Defanging uncertainty
 

Due to demand for practical examples, not just principles, the following excerpt is offered for your consideration.

DEFANGING UNCERTAINTY
Don't manage. Command!
...

It may be helpful to compare different approaches to uncertainty to appreciate the value of skills needed to handle the unknown. Consider the following example. Two aircraft, Flight "Alpha" and Flight "Bravo", are flying at FL 290 at night in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), in and out of light chop, when they encounter moderate turbulence. Both pilots instinctively switch on the seat belt sign and glance down at the radar screen. Nothing. All they see are a few weak shower returns, about the same as for the last ten minutes. Both pilots observe the signs of uncertainty (ambiguity and inconsistency), both feel the symptoms of uncertainty (doubt and confusion), and both seek information (looking at the radar screen). Yet the pilot of Flight "A" starts running the radar antenna sweep from full up to full down while the pilot of Flight "B" calls Air Traffic Control (ATC) for a climb. Why the big difference in the way two qualified pilots handle the same uncertainty?

An analysis of each pilot's motive may shed light on this difference. The pilot of Flight "A" feels anxious not knowing what else is lurking out there the radar is not showing and begins to fixate on anxiety. He might look up a radar maintenance history in the logbook or just shake his head saying "I don't understand this; this shouldn't be happening." Meanwhile, he is in a bad position to maintain situation awareness and does not notice the ice build-up on his windshield wipers. Eventually he clears the turbulence and calls his Company's maintenance on AIRINC (Aeronautical Radio Inc.) to find out why the radar does not paint weather. One can only speculate on the maintenance crew-chief's words of wisdom at 0340, two thousand miles away.

At some point, probably inside the Outer Marker, this pilot realizes he has been preoccupied by this minor event and decides to seek justification by sharing his wisdom with the rest of the crew. He insists, it is important to pursue these matters because if nobody ever brings them up, "those SOBs in maintenance will try to get away with murder." This pilot is at the end of his nine-hour flight but mentally he is still somewhere over the Atlantic. His attempt to justify his actions proves he is still fighting anxiety.

The pilot of Flight "B", however, knows, such inconsistencies occur on a regular basis with both the weather and electronic equipment. He notes the ambiguity but tosses it aside and juts it down as another experience. Why something happened is not important to him. What is important is what he is going to do about it. He wants to move on. Moving at eight miles per minute, he does not dwell on whether or not to trust his radar, and he is unimpressed by suggestions he is the first man to experience a rare atmospheric phenomenon. Whatever it is, he wants out of it. He does not tie down his thoughts trying to solve the mystery. He knows that to engage in such exercise is to court danger because it would require him to focus on an event rather than on his mission. He applies the first adequate solution he thinks of, clears the uncertainty from his mind and continues to concentrate on his assignment. He climbs out of the turbulence, checks with the cabin crew and goes about his business of flying the airplane to its destination. Meanwhile, he is well positioned to maintain situation awareness. At the end of the day, he might write up the radar. Then again, he might not. He will think about it then. For now, "it's time for that medium-rare steak."

Later that morning on the nineteenth floor of the Marriott, he will look at his watch and figure he has fourteen hours and a bit, before his next flight. He pops open a can of beer from the mini-bar and watches the fights for half an hour on cable. He then sets the alarm clock and turns in for a well-deserved crew rest.

Meanwhile, the pilot of Flight "A," rather than rest up for the next day, pulls out a sheet of hotel stationary and begins to write the first draft of a letter to the Chief Pilot. He is still justifying his actions; but now, he is complaining not only about the radar, but also about the crew-chief's suggestion on where "to stick it(!)" This pilot has become a defense mechanism junkie through, probably, no fault of his own. He simply missed out on the chance to learn how to deal with uncertainty. (G.N. Fehér, Beyond Stick-and-Rudder, Hawkesbury, 2013, p. 87-89)

There goes 1.5 minutes of my life.

Thank you for your feedback, CheapTrick. I can only hope you'll do better when your time comes.

Interesting narrative. I think the previous posters comments relate more to the prose than the subject. Its reads a bit like a novel. There is a lot of good stuff written about leadership, command authority, and (relevant to flight ops) crew resource management. I think the author of the quoted piece would have done his subject a greater service if his writing aimed more towards education than entertainment.

The title had me thinking this might be about thoughts expressed by a snake handler before performing his work. They probably have articles laying around with the same title (kidding).

Thank you for your valuable observation, dckozak. I've found that examples are among the most effective tools to drive home a point. Sometimes they can even deliver a message all by themselves. I've also found it's best to narrate events because that form seems to paint complete pictures, as opposed to a series of report-style spot observation the reader must then connect. Entertainment? If it adds a little spice, so much the better. This example follows a rather long and dry “educational” text that deals with principles and difficult abstract concepts. The intent was to give the reader a break, a moment to catch his breath. I realize that's not obvious when an example appears in isolation, but that's the only way I can give a practical example in a single post that doesn't roll all the way down to the floor.

True, the topic itself falls under “command,” but not under “leadership,” IMO - though that topic is worth addressing, too. The latter complements “command” only when a crew is involved. As for CRM, the jury's still out on that. No, not on its aspirations, they're certainly noble: only on its present structure, function and performance.

Howzit goin' Cubdriver? Probably. Not that different, though. Snakes and uncertainty are both here, and here to stay. So those who have to handle them are well advised to pull out the fangs of their foes if they don't want to get bitten.

978, are you the author of this book? Am curious if the rest of the book is similar on examples like this.

Yes, yours truly is the author. The book cites lots of examples, but I can't say the above excerpt is typical. Its appendix is a collection of a few sample Operational Decision Games(*), which are also scenario-based, but their style is different. My hope is that pilots will add and share their own.

(*) Modeled [with permission] on Tactical Decision Games by Major John F. Schmitt, USMC, Marine Corps Gazette.