A321

I was at the DFW roadshow meeting that John Darrah spoke at and thought John had some very valid questions and made some very good points. Most at the meeting thought that so far he provided the best overall view of what the process and the agreement entailed. I had the opportunity to talk with him after the meeting to try to clarify and understand exactly what he said. I was going to post my summation of his statements but realized I would not be able to accurately articulate his points.
I phoned John to ask if he would write a summation for me to post. He said he has been receiving numerous texts, emails and phone calls asking for his opinion and for him to either write something or make a video explaining his points. He said he was not interested in getting involved in this contract debate and contrary to what is being stated by some, he has not expressed how he will ultimately vote. He said he would continue to gather information and on the 30th of January make the most informed de- cision he could. He hopes others will as well.
I then asked him if he would be willing to at least explain again to me his questions and points he raised at the meeting. He said his intent at the meeting was merely to be- come better informed, not to influence the decision of others one way or another. He said that given the number of inquiries he is receiving, and his present inability to re- spond to all of them, that he would agree to clarify his points with me as long as I stressed the point he is not saying how anyone should vote (yes or no). That’s their choice. He simply believes that everyone should gather all the information they can from the APA, the Company and others before they make their yes/no decision.
Trying to articulate John’s points in writing is no easy task. To accurately capture his questions and points requires a lot of explanation. Understanding that many don’t have the appetite to read a long dialogue I will start by summarizing John’s questions and points raised at the meeting.
1. People and Process
John wanted to know from the APA representatives present what if any of the alleged statements that were attributed to Mr. Parker in 2012 were true? Were statements ever made that if APA supported him that when the time came and AAL was profitable like its competitors, DAL and UAL, that he would provide us DAL and UAL pilot pay rates?
It’s no secret that for years Mr. Parker has been telling USAirway’s pilots that they could only receive AMR, DAL and UAL pay if they worked for an airline that produced revenues and profits like they did. Now they are.
So, are we having to give up items (Duration, excise tax, etc.) to get something that was already a gentlemen’s agreement?
He has noticed some very deliberate and well thought out sound bites used by management in the Crew News’ that appear to be overtly biased to sway the pi- lots’ view of this process and this agreement.
He then raised questions about the purpose of Mr. Kirby’s email and the retrac- tion 48 hours later?
2. Duration
He wondered where the extended duration came from? What was the quid for extending our contract by a year? Was it a requirement to get the pay rates? He doesn’t see any other reason than management made a grab for an extra year, unless someone could explain otherwise. Some have expressed that we will get another 3% pay raise, but in return the pilots have to wait another year for Profit Sharing, Calendar Day, LTD, etc. What was the thought process and reasoning behind the one-year extension?
3. Work Rules and Benefits
When looking at Work Rules and Benefits it appears there was no overall
value created for the pilots. There were changes, but looking at the APA valuations it appears it was just the moving of the deck chairs. Unfortunately, some of the most important chairs were not changed, Calendar Day,
LTD, Life Insurance, A321 pay, etc. If you were to include the
value of profitability for HBT, one could argue the Company received more value than the APA received with respect to valuations?
Additionally, the items in the proposed agreement come with uncertainty.
No one can guarantee the limits of our monetary exposure, both in the short- term and the long-term with the excise tax letter. Uncertainty also appears to exist with the creation of the International/Domestic fences, Short Call Reserve Report and the treatment of Vacancy bids.
4. Pay
Pay is obviously the most important issue given the amounts. Many pilots aren’t even looking past them. Under the Company proposal we know what the pay rates will be. The rates shown are the ceiling, with no mechanism to raise them any higher regardless what occurs with the DAL pilots this year.
And, they come attached with the items above.
MTA pay rates are the floor. Based on the mechanism in the MTA they can only go higher. Unlike the Company proposed pay rates, there is no way to definitive- ly define what they will be. We only know they can’t go lower than the rates in the MTA and they do not come conditional with the items above.
