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Old 09-24-2019, 12:13 PM
  #10  
RJSAviator76
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Joined APC: Jul 2007
Posts: 3,565
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Originally Posted by ShyGuy View Post
Not the same thing.



The primary cause needs to be Boeing’s decision to design a single point of failure for a critical flight control feature, the FAA’s certification of a said system whose failure modes were not properly studied or understood, along with Boeing’s willful act of hiding any information about this new system in the manuals. Contributing to the accident are the pilot errors like leaving thrust levers in climb, etc.

RJS, if you operate under a PC/PT training scenario here, you are not allowed to be given “multiple failure” scenario for a jeopardy event. You don’t get a V1 cut at the same time with a cargo fire going off. The problem with Boeing is they assumed any activation of MCAS would simply be recognized as a trim runaway. What they never realized (because they rushed and had time compression due to their NEO competition) is that a single failure of the CA side AOA sensor or probe would trigger MCAS, but only after the CA stick shaker goes off and loses potential altitude/airspeed information on the CA side. The pilot receives what looks like a false approach to stall warming (stick shaker) along with potential unreliable airspeed information. Now MCAS kicks in. Not just kicks in, but keeps kicking in an infinite amount of times because of the false AOA readings, instead of just kicking on once and stopping. No one at the FAA or Boeing envisioned this type of failure mode.


It’s a little tiring to read reports that blame dead pilots only, while the system that allowed the accident to happen changes without being acknowledged as at least a contributing factor. Colgan was a good example. No doubt the crew screwed up and the probable cause stands. Still. Fact remains until 2009 if you were flying at 121 airlines, with gear and flaps down we were told to power out of stalls and minimize altitude loss (which in most cases) meant pulling slightly back into the shaker. The industry taught altitude loss and an approach to stall as a speed/altitude problem, instead of an AOA problem. After the plane crashes the entire industry changes training and stall scenarios so now at the first indication of stall, you must apply nose down input to reduce AOA. The previous training methodology should have been cited as a contributing factor to Colgan. “FAA’s insistence of an approach to stall be treated as an altitude/speed problem, instead of an AOA problem, and the ensuing negative training pilots received that prioritized altitude.”


Regardless, I doubt some of you will accept the Lion Air report and any blame on Boeing. You feel superior and think it couldn’t have happened to an American crew (re: white crews). That’s your right to believe that. Although I’m disappointed to hear stuff like that, I acknowledge that on average, pilots (because of their type A personality) tend to think highly of their own pilot skills versus their actual reality. Re: you’re not as good as you think you are.
You lost me at "white crews."

For the rest of you, this is a long read, but well-worth it.

https://apple.news/AHhKSVOlLS0GHBTAPJI9UXA
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