What’s in PRIA besides training/checkrides?
02-05-2022, 10:44 AM
#11
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2017
Posts: 936
Originally Posted by Pilot4000
Are part 91 operations required to participate in PRIA? What, if anything, would a 121 carrier require from a 91 operator?
I got to a major from a 91. The most important thing is to declare everything. Give the PRIA consultants a solid contact at said 91 operator and it will all shake out.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
02-05-2022, 11:39 AM
#12
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,009
Originally Posted by rickair7777
Once PRD actually replaces the PRIA, then you can probably rely on it. But it's not there yet.
NOTICE: On December 7, 2021, the Aviation Data Systems Branch will no longer accept FAA Form 8060-10 to request FAA records under PRIA. The requirement to review a pilot's FAA records under PRIA is still in effect and is expanded on by 14 CFR Part 111. Air carriers and operators who must review FAA records under PRIA and/or § 111.105 must use the Pilot Records Database (PRD) to obtain the records beginning December 7, 2021 in accordance with § 111.100(b).
Pilots can register to review their own PRD file. Go to the PRD website to register to view your own data. https://prd.faa.gov/PRDExternal
As for requesting records, your new employer must obtain records from prior employers. Specifically, the requirement is "an air carrier or other person that has employed an individual as a pilot of a civil or public aircraft at any time during the 5-year period preceding the date of the individual’s employment application," and further defines "person" as: "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals. It also includes a governmental authority, trustee, receiver, assignee, and other similar representative. Thus, a 14 CFR part 91 operator that has employed the applicant as a pilot within the previous 5-year period is considered a “person” and must furnish any PRIA requested records that it has created concerning the applicant" (https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...er_8000_88.pdf).
You'll be asked to send records requests to all former employers, with the exception of certain types of employment excluded under 119 (part 137, etc). Your new employer must make a good faith effort in attempting to obtain the records. You may begin training with your new employer before the PRIA investigation is done, but cannot go to work until it is complete. If you're hiring into a light airplane (under 7,500 lbs payload) or helicopter position, and unscheduled operations, you can go to work for up to 90 days while the process is completed.
03-25-2022, 03:34 PM
#13
Jet Jockey Junkie
Joined APC: May 2015
Position: F.O.
Posts: 231
PRIA Information
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
Your employer is asking because your employe is required to ask. It's an act of congress, and the employer can't employ you until having asked, and then with certain time passage, received.Your employer is making a good faith effort.
You're entitled to see everything your employer sees. It's a box you check on the form. That said, since the beginning of PRIA, I've never once had a copy of any of the records sent to me. I've requested them in every case.
Former employers are required to comply and notify the requesting parties about your training records and disciplinary action. Your former employer is not required to do a file dump, and most won't. Most employers aren't going to do more than receive the records. If you have training failures or disciplinary action (termination, for example) that you didn't disclose, then it may be an issue with your present employer. Beyond that, an employer isn't going to care about a "score" you received on your prior training, or call a former employer. Why did Mr. Ross get a sat/unsat...or 1,2,3,4,5...etc? Your new employer will do due diligence in checking and training and produce their own records. What the new employer does want is to comply with the law, and what the new employer does not want is to be surprised with the liability of an employee with a history of failures who comes aboard and hurts the employers operation or reputation.
Where former records will bite you is when you haven't been open or disclosed the past, and you need to know your past that will show up. Cheryl Cage's book, Reporting Clear, was a standard primer for some time in explaining how and why one should know one's background as it will be presented, before the future employer does. It's still available for purchase from Cage Marshall consulting.
You're entitled to see everything your employer sees. It's a box you check on the form. That said, since the beginning of PRIA, I've never once had a copy of any of the records sent to me. I've requested them in every case.
Former employers are required to comply and notify the requesting parties about your training records and disciplinary action. Your former employer is not required to do a file dump, and most won't. Most employers aren't going to do more than receive the records. If you have training failures or disciplinary action (termination, for example) that you didn't disclose, then it may be an issue with your present employer. Beyond that, an employer isn't going to care about a "score" you received on your prior training, or call a former employer. Why did Mr. Ross get a sat/unsat...or 1,2,3,4,5...etc? Your new employer will do due diligence in checking and training and produce their own records. What the new employer does want is to comply with the law, and what the new employer does not want is to be surprised with the liability of an employee with a history of failures who comes aboard and hurts the employers operation or reputation.
Where former records will bite you is when you haven't been open or disclosed the past, and you need to know your past that will show up. Cheryl Cage's book, Reporting Clear, was a standard primer for some time in explaining how and why one should know one's background as it will be presented, before the future employer does. It's still available for purchase from Cage Marshall consulting.
If you were fired for banging the Chief pilots daughter or because you had an argument with management and told them where to go, is that really something you should disclose?
I’m sure a termination will show up on your PRIA but it also has nothing to do with performance as a pilot which is what they are supposed to report, nothing relating to performance or safety as a pilot is supposed to be reported.
Even a checkride failure which for sure will show up on your PRIA but if they don’t ask should you disclose it?
Of course I’m not advocating lying and cover ups etc but at the same time pilots don’t want to jeopardize their chances of a new position. If called in you could always say well you never asked.
03-25-2022, 05:53 PM
#14
Prime Minister/Moderator
Joined APC: Jan 2006
Position: Engines Turn Or People Swim
Posts: 39,261
Originally Posted by Egg320
I agree with you that honesty is the best policy however do you feel pilots should disclose something they were never asked about?