Moving forward with a ratified contract, what are our options? Moving forward with a rejected contract, what are our options?
That is a summarization of John’s questions and points, but that in no way does justice to what everyone believed were very valid questions and comments at the meeting.
At the meeting John started by saying that he had spoken with his wife about the agreement, because like most, he thinks this is a very difficult decision. He had said he had never sat down with his wife before to get her perspective or feedback on trying to make a decision about an agreement. He said after he was done explaining the situa- tion his wife’s response was, “that it was obvious that management has been very suc- cessful at confusing the pilots”. He said that he was very surprised by her response, but in thinking about it, she was correct.
He mentioned to just look at the issue of profit sharing. Management over time has very successfully managed pilots expectations that they should not expect profit shar- ing. Mr. Parker explained in one of the Crew News’, no one should be paid based purely on profitability, especially if items like lower fuel prices would result in individuals get- ting profit sharing (variable pay) based on issues outside of their control. Ironically, Mr. Parker is set to receive a 200% bonus (variable pay) based on AAL making a $2.5 billion operating profit in 2014.
John then went on to explain how he is trying to make his decision and listed some facts and some possible scenarios to which he asked the APA leadership to comment on where his conclusions might be incorrect.
He stated he has been watching the actions and statements of those involved, both at APA and in management, but particularly Mr. Parker and Mr. Kirby since he has had no previous experience with them.
He asked if anyone could comment about Mr. Parker’s alleged comments in 2012 when he was courting the APA for their support of him as the CEO of AAL. It has been al- leged he stated if APA supported him that when the time came he would pay the pilots of APA like DAL pilots.
Neither Tom nor Josey, the DFW domicile representatives, where on the Board then and at the time John asked the question no one in the room at the DFW domicile meeting was present at that meeting in 2012. He went on to describe what he had been told and we have all heard over time. Mr. Parker had been alleged to have said that if the APA would support him, though he could not put it into writing, that if the time came where AAL made DAL revenues and profits that the pilots of AAL should make DAL pay. To John’s knowledge no one present at that meeting has denied that was said, or at least some version of it. But even if it was never said, what Mr. Parker has been very public about over the years with US Airways pilots is that he could not pay them like AMR, DAL or UAL pilots until they had the structure, revenues and profits like they did.
What John asked of the APA reps was, it appears APA leadership did what they said they would do. They supported Mr. Parker and worked collaboratively with him to oust Mr. Horton. Why is it now that if the comments were true, that APA is being asked to fund these pay raises with a contract extension, work rules changes and last minute items like the excise tax issue? It appeared the APA representatives had no explanation.
He then went on to say that he had watched the Crew News’ in an effort to try to learn as much as he could. He said that Mr. Parker and Mr. Kirby appeared to be much more affable then our past executives, but he also noticed the inclusion of some very well de- signed and placed sound bites.
He gave a couple of examples of where Mr. Parker in an earlier Crew News gave an example of what kind of pay raise he was offering. This was for the original proposal and I believe he said Mr. Parker said that pilots would be receiving a 15% pay raise. He didn’t think that number was correct so he checked them and discovered Group II was 15%, but Group III and IV was 13%. He thought it was interesting that he would ran- domly choose the one figure that illustrated the large raise, but realizing Mr. Parker’s intentions John didn’t think much more about it.
Last week Mr. Parker had a Crew News in CLT and in that video he said that the DAL pilots would have to receive a 22% pay raise for the AAL pilots to receive the same pay raise he was offering (APA puts the figure at 19%). John said he didn’t think that was accurate, that it seemed high so he went and checked the figures. He determined that Group I would need a 8% raise, Group II a 18.5% raise and Group IV a 17.5%. Group III did need a 22% raise to match DAL. John said he now understood these figures be- ing used by Mr. Parker were no coincidence, he felt Mr. Parker’s statements and exam- ples in the Crew News’ were a deliberate and direct attempt to persuade pilots by using the most biased numbers to support his statements knowing that most pilots would not take the time to gather the facts.
