Korean, Asiana, and the TPAC JV
 

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/korean-air-makes-airlines-biggest-ever-boeing-jet-order-amid-trump-lee-summit-2025-08-26/


How does the tie up between these two Korean carriers affect our JV balance/global scope?

anyone have concrete numbers and figures or examples apart from the obvious language that says we grow equal yadda yadda?

PS- this must’ve been our 787 rumor coming to fruition :confused:

Koreans new order book is quite substantial given their relevant size, but the Asiana merger must be considered due to the combined aircraft replacements they both have due. Nonetheless, most of it is WB substantial growth.

I honestly don’t believe it affects Delta to any degree other than greatly exercising our global scope to force more WB’s to be ordered - which I believe you mentioned per our global scope. Another reason why I believe that large 787 order is imminent per JonNYC or a top of 330/350 order (both including the 20 350 options).

My money is on the 330/350 top up. It seems they really like the simple fleet approach.

I think it all depends on if Boeing or Airbus gives the best deal

I mean who wants to fly a transport category aircraft with a yoke anyway (So dumb that the 787 has a yoke!)?? That reason alone would make me bid the 330/350 over the 787.

It does make sense. Though, a MRO for GE on the 787 alongside a killer deal which Boeing and Airbus are surely arguing for could be the cherry on top for a 787 order.

Good news is we should get some clarity on it via a new wide-body order in late 25’ or Q1-ish 2026. I’m personally betting for 787’s despite the 350 being a better aircraft (the flight deck - at least) just so theres more options for the pilot group to pick from.

Not having a yoke killed 228 people on June 1, 2009.

The yoke itself isn't what's necessary for safety, side-sticks that move together could be. That and thrust levers that actually move.

Autothrust is also one of those Airbus engineering "solutions" that exists despite nobody asking for it and no problem existing with auto-throttles.

Airbus believes that the shared mental model should only exist between the autopilot and the flight data recorder and the pilots should not only be left in the dark but also not have much of a clue what the other pilot is doing.

So yeah, this isn't necessarily about wanting a yoke, it's about wanting an airplane that doesn't keep secrets.

Not having a yoke didn't kill those people, poor systems knowledge did. Plenty of people have stalled an aircraft with a yoke. Colgan 3407 enters the chat.

No problem existing with auto-throttles??
Turkish Air 1951 enters the chat

What a ridiculous statement. That was a minor contributing factor.

Also a ridiculous statement, there were a lot of reasons for the crash. Systems knowledge could have helped prevent the loss of SA but it was not the sole reason.

Might as well say the wright brothers killed them.

You’re not wrong, you know

It was definitely Orville that guy was a psychopath.

lol wut? That’s what you’re going with?

I mean yes, the statement is over the top. But from what I recall the FO in the right seat held full back side stick for a very large portion of the event. You can’t deny that if he did the same thing having a yoke jammed back into his stomach that the other pilot wouldn’t notice and most likely would have been able to stop that control input. Whether or not they could have recovered is unknown. What they did with the controls put them into such a deep stall that it is estimated the last altitude they could have recovered by going full nose down to break the stall and pull out of the resulting dive was ~13000 ft. In other words once they passed through 13k no matter what they did their fate was sealed and they were going to hit the water.

that incident would not have resulted in 228 fatalities on an aircraft with a yoke, do you disagree?

Did Airbus not have sidestick priority by pressing red button when that crash happened?

Page 199 of the final report. The sidesticks had a minor role.


