Old 03-26-2022, 09:22 AM
  #17  
JohnBurke
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Joined APC: Jun 2012
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Originally Posted by bababouey View Post
Shouldn’t pria have flagged the atlas dude?
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA19MA086

Section 1.9.3.2 of the NTSB report on Atlas Air 3591 (NTSB Docket DCA19MA086) provides information about the PRIA checks for the first officer (pilot flying). Atlas used a third-party designated agent (DA) for the PRIA work, and relied on the DA to red-flag any issues that might arise. Atlas HR received the designated agent review of the records, which included the first officer's prior four employers (Mesa, Trans States, Charter Air Transport, and Air Turks and Caicos. Atlas claims that no red flag information was received, including an account of the first officer's failed upgrade attempt at Mesa. The record referred to the training not as a failure, but as "returning to FO," and the head of Atlas HR later said it was only in retrospect after the crash of 3591, that she perceived this as an upgrade training failure. Atlas indicated that the language in the record did not appear that way, when reviewed, and that the language was vague.

The first officer on 3591 failed to disclose two former employers from whom he had resigned, Commutair and Air Wisconsin. Instead, he claimed it as a period of unemployment during which he going to college, furloughed, or working as an independent real estate agent. The first officer did disclose a failed checkride, which was his ATP ride at Trans States; he claimed he had to "redo one non-precision approach." He didn't disclose unsatisfactory line checks that followed the failed checkride, but those were identified with the paperwork received a part of the PRIA checks. The language of the failed Mesa checkride listed nine checks, and included only a reference with them that said "per email received on 09 May 2017, he is returning to FO." The training records didn't specifically state training failure or upgrade failure.

In the course of hiring at Atlas, the first officer wasn't given a simulator evaluation, but both the technical and personnel interview panels rated him "highly recommended" during the interview process.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAR2002.pdf

1.9.3 Pilot Hiring Process 1.9.3.1 General

Atlas’ minimum pilot qualifications for employment included an ATP certificate, current first-class medical certificate, and flight experience of at least 1,500 total hours, to include at least 500 hours turbine time and at least 1,000 hours in airplanes or 500 hours with a Part 121 carrier.

In 2018, Atlas and Southern Air (whose certificate Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings was integrating into Atlas) had hired 336 pilots, combined, with an average total flight time of 6,550 hours.44

According to Atlas’ human resources (HR) director, the company received about 1,200 to 1,400 pilot applications each year. The HR director said that a pilot applicant with 3,000 to 6,000 flight hours, a turbojet type-rating, 3 to 5 years of regional airline experience, and a good work and training history would be considered a competitive applicant.

Atlas’ procedures for considering pilot applicants included an initial review for minimum requirements, resume review, and initial telephone screening with a recruiter before an interview would be scheduled. Atlas’ HR director and the senior director of flight procedures, training, and standards (director of training) said the application process relied on the applicants’ honesty in disclosing information. The HR director said the process included crosschecking to ensure that information provided during interviews, on the application, and in the background check all agreed but noted that “it’s hard to catch someone who’s deliberately trying to deceive you.”

Interviews were conducted by the personnel panel (made up of HR personnel and a company flight operations management pilot, such as director of training or chief pilot) and the technical panel (typically consisting of a retired captain). The personnel and technical panels would separately score applicants on a rating sheet, then both panels would meet and discuss the applicant.45 Applicants were rated as “highly recommended,” “recommended,” or “do not recommend for employment.” Atlas’ HR director and the director of training, who jointly made all final decisions, controlled the hiring process.

When the accident captain applied for a job with Atlas, he listed his three previous employers, which represented a continuous employment history back to March 2002. Atlas’ director of training recalled that he had interviewed the accident captain in 2015 and had no areas of concern.

When the accident FO applied for a job at Atlas, he did not disclose that he had worked briefly for and resigned from both CommutAir (in 2011) and Air Wisconsin Airlines (in 2012). The FO stated on his Atlas employment application that gaps in his employment history were times when he was furloughed, working as a freelance real estate agent, or attending college.46 Atlas’ director of training said he would have liked to have known about the FO’s work history at CommutAir and Air Wisconsin Airlines during hiring so he could have further evaluated trends in the FO’s training. He considered an applicant’s failure to disclose employer information as deceptive and possibly grounds for termination if discovered after hire.

On the FO’s application for employment at Atlas, he answered “yes” when asked if he had “ever failed an initial, upgrade, transition, or recurrent proficiency check” and stated, “when I was doing my ATP checkride, I had to redo one nonprecision approach.” As described in section 1.2.2.2, this failure occurred in May 2014 while the FO was employed at Trans States Airlines. Atlas’ HR director recalled that the FO discussed this failure during his interview, and Atlas had received a record (from Trans States Airlines) of this failure and the FO’s subsequent unsatisfactory line checks as part of its background check on the FO (see section 1.9.3.2).

