THE QUESTION: Conclude or Continue?
Clearly, this tentative agreement falls well short of achieving the goals we set out to meet. As an interim measure, it needs to be evaluated on the basis of how it will affect our efforts to reach the ultimate goal of a CBA which addresses the issues we set out in the beginning to address.
Ratifying this TA would conclude the Section 6 process of the Railway Labor Act. We would have a complete collective bargaining agreement with an effective date and an amendable date. At some point in the future, we would open a fresh “set” of negotiations with the Company to amend the CBA to address the issues we have now. At that point, we would try again to achieve the goals we have now.
Rejecting this TA would leave our status under the RLA unchanged. We would continue negotiating the issues we identified through our planning processes, and we would strive towards the same goals. The question to ask is which strategy is best to bring us to the ultimate goal? Will the end product be affected in any positive or negative way? Will it take more time to get there, or less?
If concluding negotiations now would result in a diminished ability to negotiate in the future, it stands to reason that we will not be able to achieve as much through negotiations to achieve our goals. It would be unrealistic to assume that we’ll get everything we want, but it would be silly to not try to get as much as possible. We all want the best deal possible, and we don’t to do anything which would harm our chances of getting as much as possible.
Even if the quality of the final product were to be unaffected, prolonging the process is also undesirable. One of our major goals in this undertaking has been to conclude negotiations in a reasonable time frame, recognizing that the two-and-a-half years of negotiations the last time was too long. Delayed benefits are no benefits at all. While we can look at the issues of overall quality of the final product and the time required to achieve it as separate issues, it is more likely they are not separate, but are inextricably intertwined.
So, given the background of the tentative agreement itself, I needed to answer several questions. How would accepting this TA affect our ability to achieve our original goal, a collective bargaining agreement which addresses our most important concerns and which appropriately rewards us for our contribution to the success of our company? Would this “interim CBA” strategy risk our ultimate goal of a complete CBA that addresses the broad-spectrum issues described in our openers? Would it prolong the process, or will it diminish the quality of the final product, or both? If the “interim CBA” strategy does place that goal at risk, does it provide sufficient reward to offset that risk?
The Timeline and the NMB
In order to fully appreciate the importance of the timeline, we need to understand a few important points about the National Mediation Board, or NMB. If we encounter difficulties negotiating with the Company, we will go to the NMB to seek relief. If we want the assistance of a mediator, we go the NMB. If we reach a point where we can’t seem to resolve our differences and we want to be released to self-help, we will go to the NMB. So, who is the NMB?
The NMB consists of a chairman and two other members, all appointed by the president of the United States. The RLA requires that one of the three appointees is from a political party other than that of the sitting president. Currently, the chairman and one member are from the president’s party, and one member is from the other party. Mr. Harry Hoglander is serving his third (nonconsecutive) term as chairman of the NMB. Mr. Hoglander was a pilot and lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force, a captain for TWA, a TWA MEC chairman, and an ALPA executive vice . He was named Aviation Labor representative to the United States Bilateral Negotiating Team by Secretary of State James Baker. He also served as legislative specialist in the office of Congressman John Tierney of Massachusetts with responsibilities in transportation issues including aviation, rail and maritime, labor, defense and veterans affairs.
Ms. Linda Puchala is an appointee of the current president. She has worked as a mediator, a senior mediator, and, for a brief time, as the chairman of the NMB. Her 40 years of experience in labor relations includes being the international president of the Association of Flight Attendants–CWA, AFL-CIO. Ms. Puchala’s current term as NMB member runs through June 30, 2012.
The third member of the NMB is Ms. Elizabeth Dougherty. An appointee of President George W. Bush, she has served on the NMB since December 2006, and has served twice as the chairman. She began her career practicing labor and employment law, served as chief counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Safety, and Training, and then served as special assistant to the president for Domestic Policy at the White House, where she covered labor and transportation issues.
A key factor in planning our strategy for this round of collective bargaining has been to conclude the process in a labor-friendly environment. There is no guarantee that the next presidential election will result in the election of a labor-friendly president and the appointment of a labor-friendly NMB. With such uncertainty, it would be wise for us to complete the bargaining process within the terms of this particular NMB. It would be foolish to prolong the process and take the chance that we reach the “endgame” under a new administration and a less-friendly NMB.