If you were fired for banging the Chief pilots daughter or because you had an argument with management and told them where to go, is that really something you should disclose?
I’m sure a termination will show up on your PRIA but it also has nothing to do with performance as a pilot which is what they are supposed to report, nothing relating to performance or safety as a pilot is supposed to be reported.
Even a checkride failure which for sure will show up on your PRIA but if they don’t ask should you disclose it?
Of course I’m not advocating lying and cover ups etc but at the same time pilots don’t want to jeopardize their chances of a new position. If called in you could always say well you never asked.
If you were fired for banging the Chief pilots daughter or because you had an argument with management and told them where to go, is that really something you should disclose?
I’m sure a termination will show up on your PRIA but it also has nothing to do with performance as a pilot which is what they are supposed to report, nothing relating to performance or safety as a pilot is supposed to be reported.
Even a checkride failure which for sure will show up on your PRIA but if they don’t ask should you disclose it?
Of course I’m not advocating lying and cover ups etc but at the same time pilots don’t want to jeopardize their chances of a new position. If called in you could always say well you never asked.
But if it's something relatively minor, better to disclose and deal with it up front... your odds of getting/staying hired are usually better with honesty.
Exception to honesty might be for something serious which was not covered in their asks, but would most likely prevent you from being hired if they find out. In that case you might roll the dice, try to get the job, and hope they never find out. Examples... member of an extremist group in your youth, expelled from college for running a cheating ring, member of a public S&M/swinger group. These are all situations that I've seen or heard about on employee background checks... not illegal, but a turn off for most employers.
It also matters what you have to lose if you get the job but get fired later. CFI, not so much... 20 year regional CA with wife, mortgage, and three kids, different story. In the later case you should really be upfront about anything that might be controversial, before you take the job.
03-26-2022, 04:20 AM
#15
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,009
It's entirely possible that something happened, unrelated to your performance as a pilot, that led to a termination or something along those lines. Bosses daughter, someone didn't like your politics, whatever. I've seen it happen. In such a case, historically, the best bet is to put distance (years) down the road and leave it behind. Up until PRD, anyway. Whereas PRIA was a request process (requirement) going back a few years, PRD is a permanent record, in one clearinghouse. It has the disadvantage of not being able to outrun your past, but the advantage of foresight: you'll know what's there and you can address it.
The light in which you're viewed regarding your past is two-fold: it's about the events that are recorded and reported, but it's also about how you deal with them and present them (attitude, altitude, and all that). The ancient, sage advice to come clean, own your past, and show what you've learned from it can be a strong point in your favor, but you have to be in front of it to do that. You have to own it outright and explain how, why, and where it's got you today. If it's something you hide and only admit after being confronted, then it becomes a problem.
Life is full of gray areas. You worked for a union, the company came after you. Negotiations were in play, and any shots across the bow were the company's way of putting pressure on the union. You made a minor screw up, company fired you. You filed a grievance through the union, and it was settled with back pay and the company agreed to accept a letter of resignation, converting it from a termination to you quitting. Fair enough. You don't want to work for them after they did that to you, anyway. You move on. You're happier, blood pressure goes down. You don't look back. But, your next employer does.
So, here's a gray area. The separation from the company was a firing: it was a termination. Your former employer, as part of a legal settlement, agreed to accept your resignation, six months later. They paid you back pay...pretty good exoneration; read between the lines and know the company wouldn't have paid you if you didn't have a case. They knew they were wrong. But you really can't say that, doesn't look good, no matter how you slice it ("yeah, I hit back, got paid, got a legal settlement to cover it up..."). The illusion is relatively complete: you have a legally binding agreement to convert the termination to a resignation...not that uncommon for employees to resign, quit, etc. Also a bit of a red flag, sometimes, because "resign" is often tacitly viewed as quitting under pressure...sometimes viewed as one step up from firing. That said, it's made the best of a bad situation, legally...except: the company can't lie when records are required under the law. They can't change your history in those records.
When the union was fighting the company for the new contract, and you, as their steward, walked around with a big target on your back, you became the bullseye for that shot across the bow. You made a minor mistake. The company had a policy about flap use, or something like that, and you followed it, resulting in a blown tire at a high density altitude field. The company grabbed onto it, fired you for whatever reason, but it went in the records as a violation of company policy. A memo went to the training department, give this guy remedial training, but in the meantime, before you got there, the company saw the opportunity, and fired you. The company has, buried in those training records, a memo about the real reason you're gone, so far as they're concerned. Violation of company policy, blown tire, whatever. If anyone asks the company about the reason you left, they have a legal obligation to say you resigned. HOWEVER, the records can't be altered. While your resignation letter can be inserted into your HR employment jacket, your training department file is sacred, and if it says something else, that's going to appear.
Know before you go: know what other employers are going to say about you. Review your records. Review all of them; see what former employers have submitted, see what is in your FAA and PRD records. Get a copy of your driving history, and pull your credit. An employer may have told you one thing, but may have written another. It does happen. Mistakes occur, and some have a vindictive streak, too. Some operators have little fifedoms in their operation, complete with Napoleon-complex czarist autocrafts, and who knows what might lurk? You can know, however, and that's the best way to get ahead of it. Find out what's reported. If you're unsure about how to address the past, or what to disclose, see what's been disclosed already, see what's reported to the PRD, etc. Did that legal agreement to convert your termination to a resignation play out as intended? Find out, and then know whether to report it this way, or that. Both are legitimate. Neither are a lie: if you say you were terminated, that's true. If you say you resigned, that's also true. Better to say resigned, if able, but know how to address it. Talk to an attorney, former union personnel, etc.
