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Scruffydog7347
02-12-2018, 03:53 PM
I'm an aircraft technician for a major airline. I also have a private pilot's license, single engine, not instrument rated. I often read through accident reports in the hope of learning something. Recently I came across flight ifo-21, the flight that killed Commerce Secretary Ron Brown.
Aircraft: CT43A (737-200). Flying into Dubrovnik runway 12 (119 degrees). Time 3 pm, April 1996. No vor/ils available because the equipment for this had either been blown up or stolen during the recent war. The aircraft only had 1 ADF system. Airport elevation: 500'. Low lying mountains 1.5 miles to the left, the tallest of which was 2,300'. Overcast at 2,000', the top of which obscured the mountain tops. Winds on the surface right down the runway at 15 knots. Winds at 4,000' 160 degrees at 25 knots. light rain.

There are two NDBs in line with the runway. One is KLP, 12 miles from the runway. The second is CV, two miles from the runway. According to AWACs tracking images, this plane passed right over the first beacon at 4,100', pretty much on course. But according again to AWACs, they were going 30 knots too fast with flaps and gear up. With their single adf system, they had to tune in the next ADF, CV. Whether they could tune it in with a flip of a switch or had to 'tune' it, I could not find out.After a slight joggle in course during this tuning time I'm guessing, they then flew a straight 'course' of 109 degrees and hit that highest peak.
The accident investigation said that the ADF was still tuned to that first ADF (KLP) and not CV as it should have been. There were no black boxes on this aircraft.

There was a lot of controversy about this crash saying it shouldn't have been attempted with just one ADF system and the MDA should have been 2,350 instead of 2,150. Granted it shouldn't have been attempted, but I'd still like to ask a couple of questions. From what I've read about the pilots, Capt Ashley Davis and Capt Tim Shafer, they were good pilots. You don't assign second rate pilots to fly dignitaries around. This unit flew Hillary Clinton into Bosnia supposedly under sniper fire the week before.

So how likely is it that both pilots missed the passage of that first ADF beacon and didn't tune in the second beacon? Or is it possible that once they passed right over that first beacon, they trusted the INS system enough to keep them on line with the runway? The third question I have is if after they passed over the first beacon, if they tried tuning in the second beacon and couldn't pick it up, is it possible they might have used the previous beacon in a reverse sensing fashion? I know all these scenarios go completely against the book?


badflaps
02-13-2018, 04:06 PM
From what I remember their ADF skills were lacking. (Not unusual, considering the amount available for practice.)

galaxy flyer
02-13-2018, 05:55 PM
What you’re missing is approach design required DUAL ADFs, not one as installed. They only had one ADF and tried to fly it without the required second one. In the ADF era, this design was common—two beacons, one for the FAF and one at the MAP, providing positive identification of the MAP allowed for the minimums published. Jeppesen was brought in to review the design and found it complies with the PANS-OPS in effect at design.

There was another factor—mission accomplishment overrode AF Instructions. The crew and the supervisory team were dinged for not conducting a review of the approach and the equipment suitability. Including a General. Sounds like you have an agenda.

GF


Excargodog
02-13-2018, 07:31 PM
And of course the two preceding aircraft, both appropriately equipped, had both gone missed approach. I think it is very likely that political pressure was placed on the aircrew to make the attempt, probably not by Brown himself but by one of the officials little aides who serve as dog robbers for the senior political class. And I think the aircrew caved to it.

I seriously doubt either of the pilots had actually done an NDB approach .... Perhaps ever. T-37s and T-38s didn't even have them, in fact very few USAF aircraft of that era still did. Their general non precision approach was a TACAN approach.

Adlerdriver
02-13-2018, 08:28 PM
You make a few statements that I either disagree with or have some initial comments about.
Winds at 4,000' 160 degrees at 25 knots. light rain. This wind is a big factor. The fact that the winds at the airport elevation were "right down the runway" are not as important.

But according again to AWACs, they were going 30 knots too fast with flaps and gear up. AWACs would have no idea of the status of their gear and flaps. Everything I've seen online says they passed the FAF (KLP) 80 knots above the correct final approach speed. KLP is almost 12 miles from the runway. By the time they arrived in the vicinity of the runway and missed approach point, they had slowed to something fairly close to their final approach speed and had their landing gear down. More on the landing gear below.

The accident investigation said that the ADF was still tuned to that first ADF (KLP) and not CV as it should have been. The ADF was found tuned to KLP. Since they crashed attempting to execute the missed approach, KLP was the proper station for their ADF.

There was a lot of controversy about this crash saying it shouldn't have been attempted with just one ADF system That's not controversial. It's factual. Two ADF systems were required to properly fly this approach.

So how likely is it that both pilots missed the passage of that first ADF beacon and didn't tune in the second beacon? This isn't the correct procedure to fly this approach.

