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View Full Version : FDX MD-10 2008 Incident at HOXIE


JetPiedmont
03-29-2010, 03:26 PM
Interresting...

Report: Fedex DC10 near Raymond on Jun 14th 2008, aerodynamic stall while in holding (http://avherald.com/h?article=429149bb&opt=0)


FDXFLYR
03-29-2010, 03:31 PM
It's been discussed is training and issue resolved.

KC10 FATboy
03-29-2010, 04:15 PM
Interesting thing to note. According to the NTSB report, the FO had a total of 2334 flying hours with 820 in the MD-10.

2334 total ??? That seems awefully low. But stranger things have happened.


Worldguy
03-29-2010, 10:55 PM
It's been discussed is training and issue resolved.
Very informative.....well, not really. Glad to hear they got it all sorted out though, whatever it was that could be useful to others to take away from this incident, that we might not know about....

Jetjok
03-30-2010, 03:44 AM
Interesting thing to note. According to the NTSB report, the FO had a total of 2334 flying hours with 820 in the MD-10.

2334 total ??? That seems awefully low. But stranger things have happened.

Interesting thing to note is that could have represented 1300 hours of fighter time, which could equate to 7 years of flying, prior to getting hired into the right seat of the Mad Dog. Not saying that's the way it is, just that although 2300 hours does sound like low time, it could easily be real quality time over a good number of years.

JJ

JetPiedmont
03-30-2010, 05:54 AM
Very informative.....well, not really. Glad to hear they got it all sorted out though, whatever it was that could be useful to others to take away from this incident, that we might not know about....

Perhaps FDXFLYR could share some of the details of how this incident was reconciled in his training.

DaRaiders
03-30-2010, 05:58 AM
Interesting thing to note is that could have represented 1300 hours of fighter time, which could equate to 7 years of flying, prior to getting hired into the right seat of the Mad Dog. Not saying that's the way it is, just that although 2300 hours does sound like low time, it could easily be real quality time over a good number of years.

JJ

But it's an entirely different type of flying.........altogether! :rolleyes:

AerisArmis
03-30-2010, 06:53 AM
Perhaps FDXFLYR could share some of the details of how this incident was reconciled in his training.

They told us what happened, how it happened and what to do about it. Unless you fly the MD-10-10, it's of little concern to you. It's no big secret but it's also something I wouldn't talk about on a public forum without permission, and I ain't gonna ask.

JetPiedmont
03-30-2010, 09:41 AM
They told us what happened, how it happened and what to do about it. Unless you fly the MD-10-10, it's of little concern to you. It's no big secret but it's also something I wouldn't talk about on a public forum without permission, and I ain't gonna ask.

Well there you have it, World Guy, it was something specific to the MD-10-10, and does not apply in any way to the MD-11.

dojetdriver
03-30-2010, 12:59 PM
Interesting thing to note is that could have represented 1300 hours of fighter time, which could equate to 7 years of flying, prior to getting hired into the right seat of the Mad Dog. Not saying that's the way it is, just that although 2300 hours does sound like low time, it could easily be real quality time over a good number of years.

JJ

Or said pilot was single seat tactical jet, and was hired as an engineer where no flight time was logged, then transitioned later to the right seat of said airframe. Or possibly said pilot is heavy/tanker/transport guard/reserve, got hired at FedEx, but maybe went on AD and didn't fly much, if at all, then went back to their civilian job.

But yeah, agreeing with you, I wouldn't rate the flight time as "low" if those scenarios were indeed said pilots background.

The Walrus
03-30-2010, 01:03 PM
I think by low, he meant that 2300 with 800 in the aircraft would probably mean that he was hired at Fedex with 1500hrs, which is well below the average hrs to be hired here with.

dojetdriver
03-30-2010, 01:07 PM
I think by low, he meant that 2300 with 800 in the aircraft would probably mean that he was hired at Fedex with 1500hrs, which is well below the average hrs to be hired here with.

What's the average total time of a typical single seat/IP pilot that only did the minimum commitment when there were hired at FedEx?

The Walrus
03-30-2010, 01:14 PM
No idea, but you need 1500 hrs for an ATP, and it is required. I was just saying that the average flt time of a fedex pilot is probably around 4000.

dojetdriver
03-30-2010, 01:24 PM
No idea, but you need 1500 hrs for an ATP, and it is required. I was just saying that the average flt time of a fedex pilot is probably around 4000.