Looking back, you may determine that you need to explain the resignation, after you've determined that your records don't show it as a termination. It does need explaining: did you resign because you were about to be fired, or did you resign to go to another job, or were there other, extenuating circumstances that might also require explanation? Those records to have mention, as it turned out, of the incident that led to the termination/resignation, but don't say anything about termination. You still need to get ahead of it. Perhaps you can disclose the event in advance, simply say that you, and the company, didn't see eye to eye on the matter, and you determined you'd prefer to go elsewhere.
Gray areas. Some of this is best addressed with a coach; you may find that an experienced coach who does employment preparation has seen this, and every other shade of gray, before, and has helped hundreds, maybe even thousands of other pilots polish and explain history in a way that paints them in the best light. Call it spin, call it the fine art of diplomacy, call it preparation: it doesn't hurt to sit down with someone who does this for a living, and work out the best way to get ahead of anything that you might need to explain. Skeletons in the closet aren't nearly as scary in the daylight.
With PRD, ancient employers will still be in the record books, years down the line, and you can expect to have multiple employers in your career. This is aviation. If you haven't see it yet, you will...bankrupcies, mergers, furloughs, downsizing, whatever...you'll ride the roller coaster if you stick with this, and you'll ride it more than once. Why did you go fly a Cessna 210 doing night freight, when you had a cushy job in a 767? Furloughed, took what you could find until recalled? Easy explanation. But what about that period when you didn't fly for a year? Family emergency. Okay. And that time you switched jobs, went from captain to F/O, similar equipment, similar employer...looks like you resigned? Tell us about that. Helps to get ahead of it, be prepared with the answer that works in your best interest. Don't lie. Don't hide, but you have to paint with the colors you've got and you have to know what they are...get the information, and determine what, if anything, you may need to address, and how best to address it. You can approach the same incident or subject from several different directions, and leave several different impressions.
Excuses are never complimentary. Don't use them. Concealing never looks good. Lying is a cardinal sin. But outside of that, we're all human. Few careers are picture perfect. We move. We divorce. We marry. Families form, members die. We get sick. We get well. We make mistakes. We make choices. Sometimes, choices are made for us. The economy rolls on. Life happens. Know how that's reflected in your records, and how to best discuss that reflection. Given a new record-keeping and record-reporting system, that's a life-long reflection, so get ahead of it now, keep ahead of it over time, review it from time to time, and get comfortable with the way you'll address it. Whatever questions you're asked tomorrow, you'll be asked again in five years, ten years...you'll see this material again. Be comfortable discussing what needs to be discussed. History isn't just what happened. History is often known in the way it's recorded, the way it's retold, and the lens through which it is viewed. You have some control over that; empower yourself by staying informed.
The light in which you're viewed regarding your past is two-fold: it's about the events that are recorded and reported, but it's also about how you deal with them and present them (attitude, altitude, and all that). The ancient, sage advice to come clean, own your past, and show what you've learned from it can be a strong point in your favor, but you have to be in front of it to do that. You have to own it outright and explain how, why, and where it's got you today. If it's something you hide and only admit after being confronted, then it becomes a problem.
Life is full of gray areas. You worked for a union, the company came after you. Negotiations were in play, and any shots across the bow were the company's way of putting pressure on the union. You made a minor screw up, company fired you. You filed a grievance through the union, and it was settled with back pay and the company agreed to accept a letter of resignation, converting it from a termination to you quitting. Fair enough. You don't want to work for them after they did that to you, anyway. You move on. You're happier, blood pressure goes down. You don't look back. But, your next employer does.
So, here's a gray area. The separation from the company was a firing: it was a termination. Your former employer, as part of a legal settlement, agreed to accept your resignation, six months later. They paid you back pay...pretty good exoneration; read between the lines and know the company wouldn't have paid you if you didn't have a case. They knew they were wrong. But you really can't say that, doesn't look good, no matter how you slice it ("yeah, I hit back, got paid, got a legal settlement to cover it up..."). The illusion is relatively complete: you have a legally binding agreement to convert the termination to a resignation...not that uncommon for employees to resign, quit, etc. Also a bit of a red flag, sometimes, because "resign" is often tacitly viewed as quitting under pressure...sometimes viewed as one step up from firing. That said, it's made the best of a bad situation, legally...except: the company can't lie when records are required under the law. They can't change your history in those records.
When the union was fighting the company for the new contract, and you, as their steward, walked around with a big target on your back, you became the bullseye for that shot across the bow. You made a minor mistake. The company had a policy about flap use, or something like that, and you followed it, resulting in a blown tire at a high density altitude field. The company grabbed onto it, fired you for whatever reason, but it went in the records as a violation of company policy. A memo went to the training department, give this guy remedial training, but in the meantime, before you got there, the company saw the opportunity, and fired you. The company has, buried in those training records, a memo about the real reason you're gone, so far as they're concerned. Violation of company policy, blown tire, whatever. If anyone asks the company about the reason you left, they have a legal obligation to say you resigned. HOWEVER, the records can't be altered. While your resignation letter can be inserted into your HR employment jacket, your training department file is sacred, and if it says something else, that's going to appear.