He found it interesting that in the earlier video Mr. Parker used Group II as an example and in the latest example he used Group III. Even more interesting, Mr. Parker used the aircraft group in the latest Crew News that will not even have any aircraft left on the property by the end of the proposed agreement.
He then briefly addressed Mr. Kirby’s emails and thought it was a mistake for him to send them.
Most pilots read the first email as an ultimatum. Secondly, Mr. Kirby stated that the APA and management had an understanding that the agreement would be voted on by the 19th of January and more importantly it wouldn’t be fair to the other employee groups to change that date. Thirdly, Mr. Kirby stated he couldn’t give the APA pilots a 5:15 cal- endar day because it was the equivalent of a 3% pay raise. In other words, the pilots of APA are not just 15% behind DAL pilots in profit sharing they are 3% more behind in pay due to duty rigs.
Then 48 hours later Mr. Kirby retracted his previous position and said they would agree to allow the pilots to vote on the 30th.
John thought it was interesting that an executive would publicly state he couldn’t do something for his beliefs on fairness to the other employee groups and then 48 hours later totally disregard those beliefs.
Based on management’s actions he does not believe they want to head to arbitration. He is not suggesting that management will not go to arbitration, just that once arbitra- tion is done there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty for them. Neither party should want to, but both parties must measure their risks of doing so. He believes there are risks for both, risks on either side that most have not thought through.
He then discussed duration. Why is it there? No one from APA had a good explanation. He believes management has figured out given the money being presented, the pilots will look past a one-year extension. If they had tried for two years it may have been a deal breaker, but they figured they could get away with asking for one year.
He then discussed the change in duration and how it affects negotiations. Under or current MTA we begin negotiations in one year and eleven months. Under the proposed agreement we begin negotiations in three years and eleven months. The start of negotiations has therefore been moved by two years.
In my discussion with John he said one item he has heard being stated is that the pilots of DAL have been able to increase their contracts by agreeing to deals and moving for- ward each contract cycle. He agreed with that philosophy, but the difference between what the pilots of DAL did and what we are doing is the DAL agreements have been two to four years in length whereas ours have been much longer. In our case, it’s five years and if we agree to the Company’s proposal it will be seven in total. In comparison DAL pilots have had new contracts in 2006, 2008, 2012 and begin negotiations for another new contract to be in place by 2016. He mentioned that the DAL pilots’ contract is up next year and management at DAL has already stated they expect to have a con- tract concluded this year. In 2012 they concluded a contract seven months before their amendable date. In the last ten years the DAL pilots will have had four agreements. It seems much easier to get continued improvements with shorter duration contracts.
He concluded his discussion on duration by stating that, given his understanding of why it was extended, the total length of the contract and the effect on pushing negotiations back by two years he stated he could not see voting for the agreement based purely on the aspect of duration.
No one from the APA leadership offered a differing view. The next item he discussed was work rules.
He said to look at APA’s valuations for the years left in our current agreement, 2015-2018. He said it was not a fair comparison to use 2019 as that was after the end of our current agreement and our follow-on agreement may provide more value than what we are being offered in this agreement for 2019.
Based on the years 2015-2018, looking at the value received for line pilots (excluding check airmen for a moment) line pilots receive $53 million in value for those years for LOS, 5:10 daily average, Mexico flying, etc. The Company receives $58 million in value over this same period just for Int/Dom fence. This one provision for the Company pays for all the line pilots work rule changes. Additionally, the APA did an analysis of HBT to see the potential value. In completion factor alone the Company may realize $10 mil- lion in profit. The new routes may potentially add an additional $57 million in annual profit. HBT may add a total of $67 million in annual profit. This profit potential more than offsets any additional costs created by the check airman proposal.