Or is it possible that once they passed right over that first beacon, they trusted the INS system enough to keep them on line with the runway? I could find no information about their use of the INS. Only that the aircraft was equipped with a dual INS system. In 1996, it was not very common (or legal) for USAF pilots to rely on INS for instrument approaches. Using it to aid their course control or as a situational awareness enhancing aid would have been a great technique, but it's unclear how they chose to use it.

The third question I have is if after they passed over the first beacon, if they tried tuning in the second beacon and couldn't pick it up, is it possible they might have used the previous beacon in a reverse sensing fashion? This is exactly how the final approach portion of this approach would need to be flown.

I know all these scenarios go completely against the book? What book?

Without a CVR or FDR, there's a lot missing from any detailed discussion of the crew actions. My general impression of what we do know shows a classic rushed, unstable approach with a late configuration. I believe one reason for this is a lack of distance information from the airfield and the navaids in use.

USAF pilots "grow up" flying from AF bases that are typically equipped with a TACAN co-located with the base. In case you're unfamiliar, TACAN operates very similar to a VOR/DME but both pieces of information (range and azimuth) are obtained by tuning a single control head to a single frequency. So, with the TACAN tuned on the base to which they're flying an approach, they can determine their exact position in relation to the field with a single glance. As simple as this sounds, knowing this is critical when calibrating one's mental clock and choosing when to slow/configure for landing while flying an approach in IMC conditions.

In this accident, these pilots didn't have that luxury. In fact, there appear to be no navaids available that would provide the crew with any sort of DME (distance) information related to the runway. The INS would have been a great back-up here. Programming a lat/long point at the airport or maybe approach end of the runway itself would have enhanced their situational awareness (SA) immensely. Using the INS to aid flying the course from KLP to CV with a wind-corrected heading would also have been a great use of that tool. However, this might not have been possible to due system limitations or may simply have not been something the crew regularly trained to.

If their INS was anything like the one I used in the USAF, they probably couldn't do both of these options at the same time and may have had to choose one or the other. From what I can see online, the INS was found in a position to provide wind data to aid them flying the final approach course. That may have ended up being a moot point if they lost SA on their position from the airport.

So, it's very likely that the crew got rushed or may not have been 100% certain exactly how far from the field they were when they received approach clearance. If they weren't using the INS to provide distance information from the field, their first reliable indication of position would have been station passage at KLP (the final approach fix). They arrived there at 220 knots, most likely in a clean configuration. Normal instrument approach guidelines for USAF pilots would have been to arrive there fully configured at final approach speed. In fact, typical guidelines are to plan to be fully configured, on speed, 3 to 5 miles prior to the FAF. Since this FAF is almost 12 miles from the field (most are more commonly 5-7 miles out), the crew may have chosen to delay configuration slightly.

However, I seriously doubt the crew planned to arrive at the FAF clean at 220 knots. So, I think it's a fair to assume they had lost SA on their position in relation to the airport and were probably scrambling to salvage the approach when they passed KLP. It definitely would have been a scramble. In order to land out of this approach, they would have needed to be down at the MDA (2150' MSL) NO LATER than 5 miles from the airport. This is known as the VDP (visual descent point) and is based on AGL altitude to lose from the MDA to the runway threshold on a typical 3-degree glide path. They probably would have wanted to get down to the MDA prior to 5 miles and level off (the "dive and drive" approach). This would have allowed them a chance to get down to minimums, try to get a visual on the runway and set up a normal 3-degree descent to the runway. Unfortunately, unless they were using INS for distance (or manual ground speed timing) from the runway, they would have no way of knowing their exact distance from the runway during this point in the approach. I can't tell if there was a timing block associated with this approach.

Starting at 220 knots, clean and trying to descend from 4000 to 2150 in less than 6 miles while slowing and configuring is almost impossible. So, to say this approach was rushed is an understatement. One of the first thing any pilot trying to salvage such a descent would do is drop his landing gear. That's going to provide much needed drag and can typically be extended at higher speeds than any high lift devices like flat/slats. Once they're at the MDA (2150) and at the VDP, every second that passes, every fraction of a mile closer to the runway they get while not descending on a normal glide path to the runway means it's very likely they would be unable to land out of the approach.

I mentioned earlier the winds were a factor. On any NDB approach, correcting for winds can be a challenge. It takes some trial and error starting from a known, stable reference point to determine how the winds are affecting you, input a correction, determine if that's enough and so on. When you add in additional challenges like trying to lose 80 knots of excess speed, fully configure your aircraft while descending to mins and only using one of two required navaids....... I seriously doubt they had a lot of excess time to try to figure out the winds, even if they were using their INS to help. So, since the winds were from 40-degrees right (160⁰), they got blown to the north of course during the approach and missed approach.