Know before you go: know what other employers are going to say about you. Review your records. Review all of them; see what former employers have submitted, see what is in your FAA and PRD records. Get a copy of your driving history, and pull your credit. An employer may have told you one thing, but may have written another. It does happen. Mistakes occur, and some have a vindictive streak, too. Some operators have little fifedoms in their operation, complete with Napoleon-complex czarist autocrafts, and who knows what might lurk? You can know, however, and that's the best way to get ahead of it. Find out what's reported. If you're unsure about how to address the past, or what to disclose, see what's been disclosed already, see what's reported to the PRD, etc. Did that legal agreement to convert your termination to a resignation play out as intended? Find out, and then know whether to report it this way, or that. Both are legitimate. Neither are a lie: if you say you were terminated, that's true. If you say you resigned, that's also true. Better to say resigned, if able, but know how to address it. Talk to an attorney, former union personnel, etc.
Looking back, you may determine that you need to explain the resignation, after you've determined that your records don't show it as a termination. It does need explaining: did you resign because you were about to be fired, or did you resign to go to another job, or were there other, extenuating circumstances that might also require explanation? Those records to have mention, as it turned out, of the incident that led to the termination/resignation, but don't say anything about termination. You still need to get ahead of it. Perhaps you can disclose the event in advance, simply say that you, and the company, didn't see eye to eye on the matter, and you determined you'd prefer to go elsewhere.
Gray areas. Some of this is best addressed with a coach; you may find that an experienced coach who does employment preparation has seen this, and every other shade of gray, before, and has helped hundreds, maybe even thousands of other pilots polish and explain history in a way that paints them in the best light. Call it spin, call it the fine art of diplomacy, call it preparation: it doesn't hurt to sit down with someone who does this for a living, and work out the best way to get ahead of anything that you might need to explain. Skeletons in the closet aren't nearly as scary in the daylight.
With PRD, ancient employers will still be in the record books, years down the line, and you can expect to have multiple employers in your career. This is aviation. If you haven't see it yet, you will...bankrupcies, mergers, furloughs, downsizing, whatever...you'll ride the roller coaster if you stick with this, and you'll ride it more than once. Why did you go fly a Cessna 210 doing night freight, when you had a cushy job in a 767? Furloughed, took what you could find until recalled? Easy explanation. But what about that period when you didn't fly for a year? Family emergency. Okay. And that time you switched jobs, went from captain to F/O, similar equipment, similar employer...looks like you resigned? Tell us about that. Helps to get ahead of it, be prepared with the answer that works in your best interest. Don't lie. Don't hide, but you have to paint with the colors you've got and you have to know what they are...get the information, and determine what, if anything, you may need to address, and how best to address it. You can approach the same incident or subject from several different directions, and leave several different impressions.
Excuses are never complimentary. Don't use them. Concealing never looks good. Lying is a cardinal sin. But outside of that, we're all human. Few careers are picture perfect. We move. We divorce. We marry. Families form, members die. We get sick. We get well. We make mistakes. We make choices. Sometimes, choices are made for us. The economy rolls on. Life happens. Know how that's reflected in your records, and how to best discuss that reflection. Given a new record-keeping and record-reporting system, that's a life-long reflection, so get ahead of it now, keep ahead of it over time, review it from time to time, and get comfortable with the way you'll address it. Whatever questions you're asked tomorrow, you'll be asked again in five years, ten years...you'll see this material again. Be comfortable discussing what needs to be discussed. History isn't just what happened. History is often known in the way it's recorded, the way it's retold, and the lens through which it is viewed. You have some control over that; empower yourself by staying informed.
03-26-2022, 09:22 AM
#17
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,009
Originally Posted by bababouey
Shouldn’t pria have flagged the atlas dude?
Section 1.9.3.2 of the NTSB report on Atlas Air 3591 (NTSB Docket DCA19MA086) provides information about the PRIA checks for the first officer (pilot flying). Atlas used a third-party designated agent (DA) for the PRIA work, and relied on the DA to red-flag any issues that might arise. Atlas HR received the designated agent review of the records, which included the first officer's prior four employers (Mesa, Trans States, Charter Air Transport, and Air Turks and Caicos. Atlas claims that no red flag information was received, including an account of the first officer's failed upgrade attempt at Mesa. The record referred to the training not as a failure, but as "returning to FO," and the head of Atlas HR later said it was only in retrospect after the crash of 3591, that she perceived this as an upgrade training failure. Atlas indicated that the language in the record did not appear that way, when reviewed, and that the language was vague.
The first officer on 3591 failed to disclose two former employers from whom he had resigned, Commutair and Air Wisconsin. Instead, he claimed it as a period of unemployment during which he going to college, furloughed, or working as an independent real estate agent. The first officer did disclose a failed checkride, which was his ATP ride at Trans States; he claimed he had to "redo one non-precision approach." He didn't disclose unsatisfactory line checks that followed the failed checkride, but those were identified with the paperwork received a part of the PRIA checks. The language of the failed Mesa checkride listed nine checks, and included only a reference with them that said "per email received on 09 May 2017, he is returning to FO." The training records didn't specifically state training failure or upgrade failure.
In the course of hiring at Atlas, the first officer wasn't given a simulator evaluation, but both the technical and personnel interview panels rated him "highly recommended" during the interview process.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAR2002.pdf
1.9.3 Pilot Hiring Process 1.9.3.1 General
Atlas’ minimum pilot qualifications for employment included an ATP certificate, current first-class medical certificate, and flight experience of at least 1,500 total hours, to include at least 500 hours turbine time and at least 1,000 hours in airplanes or 500 hours with a Part 121 carrier.
