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SEPfield
09-20-2017, 07:41 AM
I am placing this in the Majors forum because EK flies into some of the same large and very busy airports that we all operate into everyday.

Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway (http://avherald.com/h?article=4ae84b8a&opt=0)

Incident: Emirates A388 at Moscow on Sep 10th 2017, go around from about 400 feet AGL 8nm before runway
By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Sep 18th 2017 12:55Z, last updated Tuesday, Sep 19th 2017 09:23Z
An Emirates Airbus A380-800, registration A6-EEZ performing flight EK-131 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Moscow Domodedovo (Russia), was positioning for an approach to Domodedovo's runway 14R about to intercept the extended runway center line about 8nm before the runway threshold when the aircraft descended to about 400 feet AGL, initiated a go around climbing straight ahead and crossing through the localizer to safe altitude. The aircraft subsequently positioned for another approach to runway 14R, aligned with the extended runway center line but did not initiate the final descent and joined the missed approach procedure as result. The aircraft positioned again for an approach to runway 14R and landed without further incident on runway 14R about 35 minutes after the first go around (from 400 feet AGL).

Position and Altitude data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder suggest the aircraft was tracking about 190 degrees magnetic when the aircraft initiated the go around at about 1000 feet MSL about 8nm before the runway threshold, which translates to about 400 feet AGL with the aerodrome elevation at 180 meters/592 feet MSL.

The airline told The Aviation Herald on Sep 18th 2017, that the occurrence is being investigated by United Arab Emirates' Civil Aviation Authority GCAA, the airline apologizes that due to the investigation no further details can be provided.

The GCAA have already sent a first preliminary reply indicating the communication department is about to respond to the questions.

On Sep 19th 2017 the GCAA reported that the occurrence of the A380 descending below the glideslope on approach to runway 14R at Moscow Deomodedovo Airport was rated a serious incident and is being investigated by UAE's Air Accident Investigation Sector (AAIS). There were no injuries and no damage to the aircraft.

Russia's Rosaviatsia (Civil Aviation Authority) have not yet replied to the inquiry by The Aviation Herald.

Metars:
UUDD 102030Z 20003MPS 170V230 9999 -SHRA SCT050CB 14/12 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 102000Z 20003MPS 9999 -SHRA FEW046CB 14/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101930Z 21003MPS CAVOK 14/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101900Z 21003MPS 170V230 CAVOK 14/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101830Z 18003MPS CAVOK 14/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101800Z 18004MPS CAVOK 15/11 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101730Z 18004MPS 9999 FEW040 15/12 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101700Z 19003MPS 9999 FEW040 15/12 Q1016 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101630Z 18003MPS CAVOK 15/12 Q1016 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101600Z 17003MPS CAVOK 17/12 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101530Z 17003MPS CAVOK 18/12 Q1015 R88/010095 NOSIG
UUDD 101500Z 18003MPS CAVOK 20/12 Q1016 R88/010095 NOSIG


SEPfield
09-20-2017, 07:45 AM
Below is the Emirates training departments response to the incident. There is no mention of how the brutally fatiguing schedules contributed to this accident, only more fear and intimidation tactics.
Ladies and Gentlemen

STANDARDS ON THE LINE

You will be aware that we have experienced some poorly managed events on the line over the last few months; unfortunately we experienced another one last week. In Training we promote the fact that we are driven by evidence, well the evidence indicates that that these events can no longer be viewed as isolated events, therefore it is imperative action is taken to stop the onset of a potential trend. We need to raise the levels of airmanship, awareness, suspicion and professionalism across our pilot community. Let me state that we are of the firm belief that the vast majority of our pilots are professional, proficient, efficient and effective. Unfortunately, the evidence indicates there is still work to be done to bring a small minority of pilots to this standard. The acid test, as always is, if following any training/checking session you would not be confident with the pilot flying your loved ones into some of the demanding destinations, terrain, weather and ATC environments which we operate into, then you have to flag those concerns to Training Management by accurately grading and reporting your observations.

In reviewing the events of the last few months we have asked ourselves what are we doing wrong? What are we missing? What’s the root cause? Why is our training and checking not able to identify those pilots who underperform on the line? Whilst the PFs and PMs in each case demonstrated failures in one or more of the pilot competencies, it was the loss of Situation Awareness and ineffective Pilot monitoring which were so concerning; we therefore need to enhance our training with regards to both. We have already started this in the current round of RTGS, where we present the Flight Data Monitoring playbacks from some of the events in question and then facilitate a discussion on what went wrong and what could have been done to prevent the situation from developing. However it is obvious that we need to do more, therefore in cooperation with Fleet we have decided to introduce the following changes:

· Trainers are to re-emphasize the importance of Pilot Monitoring duties during all Training and Checking events; this is to happen with immediate effect.
· Recurrent training to include a manually flown (Auto Pilot/Auto Throttle off) short sector, focusing on SA and Monitoring. We already cover this on Day 3 on the A380 using NCE; Boeing will introduce something similar on Day 2, this will be effective from 1 Oct this year. Emphasis is to be placed on the Pilot Monitoring making timely exceedance calls and demonstrating a satisfactory level of monitoring throughout the session. Please continue to insert ‘distractors’ during your sessions to mirror the distractions encountered on the line. The PM is to prioritise his workload to ensure his own SA and the safety of the aircraft are never compromised.
· We have re-written the word pictures for the Communication and the Leadership, Teamwork and Support PAMs to include more focus on PM skills. The FCI detailing these changes will be published shortly and will be effective immediately on receipt.
· During a training/checking session should a pilot miss a number of radio or SOP calls which might jeopardise the safety of the flight, or if their attitude or professionalism is called into question then the pilot is to be graded a ‘1’ for Leadership, Teamwork and Support. I accept this is subjective and whilst I would not expect to see a trainee fail because of a ‘few’ missed calls, several missed radio and/or SOP calls could be indicative of capacity or SA issues, so additional training is entirely appropriate.
· Any commander who is graded a ‘1’ or a ‘2’ for any competency during Day 1 or 2 of their recurrent simulator session will continue with their remaining simulator sessions, unless they are removed by a Training Manager. However, on completion of their recurrent training sessions a review of their performance will be conducted by Training/Fleet management prior to the commander being released back to the line; this is effective immediately.
· We will develop learning modules to improve knowledge and understanding of Auto Flight Systems modes. In the interim it is vital that you not only train Automation awareness but also the understanding of the modes.
· 25% of line checks will be planned as ‘No Notice’, this will be effective from the next planned roster. If you are rostered for one of these No Notice line checks, it is important you do not make the rostered crew aware – we are trying to get better visibility over our crews’ standards and level of preparedness – a true No Notice line check will give us that.
· Safety will provide Training with a list of our most challenging destinations and where possible Line Checks will be planned to these destinations going forward.
· There will be an additional 1-week ground school introduced for all new conversion courses to enhance/refresh fundamental ATPL knowledge; date for implementation TBD.
· Starting 1 Feb 2018, Day 3 of the recurrent PPC will be separated from Day 1 and 2. This will give trainees more regular exposure throughout the year to manual flight in the simulator as well as the opportunity to practise their monitoring skills. This initiative will also address the negative feedback we have received relating to 3 x deep night duties in a row and the limited training value gained from the 3rd night.
· We will be working with a third party research team to trial ‘eye tracking’ functionality in the simulator. We will use the results of the trial in the following RTGS phase to demonstrate the effectiveness, or not, of some crews’ scanning techniques during various stages of the flight.

In conclusion, the recent spate of poorly managed events on the line is deeply disappointing. Inaction on our part was simply not an option; as a result I hope you understand why these actions are being taken. It is vital that as trainers we lead by example and we demonstrate the standards others wish to aspire to. We recognise that ‘change’ can lead to uncertainty, especially if that change is introduced quickly. Therefore, if you are faced with a situation during your training and checking sessions over the coming weeks and are unsure of what is expected of you, please call your training management team who will be happy to assist.

As always thank you for your continued support.


SVP Flight Training

Riverside
09-20-2017, 09:43 AM
I am placing this in the Majors forum because EK flies into some of the same large and very busy airports that we all operate into everyday.


Actually it should be placed in the safety thread.


sACKtis
09-20-2017, 10:21 AM
Actually it should be placed in the trash can.

qball
09-20-2017, 11:38 AM
Thankfully this is just an incident report, and not an accident report. No matter what air line is the subject, I'm glad the crew and passengers all got to go home to their families.

If the root cause is inadequate crew experience, inadequate training, or unrealistic scheduling. That is the subject of another thread. I'm glad all are safe.

Viperstick
09-20-2017, 01:14 PM
Sounds like the ATA charter I nearly rode into the dirt just short of Gander when deploying in 2007. Broke the gear on landing too.

kc10/c130
09-20-2017, 03:32 PM
Or the F16 that tried to impress a Lt & almost hit the tanker.

Peacock
09-20-2017, 03:52 PM
Or the F16 that tried to impress a Lt & almost hit the tanker.

That doesn't sound very similar at all

Whale Driver
09-21-2017, 07:28 AM
Any airline that has to have "manual handing" sims has a major culture problem in their flight management department. Plus a bigger problem with the competency and confidence of the line crews. Every pilot should be required to maintain line flying proficiency in ALL modes of automation. NO automation is one those modes. See Asiana SFO.

coxmb
09-21-2017, 10:29 AM
Sounds like the ATA charter I nearly rode into the dirt just short of Gander when deploying in 2007. Broke the gear on landing too.

Do you recall what type of aircraft?

Viperstick
09-21-2017, 02:53 PM
Do you recall what type of aircraft?

757, May 2007.

We came out of a low overcast about 1000'/min, 400 AGL. Engines spooled up and we went up to what I presume was the FAF altitude because we drove straight ahead for about 10 miles before starting down again. Did a three point landing; exit sign in mid-cabin came crashing down. Sat at Gander for four hours (three longer than the planned fuel stop). Word we got was we had a gear problem (not surprising). Not sure if they fixed it or deferred it, but we had another longer than planned stop at Shannon while they brought another jet over.

Sounds strange to say, but I was relieved to get to the Deid.