Some of your statements about the ADF use on this approach are incorrect. As has been stated, two ADFs were required to fly the approach. So first, saying there is a proper tuning hierarchy - i.e. when a pilot should tune one navaid instead of the other, is incorrect. Two NDBs should have been in use throughout the approach. Second, the final approach guidance from KLP to the runway (or missed approach point) would have been provided by KLP, not CV. NDB signals are generally more stable and easier to track the further from the station you get. Using the CV NDB would become more difficult the closer they got to it. The display of its signal would become more and more sensitive to changes just when it's guidance was needed most. So, the only use of CV on this approach was to identify the missed approach point by signaling station passage. Finally, the missed approach procedure called for a right turn back to KLP. So, having that navaid tuned during the missed approach was, in fact, the correct setting for their primary (and only) ADF in this case.

I'm sure they were good pilots. No matter how good someone is, there's a point where enough negative factors on a situation can overwhelm anyone. Improper navaids, lack of "typical" distance guidance, pressure to get the job done, unfamiliar non-precision approach, rushed, unstable approach, terrain issues and some weather. Any one of those things would be a threat. All of them combined was obviously a recipe for disaster.

Adlerdriver
02-13-2018, 08:35 PM
I seriously doubt either of the pilots had actually done an NDB approach .... Perhaps ever. T-37s and T-38s didn't even have them, in fact very few USAF aircraft of that era still did. Their general non precision approach was a TACAN approach.
This is not correct. The T-37 was equipped with an RMI which is essentially the same thing as an ADF. While the main focus in training was use of TACAN, LOC or ASR for non-precision approaches, we did fly and train with "RMI only" approaches. I honestly can't remember if we could tune NDBs with it or simply used the azimuth only signal from a VOR.

My point is that both of these pilots received training in UPT that would have allowed them to fly an NDB. I also expect that since their aircraft was so equipped (obviously not enough for this particular approach), they received regular training and check rides involving NDB approaches.

I also wonder where you got the information about the preceding two aircraft going missed. The only thing I could find for certain was a pilot who had landed one hour earlier radioed the crew while they were on approach and told them weather was at mins for the approach. The final report concluded weather was not a major factor in the approach. 500 BKN, 2000 OVC and 5 miles vis isn't great but it's hardly a show stopper.

galaxy flyer
02-14-2018, 06:10 AM
Ausgezeichnet, Adlerdriver!.

The seeming failure to use the INS to keep up the SA; plan the slowdown at KLP; and use the wind output to help with tracking was a mystery to me. It probably had the Carousel “whirling steel” INS, but plenty good enough for those tasks. We used it that way in the C-5 all the time. If they had just done a turn in a hold at KLP, it all might have worked, illegally, but they wouldn’t have contended with the high energy problems.

We did plenty of “RMI Only” procedures in UPT in both planes. Then again, I was going to the Hun, which had a Tweet panel, essentially. :D. The Tweet didn’t have an ADF, but the Hun did and we were checked on ADF in RTU.

GF

Adlerdriver
02-14-2018, 06:36 AM
Ausgezeichnet, Adlerdriver!.

The seeming failure to use the INS to keep up the SA; plan the slowdown at KLP; and use the wind output to help with tracking was a mystery to me. It probably had the Carousel “whirling steel” INS, but plenty good enough for those tasks. We used it that way in the C-5 all the time. If they had just done a turn in a hold at KLP, it all might have worked, illegally, but they wouldn’t have contended with the high energy problems.

We did plenty of “RMI Only” procedures in UPT in both planes. Then again, I was going to the Hun, which had a Tweet panel, essentially. :D. The Tweet didn’t have an ADF, but the Hun did and we were checked on ADF in RTU.

GF
Was ist los Herr Flyer?

We've all been there and that willingness to admit temporary defeat and request a turn in holding can be tough to do. I agree the outcome probably would have been far different had they chosen to "light up a lucky" and wind the clock.

I don't remember an RMI in the -38 but I'll take your word on it. I'm stretching my memory on a lot of that stuff as it is. The only reason I remember it being in the T-37 was due to the NDB-A with a circle to land opposite direction to actual mins I did on my ATP Seminole check ride. After I landed I just remember thinking "how in the holy #@$% did I pull that out of my a$$?". I just chalked it up (very thankfully) to T-37 muscle memory and a vague recollection of that damn RMI (not to mention it's almost impossible to get behind in an airplane that slow). :D

Tweetdrvr
02-14-2018, 07:28 AM
GF, auch eine gute Erklarung!!

The T-37 was VOR/DME and ILS only. The T-37 syllabus I went through in the early 90s did not emphasize RMI only. I learned most of my RMI/BDHI only stuff in the T-43 at MHR in SUNT in the late 80s. As a student, I lived off the RMI because I never really liked the crappy CI and the toilet bowl indicator in the T-37. It was really only useful (IMHO) for ILS/GS info.

