Operational Decision Games (ODGs)
#1
Gets Weekends Off
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Joined APC: Sep 2013
Position: PA-18, Front
Posts: 187
Operational Decision Games (ODGs)
Operational Decision Games (ODGs)
Operational Decision Games (ODGs) modeled [with permission] on Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) by John F. Schmitt, Mastering Tactics, Marine Corps Gazette, are designed to accelerate line experience by having players deal with operational situations. ODGs are roughly equivalent to the original concept of LOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training)—that is, before LOFT became a tool to condition pilots to serve Managements' interests—with one exception. ODGs can be played alone. Some games are excerpts of real event reports, some are fictional, some are a mix of real and fictional events. All games are intended to force the line pilot to make decisions within the allotted time. There are neither good nor bad solutions. The intent of ODGs is to encourage the line pilot to reflect on the situation presented and to draw his own conclusions. ODGs are not intended to replace processes such as Operating Procedures. Neither are they intended to prompt questions as to how a given situation developed as it did. The reader is encouraged to sit on the "hot seat" and make decisions based on available information. He should resist the temptation to wait for more information or to take longer than the allotted time to decide. He should also keep in mind that, once a decision has been made, communicated and executed, the exercise is complete.
Each game is divided into five or six parts. Part one presents the situation. Part two challenges the reader to decide and act in the allotted time and to specify his actions. After the allotted time has elapsed, part three prompts him to quote any relevant maxims. Since all scenarios are goal-oriented (the question being, What now...?), the maxim, "Ask what before how" is always assumed. Part four prompts the player to give his rationale for his decision.
Part five is the author's solution. It must be stressed that these are not the right solutions and that the reader is free to disagree with the author. The value of ODGs is in the completion of the exercise within the allotted time. Part six is a case history, if any.
All pilots are encouraged to add their own ODGs and to exchange games. They are also encouraged to stick to the rules. The games should be realistic, brief and simple to present. They should de-identify real events to the extent needed to protect those actually involved, and offer at least one realistic solution.
Good luck and enjoy the challenge.
ODG-1
't Was a Dark and Rainy Night
't Was a Dark and Rainy Night
1. You are the First Officer (FO) and Pilot Flying (PF) of a twin-jet transport, (it does not have a nose wheel steering on the FO's side). During the flight, you were discussing a recent B-737 crash caused by the failure of reverser doors following a go-around. It is 22:43, the weather (Wx) is overcast, 3 miles in rain and fog.
You just landed your A/C, deployed the thrust reversers and are pulling near maximum reverse thrust. Your eyes are on the runway and you notice that, as you modulate reverse, your A/C begins to swing to the right. You compensate first with left rudder then with left brakes too. You glance down at the Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) gauges and notice that #2 EPR is still near maximum. The noise is deafening. Your airspeed is down to 105 knots and you still have better than 6000 feet of runway. You close both reversers.
As soon as the reverser doors close, your A/C swings violently to the left. You immediately apply maximum right rudder and right brakes, release the left brakes and regain directional control. You once again glance down at the instrument panel and notice that both reversers are stowed, the #1 engine is spooling down to idle, the #2 is in go-around thrust, and the airspeed is increasing through 115 knots.
What now, Mister?
2. In a time limit of 3 seconds, decide what actions or communications you will initiate. Be precise in your response by giving the exact wording of any commands or communications.
3. Quote any applicable maxims
4. State your rationale
Author's solution and case history: (to follow)
(G.N. Fehér, Beyond Stick-and-Rudder, Hawkesbury, 2013, p. 338-339)
#3
New Hire
Joined APC: Dec 2013
Posts: 9
command "right fuel control-off"
max brake
you clearly do not have an airworthy craft.
Lots of important info not in the problem. Aircraft weight is important as is runway condition and braking action. Prudent pilots do not use immediate max reverse thrust. Normal procedure is to confirm reverser deployment with the lights then ease up to the operationally allowed maximum, maybe 80% and then idle reverse by 80 knots or so. An epr of 2.0 would be the first sign of trouble and an indication that you lost control of that engine and time to shut it down.
max brake
you clearly do not have an airworthy craft.
Lots of important info not in the problem. Aircraft weight is important as is runway condition and braking action. Prudent pilots do not use immediate max reverse thrust. Normal procedure is to confirm reverser deployment with the lights then ease up to the operationally allowed maximum, maybe 80% and then idle reverse by 80 knots or so. An epr of 2.0 would be the first sign of trouble and an indication that you lost control of that engine and time to shut it down.
#4
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Sep 2013
Position: PA-18, Front
Posts: 187
command "right fuel control-off"
max brake
you clearly do not have an airworthy craft.
Lots of important info not in the problem. Aircraft weight is important as is runway condition and braking action. Prudent pilots do not use immediate max reverse thrust. Normal procedure is to confirm reverser deployment with the lights then ease up to the operationally allowed maximum, maybe 80% and then idle reverse by 80 knots or so. An epr of 2.0 would be the first sign of trouble and an indication that you lost control of that engine and time to shut it down.
max brake
you clearly do not have an airworthy craft.
