Scope: Outsourcing the Future
 

Outsourcing the Future October 25th, 2014


Executive Summary:

The purpose of this letter is to reinforce upon APA the need to find partnership with management to preserve the Scope of flying performed by American Airlines pilots. We must approach Scope with a mentality that balances profitability, with recognition of social responsibility relative to destructive outsourcing trends. In the long-term, APA needs to remind membership continually that any further surrender of Scope will have harmful and lasting implications to our profession and negative strategic outcomes for American Airlines. We need to not only focus our efforts on our members, but on all industry stakeholders. APA may accomplish outreach through political action alliances engaging in social media campaign(s) targeting mainline, regional, and perspective pilots as well as passengers. Finally, we need to engage and challenge management to focus on the long-term strategic advantage of mainline flying. We should resist short-term financial gains based on accounting methods that may mask true outsourcing costs.

[attachment=1]map.gif[/attachment]

A Picture of Outsourcing
425 US Airways East & West post-2005 hires were asked to name the longest routes they had ever flown for so-called regional airlines—these were their answers. Note that only one route depicted above is under 800nm using direct great circle routing. (See end of document for route analysis) ATL-GGT, ATL-TUS, ATL-GJT, ATL-MTJ, ATL-ELP, ATL-SXM, ORD-NAS, ORD-GEG, ORD-YYC, IAH-NAS, IAH-ROC, ATL-YHZ, ATL-TUS, ATL-STX, ATL-KIN, ATL-ASE, EWR-OMA, EWR-OKC, EWR-YYT, EWR-MSP, DEN-YEG, DEN-MKE, DEN-PIT, DEN-ATL, DEN-MLI, DEN-CMH, DTW-MTY, IAD-COS, JFK-SAT, JFK-AUS, SFO-AUS, SFO-SAT, IAH-ISN, IAH-RSW, KIAH-YYZ, KIAH-YUL, IAH-PSP, IAH-BFL, IAH-BOI, IAH-YEG, IAH-SFO, IAH-ACY, IAH-YYZ, LAX-XNA, KLGA-KXNA, KLGA-KDFW, KLGA-KIAH, KLGA-KOMA, KLGA-KMCI, MEM-DEN, MEM-PHX, MIA-CMH, MIA-PIT, MIA-CLE, MIA-IND, MIA-STX, MSP-LAX, MSP-LAX, ORD-YQR, ORD-ASE, ORD-COS, ORD-LAX, ORD-YHZ, PHL-IAH, SLC-YUL

newAmerican Airlines Hub Structure
[attachment=0]map2.jpg[/attachment]
Great Circle Mapper


October 25th, 2014


*redacted*
*redacted*
*redacted*
*redacted*
*redacted*

“If each pilot makes his or her union decisions based on what’s best for the group [as well as] profession instead of self-interest, we will succeed."

Dear *redacted*,

As a new APA member, I am excited to do my part to support our union. APA has a proud legacy dating back and prior to its firm 1997 position that mainline pilots perform all regional jet flying. Sadly, ALPA established industry standards enabling Whitehouse action to reduce the scope of flying performed by APA pilots. Eventually, thousands of ALPA and APA mainline pilots were furloughed. ALPA continues a conflict of interest representing both regional and mainline pilots. I am pleased APA is answering membership concerns regarding the Scope of flying conducted by American pilots, but we need more feedback. The October 8th, 2014 BOD announcement informing Mr. Parker "that APA will not agree to any Scope concessions" is what I hope to be the beginning of a more rounded approach informing membership of Scope implications. We have an opportunity to partner with management in JCBA to find meaningful solutions to outsourcing. Let's put real action behind APA’s position on Scope and establish barriers to keep mainline flying “in the green.”