I was just saying that I think you'd be hard pressed to find a single seat/tactical pilot that just did the minimum military commitment, had the sponsor, the 3 recs from FedEx pilots that he/she has flown operationally with, did the meet n' greet, passed the interview, and had much more than the 1500 hours to fill out the app.

KC10 FATboy
03-30-2010, 01:43 PM
Interesting thing to note is that could have represented 1300 hours of fighter time, which could equate to 7 years of flying, prior to getting hired into the right seat of the Mad Dog. Not saying that's the way it is, just that although 2300 hours does sound like low time, it could easily be real quality time over a good number of years.

JJ

I think by low, he meant that 2300 with 800 in the aircraft would probably mean that he was hired at Fedex with 1500hrs, which is well below the average hrs to be hired here with.

My comment was innocent and I was trying to infer anything negative about certain classes of pilots or bring hate. TheWalrus said it best as to what I had been thinking.

I was interested in this accident because the USAF has had several KC-10s lose parts of the stab/elevator while encountering buffet. In one instance, I believe it was enough to cause damage to the stab trim jack screws/motors and the crew ended up with a jammed horizontal stabilizer.

I once had a TCAS RA which commanded a 3,750FPM descent. During the maneuver, it reversed itself and switched to a climbing TCAS RA. We were at FL280, 0.83M, and 565Klbs when it all started. Per the flight manual, I used the vertical speed wheel and autopilot to fly the RA (Air Force rules, not the TCAS maker's) and set the VVI in the green arc. When I rolled the vertical speed wheel from a descent to a climb, the aircraft shook violently ... very violently. Even though we were still at .83M, somehow the aircraft accelerated stalled?? I had our first set of receivers do a damage check of the tail and they didn't see anything unusual. We flew the mission and landed uneventually. I notified maintenance and they inspected the tail but found no damage.

A few months later, a safety rep from the Air Force and Boeing got in touch with me. It seems they were interested in my story and were investigating how the TCAS system could command rates of climbs, descent, and rollouts which could be outside the performance envelope of the KC-10. I've never heard back from them and I don't know what was or was not discovered.

One thing I know for sure, I'm not the only one who has had a KC-10 get into buffet like this.

FliFast
03-30-2010, 02:17 PM
Interesting thing to note is that could have represented 1300 hours of fighter time, which could equate to 7 years of flying, prior to getting hired into the right seat of the Mad Dog. Not saying that's the way it is, just that although 2300 hours does sound like low time, it could easily be real quality time over a good number of years.

JJ

7 years of flying to attain 1300, but it's good quality ?

1300 hours is 1300 hours. 15 hours a month.

I'm not unappreciative of our courageous men and women of the armed forces, but call it what it is, and furthermore who cares how many hours the pilot in question has. None of us are immune to accidents, incidents, violations, and just plain boneheaded mistakes....experience just means you've probably already made the same mistake and learned from it without incident.

FF

MaydayMark
03-30-2010, 03:15 PM
I "think" we've had more than one MD-11 GPWS alert (usually in heavy rain showers which used to indicate as terrain prior to a software fix), that, during the flight manual recovery procedure (even by rather petite women) damaged the horizontal stab? It a long moment arm and it wouldn't take much to "over G" the tail?

Jetjok
03-30-2010, 04:34 PM
7 years of flying to attain 1300, but it's good quality ?

1300 hours is 1300 hours. 15 hours a month.

I'm not unappreciative of our courageous men and women of the armed forces, but call it what it is, and furthermore who cares how many hours the pilot in question. None of us are immune to accidents, incidents, violations, and just plain boneheaded mistakes....experience just means you've probably already made the same mistake and learned from it without incident.

FF

FF

Yes, of course you're right. 1300 hours is indeed 1300 hours. And there certainly can't be much difference between C-172 time and F-18 (flying off of an aircraft carrier.) I'm sure any interview board would rate both guys about the same. Another interesting point is that if this guy got hired at FedEx with minimum time, he is either a good stick (or for you heavy boys, a good yoke:D) or he's got some serious friends on the hiring board. I prefer to think that he's a good pilot. I do agree that in this business, there are those who have and those who will. That's why they publish accident and incident reports, so that we can learn and hopefully not repeat anothers mistake.