On his Atlas application, the FO did not list his unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain on the Embraer ERJ175 while employed at Mesa Airlines. The Mesa training records provided to Atlas as part of the FO’s background check contained nine line items dated May 12, 2017 (including “Line Operational Evaluation,” “Maneuvers Validation,” and “Line Check”). Each of these items stated, “PER EMAIL RECEVIED ON 09MAY17, HE IS RETURNING TO FO [capitalization in original],” indicating that the FO did not successfully upgrade to captain.

Neither the HR director nor the director of training was aware that Mesa’s training records referenced the unsuccessful captain upgrade attempt, and both said that such a training event should have been “red flagged” during the background check process (see section 1.9.3.2). When asked how Atlas classified an unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain, the HR director said, “if I had seen that, we probably would’ve asked him about it, and then he would’ve explained what it was.” Atlas’ director of training said he would have liked to have had that information for follow-up questioning with the FO.

Hiring records for the FO showed that he was rated “highly recommended” by both panels. His rating sheet included a disclosure from the FO about a failure in 2014 for his ATP certificate and a hand-written comment that stated, “really nice,” and that no Level D simulator evaluation of the FO was required for the interview process.

1.9.3.2 PRIA Records Review

The Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA) of 1996 specified that a hiring operator could not place a pilot into service until it obtained and reviewed specified background and other safety-related records on that pilot from the last 5 years. The PRIA requirement for obtaining records applied to Part 119 certificate holders (air carriers and commercial operators with authority to conduct operations under Part 121, Part 125, and/or Part 135), governmental entities conducting public aircraft operations, air tour operators, and fractional ownership programs. The information required by the PRIA included records from the FAA, the National Driver Register (NDR), and previous employers. These records included information that previous employers were required to provide about the pilot’s training, experience, qualifications, safety background, and performance as a pilot.

Under the PRIA, pilot applicants were required to provide hiring operators with information on all previous employers for which the applicant was employed as a pilot within the preceding 5 years. Atlas used a third-party designated agent (DA) to conduct PRIA background checks of pilot applicants. According to FAA guidance outlined in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-68H, “Pilot Records Improvement Act and Pilot Records Database,” an operator may

use a DA to obtain pilot records, but the operator is ultimately responsible for evaluating those records (FAA 2017, 3.1).

According to Atlas’ HR director, the DA would review the applicants’ records and notify her of any significant events like training failures, which she considered a “red flag,” that HR staff would bring to the director of training’s attention. When asked if she believed that the DA should identify and “red flag” an event such as a failure to upgrade to captain, the HR director said, “Yes. Emphatically, yes.” She said the HR personnel were not reliant on the DA and that either she or a member of her staff would also review the background records and notify the director of training if they saw anything of concern. Atlas’ director of training said that both the DA and Atlas’ HR department would flag substantial issues in the training records for his attention.

PRIA background records for the captain were obtained by a DA on September 22, 2015, and included information from the FAA, NDR, and the captain’s three previous employers. According to the HR director, the captain’s background records did not disclose any issues of concern.

PRIA background records for the FO were obtained by a DA on August 11, 2017, and included information from the NDR, FAA, and the four employers that the FO disclosed to Atlas: Mesa Airlines, Trans States Airlines, Charter Air Transport, and Air Turks and Caicos.

As described in the previous section, the HR director and the director of training were unaware that the FO’s background information provided by Mesa Airlines included a record of his unsuccessful May 2017 captain upgrade attempt. The HR director said she never received a “red flag” from the DA about this event. She noted that, in reviewing the records after the accident, the unsuccessful upgrade attempt was presented in such a way that “it did not present as a red flag.” She also said that, in hindsight, she could see how the record’s comment “returning to FO” referred to captain upgrade training. In reviewing the record after the accident, the director of training said the information provided in the record was vague and should have been identified for additional follow-up.
It should be noted that along with the final report (NTSB/AAR-20/02), the NTSB issued six safety recommendations, including four (A-20-33, A-20-34, A-20-35, and A-20-36), addressing pilot selection, background checks, and employment history/pilot record database. It's clear that the NTSB considered the hiring of the subject first officer, and his prior history, central to the mishap, and also considered it indicative of serious lapses in industry hiring practices and the background check process. Two of those recommendations were specific to the Pilot Record Database, which is presently implemented.

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-033
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-034
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-035
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-036
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