In 2018, Atlas and Southern Air (whose certificate Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings was integrating into Atlas) had hired 336 pilots, combined, with an average total flight time of 6,550 hours.44
According to Atlas’ human resources (HR) director, the company received about 1,200 to 1,400 pilot applications each year. The HR director said that a pilot applicant with 3,000 to 6,000 flight hours, a turbojet type-rating, 3 to 5 years of regional airline experience, and a good work and training history would be considered a competitive applicant.
Atlas’ procedures for considering pilot applicants included an initial review for minimum requirements, resume review, and initial telephone screening with a recruiter before an interview would be scheduled. Atlas’ HR director and the senior director of flight procedures, training, and standards (director of training) said the application process relied on the applicants’ honesty in disclosing information. The HR director said the process included crosschecking to ensure that information provided during interviews, on the application, and in the background check all agreed but noted that “it’s hard to catch someone who’s deliberately trying to deceive you.”
Interviews were conducted by the personnel panel (made up of HR personnel and a company flight operations management pilot, such as director of training or chief pilot) and the technical panel (typically consisting of a retired captain). The personnel and technical panels would separately score applicants on a rating sheet, then both panels would meet and discuss the applicant.45 Applicants were rated as “highly recommended,” “recommended,” or “do not recommend for employment.” Atlas’ HR director and the director of training, who jointly made all final decisions, controlled the hiring process.
When the accident captain applied for a job with Atlas, he listed his three previous employers, which represented a continuous employment history back to March 2002. Atlas’ director of training recalled that he had interviewed the accident captain in 2015 and had no areas of concern.
When the accident FO applied for a job at Atlas, he did not disclose that he had worked briefly for and resigned from both CommutAir (in 2011) and Air Wisconsin Airlines (in 2012). The FO stated on his Atlas employment application that gaps in his employment history were times when he was furloughed, working as a freelance real estate agent, or attending college.46 Atlas’ director of training said he would have liked to have known about the FO’s work history at CommutAir and Air Wisconsin Airlines during hiring so he could have further evaluated trends in the FO’s training. He considered an applicant’s failure to disclose employer information as deceptive and possibly grounds for termination if discovered after hire.
On the FO’s application for employment at Atlas, he answered “yes” when asked if he had “ever failed an initial, upgrade, transition, or recurrent proficiency check” and stated, “when I was doing my ATP checkride, I had to redo one nonprecision approach.” As described in section 1.2.2.2, this failure occurred in May 2014 while the FO was employed at Trans States Airlines. Atlas’ HR director recalled that the FO discussed this failure during his interview, and Atlas had received a record (from Trans States Airlines) of this failure and the FO’s subsequent unsatisfactory line checks as part of its background check on the FO (see section 1.9.3.2).
On his Atlas application, the FO did not list his unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain on the Embraer ERJ175 while employed at Mesa Airlines. The Mesa training records provided to Atlas as part of the FO’s background check contained nine line items dated May 12, 2017 (including “Line Operational Evaluation,” “Maneuvers Validation,” and “Line Check”). Each of these items stated, “PER EMAIL RECEVIED ON 09MAY17, HE IS RETURNING TO FO [capitalization in original],” indicating that the FO did not successfully upgrade to captain.
Neither the HR director nor the director of training was aware that Mesa’s training records referenced the unsuccessful captain upgrade attempt, and both said that such a training event should have been “red flagged” during the background check process (see section 1.9.3.2). When asked how Atlas classified an unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain, the HR director said, “if I had seen that, we probably would’ve asked him about it, and then he would’ve explained what it was.” Atlas’ director of training said he would have liked to have had that information for follow-up questioning with the FO.
Hiring records for the FO showed that he was rated “highly recommended” by both panels. His rating sheet included a disclosure from the FO about a failure in 2014 for his ATP certificate and a hand-written comment that stated, “really nice,” and that no Level D simulator evaluation of the FO was required for the interview process.
1.9.3.2 PRIA Records Review
The Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA) of 1996 specified that a hiring operator could not place a pilot into service until it obtained and reviewed specified background and other safety-related records on that pilot from the last 5 years. The PRIA requirement for obtaining records applied to Part 119 certificate holders (air carriers and commercial operators with authority to conduct operations under Part 121, Part 125, and/or Part 135), governmental entities conducting public aircraft operations, air tour operators, and fractional ownership programs. The information required by the PRIA included records from the FAA, the National Driver Register (NDR), and previous employers. These records included information that previous employers were required to provide about the pilot’s training, experience, qualifications, safety background, and performance as a pilot.
Under the PRIA, pilot applicants were required to provide hiring operators with information on all previous employers for which the applicant was employed as a pilot within the preceding 5 years. Atlas used a third-party designated agent (DA) to conduct PRIA background checks of pilot applicants. According to FAA guidance outlined in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-68H, “Pilot Records Improvement Act and Pilot Records Database,” an operator may
use a DA to obtain pilot records, but the operator is ultimately responsible for evaluating those records (FAA 2017, 3.1).
According to Atlas’ HR director, the DA would review the applicants’ records and notify her of any significant events like training failures, which she considered a “red flag,” that HR staff would bring to the director of training’s attention. When asked if she believed that the DA should identify and “red flag” an event such as a failure to upgrade to captain, the HR director said, “Yes. Emphatically, yes.” She said the HR personnel were not reliant on the DA and that either she or a member of her staff would also review the background records and notify the director of training if they saw anything of concern. Atlas’ director of training said that both the DA and Atlas’ HR department would flag substantial issues in the training records for his attention.
PRIA background records for the captain were obtained by a DA on September 22, 2015, and included information from the FAA, NDR, and the captain’s three previous employers. According to the HR director, the captain’s background records did not disclose any issues of concern.