Lots of important info not in the problem. Aircraft weight is important as is runway condition and braking action. Prudent pilots do not use immediate max reverse thrust. Normal procedure is to confirm reverser deployment with the lights then ease up to the operationally allowed maximum, maybe 80% and then idle reverse by 80 knots or so. An epr of 2.0 would be the first sign of trouble and an indication that you lost control of that engine and time to shut it down.
#5
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Sep 2013
Position: PA-18, Front
Posts: 187
Author's solution:
Actions:
- Redeploy both reversers and apply maximum reverse thrust;
- Apply maximum brakes;
- Maintain directional control with rudders;
- At taxi speed, shut down #2 engine;
- Modulate reversers to idle, then stow;
- Stop the A/C.
Communications:
- To captain : "I could not control #2: I shut it down."
Maxims:
- "When dealing with uncertainty in time-competitive situations, rely on intuition. You might not have the time to analyze the situation and synthesize a rational plan."
Rationale:
I must treat this incident as an RTO: "Act now; talk later." My first priority is to control the A/C. I can communicate once the A/C has stopped, is secure and the noise subsides. I don't know what the problem is but I have no time to solve it. I must, therefore, get rid of it.
The captain does not realize what is happening because he is not flying. His eyes are on the runway. I cannot just "dump" control unto to him. I am in a better position to deal with the situation then he is.
Case History:
The #2 Fuel Control Unit (FCU) linkage rod-end failed and the linkage separated from the FCU causing the FCU to schedule 90% power, regardless of thrust lever or of reverser door positions. With reversers deployed, the #2 engine delivered 90% reverse thrust. When the reverser doors closed, it delivered 90% forward thrust. All other A/C systems worked normally.
The solution presented was the course of events that actually took place with two exceptions: The A/C was not stopped on the runway but taxied off to a high-speed turnoff. Also, the FO did not tell the captain he could not control the engine and shut it down. At taxi speed, the captain assumed control and, when warning lights began to illuminate (master warning, oil pressure, hydraulics, etc.) he asked, "what the hell's going on?"
Maintenance investigation revealed that during a recent engine change, the FCU rod-end in question was pinched between one of the forks of the engine lifting platform and the engine casing creating a stress point in the rod-end. With engine vibration, a crack developed from the stress point and progressed across the rod-end. The tie-rod eventually failed when reverse thrust was scheduled to the FCU.
Both pilots were interviewed by their employer and by technical representatives (TechReps) of both the A/C and engine manufacturer. Both TechReps praised the crew for taking decisive action when faced with a situation not covered by drills, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or documented training material.
Both pilots were disciplined by their employer; the captain, for allowing the FO to land on a runway known to be slippery during marginal weather (captain's Discretion) and the FO for not following SOP. The omission cited was the Company SOP preamble which stated: "The Pilot Flying (PF) shall call out any abnormalities and call for appropriate checklists." SOP policy to ponder… (p. 339-341)
Actions:
- Redeploy both reversers and apply maximum reverse thrust;
- Apply maximum brakes;
- Maintain directional control with rudders;
- At taxi speed, shut down #2 engine;
- Modulate reversers to idle, then stow;
- Stop the A/C.
Communications:
- To captain : "I could not control #2: I shut it down."
Maxims:
- "When dealing with uncertainty in time-competitive situations, rely on intuition. You might not have the time to analyze the situation and synthesize a rational plan."
Rationale:
I must treat this incident as an RTO: "Act now; talk later." My first priority is to control the A/C. I can communicate once the A/C has stopped, is secure and the noise subsides. I don't know what the problem is but I have no time to solve it. I must, therefore, get rid of it.
The captain does not realize what is happening because he is not flying. His eyes are on the runway. I cannot just "dump" control unto to him. I am in a better position to deal with the situation then he is.
Case History:
The #2 Fuel Control Unit (FCU) linkage rod-end failed and the linkage separated from the FCU causing the FCU to schedule 90% power, regardless of thrust lever or of reverser door positions. With reversers deployed, the #2 engine delivered 90% reverse thrust. When the reverser doors closed, it delivered 90% forward thrust. All other A/C systems worked normally.
The solution presented was the course of events that actually took place with two exceptions: The A/C was not stopped on the runway but taxied off to a high-speed turnoff. Also, the FO did not tell the captain he could not control the engine and shut it down. At taxi speed, the captain assumed control and, when warning lights began to illuminate (master warning, oil pressure, hydraulics, etc.) he asked, "what the hell's going on?"
Maintenance investigation revealed that during a recent engine change, the FCU rod-end in question was pinched between one of the forks of the engine lifting platform and the engine casing creating a stress point in the rod-end. With engine vibration, a crack developed from the stress point and progressed across the rod-end. The tie-rod eventually failed when reverse thrust was scheduled to the FCU.
Both pilots were interviewed by their employer and by technical representatives (TechReps) of both the A/C and engine manufacturer. Both TechReps praised the crew for taking decisive action when faced with a situation not covered by drills, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or documented training material.
