California Pacific Airlines
#41
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Nov 2018
Position: Phenom Captain
Posts: 114
Hey guys sorry to hear about the tough patch... No one likes to hear news like this especially at the beginning of a new year and end of an expensive holiday season. The good news is employment for pilots in general is plentiful and with great operators.
I know for a fact Jetsuite/JetsuiteX are hiring on a rampage. There is an upcoming hiring event 01/08/19-01/09/19. With competitive pilot conditions, a great pilot group and various California bases I think it would be a great fit for many of you. Feel free to PM me for info or simply email [email protected]. Best of luck!
I know for a fact Jetsuite/JetsuiteX are hiring on a rampage. There is an upcoming hiring event 01/08/19-01/09/19. With competitive pilot conditions, a great pilot group and various California bases I think it would be a great fit for many of you. Feel free to PM me for info or simply email [email protected]. Best of luck!
#42
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2007
Position: I pilot
Posts: 2,049
Mayors of Pierre, Watertown, tell feds California Pacific Airlines delinquent on bills, flights
https://www.capjournal.com/news/mayo...866660cd5.html
https://www.capjournal.com/news/mayo...866660cd5.html
#43
New Hire
Joined APC: Dec 2018
Posts: 2
Hey Friend, it’s Tim
Facts matter; so here are some:
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
This has Tim Seiber all over it. He’s the guy who drove Seaport into the ground. Wants to run a big airline so he jumps from 135 to 135 with these ridiculous big airline ideas. Did the same thing with Seaport talked them away from their bread and butter at local FBOs to FBO and had them playing big airline in the main terminal behind security which was the one thing Seaports customers were trying to avoid.
Now he’s apparently talked ADI (Beardsley) into dumping what ADI has done for 60 years (charter) to fill his “big airline” dreams. I know he was consulting with them at one point. If true I give them maybe two years, three if they pick up some EAS.
Now he’s apparently talked ADI (Beardsley) into dumping what ADI has done for 60 years (charter) to fill his “big airline” dreams. I know he was consulting with them at one point. If true I give them maybe two years, three if they pick up some EAS.
#44
New Hire
Joined APC: Dec 2018
Posts: 2
Fact checking myself
I’m going fact check myself here: The SeaPort reorg efforts were in 2016, not 2015 as I stated. My apologies
Facts matter; so here are some:
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
#45
On Reserve
Joined APC: Apr 2016
Posts: 11
Mighty stand up of you to publicly post on such matters. I like working for/with stand up people, you ever need a line pilot then look me up. Currently F/O heavy jet international cargo, not liking it.
#46
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: B-737NG preferably in first class with a glass of champagne and caviar
Posts: 5,886
Low pay, and training bonds were advised against given the demand for pilots. Well management thought they were smarter than the average bear.... thought that is.
Revenue lost, lease payments, insurance payments, storage payments, salary(ies) for the skeleton staff. Clear to the casual observer that competent management is required. Oh wait there’s more.... consumer confidence?
Revenue lost, lease payments, insurance payments, storage payments, salary(ies) for the skeleton staff. Clear to the casual observer that competent management is required. Oh wait there’s more.... consumer confidence?
#47
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2014
Posts: 279
Facts matter; so here are some:
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
All of that is nice and dandy but it doesn’t mean anything because the business failed. SeaPort was the 2nd failure for that particular leadership team. They paid slave wages, treated all employees that weren’t in PDX like garbage and we’re openly hostile with the pilots. Places like ADI and California Pacific won’t make it because the options out there for pilots are many and places that ran like SeaPort can’t find people to fly their planes.
#48
Facts matter; so here are some:
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
1. It’s Sieber, not Seiber.
2. SeaPort’s migration to main terminals was a board level decision made in 2014 when the company was not winnjng EAS contracts due to a lack of interline agreements. The only way to offer seamless connections (particularly interline transfer of bags in/out of the secure area) was to be in the main terminals.