PRIA background records for the FO were obtained by a DA on August 11, 2017, and included information from the NDR, FAA, and the four employers that the FO disclosed to Atlas: Mesa Airlines, Trans States Airlines, Charter Air Transport, and Air Turks and Caicos.
As described in the previous section, the HR director and the director of training were unaware that the FO’s background information provided by Mesa Airlines included a record of his unsuccessful May 2017 captain upgrade attempt. The HR director said she never received a “red flag” from the DA about this event. She noted that, in reviewing the records after the accident, the unsuccessful upgrade attempt was presented in such a way that “it did not present as a red flag.” She also said that, in hindsight, she could see how the record’s comment “returning to FO” referred to captain upgrade training. In reviewing the record after the accident, the director of training said the information provided in the record was vague and should have been identified for additional follow-up.
Atlas’ minimum pilot qualifications for employment included an ATP certificate, current first-class medical certificate, and flight experience of at least 1,500 total hours, to include at least 500 hours turbine time and at least 1,000 hours in airplanes or 500 hours with a Part 121 carrier.
In 2018, Atlas and Southern Air (whose certificate Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings was integrating into Atlas) had hired 336 pilots, combined, with an average total flight time of 6,550 hours.44
According to Atlas’ human resources (HR) director, the company received about 1,200 to 1,400 pilot applications each year. The HR director said that a pilot applicant with 3,000 to 6,000 flight hours, a turbojet type-rating, 3 to 5 years of regional airline experience, and a good work and training history would be considered a competitive applicant.
Atlas’ procedures for considering pilot applicants included an initial review for minimum requirements, resume review, and initial telephone screening with a recruiter before an interview would be scheduled. Atlas’ HR director and the senior director of flight procedures, training, and standards (director of training) said the application process relied on the applicants’ honesty in disclosing information. The HR director said the process included crosschecking to ensure that information provided during interviews, on the application, and in the background check all agreed but noted that “it’s hard to catch someone who’s deliberately trying to deceive you.”
Interviews were conducted by the personnel panel (made up of HR personnel and a company flight operations management pilot, such as director of training or chief pilot) and the technical panel (typically consisting of a retired captain). The personnel and technical panels would separately score applicants on a rating sheet, then both panels would meet and discuss the applicant.45 Applicants were rated as “highly recommended,” “recommended,” or “do not recommend for employment.” Atlas’ HR director and the director of training, who jointly made all final decisions, controlled the hiring process.
When the accident captain applied for a job with Atlas, he listed his three previous employers, which represented a continuous employment history back to March 2002. Atlas’ director of training recalled that he had interviewed the accident captain in 2015 and had no areas of concern.
When the accident FO applied for a job at Atlas, he did not disclose that he had worked briefly for and resigned from both CommutAir (in 2011) and Air Wisconsin Airlines (in 2012). The FO stated on his Atlas employment application that gaps in his employment history were times when he was furloughed, working as a freelance real estate agent, or attending college.46 Atlas’ director of training said he would have liked to have known about the FO’s work history at CommutAir and Air Wisconsin Airlines during hiring so he could have further evaluated trends in the FO’s training. He considered an applicant’s failure to disclose employer information as deceptive and possibly grounds for termination if discovered after hire.
On the FO’s application for employment at Atlas, he answered “yes” when asked if he had “ever failed an initial, upgrade, transition, or recurrent proficiency check” and stated, “when I was doing my ATP checkride, I had to redo one nonprecision approach.” As described in section 1.2.2.2, this failure occurred in May 2014 while the FO was employed at Trans States Airlines. Atlas’ HR director recalled that the FO discussed this failure during his interview, and Atlas had received a record (from Trans States Airlines) of this failure and the FO’s subsequent unsatisfactory line checks as part of its background check on the FO (see section 1.9.3.2).
On his Atlas application, the FO did not list his unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain on the Embraer ERJ175 while employed at Mesa Airlines. The Mesa training records provided to Atlas as part of the FO’s background check contained nine line items dated May 12, 2017 (including “Line Operational Evaluation,” “Maneuvers Validation,” and “Line Check”). Each of these items stated, “PER EMAIL RECEVIED ON 09MAY17, HE IS RETURNING TO FO [capitalization in original],” indicating that the FO did not successfully upgrade to captain.
Neither the HR director nor the director of training was aware that Mesa’s training records referenced the unsuccessful captain upgrade attempt, and both said that such a training event should have been “red flagged” during the background check process (see section 1.9.3.2). When asked how Atlas classified an unsuccessful attempt to upgrade to captain, the HR director said, “if I had seen that, we probably would’ve asked him about it, and then he would’ve explained what it was.” Atlas’ director of training said he would have liked to have had that information for follow-up questioning with the FO.
Hiring records for the FO showed that he was rated “highly recommended” by both panels. His rating sheet included a disclosure from the FO about a failure in 2014 for his ATP certificate and a hand-written comment that stated, “really nice,” and that no Level D simulator evaluation of the FO was required for the interview process.
1.9.3.2 PRIA Records Review
The Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA) of 1996 specified that a hiring operator could not place a pilot into service until it obtained and reviewed specified background and other safety-related records on that pilot from the last 5 years. The PRIA requirement for obtaining records applied to Part 119 certificate holders (air carriers and commercial operators with authority to conduct operations under Part 121, Part 125, and/or Part 135), governmental entities conducting public aircraft operations, air tour operators, and fractional ownership programs. The information required by the PRIA included records from the FAA, the National Driver Register (NDR), and previous employers. These records included information that previous employers were required to provide about the pilot’s training, experience, qualifications, safety background, and performance as a pilot.