Both pilots were disciplined by their employer; the captain, for allowing the FO to land on a runway known to be slippery during marginal weather (captain's Discretion) and the FO for not following SOP. The omission cited was the Company SOP preamble which stated: "The Pilot Flying (PF) shall call out any abnormalities and call for appropriate checklists." SOP policy to ponder… (p. 339-341)
#7
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Sep 2013
Position: PA-18, Front
Posts: 187
ODG-5
Birds of a Feather
Birds of a Feather
1. You are the captain of a twin-jet transport operating a passenger (Pax) charter from an ocean-front vacation resort. The near-sea level single runway stretches out to sea, there is a 5 knot on-shore flow favoring a takeoff towards the water. Your aircraft is loaded to maximum climb-limited weight for the 3-hour flight. It is 19:30 hours, 15 minutes after sunset, the weather (Wx) is clear.
You have just taken off, you are the Pilot Flying (PF). As your First Officer (FO) retracts the [Landing] gear, you fly into a large flock of birds. You notice bird strikes on the wind shield; you hear several "thuds" in rapid succession and one loud "bang." Your #2 engine flames out and spools down; the Engine Fire Warning bell sounds, and the Master Warning and the #1 Engine Fire Warning Lights are "ON." You are now at 200 feet above the water at V2+10, airspeed decreasing.
What now, captain?
2. In a time limit of 3 seconds, decide what commands, actions or communications you will initiate. Be precise in your response by giving the exact wording of any commands or communications. Do not include aircraft type-specific procedures as these may vary but do include generic actions common to all types.
3. Quote any applicable maxims
4. State your rationale.
Author's solution and case history: (to follow)
(G.N. Fehér, Beyond Stick-and-Rudder, Hawkesbury, 2013, p. 348)
#8
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Sep 2013
Position: PA-18, Front
Posts: 187
Author's solution:
Actions:
- Fly the aircraft at not less than V2;
- Return to the airport and land.
Commands and communications:
To FO:
- "Cancel the (fire) bell!"
- "Returning for immediate landing."
- "Monitor the profile"
Maxims:
- "Know the difference between what is important and what is urgent, and act on what is important."
Rationale:
Here, two failures are competing for our attention. One is the flame-out of the #2 engine the other is a fire in #1 (engine). Both are urgent but only the loss of thrust that resulted from the flame-out is (relatively) important. Although the fire warning (bell and lights) is certainly hard to ignore, the #1 engine, though on fire, is producing thrust, thrust we need if we are to stay dry. I must, therefore, ignore the fire warning, remove all sources of distraction (i.e. silence the bell) and concentrate on landing as soon as possible.
Standard (Standing) Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Engine Fires should be kept in healthy perspective. They assume that (in two engine aircraft) the other power-plant continues to produce thrust. Lifeless, mindless, robot-like knee-jerk responses to Engine Fire Warning Devices could lead to the loss of the only means to stay in the air (i.e. shutting down the only thrust-producing engine). If #1 spools-down, we will deal with that loss when it happens.
Case History:
With the setting sun, waterfowl settled down for the night at the far end of the runway. The flock became aroused by the engine noise and took-off right into the aircraft's flight path. Several birds struck the nose cone, wind shield, landing gear and leading edges. The #1 engine ingested 4 birds bending 1 fan blade and braking off 1 blade tip which consequently cleared through the bypass. The #2 engine ingested an unknown number of birds, its compressor stalled and the engine flamed out. (p. 348-349)
Actions:
- Fly the aircraft at not less than V2;
- Return to the airport and land.
Commands and communications:
To FO:
- "Cancel the (fire) bell!"
- "Returning for immediate landing."
- "Monitor the profile"
Maxims:
- "Know the difference between what is important and what is urgent, and act on what is important."
Rationale:
Here, two failures are competing for our attention. One is the flame-out of the #2 engine the other is a fire in #1 (engine). Both are urgent but only the loss of thrust that resulted from the flame-out is (relatively) important. Although the fire warning (bell and lights) is certainly hard to ignore, the #1 engine, though on fire, is producing thrust, thrust we need if we are to stay dry. I must, therefore, ignore the fire warning, remove all sources of distraction (i.e. silence the bell) and concentrate on landing as soon as possible.
Standard (Standing) Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Engine Fires should be kept in healthy perspective. They assume that (in two engine aircraft) the other power-plant continues to produce thrust. Lifeless, mindless, robot-like knee-jerk responses to Engine Fire Warning Devices could lead to the loss of the only means to stay in the air (i.e. shutting down the only thrust-producing engine). If #1 spools-down, we will deal with that loss when it happens.
Case History:
With the setting sun, waterfowl settled down for the night at the far end of the runway. The flock became aroused by the engine noise and took-off right into the aircraft's flight path. Several birds struck the nose cone, wind shield, landing gear and leading edges. The #1 engine ingested 4 birds bending 1 fan blade and braking off 1 blade tip which consequently cleared through the bypass. The #2 engine ingested an unknown number of birds, its compressor stalled and the engine flamed out. (p. 348-349)
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