JJ

The Walrus
03-30-2010, 05:21 PM
There are those who have, and those who has been.:rolleyes:

KC10 FATboy
03-30-2010, 05:22 PM
Yes, of course you're right. 1300 hours is indeed 1300 hours. And there certainly can't be much difference between C-172 time and F-18 (flying off of an aircraft carrier.) I'm sure any interview board would rate both guys about the same. Another interesting point is that if this guy got hired at FedEx with minimum time, he is either a good stick (or for you heavy boys, a good yoke:D) or he's got some serious friends on the hiring board. I prefer to think that he's a good pilot. I do agree that in this business, there are those who have and those who will. That's why they publish accident and incident reports, so that we can learn and hopefully not repeat anothers mistake.

JJ

I agree, that's why some of us were curious about this accident. But some of ya'll slammed the door in our faces with the "we've addressed it, you don't fly the MD-10, nothing to see here" attitude.

We weren't throwing stones in the glass house, we were trying to learn something to include in our bag of tricks.

navigatro
03-30-2010, 05:30 PM
It is a shame when people let pride and ego get in the way of learning and safety.

navigatro
03-30-2010, 05:32 PM
They told us what happened, how it happened and what to do about it. Unless you fly the MD-10-10, it's of little concern to you. It's no big secret but it's also something I wouldn't talk about on a public forum without permission, and I ain't gonna ask.


I have read the report, and I disagree completely.

bcrosier
03-30-2010, 08:24 PM
They told us what happened, how it happened and what to do about it. Unless you fly the MD-10-10, it's of little concern to you. It's no big secret but it's also something I wouldn't talk about on a public forum without permission, and I ain't gonna ask.

I'm glad you know so much about every other aircraft type out there that you conclusively know there would be nothing to benefit the rest of us simpletons from this event. Heaven forbid we might all learn a bit from this incident.

If it's no big secret, then why don't you share (in broad terms), what caused this event? You sir, are coming across as a grand champion tool bag.

FliFast
03-30-2010, 09:29 PM
Yes, of course you're right. 1300 hours is indeed 1300 hours. And there certainly can't be much difference between C-172 time and F-18 (flying off of an aircraft carrier.) I'm sure any interview board would rate both guys about the same.
JJ

When I got hired across the street at Brown, I had 700 hours (mostly PIC time) of Cessna time (all types)...and I know I was lucky.

FF...the FLAP.

JetPiedmont
03-31-2010, 03:06 AM
So when you say you're "building time at UPS", you're not kidding! Had you been a UPS employee at a different job when you were hired? Either way, well done!

JetPiedmont
03-31-2010, 03:15 AM
...Heaven forbid we might all learn a bit from this incident. ...If it's no big secret, then why don't you share (in broad terms), what caused this event?

I agree completely. As particular as the MD-10 and MD-11 is to fly, I would think any insights FDX was able to have from this rather disturbing incident would have been shared with other MD-10 and MD-11 operators, but doesn't seem to have been.

Laughing_Jakal
03-31-2010, 09:31 AM
I agree completely. As particular as the MD-10 and MD-11 is to fly, I would think any insights FDX was able to have from this rather disturbing incident would have been shared with other MD-10 and MD-11 operators, but doesn't seem to have been.

There are no other MD-10 operators.....we invented it.

bcrosier
03-31-2010, 10:02 AM
So, is the cause of this COMPLETELY unique to the MD-10, or could it have possible application do the DC-10, MD-11, or even other types? Is this information so sensitive that everyone else needs to be kept in the dark? As an MD-11 pilot, I'd really like to know.

Daniel Larusso
03-31-2010, 10:28 AM
There are no other MD-10 operators.....we invented it.

Nothing to be proud of Russ....

hyperone
03-31-2010, 10:42 AM
So, is the cause of this COMPLETELY unique to the MD-10, or could it have possible application do the DC-10, MD-11, or even other types? Is this information so sensitive that everyone else needs to be kept in the dark? As an MD-11 pilot, I'd really like to know.

