Originally Posted by
Mazster
This is exactly what has been puzzling me. The two pilots on the previous flight were familiar with the CUT OUT switches and the two on the accident flight were not? The earlier two even proved the problem by activating the switches again which initiated the AND condition again before shutting them off for the rest of the flight. If you look at the DFDR graph on the initial report, the accident crew looked to be fighting the automation to the end.
An MCAS malfunction won’t exactly present itself as a runaway trim situation, which makes it even more dangerous (especially considering the pilots aren’t even briefed on the system).
Unlike a typical stab trim runaway, MCAS trims for 10 seconds at a time and then takes a 5 second break. So the trim isn’t running away nonstop and it can also be stopped by activating electric trim. You can’t really fault the late pilots for not running the memory items for a stab trim runaway because not all the signs of a stab trim runaway were present; indeed, they were faced with the malfunction of a system they didn’t even know existed.