Under the PRIA, pilot applicants were required to provide hiring operators with information on all previous employers for which the applicant was employed as a pilot within the preceding 5 years. Atlas used a third-party designated agent (DA) to conduct PRIA background checks of pilot applicants. According to FAA guidance outlined in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-68H, “Pilot Records Improvement Act and Pilot Records Database,” an operator may
use a DA to obtain pilot records, but the operator is ultimately responsible for evaluating those records (FAA 2017, 3.1).
According to Atlas’ HR director, the DA would review the applicants’ records and notify her of any significant events like training failures, which she considered a “red flag,” that HR staff would bring to the director of training’s attention. When asked if she believed that the DA should identify and “red flag” an event such as a failure to upgrade to captain, the HR director said, “Yes. Emphatically, yes.” She said the HR personnel were not reliant on the DA and that either she or a member of her staff would also review the background records and notify the director of training if they saw anything of concern. Atlas’ director of training said that both the DA and Atlas’ HR department would flag substantial issues in the training records for his attention.
PRIA background records for the captain were obtained by a DA on September 22, 2015, and included information from the FAA, NDR, and the captain’s three previous employers. According to the HR director, the captain’s background records did not disclose any issues of concern.
PRIA background records for the FO were obtained by a DA on August 11, 2017, and included information from the NDR, FAA, and the four employers that the FO disclosed to Atlas: Mesa Airlines, Trans States Airlines, Charter Air Transport, and Air Turks and Caicos.
As described in the previous section, the HR director and the director of training were unaware that the FO’s background information provided by Mesa Airlines included a record of his unsuccessful May 2017 captain upgrade attempt. The HR director said she never received a “red flag” from the DA about this event. She noted that, in reviewing the records after the accident, the unsuccessful upgrade attempt was presented in such a way that “it did not present as a red flag.” She also said that, in hindsight, she could see how the record’s comment “returning to FO” referred to captain upgrade training. In reviewing the record after the accident, the director of training said the information provided in the record was vague and should have been identified for additional follow-up.
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-033
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-034
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-035
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-20-036
03-30-2022, 10:29 AM
#18
Prime Minister/Moderator
Joined APC: Jan 2006
Position: Engines Turn Or People Swim
Posts: 39,261
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
It should be noted that along with the final report (NTSB/AAR-20/02), the NTSB issued six safety recommendations, including four (A-20-33, A-20-34, A-20-35, and A-20-36), addressing pilot selection, background checks, and employment history/pilot record database. It's clear that the NTSB considered the hiring of the subject first officer, and his prior history, central to the mishap, and also considered it indicative of serious lapses in industry hiring practices and the background check process.
Right up until they'd have to raise compensation to compete for applicants with the rest of the industry... then it's all good
03-30-2022, 11:08 AM
#19
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,009
I have flown with several first officers in the past few years who could not locate a lat/long on a chart.
I had a first officer on a simulator PC checkride within the last few years who could not wrap his head around the concept of flying a raw data approach, or manually tuning and flying an approach. While "on fire" with vectors to a runway, we were told there were problems reported with the approach. I told the F/O to be ready with the parallel, and sure enough, we were flown through the localizer, told it was down, and cleared the parallel. Minimums were the same. Prebriefed. Inbound course the same. Charts were up; all he had to do was manually tune, and even that was prepared...but couldn't get past putting it in the box. He couldn't get it in the box, and we were inside the marker, landing, before he gave up. So focused on that magenta line.
One F/O so green that on the morning of his first live trip, he glanced at the low overcast and whistled, and said, "Wow, this is just like the simulator." Ya think?
I observed a OE candidate a few years ago who put in just shy of 200 hours OE. The operator refused to terminate the individual (again). The person had failed the type ride twice, I believe, was sent home, brought back and put through again, just passed, and sent to OE. I met with several check airmen who expressed frustration with the individual, but who were unwilling to be the bad guy and pull the plug. Eventually, the individual had just under 200 hours of OE before being let go. I observed some of the training, and saw a pilot who couldn't talk on the radio, fly a heading, hold an altitude, and was always full scale deflection on each approach. I examined the individuals resume and it's falsification was immediately clear. I had that discussion with each of the check airmen, who said that was their impression, but they'd been told to get the individual through training. It certainly wasn't for lack of trying when that person was released.
I don't know what the PRIA status was or might have revealed, because I wasn't part of that end at the time, but I can't see how anyone could be anything but willfully deaf, dumb, and blind, to miss it, and certainly the next operators, too. I was privy to a later checkride by the same individual, which was worse by some order of magnitude, than the previous observations, and that ain't easy to do.
Most of us are average joes, and smattered through the business there are the occasional aces of the proverbial base...but counterpoint to those, there are certainly some who seem to continually slip through the cracks, and there's always someone out there willing to hire them. It truly boggles the mind.
I had a first officer on a simulator PC checkride within the last few years who could not wrap his head around the concept of flying a raw data approach, or manually tuning and flying an approach. While "on fire" with vectors to a runway, we were told there were problems reported with the approach. I told the F/O to be ready with the parallel, and sure enough, we were flown through the localizer, told it was down, and cleared the parallel. Minimums were the same. Prebriefed. Inbound course the same. Charts were up; all he had to do was manually tune, and even that was prepared...but couldn't get past putting it in the box. He couldn't get it in the box, and we were inside the marker, landing, before he gave up. So focused on that magenta line.