My Vote
I considered the vote I cast on your behalf to be a very important part of our process. I have a fiduciary responsibility to consider whether it is best to commit our financial resources in support of the TA and the strategy it represents. You don’t pay dues money, and you didn’t elect me, so I can rubber stamp every proposal brought to the MEC. Tens of thousands of dollars will be spent to saturate the membership with information and to conduct a vote. There are costs of printing, costs of renting venues for Road Shows and Q&A sessions, costs of video productions, and webcasting. There are costs for “free lunches,” and costs for MEC officers and the Negotiating Committee to travel around the country and abroad. In addition to the significant cost, the lengthy process stops the process of negotiating until the vote is concluded. Simply passing a difficult question along to the membership to vote would have been an abdication of my responsibility to you, and a violation of my commitment to provide prudent stewardship of your dues money.
In deliberating these issues and questions, the question was posed, “If we ratify this TA, will we be better or worse off one year from now?” The only way to answer that question is to analyze all the facts we know and to apply our judgment.
Let me start by saying, I do not believe the FAA’s proposed rules for flight and duty Times times constitute a roadblock to negotiations. I do believe there will be challenges, but I am confident they can be met and overcome. One year from now, we will be seven months beyond the time mandated by Congress that the rules be issued. They will include a phase-in period of two years to allow us to program the rules into our contract. The two-year period is not a time to stop negotiating—it is a time to adjust to the new rules.
Many of you are aware that the pilots of Pinnacle Airlines have been struggling with their management for nearly seven years to negotiate their CBA. After the purchase of Mesaba and Colgan, they undertook an effort to negotiate a joint collective bargaining agreement. After only 102 days, they achieved just that. How could that be possible? With a management who has managed to delay seven years, how could the NPRM not have been a roadblock to negotiating a JCBA? Won’t the changes to the flight and duty times have a more dramatic effect on their work rules than ours? They met the challenge in an innovative way, and we should all take note. They included in their JCBA an agreement to reopen sections which are affected by any changes to flight and duty time rules. Clearly, the FAA rulemaking process is not a roadblock to RLA Section 6 negotiations.
Given that view and the long list of items we have left to negotiate, I believe it is realistic to believe we can spend the upcoming 12 months negotiating the open sections of our CBA, find out what the Company has in mind for Retirement and Insurance (they haven’t presented their proposals yet), and clear the table of most of the issues we want to negotiate. If the Company is not then willing to consummate a deal, we will be in an optimal position to petition the National Mediation Board for assistance. We are very fortunate now to have an NMB composed of labor-friendly appointees, but there is no guarantee that the board will have the same composition if the next presidential election results in a change in the White House. If we delay too long, we risk not being able to take advantage of a labor-friendly NMB.
The alternative course of action would be to approve this TA, have “meaningful conversations” instead of Section 6 negotiations, elect to forgo the second year of this CBA, and begin Section 6 negotiations again on February 1, 2012. Twelve months from now, if we choose this path, we will not even have reached the amendable date of the CBA. If we seek assistance then from the NMB, I cannot imagine how they will contain their laughter.
If we choose instead to take the second pay rate increase and extend the CBA for the second year, we will almost guarantee we’ll never see this NMB. Given the history we have with negotiating, I would then anticipate years and years of negotiating to get to the “real CBA.” Given that prospect, I don’t know of any member on the MEC who views this as anything other than a one-year deal. And yet, we haven’t considered who will make that decision, or how.
In all of this analysis, one has to wonder what motivates the Company to make this deal. It wasn’t their idea in the first place, and it wasn’t their idea to rush the deal to a conclusion right now, but they are obviously motivated enough to wrap it in money—tens of millions of dollars of money. Why?
You probably have some ideas, and I have some of my own. Let’s talk about the elephant in the room again. I’ve heard it said many times that if the Company wants to establish an FDA in Cologne, they can use Section 6 of the CBA. In fact, I’ve said it myself. However, I don’t believe that statement is 100 percent accurate. What is accurate is that the Company has Section 6 of the CBA at its disposal. They can use anything in Section 6 any time and any where they desire. But the question is—can they establish an FDA in Cologne using Section 6? I’m inclined to believe they cannot, and for at least three reasons. First, Section 6 of the CBA does not require a pilot to sign a personal agreement promising to be bound by the laws of the United States, and not the laws of Germany, or to waive his right to seek jurisdiction in a German court. Second, Section 6 of the CBA does not require a pilot to participate in tax equalization. Finally, and I believe most importantly, Section 6 of the CBA does not have a method to force a pilot to leave Cologne before five years of residency.