Informed membership is the best method to increase the value of Scope beyond management’s reach. Information is the best means to hold future generations of APA leadership accountable. I implore APA Board of Directors and National Officers as well as Negotiating, Scope, Government Affairs, and Communications Committees to demonstrate further resolve to retain the Scope of our flying using awareness methods that cement negative perceptions of Scope loss. We must persuade Regional pilots that relaxing Scope limits availability of mainline employment opportunity. Line pilot predispositions may best be shaped using basic economics that demonstrate how currency inflation is part of our union's key method of control over regional airline industry. APA must also demonstrate concepts such as how releasing Scope drives furloughs, decreases brand quality control, lowers margins of safety, drives greater unit carbon pollution, and increases air traffic congestion. Allow the history of outsourcing to guide us going forward, or it will continue to repeat itself.

APA should present outsourcing statistics in more meaningful ways than current aircraft seat and max gross operating weights limits. Suggested metrics includes data and charting methods that outline relative percentage and the net number of potential physically outsourced seats, air seat miles, and jobs. These figures should be further equated to Group I and Group II equivalency to demonstrate what could have been. The coming redesign of About APA should include depositories of multimedia, news articles, and white papers concerning Scope. The APA website should further inform membership on the manufacturing and sales trends of ATR, Bombardier, Embraer, and Mitsubishi. APA may also contract industry consultants to identify indirect costs associated with outsourcing. Providing current and archived information regarding degrees of subjects related to outsourcing is proper, and relevant to establishing stronger union social norms derived from informed membership.

We must observe accurate jargon referring to subjects related to Scope to properly frame cognitive bias. The term Scope relaxation should exchanged with negative references such as surrender, loss, demise, or reduction. Regional airlines may best be referred to as outsourced operators, national airlines, or third-party carriers. APA should coin the notion of “Scope recovery.” Legacy airlines once operated 80-seat single class McDonnell Douglas DC-9-10 aircraft with 90,700lb MTOW equivalent to Bombardier CRJ700/900, E175, and MRJ90 aircraft. Any jet aircraft capable of traveling over 1000nm should not be referred to as regional jets. Large regional jets may best be referred to as DC-9 type jets. Small regional aircraft may better be referred to as turbo-prop equivalent jets. APA should redefine Scope psychology with specificity of language that dissociates from failed past policy.

Compromising the Scope of flying done by legacy pilots may cause little if any competitive advantage between legacy carriers once industry Scope reaches equilibrium. Put differently, the entire concept of industry standard Scope may negate the need for further Scope compromise. Management believes that regional aircraft spurs growth, but what is the relative benefit if all legacy airlines do the same? None. APA is unlikely to recover the Scope of mainline flying overnight. How can APA partner with management to implement new industry equilibrium over a series of Collective Bargaining Agreements? Group I orders would be a good starting point. For now, the AAL MTA reflects the most liberal allowance of legacy airline outsourcing creating regional Scope inequity relative to Delta and United. Know that DAL, UAL, and AAL merger synergies demand frequency reductions resultant of airframe up-gauging and hub consolidation. Delta and United mergers triggered CBAs lowering total regional airframes. Similarly, American Eagle ASM should be translated into mainline metal to subsidize coming AAL merger synergy reduction.

Thousands of mainline pilots today were involuntarily furloughed due to outsourcing. Similarly, the majority of legacy new hires were former regional pilots who also carry negative views of third-party airlines. APA leadership should capitalize on the political opportunity presented by large blocks of pilots with negative personal experiences associated with regional airlines. Industries commonly form political action campaigns such as takeflighttomorrow.com. APA may also consider partnering with ALPA, IFALPA, AMFA, CAP, AIBT-AD, IPA, and CAPA to form multimedia driven Scope awareness initiatives. Public perception of such an initiative may be better received without traditional "labor" talking points. More universal methods of discussing regional airlines include flight safety, environmental impact, quality of service rendered, passenger experience perceived, pilot shortage, and traffic congestion. Such initiative expands APA’s sphere of influence within DALPA and UALPA policy.