bcrosier, the problem with the high altitude holding is that many FMS's are not designed to keep you out of the coffin corner of high altitude and slow speed driving you below an airspeed that your aircraft can maintain while holding level flight. The ICAO holding speed of 265 kts is simply too slow when above about FL250. The problem is made worse by an FMC that normally limits bank angles to 15 degrees or less for cruise, but will go to 25 degrees for standard rate turns in holding. Even worse, a high altitude stall in the MD-11 or MD-10 may or may NOT be preceded by stick shaker.
You are allowed to ask ATC to hold at 280kts/.80M (whichever is lower) if you expect or encounter turbulence when using FAA TERPS, Old PANS OPS, or New PANS OPS. Fedex Safety says we can and must ask for this higher speed when above FL250.
bcrosier, there's no secret and hopefully all air carrier now train their pilots that if they are directed to hold above FL250, that they do it at 280kts/.80M (or whatever your aircraft's minimum safe speed at altitude in a 25 degree turn is) and tell ATC that's what they are doing.

AerisArmis
03-31-2010, 02:59 PM
If it's no big secret, then why don't you share (in broad terms), what caused this event? You sir, are coming across as a grand champion tool bag.

Ouch, there goes tonights sleep! Look, if you want to know something, get with your safety guys. You have company and union safety groups, don't you? You don't have a "right" to have company info posted on APC. Oh yeah, the opposite of above me.

FliFast
03-31-2010, 03:06 PM
Report: Fedex DC10 near Raymond on Jun 14th 2008, aerodynamic stall while in holding

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Mar 23rd 2010 22:52Z, last updated Tuesday, Mar 23rd 2010 22:52Z
A Federal Express McDonnell Douglas MD-10, registration N554FE performing flight FX-764 from Memphis,TN to New York JFK,NY (USA) with 3 crew, entered a holding near Raymond,PA at FL330, when the stickshaker activated and the airplane experienced aerodynamic buffet. The crew managed to recover the airplane and continued to JFK for a safe landing. Post flight inspection revealed substantial damage to both elevators and the right hand stabilizer.

The NTSB released their factual report (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20080703X00974&key=1) stating, that the airplane was sent into a holding pattern at waypoint HOXIE (inbound course 115 degrees). The airplane's FMS computed the holding speed at 230 KIAS, 5 knots above minimum clean speed, while the crew expected the FMS to default to 265 KIAS, the ICAO maximum holding speed. The captain increased the holding speed to 240 KIAS to increase the margin to Vmin. The crew expected the autopilot would limit the bank angles to 15 degrees.

While the airplane banked 23 degrees to enter the holding, the airspeed fell below 240 KIAS and was about 235 KIAS when wings rolled level, but did not recover. Therefore the crew requested a lower level and was cleared to FL320. The captain selected the bank angle limitation from auto to 15. During the descending turn the speed fell to about 220 KIAS, the first officer recommended to extend the slats, the maximum slat speed was indicated 270 KIAS, so that the captain ordered the slats to be extended. Upon selecting the slats down the indicated maximum slat speed dropped to below 220 KIAS, so that the captain ordered the slats to be immediately retracted. At that point the airplane began to buffet and the autoslat extension alert activated. The crew requested further descent and was cleared to FL290. The buffeting ceased when the airplane descended through FL300.

Data off the flight data recorder showed, that slats were extended at 205 knots well below the maximum slat speed of 260 knots. However, the mach number at that time was 0.59 well above the maximum mach number 0.51 for extended slats. With the slat extension the selected airspeed fell to 0.51 and autothrottle reduced thrust from 100% N1 to about 50% N1. When the slats were retracted, autothrottle increased thrust again to 100% N1. By the time the engines had spooled up again the airspeed had dropped to 180 KIAS, the stickshaker activated 5 seconds later and continued to operate for about one minute. A series of pitch oscillation between 2 and 12 degrees nose up occured. While the stick shaker was active, the airplane descended from FL340 to FL306 and subsequently reached FL290 at 230 KIAS.

The AOM reads in part under Stall Recovery Procedures:

"Should a crew encounter buffet in the clean configuration below 0.84 Mach, prompt stall recovery corrective action should be taken. Maximum continuous thrustů should be applied and pitch attitude reduced as required to minimize altitude loss. If below the slat limit speed, slats should be extended. At heavy weights or high altitudes, if the airspeed/Mach has become low, this technique alone may not be adequate for recovery and altitude should be traded for airspeed to accelerate out of the buffet. Incomplete recovery may result in a secondary stall or inability to accelerate to cruise mach with thrust available. If recovery action is not promptly initiated, a substantial loss of altitude may resultů"

The bank angle is limited to 25 degrees between Mach 0.17 and Mach 0.55.