One F/O so green that on the morning of his first live trip, he glanced at the low overcast and whistled, and said, "Wow, this is just like the simulator." Ya think?
I observed a OE candidate a few years ago who put in just shy of 200 hours OE. The operator refused to terminate the individual (again). The person had failed the type ride twice, I believe, was sent home, brought back and put through again, just passed, and sent to OE. I met with several check airmen who expressed frustration with the individual, but who were unwilling to be the bad guy and pull the plug. Eventually, the individual had just under 200 hours of OE before being let go. I observed some of the training, and saw a pilot who couldn't talk on the radio, fly a heading, hold an altitude, and was always full scale deflection on each approach. I examined the individuals resume and it's falsification was immediately clear. I had that discussion with each of the check airmen, who said that was their impression, but they'd been told to get the individual through training. It certainly wasn't for lack of trying when that person was released.
I don't know what the PRIA status was or might have revealed, because I wasn't part of that end at the time, but I can't see how anyone could be anything but willfully deaf, dumb, and blind, to miss it, and certainly the next operators, too. I was privy to a later checkride by the same individual, which was worse by some order of magnitude, than the previous observations, and that ain't easy to do.
Most of us are average joes, and smattered through the business there are the occasional aces of the proverbial base...but counterpoint to those, there are certainly some who seem to continually slip through the cracks, and there's always someone out there willing to hire them. It truly boggles the mind.
03-30-2022, 09:56 PM
#20
Line Holder
Joined APC: Aug 2013
Posts: 50
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
I have flown with several first officers in the past few years who could not locate a lat/long on a chart.
I had a first officer on a simulator PC checkride within the last few years who could not wrap his head around the concept of flying a raw data approach, or manually tuning and flying an approach. While "on fire" with vectors to a runway, we were told there were problems reported with the approach. I told the F/O to be ready with the parallel, and sure enough, we were flown through the localizer, told it was down, and cleared the parallel. Minimums were the same. Prebriefed. Inbound course the same. Charts were up; all he had to do was manually tune, and even that was prepared...but couldn't get past putting it in the box. He couldn't get it in the box, and we were inside the marker, landing, before he gave up. So focused on that magenta line.
One F/O so green that on the morning of his first live trip, he glanced at the low overcast and whistled, and said, "Wow, this is just like the simulator." Ya think?
I observed a OE candidate a few years ago who put in just shy of 200 hours OE. The operator refused to terminate the individual (again). The person had failed the type ride twice, I believe, was sent home, brought back and put through again, just passed, and sent to OE. I met with several check airmen who expressed frustration with the individual, but who were unwilling to be the bad guy and pull the plug. Eventually, the individual had just under 200 hours of OE before being let go. I observed some of the training, and saw a pilot who couldn't talk on the radio, fly a heading, hold an altitude, and was always full scale deflection on each approach. I examined the individuals resume and it's falsification was immediately clear. I had that discussion with each of the check airmen, who said that was their impression, but they'd been told to get the individual through training. It certainly wasn't for lack of trying when that person was released.
I don't know what the PRIA status was or might have revealed, because I wasn't part of that end at the time, but I can't see how anyone could be anything but willfully deaf, dumb, and blind, to miss it, and certainly the next operators, too. I was privy to a later checkride by the same individual, which was worse by some order of magnitude, than the previous observations, and that ain't easy to do.
Most of us are average joes, and smattered through the business there are the occasional aces of the proverbial base...but counterpoint to those, there are certainly some who seem to continually slip through the cracks, and there's always someone out there willing to hire them. It truly boggles the mind.
I had a first officer on a simulator PC checkride within the last few years who could not wrap his head around the concept of flying a raw data approach, or manually tuning and flying an approach. While "on fire" with vectors to a runway, we were told there were problems reported with the approach. I told the F/O to be ready with the parallel, and sure enough, we were flown through the localizer, told it was down, and cleared the parallel. Minimums were the same. Prebriefed. Inbound course the same. Charts were up; all he had to do was manually tune, and even that was prepared...but couldn't get past putting it in the box. He couldn't get it in the box, and we were inside the marker, landing, before he gave up. So focused on that magenta line.
One F/O so green that on the morning of his first live trip, he glanced at the low overcast and whistled, and said, "Wow, this is just like the simulator." Ya think?
I observed a OE candidate a few years ago who put in just shy of 200 hours OE. The operator refused to terminate the individual (again). The person had failed the type ride twice, I believe, was sent home, brought back and put through again, just passed, and sent to OE. I met with several check airmen who expressed frustration with the individual, but who were unwilling to be the bad guy and pull the plug. Eventually, the individual had just under 200 hours of OE before being let go. I observed some of the training, and saw a pilot who couldn't talk on the radio, fly a heading, hold an altitude, and was always full scale deflection on each approach. I examined the individuals resume and it's falsification was immediately clear. I had that discussion with each of the check airmen, who said that was their impression, but they'd been told to get the individual through training. It certainly wasn't for lack of trying when that person was released.
I don't know what the PRIA status was or might have revealed, because I wasn't part of that end at the time, but I can't see how anyone could be anything but willfully deaf, dumb, and blind, to miss it, and certainly the next operators, too. I was privy to a later checkride by the same individual, which was worse by some order of magnitude, than the previous observations, and that ain't easy to do.
Most of us are average joes, and smattered through the business there are the occasional aces of the proverbial base...but counterpoint to those, there are certainly some who seem to continually slip through the cracks, and there's always someone out there willing to hire them. It truly boggles the mind.
Sounds like problems with your training department…
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post