The Regional Airline Association’s propaganda initiative takeflighttomorrow.com warns of pending pilot shortages but overlooks up-gauging and frequency reduction as solutions. Any regional pilot shortage today reflects overreaching regional airline networks. If legacy staffing remains constant to attrition irrespective of demand then legacy carriers will hire 11,500 pilots during the next eight years. This represents 30% legacy airline attrition; AAL 41%, DAL 31%, UAL 29% respectively. Legacy carriers will hire 19,196 aviators over the next eleven years, which is 49% attrition; AAL 63%, DAL, 61% and UAL 43% respectively. Excluding Southwest, FedEx, UPS, expat, military, and corporate pilots, there are at least 32,730 aviators who may desire legacy airline employment. Individual circumstance may limit Fontrier, JetBlue, and Spirit pilots ability to seek legacy employment. Baby boomers will also exit the nonlegacy pilot workforce during this time, and greatly demonstrate the need for up-gaging regional lift into mainline ASM.

Delta ALPA and United ALPA accomplished regional fleet reductions in their most recent pilot working agreements. American pilots challenge APA leadership to consider how inflation currently threatens the regional airline model. Real inflation remains a constant of indefinite quantitative easing (QE) Federal Reserve policy. World markets dominated by debt and service sectors have little tolerance for absence of currency inflation. Even today financial analysts call for additional QE stimulated GDP growth. We must recognize that continuous inflation puts the very life or death of every regional business model squarely in our hands. Current market forces are an opportunity to reduce a quantity of physically outsourced mainline seats.

In addition to inflation, a convenience of overwhelming small RJ engine overhaul costs impact regional airlines. These charges do not fall solely on third-party airlines and add motivation to shed 50-seat jets. In August, 2012, Michael Boyd said "we think by 2016, virtually every 50-seat jet or smaller will be out of the system . … Those airplanes are getting older and more expensive, and as a result, airlines are culling them out of their fleets.” Boyd's statements reflect AviationWeek’s June, 2012 report that three of every four CRJ100/200 aircraft need CF34-4 engine overhauls within the next three years at projected cost of 1.0 billion dollars.” Similarly, “nearly every [ERJ135/145] Rolls-Royce AE 3007 will need [overhaul] over the same time period, some of them more than once, at a projected cost exceeding $1.4 billion.” “Air Wisconsin Airlines, which operates its CRJ200s for US Airways, is projected to spend $114 million to overhaul 82% of the engines.” “American Eagle Airlines, the second largest ERJ operator, would need to spend $460 million to do the same.” These overhaul costs greatly erode turbo-prop equivalent jet feasibility.

“With more than 13,000 regional airline flights every day, regional airlines operate more than 50 percent of the nation’s commercial schedule,” says raa.org.


Amazingly, industry wide scope trends reflect regional fleet reductions, but no meaningful reduction in net number of physically outsourced seats has occured. Outsourced seats have been consolidated into fewer airframes: “The US regional airline industry is changing ... and now at least 584 small 50 seat RJ’s are on their way out to be replaced by up to 346 larger 76 seat RJ’s coming in (1.7 : 1.0 ratio) and that means the total US regional airline fleet is heading for a 14% [airframe reduction] of around 238 RJ’s.” This means that “55% of [small 50 seat US regional] fleet will be removed leaving only 470 small regional jets in service within the next 3 years... many of them well before their “normal’ commercial retirement age of narrow body commercial jets (21-26 years old), in most cases less than 18 years old. While up to 346 new 76 seat RJ’s will join the US regionals, but aircraft numbers will go from 1,657 today… to around 1,417 with 2.9% less total seating capacity than today.” What added cost(s) can be associated with prematurely retiring aircraft before service date? Legacy airlines ride a knifes edge of CASM operating regional aircraft destined to be made obsolete by inflation and indirectly hidden costs. How does living on the edge of outsourcing lock management into always coming back to the well for more? Will professional pilots one day realize that the well of Scope may one day run dry the moment we outsource our relevancy?

2013 financial statements for the new American Airlines show that the cost of operating regional fleet is higher than the revenue it generates. Fee-per-departure structure may mask true operational numbers as legacy carriers are prematurely retiring small RJ airframes to avoid overwhelming maintenance, and inflation cost. Regional aircraft may be near-term cost control solutions that present indirect and unadvertised long-term charges. APA should investigate how regional aircraft drive need for additional gate space, and personnel. Banking hub schedules and frequency outsourcing further push runway, airport, and airspace capacity constraints. “With more than 13,000 regional airline flights every day, regional airlines operate more than 50 percent of the nation’s commercial schedule,” says raa.org. How many millions of minutes worth of delays are suffered system-wide to accommodate the crowding effect of regional aircraft?