As a T-37 IP in the late 90s and early 2000s, I found it useful to emphasize RMI only stuff to keep students from chasing the CI and over correcting based on CI displacement. Understanding of the VOR needle would have shown them only 2-3 radials off course, and required only enough change to drop the head or raise the tail of the needle to the desired course. The guys with prior GA time who had flown NDBs or the Nav rated students going through were able to grasp this better than the other students. It also seemed like the non fighter MWS IPs also put a bit more emphasis on the RMI than the FAIPs and Fighter MWS IPs. I would attribute this to the backgrounds of flying NDBs out in the AMC world of Africa, Eastern Europe, and South America.

The only formal RMI only training I received as a pilot was at Little Rock going through initial Herc qual in 1993, because you did NDBs in the C-130. I have heard that the T-1s are trying to drop or have dropped NDBs from the syllabus because they are getting harder to find in the CONUS as we transition to the NextGen NAS. If they do or did, I'd hope they would keep doing RMI only training using the VOR/TACAN needle because there are still places in the undeveloped hinterlands where AMC and Special Ops go that have NDBs as an only option.

I went into Dubrovnik after the Ron Brown accident and the wreckage was still being pulled from the side of the mountain. The weather was VMC that day and the high terrain off to the east was clearly visible. We flew the approach in an H model 130 with no difficulty. But we had a Nav onboard, SCNS/INS Nav displays on the HSI, and most importantly 2 NDBs

The big thing I remember from the accident report was not only did they have only 1 NDB, it was the old school coffee grinder NDB like the C-130 E models had. Not the more modern, set the frequency numbers individually and forget it. Tuning those things was an art form, and you could get the needle to point reasonably well, but not close enough unless you hit the null sound in the audio tone dead on. This was easy to do at LRF because the Toneyville NDB was directly off the approach end of Runway 25. Airplanes were parked parallel to the runway, so you had it correct when the needle pointed at 12 or 6 o'clock exactly. I believe the report said a contributing factor was the NDB possibly not being tuned correctly.

galaxy flyer
02-14-2018, 08:24 AM
I can’t positively say on the -38s, but I did them in Tweets. The CBM 37 Commander (Lt Col Terry) has done several tours in Huns, USAFE and RVN, so he took us three ANG guys under his wing and beat us silly. Character building, but a life lesson. 77-05, btw, memory maybe fading.

The C-5 A-models had two coffee grinder ADFs, the Bs only one digital one. Went into Yerevan, Armenia in an A-model, 2 beacons to the LOC intercept, lots of mountains. Very carefully flown, with all three pilots talking thru each leg. Ridges obscured, but decent ceiling and viz.



Tweetdrvr

The Hun had the identical panel—MM-3, ID-249 and ID-250 at 166 plus fuel.

GF

UAL T38 Phlyer
02-14-2018, 12:25 PM
A-model T-38 had no RMI, but it DID have a Tacan bearing-pointer, on the outside of the HSI compass-card.

Some were “head only” (sts), and some also had a Tail. (Sts). ;)

1wife2airlines
02-14-2018, 05:32 PM
A-model T-38 had no RMI, but it DID have a Tacan bearing-pointer, on the outside of the HSI compass-card.

Some were “head only” (sts), and some also had a Tail. (Sts). ;)

All of ours were head only. I can't remember what we trained students to do with the bearing pointer only but we did some kind of training with it. I was very happy to learn that I could "push the head AND pull the tail" when I got to the airlines.

Scruffydog7347
02-16-2018, 05:50 AM
Thanks to everyone for their replies. I obtained most of my information from the Flight Safety Foundation/ Flight Digest/July-August 1996.

This plane only had one ADF and should not have been attempting this landing and I tend to agree with the person who said these pilots probably were pressured by superiors.

It's hard for me to believe that they might have used KLP in reverse sensing with mountains in the area above the MDA. . Using KLP that way, the distance they were off in the end would have only shown up as about 9 degrees on the RMI which isn't a whole lot when you consider all the errors the ADF is subject too.

Yet if they had tuned to CV, it would've shown about 100 degrees clockwise from the nose of the aircraft by the time they hit that mountain. They should've had plenty of warning.

With them wanting to fly a course of 119 degrees and a wind at 4,000 from 160 at 25 kts, they probably would've had to have flown a heading of about 124. That would've put the ADF needle to the left of center and with mountains to the left, they should have never let that needle get right of center, yet in the end, if they were tuned into CV, again, it would've been about 100 degrees right of center.