3.2 Causes of the AccidentThe obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals during cruise was a phenomenon that was known but misunderstood by the aviation community at the time of the accident. From an operational perspective, the total loss of airspeed information that resulted from this was a failure that was classified in the safety model. After initial reactions that depend upon basic airmanship, it was expected that it would be rapidly diagnosed by pilots and managed where necessary by precautionary measures on the pitch attitude and the thrust, as indicated in the associated procedure.The occurrence of the failure in the context of flight in cruise completely surprised the pilots of flight AF 447. The apparent difficulties with aeroplane handling at high altitude in turbulence led to excessive handling inputs in roll and a sharp nose-up input by the PF. The destabilisation that resulted from the climbing flight path and the evolution in the pitch attitude and vertical speed was added to the erroneous airspeed indications and ECAM messages, which did not help with the diagnosis. The crew, progressively becoming de-structured, likely never understood that it was faced with a “simple” loss of three sources of airspeed information. In the minute that followed the autopilot disconnection, the failure of the attempts to understand the situation and the de-structuring of crew cooperation fed on each other until the total loss of cognitive control of the situation. The underlying behavioural hypotheses in classifying the loss of airspeed information as “major” were not validated in the context of this accident. Confirmation of this classification thus supposes additional work on operational feedback that would enable improvements, where required, in crew training, the ergonomics of information supplied to them and the design of procedures.The aeroplane went into a sustained stall, signalled by the stall warning and strong buffet. Despite these persistent symptoms, the crew never understood that they were stalling and consequently never applied a recovery manoeuvre. The combination of the ergonomics of the warning design, the conditions in which airline pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional training and the process of recurrent training does not generate the expected behaviour in any acceptable reliable way.In its current form, recognizing the stall warning, even associated with buffet, supposes that the crew accords a minimum level of “legitimacy” to it. This then supposes sufficient previous experience of stalls, a minimum of cognitive availability and understanding of the situation, knowledge of the aeroplane (and its protection modes) and its flight physics. An examination of the current training for airline pilots does not, in general, provide convincing indications of the building and maintenance of the associated skills.More generally, the double failure of the planned procedural responses shows the limits of the current safety model. When crew action is expected, it is always supposed that they will be capable of initial control of the flight path and of a rapid diagnosis that will allow them to identify the correct entry in the dictionary of procedures. A crew can be faced with an unexpected situation leading to a momentary but profound loss of comprehension. If, in this case, the supposed capacity for initial mastery and then diagnosis is lost, the safety model is then in “common failure mode”. During this event, the initial inability to master the flight path also made it impossible to understand the situation and to access the planned solution. Thus, the accident resulted from the following succession of events:ˆˆ Temporary inconsistency between the airspeed measurements, likely following the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals that, in particular, caused the autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration to alternate law;ˆˆ Inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path; ˆˆ The lack of any link by the crew between the loss of indicated speeds called out and the appropriate procedure;ˆˆ The late identification by the PNF of the deviation from the flight path and the insufficient correction applied by the PF;ˆˆ The crew not identifying the approach to stall, their lack of immediate response and the exit from the flight envelope;ˆˆ The crew’s failure to diagnose the stall situation and consequently a lack of inputs that would have made it possible to recover from it.These events can be explained by a combination of the following factors:ˆˆ The feedback mechanisms on the part of all those involved that made it impossible: yy To identify the repeated non-application of the loss of airspeed information procedure and to remedy this,yy To ensure that the risk model for crews in cruise included icing of the Pitot probes and its consequences;ˆˆ The absence of any training, at high altitude, in manual aeroplane handling and in the procedure for ”Vol avec IAS douteuse”;ˆˆ Task-sharing that was weakened by: yy Incomprehension of the situation when the autopilot disconnection occurred, yy Poor management of the startle effect that generated a highly charged emotional factor for the two copilots;ˆˆ The lack of a clear display in the cockpit of the airspeed inconsistencies identified by the computers;ˆˆ The crew not taking into account the stall warning, which could have been due to: yy A failure to identify the aural warning, due to low exposure time in training to stall phenomena, stall warnings and buffet,yy The appearance at the beginning of the event of transient warnings that could be considered as spurious,yy The absence of any visual information to confirm the approach-to-stall after the loss of the limit speeds,yy The possible confusion with an overspeed situation in which buffet is also considered as a symptom,yy Flight Director indications that may led the crew to believe that their actions were appropriate, even though they were not,yy The difficulty in recognizing and understanding the implications of a reconfiguration in alternate law with no angle of attack protection.

Sorry in advance for the condescending tone, but as I said and you ignored, not the cause, but a critical and unnecessary Swiss cheese hole that wouldn’t exist on an aircraft with a yoke, or at minimum linked flight controls.

thanks for copy and pasting nothing useful though.

Who really cares about a side stick in a transport category airplane? Do you grab it fantasizing your call sign is viper?

Tells me you’ve never flown an airbus. Tray tables are civilized.

Having said that, Boeing FBW systems are superior to Airbi. But the triple and the 78 should have had a side stick.

Airbus sidesticks do have the priority capability as well as announcing dual input. Most of the supposed control issues can be solved with the simple declaration « my controls » .

The “DUAL INPUT” annunciation is relatively new—I think it was hastened by the Air France accident under discussion?

FO kept stealing control of the plane from the lance captain, it wasnt systems knowledge that would save them. If the fo in the left seat could get some feeling/warning the guy on the right was deepinging the stall he could have saved them. 35000 ft in the air and homeboy shoots for 15degree nose up because he sorta remembers a recovery techique for a situation they werent in.

at least a connected sidestick and the guy on the left could talk the idiot down from killing everyone.

It existed back then…”Dual Input” is shown 6 times on the CVR transcript between 02:12:59 and 02:14:03

Maybe, maybe not. A Yoke didn’t help Atlas 3591, which would have still been fatal from a meaningfully higher altitude than they were at. Maybe with “Normal Law” limits of 15 degrees NL, that wouldn’t have happened.

And two 737 Max’s would not have killed 346 people with an extra AOA probe or two. Or more knowledge of this little thing called MCAS. Or…

I mean, we can come up with all kinds of darts to throw at boards. Accidents happen, and we learn from them. And we have. A lot. This poo-flinging at Airbus or Boeing design philosophy is silly and nonproductive.

LOLWUT… Gross, I make fun of the guys that still use their super hero names. All civilian here boo, All I am saying it is much nicer to have a tray table to eat off of than a logbook. I did about 9000 hours of a yoke in the way. The last 4000 without one have been way better! With 20 years to go I don’t see myself ever getting a Boeing type rating.

You do you brah. Just throwing back the shade. Autobus... eewwww.

Because of a yoke and tray table? Weird flex.

Do you still go by your super hero name??

[mod input] Let's get back on topic, please. Enough mud-slinging.

is there an easy way to find out TPAC hours added by Asiana that aren’t part of the global scope baseline and therefore need to be “plussed up” on our metal somewhere around the globe?

or have their hours added all been absorbed by existing growth and we won’t see anything more?

Other than examining each individual flight Asiana does to the U.S. and measuring schedules block hours there is no easy way unfortunately. Also flights that carry a certain percentage of Delta pax even if it doesn’t touch U.S. soil constitutes as “parter flying”.

And, I highly doubt Delta has grown proportionally to Asian’s joining of Skyteam (that growth is yet to be seen). I believe, much of the intl. growth is network simply wanting to expand abroad (as they’ve started intl. growth will be the spear head moving forward). It could also be scope compliance growth via our existing partners growing their WB fleets: AF+KLM+VS+KE, etc..

Remember, global scope protects the company from having to over-staff the WB categories if they fail to deploy appropriate block hours if it is due to known manufacturer delays (e.g. A35K..) You can go to DALPA and click the hyperlink to “scope compliance”. The green light will indicate the company is in compliance (which it is).