American Airlines may benefit from a total delay impact analysis to understand how regional aircraft bring additional congestion that multiply system-wide staffing, fuel burn, and cancellation costs. What other hidden charges can APA identify in partnership with management to motivate gradual shift away from smaller airframes? Such cost control analysis may best be conducted by reputable aviation consultants whose authority is our best means to partner with management. APA should consider the expense of commissioning expert analysis as opportunity cost to expand membership base through Scope thus driving revenue.

Inflation directly raised regional aircraft CASM beyond 50-seat unit RASM in most markets. Many 76-seat aircraft routes may eventually become unprofitable in ten years. Why has American Airlines not ordered mainline Group I aircraft at this time? Will APA then outsource 99-seat E190 or C-Series airframes? Retired ExpressJet Airlines Vice-President Charlie Tutt stated in 2011, "ExpressJet [airlines] will operate 100-seat jets for Delta and United in ten years." Is APA aware that Republic Airlines has ordered 40 single-class 130-Seat C-Series Bombardier jet aircraft? Has APA determined how Republic will deploy these aircraft? Will JCBA allow Republic to codeshare such aircraft with American? Last week, Bombardier VP Ross Mitch publicly stated that the C-Series airframe is a “transcontinental airframe” which perfectly compliments Republic Airlines business plan. Will we one day outsource A319 flight operations? Where does outsourcing stop?

APA inspired professional aviators with its 1997 Scope position that all regional jets should be operated by mainline pilots, but where is this overt resolve today? USAPA President Gary Hummel exercised similar resolve in a September 2014 letter addressed to APA President Captain Keith Wilson. Where is Captain Wilson’s response to this letter? It is time for APA to reaffirm its position regarding who operates jet aircraft for American Airlines with meaningful action. American management may seek to outsource 81-seat aircraft by way of adding five additional seats to current 76-seat regional airframes. However, APA should consider that this request only be accommodated under circumstances that these 81-seat aircraft are added to American mainline operating certificate. Outsourcing additional physical seats risk current and future mainline Group I and Group II aircraft. Transferring regional lift to mainline may not be difficult if a pilot shortage triggers regional airline failure to meet completion factor performance. Insourcing would need to be accomplished over several CBA negotiations to allow DALPA and UALPA to coordinate insourcing.

How can APA partner with management to remedy an alarming absence of Group I aircraft? Industry experts label single-aisle, 99 to 120-seat class airframes between the size of so-called “regional” planes and Airbus/Boeing as the missing niche fleet of US airline industry. Delta is actively joining AirTran B717s into its fleet. Suprisingly, American Airlines has chosen not to order Group I aircraft. Can American Airlines, as “the best airline in the world,” not compete using it’s own product? The absence of AAL Group I orders suggest new American Airlines favors regional lift over Group I operation. Legacy airlines are maintaining status quo numbers of physically outsourced seats on fewer RJ airframes. This is likely to continue as SkyWest Airlines, Trans States Holdings, Republic Airlines, and American International Group Inc. have hundreds of large regional jet orders booked. However, DC-9 equivalent jet orders by third-party companies should have no bearing on how professional pilot associations conduct business.

The cost of operating 99-seat aircraft from point A to point B is not significantly larger than 76-seat costs between the same two points. In May 2014, American President Scott Kirby outlined similar logic at the Wolfe Research airline investor conference regarding up-gauging Airbus 319 aircraft orders to 321 models. Kirby stated that additional costs of larger airframes are justified by extra seat revenue. Should American Airlines not operate 99-seat Group I aircraft on regional routes to allow for this opportunity? There is a market for lesser capacity regional aircraft, but 99-seat mainline aircraft will become increasingly relevant.