So for years 2015-2018, at best, APA appears to have received neutral value. However, one could argue the Company may recognize nearly $50 million in additional annual profit after paying for all proposed APA enhancements and after all the items are im- plemented.
He then said that looking at 2019, after all items were fully implemented the line pilots would be receiving approximately $11 million in additional annual work rules enhancements and the Company would be receiving $26 million additional value in Int/Dom alone. The Company would be making $15 million more a year the last year of the agreement and for every year thereafter until those items are changed.
In the last year of the agreement, 2019, the check airmen agreement would bring $23 million in value to APA pilots. HBT now being fully implemented would have the potential to provide nearly $67 million in additional annual profit for the Company. The HBT profit would easily offset the $8 million gap left between the $23 million check airman provision and the $15 million leftover value of Int/Dom fence illustrated above.
One item John did not discuss at the meeting, but was widely debated, particularly by Tom Westbrook, was the implication of the excise tax provision. The letter as written has no limit on the value of exposure since no one knows what the new rules will look like. Based on what Tom was saying the effects of this one item could potentially over time wipe out any value the pilots receive in retroactivity or even the higher pay rates received for 2015 if we were to agree to this agreement.
The excise tax exposure is not quantifiable – by anyone. APA is being asked to sign a blank check.
John concluded his discussion on work rules by saying that given what he is seeing in the valuations and acknowledging there are some other beneficial low cost items for the pilots he does not see how you would conclude to vote for the agreement based solely on work rules.
No one in the APA leadership present at the DFW roadshow appeared to disagree with his analysis.
With pay most pilots are comparing the pay rates in the Company offer as compared to the MTA. What he said most pilots don’t acknowledge or maybe even don’t realize is that the Company pay proposal is the ceiling. There is no mechanism to have them go any higher. The MTA pay rates are the floor. Under the MTA based on current DAL and UAL pay rates, at a minimum APA pilots will receive a 14.3% pay raise in about eleven months.
John acknowledged that the Company proposed pay rates, as initially compared to the MTA pay rates, are eye watering. However, what no one appears to be calculating is given that the MTA rates are the floor, what’s the ceiling? What’s the risk of getting there and what’s the cost in the rest of the contract to accept the Company proposed pay rates?
He stated that if we ratify the Company proposal we can see in black and white what our pay rates will be. We also know our contract will be extended by a year, at best we get equal value for our work rule exchanges and will get no changes to important items like Calendar Day, LTD, Insurance, etc. In addition, you will have agreed to an item which no one understands the implications of - excise tax.
If the agreement is rejected, we will receive a minimum 14.3% pay raise in January 2016. Our agreement will be one year shorter and negotiations begin two years earlier. Based on comments by APA’s legal counsel and Mr. Parker’s comments on Crew News, neither expects arbitration to result in work rule changes. Additionally, there will be no excise tax exposure moving forward as restricted by our current agreement.
So the million-dollar question of everyone, is what’s next? John stated
no one can accurately predict what will happen. There are only possibilities. What he acknowledged is that if the agreement is rejected you will get a 14.3% pay raise, nego- tiate earlier, and have the ability to negotiate moving forward IF the Company wants any of their items.
What he then described were possibilities. Everyone is free to come up with their own examples or own reason why his or others examples will or will not work, but after lis- tening to John most in the room agreed it was possible. (Doesn’t mean it will happen).
John said once arbitration is done if there are to be any changes to work rules the union and Company must meet to negotiate those changes. Realizing if the Company seeks no changes our current contract remains intact. What John pointed out was that, for the first time since 1991, our negotiating committee will be at the table negotiating without a backstop threat, a 1998-PEB, a 2003-potential BK, a 2012-BK or the 2015-Arbitration. He stated that after arbitration the negotiating committee would then be ne- gotiating on a level playing field without any post-negotiation threats. This will allow
the union to negotiate for those items it believes are important, not just the items the Company is willing to exchange with APA.