FliFast
03-31-2010, 03:08 PM
Clicking the link in the google search.

All is public info, readily available on the internet.

DCA08FA075
History of Flight:

On June 14, 2008, at 1015 eastern daylight time, FedEx flight 764, a McDonnell Douglas/Boeing MD-10-10 freighter, experienced aerodynamic buffet and stickshaker while descending from FL330 in a holding pattern near Raymond, Pennsylvania. Damage occurred to both elevators and right horizontal stabilizer. The flight was enroute from Memphis, Tennessee, to John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. None of the three flightcrew members on board were injured and the flight landed uneventfully.

According to the captain, the flight was uneventful until shortly before the airplane entered the holding pattern at HOXIE with an inbound course of 115 degrees at FL330. The holding pattern legs were 20 nm long. The speed calculated by the flight management system (FMS) was 230 knots, 5 knots above the Vmin speed for the configuration and weight of the airplane. Both pilots expected the FMS to automatically default to the ICAO maximum holding speed of 265 knots, as described in the Fed Ex company flight manual (CFM). However, the captain decided to command the FMS to maintain an airspeed of 240 knots to increase the buffer between the holding speed and Vmin.

Upon reaching HOXIE, the airplane automatically banked left to enter holding and the captain noticed that the airspeed was lessening from 240 knots. He stated that he expected the airspeed to recover once the turn was completed. He also stated that he expected the bank to be limited to 15 degrees, but the autopilot actually commanded 23 degrees of bank. Upon completing the turn, the airspeed was approximately 5 knots below Vmin. The captain expected the airspeed to recover now that the airplane was wings level. However, this did not occur, and when appropriate, the airplane started to automatically turn to the inbound holding heading.

The captain then asked the first officer to request a lower altitude in the holding pattern. The first officer complied and Cleveland ARTCC cleared the flight to descend to FL320. The captain then selected level change on the FMS to 320 and he also reduced the autobank controller to 15 degrees, from 23 degrees.

During the descending turn, with the airspeed at about 220 knots, the first officer recommended extending the slats. The maximum slat extension speed at that juncture was 270 knots, according to the captain. When the slats extended, the maximum slat extension speed indicator on the airspeed indicator fell to below 220 knots. The captain then immediately ordered the first officer to retract the slats. He stated that at this point the airplane began to buffet, and an autoslat extension alert occurred. The first officer requested a further descent and was cleared by ARTCC to descend to FL290. The captain then selected a level change on the FMS to 290. The buffeting ceased when the airplane was passing approximately FL300 during this descent. Visual meteorological conditions existed at the time frame of the buffeting event, and no turbulence was encountered. The flight landed uneventfully.


Injuries to Persons:

None of the flight crewmembers on board the airplane were injured.


Damage to Aircraft:

Substantial damage to the right and left elevators and the right horizontal stabilizer tip structure was discovered by maintenance personnel following engine shutdown.


Personnel Information:

Both the captain and first officer held air transport pilot ratings and were type-rated in the McDonnell Douglas MD-11. These type-ratings also apply to the McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10 due to similarities between the two types. Both held current first class medical certificates with no waivers or limitations. And, both successufully completed FAR 121 flight checks in May of 2008. The captain had accumulated 6814 total flying hours with 2740 hours in the MD-10. The first officer had accumulated 2334 total flying hours with 820 hours in the MD-10.


Aircraft Information:

The airplane was a McDonnell Douglas (Boeing) MD10-10, serial number 46708. It was registered in the United States as N554FE. The total time on the airframe was 86, 958 hours, and it was last inspected under a continuous airworthiness program on May 8, 2007.


Flight Data Recorder Information:

According to the flight data recorder data and an analysis of that data by Boeing engineers, the slats were extended by the flight crew when the airspeed was 205 knots, well below the maximum slat extension speed of 260 knots. However the Mach number at that time was 0.59, well above the 0.51 Mach minimum slat extension speed. The target Mach then became 0.51, and the autothrottles reduced from 100% N1 rpm to about 50% N1 rpm.

When the slats were retracted by the flight crew, the autothrottles advanced the thrust back to 100% N1 rpm. However, by the time the engine thrust had recovered, the airspeed had dropped to about 180 knots. The stick shakers activated about 5 seconds later and continued to operate for approximately one minute.