Still, it is ironic that United gorged itself on regional flying to the point that such flying became a financial liability. At one point roughly 63% of UAL departures were once outsourced, which in part hampered United Airlines’ post-merger profitability. UALPA pilots and other labor groups gorged on temporary contract improvements at the cost of thousands of pilot furloughs. APA, as a long-term stakeholder, must partner with management to guard against short-sighted outsourcing trends. We must not repeat United's history. Guard against permanent actions incentivized by short-sighted rewards. Even notable aviation consultants William Swelbar and Michael Boyd believe that mainline pilot unions will not repeat past outsourcing mistakes. We only have two unions left in the country who control this outcome! Have APA and ALPA learned from past outsourcing mistakes?

APA must broaden conversation regarding Scope to include its effect on traffic congestion, environmental impact, flight safety, pilot professional standards, and pilot shortages. Regional aircraft with high flight frequencies cause air traffic delays. How many additional gallons of fuel do regional jets directly and indirectly cause other aircraft to consume in relation to traffic delays? Much of these delays are avoidable if airlines would "ride share" more ASMs on relatively larger mainline aircraft. APA has an environmental responsibility to halt the unforeseen cost of regional air traffic congestion.

"Regional operators" increasingly operate aircraft beyond 800nm. Many regional airlines such as ExpressJet, Skywest, Republic, and Endeavor airlines resemble national air carriers. It may be more environmentally favorable for legacy passenger flows to connect regionally using local hubs. Connecting passengers thru non-local hubs on outsourced airlines beyond 800nm may not be ecological. Outsourcing these longer routes may offer little advantage when ASMs can be shifted through the historical method of regionally connecting traffic. Otherwise, legacy airlines continue unnecessary CASM and carbon emission serving regional airports from multiple hubs with excessive frequency. Shifting regional airport ASMs into consolidated mainline aircraft using less hubs and/or frequency is our industry’s best answer to controlling capacity and costs in an environmentally responsible manner.

Even Russian Premier Vladimir Putin once told the European Union that banning regional aircraft is a meaningful alternative to EU airline carbon tax schemes! Banning these aircraft would open our skies, lower airline carbon emission, and potentially reduce tax liability. Has APA brought before American Airlines the notion of reducing regional airline operations to offset AAL net carbon footprint? Would establishing lower unit carbon output be a valid alternative to paying proposed EU carbon taxes? Has American public relations considered the marketing value of abandoning regional airline environmental footprints? Could the world’s largest airline one day become the world’s greenest airline?

Regional airline accidents such as the February 12, 2009 Colgan Air or August 26th, 2006 Com Air disasters lead many to question relative safety of regional flight operations. While the FAA and RAA tout "one level of safety," one must ask if there is one level of mentorship, apathy, and financial distress among regional and mainline pilots? How does apathy and financial insecurity induced by whipsawing poverty wages, and lower job security generate stress that inhibits professionalism in an environment devoid of stability? Our recognition of how diminished motivation compromises professional competence is relevant to flight safety. We should not compartmentalize the human condition apart from FAA evaluation standards. How do per capita ratios of single engine taxi compliance, failed check rides, or FOQA stick shaker events at outsourced operations compare to mainline operations? We have a social responsibility to understand how these factors cause shortages of pilots no longer willing to accept employment under these conditions. Third-party airlines new hire pilot initial class “no show” rates are at all time highs.

As good stewards concerned with fuel usage, we should further concern ourselves with a lack of turbo-prop utilization. Turbo-prop aircraft are the only true regional airliners. APA may also partner with aircraft manufacturers ATR and Bombardier to stress merits of the truly regional and environmentally “green” turbo-prop. One must concede that regional aircraft make sense on a limited number of regional routes, but third party airlines should not fly distances exceeding 800nm. Turbo-prop aircraft further reduce congestion and emissions by operating in lower altitude regimes under core mainline jet traffic. APA may investigate the merits of reintroducing turbo-props, but any 99-seat turbo-prop model such as ATR's and Bombardier’s latest proposed airframes should be Group I aircraft.