I said it puzzled me that they found the ADF tuned to KLP. One gentleman explained that when you execute a missed approach, in this case, you would tune back to the previous ADF which was KLP. The accident report said the gear and the flaps were down, but the engines were at a high power level which indicates to me that they just started the procedure for the missed approach, by applying power, but hit the mountain before they could clean up the airplane. Now is it possible that when one pilot was applying power, the other was tuning the ADF back to KLP, before bringing flaps and gear up?

A note here. The report said the warning profile of the GPWS was never penetrated, so the GPWS did not sound any warnings.

galaxy flyer
02-16-2018, 06:03 AM
I’m not sure what you mean by “reverse sensing”; that applies to a LOC, they were tracking outbound from the KLP beacon as called for on the approach. They needed TWO ADFs to fly the approach and continuously monitor both, so I don’t understand your reference to retuning KLP. The wind would have shifted as they descended, probably more toward the south, so their heading would have changed to maintain the 119 track.

GF

Adlerdriver
02-16-2018, 08:20 AM
Scruffy - you have drawn some conclusions about this based on inaccurate information.
I apologize for the size of the approach plate. My upload kung fu failed. Here's a link:
http://code7700.com/leadership_styles.htm
You have to scroll down a bit to find it.


It's hard for me to believe that they might have used KLP in reverse sensing with mountains in the area above the MDA. As Galaxy Flyer stated, there is no such thing as "reverse sensing" when using an NDB. You flying a course (technically called a bearing when using NDBs) either to or from the station. Doing one or the other creates no inherent problem for the pilot. As far as mountains go, if you look at the area, there aren't any between KLP and the runway. So terrain would have no effect on their use of KLP (or CV for that matter).

Yet if they had tuned to CV, it would've shown about 100 degrees clockwise from the nose of the aircraft by the time they hit that mountain. They should've had plenty of warning.
You keep coming at this as if they had a choice in the navaids and how they used them. The fact that they could only tune one makes much of this discussion kind of silly. They never should have attempted this approach without the ability to tune both of the required NDBs.

However, I found the approach plate in use at the time (see below or the link up top) The primary navaid for this approach - i.e. the one providing final approach guidance is KLP. That's why the final approach course (119) is depicted outbound from that navaid with the black arrow. That's also why KLP is shown in the title header of the approach plate.

KLP is the navaid that was required to be used to provide final approach guidance. This is a fact and isn't an area open to interpretation or the whims of a particular pilot from one day to the next. It's possible that CV was designed exclusively to be what it's labeled on the approach - a Locator (Lctr). It's design and signal strength may not have been certified for any other use. It's only purpose on this approach is to identify the missed approach point (MAP). Period - dot.

It's perfectly acceptable to have a single NDB (CV for instance - if it was certified for that use) act as the IAF and MAP while also providing course guidance to the runway. Those types of NDB approaches are required to include a procedure turn using an on-airfield NDB. There is no FAF (final approach fix) in these types of NDB approaches. The pilot flies over the NDB away from the field, executes the procedure turn, reversing course and tracks inbound back toward the NDB (and the field). Station passage signals the MAP. However, that's not how this approach was built. In fact, it was not legal for CV to be used as the primary navaid for this approach because it was located too far away from the runway. In order for a single NDB to be considered "on airport" and used as the primary, it has to be within 1 mile of any portion of the runway.

Once an NDB approach is built with a FAF (like this one), there are different criteria involved in the requirements for the approach. One important difference is there must be a method of identifying the FAF. With this criteria comes added accuracy and lower minimums which I'm guessing was required in that area due to the surrounding terrain.

With them wanting to fly a course of 119 degrees and a wind at 4,000 from 160 at 25 kts, they probably would've had to have flown a heading of about 124. That would've put the ADF needle to the left of center and with mountains to the left, they should have never let that needle get right of center, yet in the end, if they were tuned into CV, again, it would've been about 100 degrees right of center.Sounds like someone's been using the Whiz Wheel.
My man..... you're passing an awful lot of judgement from that armchair at zero knots. But, you bet - there's a lot of things they "should have never" let happen. When they hit KLP at 220 clean, they should have just gone around, held, asked for a vector.

I think you're forgetting what was happening from KLP inbound as we now discuss 119 versus 124 degrees displayed on a 2.5" dial while flying almost 4 miles a minute and trying to pick-up a proper course after station passage. These two pilots were asses and elbows trying to get their jet slowed, configured while descending 2000 feet in less than 6 miles.

Everyone agrees they should never have been there in the first place. But if you think they were aware of the need for a 5 degree course correction at that moment in their lives, you simply do not have an appreciation of what they were experiencing.

I said it puzzled me that they found the ADF tuned to KLP. One gentleman explained that when you execute a missed approach, in this case, you would tune back to the previous ADF which was KLP. I can almost guarantee you they never took the ADF control head off KLP. That was their REQUIRED method of final approach guidance. Have you ever used an ADF to tune an NDB. The set these pilots were using was all manual. You have to ID the station using the morse code identifier before you're legal to use it. You can't just dial in a frequency and switch back and forth on a whim.