About 10 seconds after initial stick shaker activation the airplane pitch reached 12 degrees nose up. 10 seconds later, the pitch was recorded to be 3 degrees nose up, and 17 seconds after that, the pitch was recorded to again be about 12 degrees nose up. Almost immediately after that, the pitch was recorded to be 2 degrees nose up. Pitch then increased to about 7 degrees nose up, then stabilized at about 5 degrees nose up, rapidly decreased to 0 degrees nose up, and then recovered to a stable 5 degrees nose up over the next 40 seconds.

During the period of stick shaker activity, the altitude decreased from FL 340 to FL 306. The airplane continued to descend to FL 290 as the airspeed recovered to 230 knots.

Additional Information:

On January 21, 1988, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company (subsequently acquired by Boeing) issued All Operator Letter C1-E60-HHK-99-L033, titled High Altitude Stall Buffet. Although addressed to all DC-10 operators, it also still applies to the MD-10 which is aerodynamically identical to the DC-10. The subheading in the AOL titled Buffet Characteristics reads in part:

A quick way to determine whether airframe buffet is resulting from high or low speed flight is to check the Mach number. For mach numbers below 0.84 in 1.0g flight, the buffet is related to maximum lift capability or stall. The buffet onset or stick shaker speed, whichever is greater, should be used as the minimum speed below which aircraft structural damage, in the form of wrinkled elevators, could potentially occur.

The subheading in the AOL titled Stall Recovery Procedure reads in part:

Should a crew encounter buffet in the clean configuration below 0.84 Mach, prompt stall recovery corrective action should be taken. Maximum continuous thrust… should be applied and pitch attitude reduced as required to minimize altitude loss. If below the slat limit speed, slats should be extended. At heavy weights or high altitudes, if the airspeed/Mach has become low, this technique alone may not be adequate for recovery and altitude should be traded for airspeed to accelerate out of the buffet. Incomplete recovery may result in a secondary stall or inability to accelerate to cruise mach with thrust available. If recovery action is not promptly initiated, a substantial loss of altitude may result…


The Boeing MD-10 Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) section titled Recovery from Approach to Stall reads in part:

At first indication of approach to stall, simultaneously apply maximum available thrust, level wings and adjust pitch as required to minimize altitude loss.

First indication of approach to stall may be one or any combination of the following:

• Rapid decrease below selected airspeed or digital airspeed turns amber.
• Airspeed decay below the Vmin indicator toward the Vs indicator on the airspeed tape.
• Pitch Attitudes approaching the PLI
• Stick shaker or initial stall buffet (light wing rock may be present)

At first indication of a stall with auto flight engaged immediately disconnect auto flght and initiate stall recovery. Be alert to counteract excessive nose-up trim condition.

Above 25, 000 feet, stall can occur prior to stick shaker with buffet serving as the only stall warning.

The FCOM section titled Automatic Flight – Description and Operation states in part:

The commanded speed will be the FMS speed if the FMS SPD is engaged.

If the Bank angle limit selector is set to the AUTO position, the bank angle limit value will vary as follows:

Limited to 25 degrees between Mach 0.17 and Mach 0.55.


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Gunter
03-31-2010, 05:23 PM
"This doesn't apply to you, move along"

Too bad you're so embarrassed by this to want to hide it. We should all learn something from it. Put your Mad Dog egos aside for a moment.

navigatro
03-31-2010, 05:43 PM
Ouch, there goes tonights sleep! Look, if you want to know something, get with your safety guys. You have company and union safety groups, don't you? You don't have a "right" to have company info posted on APC. Oh yeah, the opposite of above me.

Real nice. Get over yourself.

Blowtorch joc
03-31-2010, 09:19 PM
JetPiedmont......in remedial school it must have gone something like this for those poor guys.
" Ok kids when you see an amber SE on your PFD DON'T TOUCH THAT SLAT/FLAP HANDLE, when it turns green then you may"

Laughing_Jakal
03-31-2010, 11:11 PM
Nothing to be proud of Russ....

Not proud .... just factual

Huck
04-01-2010, 04:11 AM
" Ok kids when you see an amber SE on your PFD DON'T TOUCH THAT SLAT/FLAP HANDLE, when it turns green then you may"

The way I read it, that was the problem - the SE was green, until the slats went out, then it dropped below their speed.