Potential impacts of pending pilot shortages regarding Scope may impact a wide-range of indirectly related subjects. You may know that international pressures lobbied the “Fair Treatment of Experienced Pilots Act” (aka. “Age 65 Law) to allow foreign airline ICAO compliant age 60+ flight crew access to US markets. Could an unresolved pilot shortage potentially lead to relaxed regulations governing foreign pilot entry, foreign ownership, and cabotage? CEOs of major US air carriers act as Airlines for America (Airlines For America |) board members. Contrary to the Regional Airline Association, Airlines for America remains oddly silent regarding pending pilot shortages, but its leadership works in concert to exacerbate a pilot shortage through attempts to further outsource airframes.

Why does the A4A national airline policy initiative nationalairlinepolicy.com call for “more airline frequency?” Further study is needed to understand incentives driving Airlines for America. APA may consider The Hegelian Dialectic also known as the Problem - Reaction - Solution method. Hegelian Dialectic is a means by which corporations may attempt to increase profit through manipulating perception to achieve unpopular goals. These goals become attainable with the creation of perceived, or actual problem(s) management could reasonably anticipate. Management’s creation or allowance of issues relative to pilot staffing may seek to generate overreaching government solution(s) to an otherwise unachievable result. Could a pilot shortage be used to alter FAR 117, or pilot qualification standards? Will foreign airlines and investors lobby a pilot shortage as an opportunity for expanded Cabotage?

Regarding aircraft orders, is American Airlines avoiding C-Series, MRJ, and E195 orders to underscore the importance of an 81-seat scope request? Has APA verified the timeline of order backlogs for B717 type aircraft in production today? How has Republic Airways managed to secure such C300 Series aircraft and not American Airlines? How have regional airlines managed to secure e170/175 orders similar to e190/195 aircraft? Do not accept Problem - Reaction - Solution fear tactics during contract negotiations where management may indicate that JCBA ratification of 81-Seat outsourcing is the only "solution." APA should preemptively identify American’s business needs to head off such tactics. Solutions could involve American Airlines leasing C300 Series Bombardier aircraft from Republic Airways for mainline operation.


“You never let a serious crisis go to waste. And what I mean by that [is] it's an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before,” says Rahm Emanuel. What unachievable solutions can Airlines for America realize through exploiting a pilot shortage and avoiding Group I aircraft orders? Similarly, what can APA do to prepare alternate solutions that may better serve our passengers, environment, and air transportation system? Professional labor unions have more consolidated influence than ever before. Pilot unions as a whole can partner with management to enforce artificial limits similar to existing airline regulation. Artificially limiting outsourcing may bring meaningful opportunity for management to partner with ALPA and APA. Now is the time to fashion holistic mechanisms of influence beyond traditional boundaries. APA and ALPA may best position for international consolidation and cabotage by expanding span of control thru improving the Scope of flying performed by its membership. I challenge APA to partner with American management and transform our air transportation system using never before tried campaigns outside of current paradigm.

A notable and growing percentage of APA members are former regional pilots who are acutely aware that surrendering Scope today weakens our profession tomorrow. Industry standard frequency based competition establishes no relative legacy airline advantage. Net reduction of regional lift is a near-term solution to looming pilot shortages. APA must reaffirm its 1997 position that all regional jets are to be flown by mainline pilots through meaningful action. We must educate membership to observe how inflation and pilot shortages are key methods of control over regional airline industry. Failure to realize this opportunity to protect the Scope of flying performed by mainline pilots may expose current APA leadership. Performance in this regard is a moral obligation. A labor force that empowers membership reduces apathy and enjoys greater unity.

The 1970’s brought regional airlines flying twenty seat turboprop aircraft, but now regional airlines threaten to envelope modern day DC-9 variants. Regional airlines and code-sharing directly threaten the longevity of mainline operations. APA must not accept nor propose any "eleventh hour" JCBA Section 1 Concession(s) Scope, code sharing, or joint business agreement . Preserve the relevancy of professional pilot unions for future generations.