A321

PART 2:

He then asked the audience once arbitration is done, who is responsible for your pay rates? Mr. Parker? Mr. Kirby? The APA BOD? John’s answer = Mr. Anderson at DAL and Mr. Smisek at UAL will be in charge of AAL’s pilot pay rates. John said that as he has worked through this process he understands that it not only makes sense that Mr. Park- er and Mr. Kirby want an agreement for the obvious reasons, but if he were Mr. Parker and Mr. Kirby, he would not want Mr. Anderson in control of his pilots’ contract. Espe- cially given Mr. Anderson’s recent history of interfering with Mr. Parker’s labor contracts.
At the end of last year the APFA concluded an agreement with the Company. The APFA was telling their membership that the AAL flight attendants now made more than the DAL FAs by 3%. Literally in the middle of the APFA board discussing their new propos- al, DAL announced a 4% pay raise for their FAs. The APFA FA’s hadn’t even voted on their agreement and they already lagged the DAL FA’s by 1%. The President of APFA had to go back across the street and get Mr. Parker to pay more money to get the APFA to accept the deal and send it to their membership.
Was that a mere coincidence that Mr. Anderson gave the DAL FA’s a 4% pay raise in the middle of the APFA agreement vote? Or was it a smart business decision if he was go- ing to give his FA’s a raise at some point anyway? By doing it when he did he just drove up his competitors costs to keep its costs in line with his.
He then said that just recently the Vice President of Flight at DAL has already sent a widely published letter to their pilots stating that they intended to conclude a pilot agreement this year. Was that message meant for the DAL pilots? AAL pilots? Possibly both?
In 2012 the DAL pilots concluded an agreement 7 months early.
Given that the MTA pay raises of 14.3% are the floor, what’s the ceiling? No one knows, but everyone can agree there is some reasonable limit.
So what’s a hypothetical scenario? Mr. Anderson already gave all his other employee groups a 4% pay raise. Is it reasonable to think that the pilots will receive at least the same? But given the cost differential between DAL and AAL pilot costs under the MTA, how can Mr. Anderson afford to give the pilots any more? That’s the quandary the DAL pilots and Mr. Anderson face. They cannot accept a long-term cost disadvantage against their competitors, especially AAL.
So how does Mr. Anderson address the cost disparity with AA? Either his pilot costs need to come down or the AAL pilot costs need to come up. Mr. Anderson would need to approach the DALPA group and let them know he needs to remain competitive with AAL pilot costs. Based on current profit sharing forecast of at least 15% at DAL, and DAL and AAL pay rates being the same in 2016 under the MTA Mr. Anderson would need the DAL pilots to agree to get rid of profit sharing, take pay cuts, or take work rule
concessions or a combination of all three. Or, he would need the DAL pilots to agree to work with him to help drive up pilot costs at AAL to decrease his 15% pilot cost dispari- ty.
John made one point here, he sees DAL as the new SWA. Labor and management understand they need to work together to succeed. The pilot group understands they need to figure out how to work with their CEO to succeed, but the most important part of that equation is that their CEO seems to understand he must work with his labor groups for DAL to succeed.
In 2016 under the MTA, AAL and DAL rates will be the same; DAL pilots are slated to receive at least a 15% profit sharing payout for the foreseeable future. So disregarding work rules, the DAL pilot contract in 2016, based on our current MTA, will cost Mr. An-derson at least 15% more than the AAL contract in 2016.
This gap is not sustainable and the DAL pilots will understand that one way or another. So what can the DAL pilots do?
What John explained as an example (it is purely hypothetical, that anyone could come up with other options and stated it doesn’t mean it will occur) is that Mr. Anderson and DALPA could agree that the DAL pilots would get a 4% pay raise like all the other em- ployees. He would then offer them 15% for their profit sharing and since the AAL pilots had a 16% 401K contribution and DAL pilots had a 15% 401K contribution he would offer the DAL pilots another 1% for a total of a 20% pay raise. For those DAL pilots who would state that they were expecting to get a 20% profit sharing check for 2016, there is no argument they are getting paid in full.
As for DAL management they could explain to their shareholders that the DAL pilots were expecting a 15% plus profit sharing check in 2016. That they intended to give the DAL pilots a 4% pay raise like the other groups so the 20% pay raise at worst cost the shareholders 1% and if DAL has a good financial year that would have paid more than a 15% profit sharing check then the deal with the pilots cost the shareholders potentially nothing.
This could be a win-win for DAL pilots and management. But how would it affect the AAL pilots? A 20% pay raise by the DAL pilots would raise the MTA rates above the proposed rates by the company. In addition the MTA would provide pay raises of 3.5% in 2017 and 2018 instead of the 3% being proposed by the Company. Beginning in 2016, in this scenario, the pilots at AAL would make more each year under the MTA then under the proposed agreement.
But how would that solve Mr. Anderson’s cost disparity? In the first year of the agree- ment (2016) the pay disparity between AAL and DAL between different aircraft would be between 5 to 11%. In the aggregate it would be somewhere around 8%. So Mr. Anderson would be able to close his pay disparity from 15% to around 8%, the DAL pi- lots would receive 20% in fixed pay rates instead of 15 to 20% in potential profit shar-