And while I believe the FDA LOA represents considerable value to the Company, I cannot know for certain what motivates them to agree to this deal. It may be the FDA LOA, or it may be the ability to claim “labor peace,” or it may be a plan to purchase new airplanes. It may be a plan to change the cycle of negotiations so we can see what UPS does with their pay rates so we can beat them by a nickel. Whatever the motivation, this I do know: Once we ratify this TA, that motivation will no longer be working to our advantage. Whatever it is that’s motivating the Company to slide money across the table to us today will certainly be gone as soon as this TA is ratified by membership vote. It follows logically, then, that whatever has been driving the Company to negotiate in earnest now will not be there to motivate the Company after TA ratification to negotiate in earnest to achieve a final, “full” CBA.
Since we are determined to achieve the “contract” we told you we would fight for, and we are determined to do that in an expedited time frame, removing a motivation for the Company to negotiate is a big problem. Any strategy which delays the ultimate achievement of that goal is counterproductive to our success.
We all must admit that none of us has a crystal ball and none of us knows what the future holds. Even the experts cannot guarantee with any degree of certainty what one course of action will produce compared to another. As mentioned before, we all favor the course of action which allows us to achieve our ultimate goal of a CBA which satisfies most of our needs, and in a relatively short time. In this case, I strongly believe ratifying this TA will have the effect of prolonging the wait for us to get to the final deal. At present, we have been in RLA Section 6 negotiations for less than six months. If this TA is ratified, we will have no negotiations for at least a year. At that point, we will be starting a fresh “set” of Section 6 Negotiations. If the year of “discussions” described by the Commitment Letter bear little or no fruit, we will have lost a year of negotiating, and we will have little chance of persuading the NMB that we need help negotiating. If we do not ratify this TA, and we have not achieved a TA on a full CBA by the same time a year from now, we will have a convincing case to make before the NMB.
Because the process would be prolonged by this TA, and because the Company would no longer be motivated by whatever is motivating them now, I believe the quality of the final product, the “real” CBA, would be considerably diminished. What will motivate the Company to fix the accepted fare problem? Why will they be interested in enhancing our deviation banks or implementing real-time trip trades? Why will they agree to a minimum value of a reserve day, or a day of instructing? Why should they increase new hire pay or agree to a solution to the §4.A.2.b. problem? We should never expect to get everything on our wish list, but I believe if we employ the strategy of this TA, we should expect to get less in the long run.
I also reject the notion that meaningful negotiations cannot occur prior to the FAA’s announcement of new flight and duty time rules. Furthermore, I believe delaying our negotiations until those rules are published will vastly increase the risk that the Company will want to make us pay for any improvements in work rules which may come as a result of the changed FARs.
A complete product will address all of the Sections of the CBA which we have opened, and although we are not so naive to think every pilot’s pet issue will be solved, we will have given our best effort to solve as many of those issues as possible. We will address accepted fares and deviation banks. We’ll work to get real-time trip trading. We’ll strive to take care of pilots who were under age 53 when the previous CBA was ratified. There will be a real fix for §4.A.2.b. There will be a real pay raise. Not only does this TA fail to accomplish those goals, I feel it will delay the achievement of those goals.
My decision then, while weighty, was very simple. In my opinion, there is not enough value to the package before us to risk the attainment of the ultimate goal. The risk of delaying the “real” CBA and diminishing its value is not outweighed, in my opinion, by the reward it represents. For that reason, I recommended that we reject the TA, and to direct the Negotiating Committee to immediately engage in negotiations to implement the safety programs—ASAP, FOQA, and Data Collection—as standalone MOUs and LOA, and to then get back to the work of negotiating our CBA.
As you know, that wasn’t the view of the majority of the Master Executive Council. The MEC did not vote to recommend the TA or to recommend how a member should vote, but the MEC did vote to endorse the TA and to begin the process of member ratification. The vote, then, is in your hands.
I did not undertake this lengthy writing project as a way to sway your vote one way or another. It is intended, rather, to be a thorough explanation of the information and thought processes I used to cast my vote against endorsing the TA. I’ve tried to make it thorough in an effort to leave no questions unanswered, as I do not intend to engage in a process of response and counter response. The vote to endorse is history, and it would serve no purpose to debate it further. The decision you as a member must now make is whether to ratify the TA. I support the ratification process, and I encourage you to do everything you can to educate yourself and cast an informed vote.
I appreciate you taking the considerable time to read this letter, and am confident you will take your responsibility to vote seriously. As always, I stand ready to answer your questions or receive your comments, suggestions, and critiques. Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time via e-mail, telephone, or in person.
In Fraternity and Unity,