GT 3591 and Atlas Managment
 

Atlas managements spin: It's not our fault. If we would have had the magical data base this would have never happened. We had no way of knowing that this pilot was incompetent.

This is not an attack by me on the pilots of Atlas. Many airlines have pilots with poor records hiding in plain sight. Hopefully this accident will make it harder for those people to move from job to job and incompetent management to hire any warm body. The lawsuits just got a whole lot uglier. Thank God it wasn't a 763 with 200+ soldiers on board.

https://abc13.com/pilot-in-atlas-cra...-says/6317054/

If I heard it correctly, Atlas mgmt had an HR firm with no flight ops experience reviewing pilot logbooks/records for training deficiencies and failures. It’s an absolute disgrace on Atlas’ part and I don’t think the NTSB drilled that point home enough. There is no reason two of those pilots on 3591 should be dead. It’s through the incompetency of Atlas mgmt that they are. FO didn’t belong in a Cessna let alone a 500,000lbs 767 airliner. Not to mention every single sim instructor that previously busted that guy prior to Atlas said the exact same thing. “Gets spooked easily, incorrect procedure, impulsivity.” An absolute tragedy and completely avoidable.

No one belongs in a 500,000lb 767!

It is 100% Atlas' fault. Hiring someone with that record is inexcusable. There are plenty of qualified minority pilots who don't have several failed 121 training events that they could have hired. However, before COVID19, there were much better jobs than Atlas available for the highly qualified pilots. I can only speculate that Atlas wanted to hire someone who couldn't leave for greener pastures, for the same reason that pilots on furlough have more difficulty getting hired. Money.

Fixed that for you.

Choosing applicants by any criteria other than their flight-related knowledge, skills, and ability causes bad things to happen.

No, you didn't fix it for me. The reason is, Blackhawk was specifically saying that Atlas management was not entirely at fault because he thinks Atlas felt pressured to hire/retain a minority pilot. Even IF that's true (I've seen no evidence to prove it), that doesn't excuse them from hiring someone with such a poor record, while more qualified minority pilots are looking for jobs. To me, it just shows how low their hiring standards were during the shortage, and how motivated they were to hire certain candidates in order to increase retention and reduce training costs.

Guys, guys- Atlas management is doing everything in their power to provide us with the industry standard contract that we deserve. You just don't see the big picture. There is a process... :D

It was bad enough that they hired him, but worse that they did not fire him when they had multiple opportunities. The boys in the elite corporate club will avoid any blame. They have lawyers to ensure that. What I want to know is how do they sleep at night? I guess on a mattress filled with $.

Are you DB with HR? Who in Atlas management are you?

Ultimately, it is J.D.'s fault. He is the ship captain, he was in charge of negotiations when he was the COO. His decisions about circumventing Section 06 and having a toxic attitude towards the pilots caused the "brain drain" and the decision to hire people that have little in the way of previous experience. They needed to fill classes come hell or high water. There was a lot of pressure to get bodies out onto the line to fulfill the executive promises to Amazon. Big bonuses were received for filling seats. He made a lot of money. The rest of us are just expendable.

I agree with this generally, but discussions about causal factors, fault and blame really spread out like oil on water.

Instructors and Check Airmen went along with things. When it comes to adopting improved training and safety practices we in the union frequently say "Well, the company said no, so there was nothing we could do." when in fact we had a number of proposals were held up in the executive council. As individuals we covered for each other. As a collective both in management and in the union we used to speak highly of the people who passed this FO onward, and we used to say the DE who failed him was a persnickety nerd.

This is why the first 6 months after a fatal crash you see the best in people. After that you see the worst. People with experience dealing with other, fatal crashes will know that there's a role for advocacy during investigations. A union's role is to advocate for full truth. So all the grand statements, pins and memorials when people are paying attention amount to nothing. What matters are the decisions made when it comes time to put your promotion on the line.

As an example, a lot of work from the pilots and others went into the investigation around Eagle 4184. For this crash, what did we really do? The Exco member in charge of safety quietly applied for an assistant chief pilot position during this investigation. We'll say that this person's character would never let him compromise our pilots' interests. Let's get real.

Regardless, this investigation is done. The time for outrage and vigor was 2 years ago. Now's the time to look forward. We failed each other here. Let's get ahead of the next crash.