ing. The pilots at AAL would have higher pay rates than what is being proposed by the Company. A potential win for all.
On the first anniversary (2017), Mr. Anderson could then give the DAL pilots 3% of their profit sharing back based on the last (12-15%) of profit sharing payout and no pay raises. The AAL pilots would receive their 3.5% pay raise scheduled in their MTA.
The cost difference would then consist of fixed pay rate differences of 4.5% (the origi- nal 8% disparity minus the AAL 3.5% pay raise) and 3% of profit sharing payout poten- tial for a total disparity of 7.5% in year two.
On the second anniversary (2018), the DAL pilots would receive another 3% profit shar- ing based on the last 6% (9 -15%) and the AAL pilots would receive their MTA pay raise of 3.5% in their final year. The pay disparity in the final year of the MTA would be 1% higher pay rates for DAL and 6% profit sharing.
Mr. Anderson could then explain to his shareholders he is paying his pilots 1% higher pay rates than AAL pilots for the difference in the 16% vs 15% 401K contribution and the 6% profit sharing is his way of sharing with his employees the successes of the Company.
At the end of the MTA, DAL pilot cost disparity would have dropped from 15% to 7%. The DAL pilots would make 20% more in fixed rates than they did two years earlier and they would have received 6% of their 15% profit sharing potential back. DAL’s com- petitors pilot contract, AAL, would be in negotiations one year earlier, which would likely result in further closure of his cost disparity.
The AAL pilots would make more under the MTA than under the Company proposal in years 2016 until the amendable date, have a contract that is one year shorter, begin negotiations two years earlier, have the ability to have its negotiating committee negoti- ate the enhancements it chooses and not have the potential liability of the excise tax when it is enacted.
The question everyone must answer is, if Mr. Anderson is in charge of AAL pilot costs will he not do anything and leave his Company at a competitive disadvantage? Does he have a responsibility to his shareholders to keep his company competitive? Do his past actions lead you to believe he will do something or that he won’t?
John finished up by discussing risks. He wasn’t implying that his scenario would happen or any other scenario that anyone else came up with would happen. No one can pre- dict with any accuracy what will happen. All decisions involve risk.
He gave examples of Orville and Wilbur Wright, Henry Ford, Steve Jobs and Fred Smith of Fedex. Every one of them took risks to succeed. But for every person who took risks and succeeded there is at least one who failed. Each pilot must determine what
are the risks and what are the rewards of this agreement. Each pilot must also deter- mine what his or her tolerance for risk is?
Voting yes on this agreement has risks. What’s the lost value of extending the contract by a year when you could have negotiated profit sharing a year earlier or improved work rules a year earlier? What’s the risk of the excise tax that has no limitations?
Voting no on this agreement has risks. What are the risks of not getting similar pay rates to the proposed agreement? What are the risks of not getting equivalency in val- ue in the earlier year of the next negotiations to offset the value we would receive in the 2015 proposed pay rates?
Until last week, that appeared to be the only two options. In his Crew News last week in CLT, Mr. Parker stated if the pilots were to reject the agreement and they went to ar- bitration that after arbitration if the pilots decided they wanted the proposal the Com- pany had offered them, he would offer the pilots the same deal he offered the FA’s. The APA could then agree to accept the same deal, but the pay would not be retroac- tive and it would not start until the deal was ratified.
At anytime, the APA could agree to the agreement that is being offered. The risk of re- jecting the contract would then be the loss of monthly pay until the agreement was rati- fied. In the meantime if DAL ratifies an agreement you would be able to determine its effect on our contract.
Each pilot must determine what his or her level of risk is and if they believe Mr. Ander- son and DALPA will come to an agreement during 2015.
John spoke in a very neutral manner at the meeting. I felt that he was being completely unbiased and that he was trying to get a better understanding of the agreement and our options. After hearing him speak most felt that he understood the options of the proposal better than anyone in the room.
John raised many questions that most have/had not thought of. He raised points many were not aware of. I believe that his questions and comments will help everyone to think through this decision differently and in a way that should help everyone reach a much more informed decision, regardless of their ultimate vote.
Here was my personal takeaway about John’s comments; If you vote yes for the agreement:
1. You get the pay rates being proposed by the Company and there is no mecha- nism for them to go any higher beyond the annual pay raises.
2. You get the additional pay increases in 2015.
3. You get some work rule changes, but based on APA’s analysis
the total value to APA is at best cost neutral.
4. The contract is extended by a year.
5. Contract negotiations are delayed by two years to start three years and eleven
months from now.
6. The excise tax agreement becomes part of the contract.
If you vote no on the agreement:
1. You get a minimum 14.3% pay raise in 2016 and there is a mechanism to in- crease rates further based on DAL and UAL pay rates.
2. No further pay increases in 2015.
3. No work rules changes. Any changes will have to be negotiated with APA.
4. The contract is one year shorter than the Company proposal.
5. Contract negotiations begin in one year and eleven months
6. There is no excise tax exposure.