You can see on the approach plate, there is in fact a timing block. Just a guess, but I'd say it's reasonable to assume they planned on using timing to identify the MAP while tracking the final approach course. While not legal, this would be the way I would have flown that approach if I had no other option. So, there was no one trying to retune KLP from CV during the missed approach.

The accident report said the gear and the flaps were down, but the engines were at a high power level which indicates to me that they just started the procedure for the missed approach, by applying power, but hit the mountain before they could clean up the airplane. That's possible. They were essentially abeam the MAP after drifting north of course, so it was probably about the time for them to go around. They could have also gotten a face full of mountain in the last few seconds and firewalled the power in an attempt to climb to safety.

galaxy flyer
02-16-2018, 10:36 AM
Adlerdriver,

Thanks for the link with the chart. He’s usually pretty on target, but I have to disagree with a couple of things.

“Eddie” of Code7700 says:

First, the approach procedure was designed in error. The descent altitude was too low, given the length of the final approach. Second, the approach plate had not been validated by the major air command.

I spoke with Jim Terpstra of Jeppesen at an AFFSA conference several years later. Jim was Jepp’s expert on charting for decades. He confirmed that the procedure was correctly drawn, according to the PANS-OPS edition. He was clear on Eastern Bloc procedures designers frequently used multiple NDBs as a low-cost way of lowering minimums and was allowed under PANS-OPS, since deleted. IIRC, he was miffed that the AF termed the approach wrongly designed; it wasn’t, but was not a design found in the West. It was also a early PANS-OPS Edition, point being you can’t apply today’s standard to an earlier one. He added, in the course of defending suits over the years, Jeppesen reviewed procedures and rarely found errors, as long as they used the design standard the procedure was drawn to. Of course, Jeppesen always says they faithfully print what the host nation charts, they do not guarantee the validity of the design.

He wasn’t surprised at the crew’s, both of the flight and investigation interviewees didn’t understand it. It was unique to the Bloc. We had the money, in the West, to pay for VOR-DME, TACAN and widespread ILSs.

The issue of validation is correct, the regs extant did require MAJCOM review which was ignored in the haste to make Brown’s trip happen. Mission accomplishment over procedure. Now, an O-8 has waive the requirement.

One last thought, the “timing block” is there but timing to MAP is not presented, hence not authorized, just a GS, descent rate and the note, MAP at CV.

Alas, we all now have better knowledge of Eastern Bloc Ops. Before DS, Eastern Bloc AF flights required special training and crew quals. I was handed a flight plan thru the East to Turkey after the bombing started, asked about “Eastern Bloc qual”; “just go, not a problem” said the CP. While true at F330, a divert might have been a challenge.

GF

Adlerdriver
02-16-2018, 11:02 AM
One last thought, the “timing block” is there but timing to MAP is not presented, hence not authorized, just a GS, descent rate and the note, MAP at CV. Ah yes, good catch. I totally missed that.

I'm a bit confused about what he is saying the crew and investigator interviewees didn't understand.

galaxy flyer
02-16-2018, 11:32 AM
That they didn’t grasp the required TWO beacons. In the investigation, they ran doming asked crews in that squadron about how to fly it, what was required, how to define the MAP. He had some real, if privately held, differences with the chart issue. Some, no doubt, could be attributed to his position at Jeppesen.

Very knowledgeable and easy to talk with. I asked some obscure question about high level charts, he thought and said, “there’s a jet route near LA that...”. It was like he memorized every peculiarity of the charts.

He was a legend, Tom Letts I think was his successor and JeppView guru.

GF

Scruffydog7347
02-17-2018, 02:20 AM
Thanks again for everybody's input. I think if pilot's here could answer this 'hypothetical' situation, I'd better understand the situation.

For this, throw the rules and regulations out the window. You're approaching this airport from the northwest from an airport about 110 nautical miles away, coming up in a few miles on the KLP NDB, with just enough fuel to make it to this airport, heading for runway 12 (119 degrees). One thing that would be different for this situation is when you crossed KLP, you were fully configured for landing, but all you have is the RMI with one ADF receiver, INS, and a compass. You have the same weather conditions with overcast around 2,000', the top of which is obscuring the mountains. Winds at 4,000' @ 25 kts from 160. You have the same two NDBs, KLP 12 miles from the airport and CV 2 miles from the airport. You don't have enough fuel to do a missed approach. How would you navigate to the airport?

galaxy flyer
02-17-2018, 05:05 AM
Here’s the pilot’s answer:

I wouldn’t let myself get into this position.

I’d like to know why you have become so possessed with this accident and details of the approach flown. You seem to have some goal in mind. That and you refuse to take the explanations given by those of us well versed in the event and the investigation. Until you can give an answer to my question, that’s my answer.