3. Regardless, SeaPort’s original business models at the FBOs had been hemorrhaging about $70K a month (in excess of $110K during bad months). Within 6 days of my arrival at SeaPort in July 2011, I pushed to close 5 cities that were responsible for the majority of these losses.
4. In January 2014, I sa xthe handwriting on the wall and begqn advocating a significant reduction in operations. I can’t remember the exact numbers, but the surgical restructuring would have produced something like a 30% fleet reduction, closing 20% of stations, 35% headcount reduction, but allow us to retain over 50% of our EAS revenue and 40% of ticket revenue. It would have painful, but surely less painful than the eventual outcome. I was not afforded the opportunity by prior management to present this plan to the Board and the ship continued head-on into the iceberg.
5. I became president of SeaPort at the end January 2015 and put the company in Chapter 11 less than three weeks later. It was the absolute correct decision. By June 2015, the new management team, supported by the best employees I’ve ever worked with, produced an operating profit. We continued to do so until the day we shut the airline down. Equally important, on-time performance was in the high 90s and we went over 100 days without any cancellations. That wasn’t me, that was the employee team guided by new operational management I installed.
6. We filed a Plan of Reorganization in July 2015. For the first time in it’s history SeaPort had clearly defined business plan. And this was not pie-in-the-sky stuff: It had scrutinized by our mostly new board of directors, creditors committee, US bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy judge. However, both ADI and SeaPort were competing for Beardsley cash. With the return on capital of a reorganized being marginally better than investing in US Treasury bills, Beardsley and I made difficult decision to shutdown SeaPort and his cash be used turnaround ADI. It was the hardest professional decision of my life because it involved letting down a team of employees who had worked so hard and achieved so much in short period of time.
7. On to ADI. I was never an employe of ADI but did act as an advisor to Beardsley. I help to restructure their financial statements to better allow peer comparisons to other operators and evaluating potential revenue streams as a way to flatten wild swings in charter revenue between NCAA basketball and NASCAR. I never advocated abandoning the bread-and-butter charter business. Further, I identified about $100K in monthly savings, but I was an advisor only and not empowered to implement those changes.
8. I helped facilitate the sale of ADI to California Pacific with that deal closing in March 2018. Neither myself or Beardsley have had any involvement since, including the decision to exit the charter business.
But you knew all that. If you wish to discuss further, we have common acquaintances that can easily put you in touch with me. I’ll even pick-up the lunch tab.
Fly safe, happy new year, and good luck with your airline management career.
Respectfully,
Tim Sieber (I before E)
I do applaud you for telling your viewpoint though.
The industry has changed. Pilots are the new currency, not EAS or other contracts. The companies with the pilots will get the work. Increase wages and improve working conditions and you’ll get pilots. Then you can takeover all the contracts that underbid you but are being dumped for non-performance.
#49
Banned
Joined APC: Jun 2017
Posts: 36
So you took a money hemorrhaging airline and in short order turned it around into profitability..... so much so that it then closed and went out of business.....
I do applaud you for telling your viewpoint though.
The industry has changed. Pilots are the new currency, not EAS or other contracts. The companies with the pilots will get the work. Increase wages and improve working conditions and you’ll get pilots. Then you can takeover all the contracts that underbid you but are being dumped for non-performance.
I do applaud you for telling your viewpoint though.
The industry has changed. Pilots are the new currency, not EAS or other contracts. The companies with the pilots will get the work. Increase wages and improve working conditions and you’ll get pilots. Then you can takeover all the contracts that underbid you but are being dumped for non-performance.
#50
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2007
Position: I pilot
Posts: 2,049
http://www.drgnews.com/end-of-california-pacific-airlines-eas-contract-with-pierre-and-watertown-appears-near/
https://www.capjournal.com/news/california-pacific-airlines-stops-flying-to-pierre-watertown-city-officials/article_edc0428e-1acb-11e9-91ae-6fb030241268.html
https://www.capjournal.com/news/california-pacific-airlines-stops-flying-to-pierre-watertown-city-officials/article_edc0428e-1acb-11e9-91ae-6fb030241268.html
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