eaglefly

Excellent review. One point everyone should be able to agree upon whether they vote no or yes, is that Doug Parker is a manipulator. He embraces manipulative tactics and hires union-busters to spearhead his relationship with his front-line employees. He feigns caring about them, but in reality seeks to dominate them, therefore is untrustworthy. In consideration of this, one simply has to assume he will never change and therefore SOME risk is necessary to have the ability to combat his treatment and tactics in the future to secure reasonable boundaries for fair treatment for without that ability.......there is no future.

Doug Parker said his primary goal of realizing an excellent future was resetting labor relations at AA. He has indeed done that, but not for the better, but for the worse. In that, there is no question.

GrapeNuts

Great post. Very well said.

Skubajet

Why would DP offer the original deal even if we vote no after we go to arbitration? Improve relations with the pilot group? If he wanted that, he would give us min cal day. Doesn't make much sense to me.

eaglefly

My belief is that should this be voted down, Parker will not reengage with APA for negotiations prior to arbitration. In fact, I prefer NOT to negotiate at that point. I would rather complete arbitration and maintain the present Green Book and proceed forward gaining our large raises in 2016 and ride the coat tails of Delta pilots, whatever that may offer. There is an outside chance the arbitrators could offer mediation during the hearing phase though and Parker might accept that believing a slightly sweeter offer would get him home.

Apparently, Parker has a different idea then the employees what good labor relations are and he believes he can get his "wants" by paying what HE wants to pay. What he doesn't want and what the BOD doesn't want is labor uncertainty going forward and just after the time we get squared away with near Delta rates in 2016 and what's left of the Green Book intact, we'll be in a better place to sit down and talk turkey instead of being in our present knee-knocking position of fear or glassy-eyed stare of quick (but tainted) ca$h.

Skubajet

I disagree. I personally feel that DP won't cave in to the pilots wants to prove that he won't cave to APA. Watch confessions of a union buster. Its about control...that what's important..not keeping pilots happy. If he gives us everything we want, we win and he is too smart for that to happen.

Everyone blames APA for not being united. That may be part if it but bottom line is our management is the elephant in the room. Delta wouldn't have the contract they have if it weren't for Anderson and his philosophy on happy employees = successful airline.

IMHO, its way to risky to chance losing the 1.7B.An extra 100k over 5 yeArs pays my kids college education or will be worth north of 500k after years in investments. Get the payrates now since its a sure thing and and slowly work at getting work rules back.

eaglefly

I keep hearing the "live to fight another day" argument with a yes vote, but so far nobody can put forth a viable plan. If our pay is still the cheapest in 2020 and Parker has everything but LTD and scope, just how do we get anything back ?

He's just going to demand another quid pro quo like this time expecting us to give those up to match Delta rates again, so we will not be gaining anything, just losing more to pay for the next pay raise. The other option if we balk will be to just kick the can for years. That works for Parker too as we'll be the cheapest in 2020.

In reality, we're really committing Seppuku by ratifying this TA. I guess if people understand that and prefer the short-term gratification then we will have to live with what we have now or even less in the future. Thankfully, the next deal (if it ever comes) will be my last and the yes voters of today who will still be around then will have to figure out their strategy. I don't envy them, that's for sure.

Skubajet

To answer your question, its once he retires and we get a new CEO. Look at the companies that have the best contracts...dal SWA...ual..and I was told they got what they got to keep the peace. But it has mostly to do with management. I really think the vote right now - its about risk. I personally as well as most AA pilots are not willing to risk losing 1.7B....especially with the management at the wheel with the track record they have. Its an unfortunate reality.

CamYZ125

Wait, that's the plan? Give everything up for a few bucks, then hope we can get everything back when Parker retires?

Ha.