Evidently it wasn't programmed to show max mach number....

Daniel Larusso
04-01-2010, 07:24 AM
Not proud .... just factual

You're not a genius with food additives are you?

EZRider
04-01-2010, 03:11 PM
bcrosier, the problem with the high altitude holding is that many FMS's are not designed to keep you out of the coffin corner of high altitude and slow speed driving you below an airspeed that your aircraft can maintain while holding level flight. The ICAO holding speed of 265 kts is simply too slow when above about FL250. The problem is made worse by an FMC that normally limits bank angles to 15 degrees or less for cruise, but will go to 25 degrees for standard rate turns in holding. Even worse, a high altitude stall in the MD-11 or MD-10 may or may NOT be preceded by stick shaker.
You are allowed to ask ATC to hold at 280kts/.80M (whichever is lower) if you expect or encounter turbulence when using FAA TERPS, Old PANS OPS, or New PANS OPS. Fedex Safety says we can and must ask for this higher speed when above FL250.
bcrosier, there's no secret and hopefully all air carrier now train their pilots that if they are directed to hold above FL250, that they do it at 280kts/.80M (or whatever your aircraft's minimum safe speed at altitude in a 25 degree turn is) and tell ATC that's what they are doing.

Awareness of the limitations of our automation and the dangers of over-reliance on it is always good info.

Thank you, 'hyperone'.

Precontact
09-28-2010, 03:51 PM
NTSB Identification: DCA08FA075
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP (D.B.A. Federal Express Corp)
Accident occurred Saturday, June 14, 2008 in Raymond, PA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 9/27/2010 2:17:55 PM
Aircraft: DOUGLAS MD-10, registration: N554FE
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
According to the captain, the flight was uneventful until shortly before the airplane entered a holding pattern at FL330. The speed calculated by the flight management system (FMS) was 230 knots, 5 knots above the Vmin speed for the configuration and weight of the airplane. Both pilots expected the FMS to automatically default to the ICAO maximum holding speed of 265 knots, as described in the company flight manual. However, the captain decided to command the FMS to maintain 240 knots to increase the buffer between the holding speed and Vmin. Upon reaching the pattern fix, the airplane automatically banked left to enter holding and the captain noticed that the airspeed was lessening from 240 knots. He expected the airspeed to recover once the turn was completed. He also expected the bank to be limited to 15 degrees, but the autopilot actually commanded 23 degrees. Upon completing the turn, the airspeed was approximately 5 knots below Vmin. The captain expected the airspeed to recover now that the airplane was wings level. However, this did not occur, and when appropriate, the airplane started to automatically turn to the inbound holding heading. The crew then requested and was granted a clearance to descend to FL320 in the holding pattern. The captain then selected level change on the FMS to 320 and he also reduced the autobank controller to 15 degrees, from 23 degrees. During the descending turn, with the airspeed at about 220 knots, the first officer recommended extending the slats. The maximum slat extension speed at that juncture was 270 knots, according to the captain. When the slats extended, the maximum slat extension speed indicator on the airspeed indicator fell to below 220 knots. The captain then immediately ordered the first officer to retract the slats. He stated that at this point the airplane began to buffet, and an autoslat extension alert occurred. The first officer requested a further descent and was cleared to FL290. The captain then selected a level change on the FMS to 290. The buffeting ceased when the airplane was passing approximately FL300 during this descent. The flight landed uneventfully; however, the buffeting had caused substantial damage to both elevators and right horizontal stabilizer that was discovered during a post-flight inspection. According to the flight data recorder data and an analysis of that data by the airplane’s manufacturer, the slats were extended by the flight crew when the airspeed was 205 knots, well below the maximum slat extension speed of 260 knots. However the Mach number at that time was 0.59, well above the 0.51 Mach minimum slat extension speed. The target Mach then became 0.51, and the autothrottles reduced from 100% N1 rpm to about 50% N1 rpm. When the slats were retracted by the flight crew, the autothrottles advanced the thrust back to 100% N1 rpm. However, by the time the engine thrust had recovered, the airspeed had dropped to about 180 knots. The stick shakers activated about 5 seconds later and continued to operate for approximately one minute.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The flight crew's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's airspeed during the holding pattern, leading to the onset of an aerodynamic stall and subsequent structural damage to the tail from buffet.