Can your hypothetical be flown, yes, but for the event, the rules can’t be thrown away. Like many people unfamiliar with aviation, it seems, for you, the rules are an obstacle, not an explanation.


GF

Adlerdriver
02-17-2018, 05:06 AM
What Galaxy Flyer said..... I'm curious too about your agenda here.
But, I'll play the game for now in the interest of the discussion:

I'd tune KLP for the whole approach. That would give me:
1. A properly tuned and identified navaid I wouldn't need to change.
2. Proper ID of the FAF which would allow me to descend to the MDA after station passage. One of the most critical aspects of flying this approach would be a safe but aggressive descend to the MDA so a normal glidepath to the runway could be flown once visual with it.
3. Stable course guidance all the way to the MAP or runway.
4. The correct navaid already tuned that's required to fly the missed approach procedure.

I'd program two INS destination using the lat/long of CV and the lat/long for the approach end of the runway.
I'd use INS steering to the CV point until I saw the runway, giving me:
1. Accurate, wind corrected course guidance from KLP to CV
2. Accurate range to CV which would help identify the MAP.

Once I saw the runway, I'd have the other pilot switch the INS destination to the runway point which would provide:
1. Accurate identification of the visual descent point in relation to the runway.
2. Exact range to the runway- allowing adjustments to glide path once leaving the MDA (since no VASIs appear to be available in 1996).

galaxy flyer
02-17-2018, 05:55 AM
How Adler did it, but he’s a better writer.

GF

Scruffydog7347
02-18-2018, 09:54 AM
Thanks again for your input guys and I'll tell you what I'm getting at.
Years ago I had read about this and thought it was suspicious in nature. One of the Air Force investigators made an observation that a hole in the top of Ron Brown's head looked like a bullet hole, yet the Air Force chose not to do an autopsy. They did take X-rays, but then those x-rays disappeared. Luckily though, one of the doctors who first saw them made copies.

There was also the case of the tech sergeant Shelly Kelly, who survived the crash, in fact was alive hours after the crash, but died of a broken neck on the ambulance ride to the hospital. This is one part of this story that I found about a half a dozen different versions of. " She was buried under galley equipment, She was seen stumbling around the wreckage hours afterwards, She was flown out by helicopter" and there's others.

I do believe the weather was too bad to land a chopper so they sent her down via an ambulance and I'll be the first to admit that her neck may have been fractured to the point, she could still walk around after the crash, but the ambulance ride on what might at first have been a bumpy ride, could have delivered the coup de grace. But to believe that, I guess we have to believe the medical personnel in this area are a primitive lot and don't know how to stabilize a patient who more than likely had some type of spinal injures.

If by some far stretch of the imagination Ron Brown was shot in the head, who ever did it would want to make sure, nobody heard it. Thus Shelly had to go.

An interesting item I heard is that the Air Force or was it Bill Cllinton ordered all the bodies cremated. I haven't been able to verify that yet.

For those who might not be aware, Ron Brown was Bill Clinton's Commerce Secretary and it's been alleged that he would go around to different countries setting up the same type of sweet heart deals that Hillary Clinton would later do as Secretary of State (Pay to Play). In this case it was En Ron that he was arranging a meeting with the Croatian government.

Ron Brown was in serious legal problems at the time and was probably a week or two from being indicted. He wanted Clinton to get him off some how, but he was in too deep and there was nothing Bill could do for him. Supposedly Ron said if he went to jail, he'd take Clinton with him. Ron Brown had to go.

The biggest problem with trying to set up a crash is how do you control the weather. After all, aren't these trips planned well in advance? Well the area they chose, Croatia certainly wasn't a bad choice for this. It rains on average about twice a week there at that time of year. Still is it possible to arrange bad weather? Well it's interesting to note Dubrovnik wasn't on the original itinerary. Dubrovnik was added about 30 hours before the flight left on the first leg of what was then to be a 5 leg trip.

Why Dubrovnik? Well the vor/ils system had either been blown up or stolen for resale on the black market during the recent war, so all you had was an NDB approach.

Which airplane do you chose? Well you arrange to have one flown in the day before from Cairo, that only had one ADF receiver on it.

So now you have motive, weather, the right airport, the right aircraft.

Of course there was one other very interesting event that happened a few days after the crash. The man who was in charge of maintaining the nav aids at the airport shot himself in the chest and it was ruled a suicide. Of course shooting yourself in the chest is the preferred way of committing suicide in Croatia. Now this happened a day before he was to talk to Air Force investigators.

Now it's very possible this guy may have been very upset that this crash happened at 'his' airport and for some reason he felt responsible. Or there is the remote possibility he knew too much.

