareness of what was happening, I think they would have ignored any other clues, no matter how verbal or obvious they would've been, in their desperate panic reaction to a situation they did not expect.
This is the common perception of this accident, and one I used to share as well. However, many pilots will simply not recognize a real stall when it happens to them outside of the training environment, and that is a sad fact. Reading it again, maybe we are not saying something so different. Once a person has created a mental model of the aircraft state confirmation bias kicks in so to that extent it true that they will ignore cues.
What I like about q-alpha is that it prevents the errant mental model in the first place. Ideally you have that an an AoA gauge that you are trained on.