Too many generations of pilots have suffered furlough brought by outsourcing. No pilot demographic has suffered more than furloughed mainline pilots victimized by Scope reductions. “If each pilot makes his or her union decisions based on what’s best for the group [as well as] profession instead of self-interest, we will succeed." I believe we can leave this industry better than we found it. Thank you so much for your consideration.

Respectfully,
*redacted*
*redacted*
*redacted*
*redacted*


A Picture of Outsourcing:
425 US Airways East & West post2005 hires were asked to namethe longest routes they had ever flown for so-called regional airlines—these were their answers:

[attachment=1]map.gif[/attachment]

ATL-GGT, ATL-TUS, ATL-GJT, ATL-MTJ, ATL-ELP, ATL-SXM, ORD-NAS, ORD-GEG, ORD-YYC, IAH-NAS, IAH-ROC, ATL-YHZ, ATL-TUS, ATL-STX, ATL-KIN, ATL-ASE, EWR-OMA, EWR-OKC, EWR-YYT, EWR-MSP, DEN-YEG, DEN-MKE, DEN-PIT, DEN-ATL, DEN-MLI, DEN-CMH, DTW-MTY, IAD-COS, JFK-SAT, JFK-AUS, SFO-AUS, SFO-SAT, IAH-ISN, IAH-RSW, KIAH-YYZ, KIAH-YUL, IAH-PSP, IAH-BFL, IAH-BOI, IAH-YEG, IAH-SFO, IAH-ACY, IAH-YYZ, LAX-XNA, KLGA-KXNA, KLGA-KDFW, KLGA-KIAH, KLGA-KOMA, KLGA-KMCI, MEM-DEN, MEM-PHX, MIA-CMH, MIA-PIT, MIA-CLE, MIA-IND, MIA-STX, MSP-LAX, MSP-LAX, ORD-YQR, ORD-ASE, ORD-COS, ORD-LAX, ORD-YHZ, PHL-IAH, SLC-YUL