So I asked myself what could he have done to make this plane fly off course? I saw someone posted that the beacon was turned 10 degrees but who ever said that had no clue as to how an NDB works. It sends out a signal in all directions and turning the antenna has no affect on it. There's only two things you can do. You can move it to a different location which is very unpractical, or what is more likely all he had to do was shut the NDB off, at a certain time (probably after receiving a phone call), then turn it back on about 5 minutes later and about 1.7 miles away there would be someone with a portable NDB.

Where do you get a portabble NDB? Well here's one made by Telerad. The RBT9300ms is a Transportable 50watt mw ndb. "The transportable NDB 50W RBT9300MS has been designed to meet the requirements of temporary and fast installations:assistance for approach and landing of helicopters on any field. " Of course it will work with airplanes too. This probably would've fit into the back of a pick up truck.

What about the frequency and the morse code identifier? " Frequency programming: 200-535 kHz (100 Hz steps) Programming of the code signal: Up to 3 letters"

http://www.telerad.fr/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/RBT9300MS-GB.pdf

The military probably has numerous types of transportable or portable ndbs, I'm sure some a lot smaller than this one.

After the plane passed KLP, it would have been only about 11 miles from this ndb and with no obstructions in the way, the plane would have had no problem picking up this signal
So like I said, all the man at the airport had to do was shut down the airport NDB for a set amount of time, then turn it back on and if I'm right, for this he died.

So this was the last item of my list to show that it might have happened that day. Looking at the flight track, after it passed KLP, it flew in a curved fashion for a short distance, then straightened out and flew pretty much a straight course into this mountain. I think during this curved section of flight was the time before they tuned in the CV NDB, especially if they had the coffee grinder control panel that some posters spoke of earlier, or it could've been the type you just flip a switch to get the standby frequency.

But it seems to me nobody in here seems to think they would've tuned in CV. The accident report said the control panel was tuned to KLP which completely blew my idea out of the water. Someone mentioned that when they executed a missed approach, if they were tuned to CV, they would've tuned back to KLP, but it looks like they just started a missed approach by applying power, but never had a chance to bring up the gear or flaps so I doubt they ever had time to tune back to KLP if they had tuned to CV.

Could they have tuned that transportable NDB to the KLP frequency? Yes but I'm sure they didn't. From the radar flight track, they flew right over the real KLP, so I think that's very unlikely.

To arrange something like this, you'd want some of 'your' (Bill Clinton's) boots on the ground to arrange things. It's interesting to note that Hillary flew to Bosnia the week before. This was her famous 'landing under sniper fire' trip. I doubt if she'd dirty her hands in dealing directly with 'people' over there to do the job, but she might have been there to 'supervise' others who came along with her and having her there would have added a lot of leverage to what they were trying to do.

So there was motive to get rid of Ron Brown
There was weather thanks to a change in the flight plan 30 hours prior to the flight
They had the right airport that only had an NDB approach
They had the right aircraft with only one ADF system
As somebody mentioned, there may have been pressure from above to make it to Durbrovnik.

They said a Croatian pilot who had flownthe EnRon executives in earlier, asked to talk to the pilots during the approach on a non tower frequency. What could have been said? Could he have said he used the CV NDB and it brought him right on course with the runway when he broke out of the clouds?

Again the accident report said the ADF was tuned to KLP which disproves my theory, but If they have the power to order the safety part of the investigation skippped and if they have the power to order autopsies not be performed and if they have the power to order all the bodies to be cremated so there is no way left to tell how Ron Brown or Shelly Kelly died, I'm sure they have the power to have a few facts changed in the accident report.

Thanks for listening to my conspiracy theory?

It is a theory, one that would've required a lot of luck, after all, the plane missed clearing that mountain by about 100', but it would not be mission impossible. I don't think this was pilot error. I think something led them or directed them into that mountain.

galaxy flyer
02-18-2018, 11:48 AM
If the motivation was to get rid of Ron Brown, there’s simpler ways than this. This was thoroughly investigated and the facts speak for themselves.

GF

Panzon
02-18-2018, 12:36 PM
Conspiracy theorist. The cra is strong in this one.

Adlerdriver
02-18-2018, 12:38 PM
I think something led them or directed them into that mountain.
Yeah - it's called winds aloft. 160/25 knots. :rolleyes:

I can't believe I got roped into this BS. I knew there was an agenda here but never would have guess it was this bad.

I'm out. :cool:

galaxy flyer
02-18-2018, 12:48 PM
It was interesting until...... OTOH, we suspected it.

GF

RhinoPherret
02-19-2018, 04:07 AM
Get a hobby...get a life...get some THERAPY. It is very apparent that you actually believe in your own concocted B.S.

USMCFLYR
02-19-2018, 04:31 AM
OP - at least you aren't going to be bored chasing down your suspicions for the next.....forever! :eek:



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