From To Distance
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) GGT (23°33'45"N 75°52'39"W) 866 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) TUS (32°06'58"N 110°56'28"W) 1541 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) GJT (39°07'21"N 108°31'36"W) 1391 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) MTJ (38°30'35"N 107°53'39"W) 1352 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) ELP (31°48'26"N 106°22'35"W) 1282 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) SXM (18°02'27"N 63°06'32"W) 1701 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) NAS (25°02'20"N 77°27'58"W) 1312 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) GEG (47°37'09"N 117°32'07"W) 1498 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) YYC (51°06'50"N 114°01'13"W) 1385 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) NAS (25°02'20"N 77°27'58"W) 1148 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) ROC (43°07'09"N 77°40'19"W) 1331 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) YHZ (44°52'51"N 63°30'31"W) 1357 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) TUS (32°06'58"N 110°56'28"W) 1541 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) STX (17°42'06"N 64°48'06"W) 1638 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) KIN (17°56'08"N 76°47'15"W) 1180 mi
ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) ASE (39°13'19"N 106°52'06"W) 1304 mi
EWR (40°41'33"N 74°10'07"W) OMA (41°18'11"N 95°53'39"W) 1134 mi
EWR (40°41'33"N 74°10'07"W) OKC (35°23'35"N 97°36'03"W) 1325 mi
EWR (40°41'33"N 74°10'07"W) YYT (47°37'07"N 52°45'07"W) 1162 mi
EWR (40°41'33"N 74°10'07"W) MSP (44°52'55"N 93°13'18"W) 1008 mi
DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) YEG (53°18'35"N 113°34'47"W) 1019 mi
DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) MKE (42°56'49"N 87°53'49"W) 896 mi
DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) PIT (40°29'29"N 80°13'58"W) 1290 mi
DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) ATL (33°38'12"N 84°25'40"W) 1199 mi
DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) MLI (41°26'54"N 90°30'27"W) 752 mi
DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) CMH (39°59'49"N 82°53'32"W) 1154 mi
DTW (42°12'45"N 83°21'12"W) MTY (25°46'43"N 100°06'25"W) 1480 mi
IAD (38°56'51"N 77°27'36"W) COS (38°48'21"N 104°42'03"W) 1463 mi
JFK (40°38'23"N 73°46'44"W) SAT (29°32'02"N 98°28'09"W) 1587 mi
JFK (40°38'23"N 73°46'44"W) AUS (30°11'40"N 97°40'12"W) 1521 mi
SFO (37°37'08"N 122°22'32"W) AUS (30°11'40"N 97°40'12"W) 1504 mi
SFO (37°37'08"N 122°22'32"W) SAT (29°32'02"N 98°28'09"W) 1482 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) ISN (48°10'41"N 103°38'32"W) 1330 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) RSW (26°32'10"N 81°45'19"W) 861 mi
KIAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) YYZ (43°40'38"N 79°37'50"W) 1280 mi
KIAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) YUL (45°28'14"N 73°44'27"W) 1584 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) PSP (33°49'47"N 116°30'24"W) 1269 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) BFL (35°26'02"N 119°03'28"W) 1428 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) BOI (43°33'52"N 116°13'22"W) 1482 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) YEG (53°18'35"N 113°34'47"W) 1854 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) SFO (37°37'08"N 122°22'32"W) 1635 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) ACY (39°27'27"N 74°34'38"W) 1345 mi
IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) YYZ (43°40'38"N 79°37'50"W) 1280 mi
LAX (33°56'33"N 118°24'29"W) XNA (36°16'54"N 94°18'28"W) 1371 mi
KLGA (40°46'38"N 73°52'21"W) KXNA (36°16'54"N 94°18'28"W) 1147 mi
KLGA (40°46'38"N 73°52'21"W) KDFW (32°53'50"N 97°02'16"W) 1389 mi
KLGA (40°46'38"N 73°52'21"W) KIAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) 1416 mi
KLGA (40°46'38"N 73°52'21"W) KOMA (41°18'11"N 95°53'39"W) 1148 mi
KLGA (40°46'38"N 73°52'21"W) KMCI (39°17'51"N 94°42'50"W) 1107 mi
MEM (35°02'33"N 89°58'36"W) DEN (39°51'42"N 104°40'23"W) 872 mi
MEM (35°02'33"N 89°58'36"W) PHX (33°26'03"N 112°00'42"W) 1264 mi
MIA (25°47'43"N 80°17'24"W) CMH (39°59'49"N 82°53'32"W) 990 mi
MIA (25°47'43"N 80°17'24"W) PIT (40°29'29"N 80°13'58"W) 1013 mi
MIA (25°47'43"N 80°17'24"W) CLE (41°24'34"N 81°51'17"W) 1080 mi
MIA (25°47'43"N 80°17'24"W) IND (39°43'02"N 86°17'41"W) 1020 mi
MIA (25°47'43"N 80°17'24"W) STX (17°42'06"N 64°48'06"W) 1139 mi
MSP (44°52'55"N 93°13'18"W) LAX (33°56'33"N 118°24'29"W) 1535 mi
MSP (44°52'55"N 93°13'18"W) LAX (33°56'33"N 118°24'29"W) 1535 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) YQR (50°25'55"N 104°39'57"W) 990 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) ASE (39°13'19"N 106°52'06"W) 1013 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) COS (38°48'21"N 104°42'03"W) 911 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) LAX (33°56'33"N 118°24'29"W) 1744 mi
ORD (41°58'46"N 87°54'27"W) YHZ (44°52'51"N 63°30'31"W) 1239 mi
PHL (39°52'20"N 75°14'27"W) IAH (29°59'04"N 95°20'29"W) 1325 mi
SLC (40°47'18"N 111°58'40"W) YUL (45°28'14"N 73°44'27"W) 1941 mi
Total: 84344 mi

Great job R!

Awesome!!!!!!

We need some Eaglefly analysis to weighin on this.

This should be made sticky in the major and regional forums

That is an awesome letter. Thank you for posting it.

I'm waiting for a transcon to read that. Way too long.

Yes, agree with the above posts! I truly do appreciate the leadership and concern I have seen from the APA in taking back scope, and fighting for this profession!