N6724G

February 27, 2006
Clement E. Bellion
Colonel, USAF (Ret.)
Order of the Daedalians
P.O. Box 249
Randolph AFB, Texas 78148-0249
Re: Nomination of Air Crew for the 2005 Lieutenant General Harold L. George Civilian Airmanship Award
Dear Colonel Bellion:
It is my pleasure to once again nominate an aircrew of American Airlines for the prestigious Lieutenant General Harold L. George Civilian Airmanship Award, which is presented annually by the Order of Daedalians.
On the evening of July 30, 2005, Captain Arnold Tolbert and First Officer Kenneth Albino exhibited superior airmanship when faced with several emergencies onboard their aircraft. Captain Tolbert and First Officer Albino were scheduled to operate American Airlines Flight 917 from Miami International Airport to Jorge Chavez International Airport in Lima-Callao, Peru. The aircraft assigned to this trip was an airbus A300-600R, registration #N083AA. Onboard the aircraft was a crew of eight flight attendants and approximately 200 passengers. Captain Tolbert was the flying pilot and the flight was operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) in accordance with CFR Part 121.
There is no better way to describe the events and emotions of this flight than by reading the very words of the pilot?s involved. As you will see, several events conspired against Captain Tolbert and First Officer Albino, but they were able to safely return the aircraft to Miami International Airport.
Captain?s Debrief
After a substantial delay, we finally "buttoned up" the aircraft and received taxi clearance to runway 8R at MIA. We were headed for Lima, Peru. The plane was fully loaded and we closed out at 370,000 lbs, only a few thousand pounds shy of max takeoff weight. Though it was a clear night, thunderstorms loomed out to the east of the airport, which prompted me to turn on the weather radar for takeoff. We set max power takeoff thrust and roared down the runway. Everything was looking good until just after V1, when we received an overtemp warning light on the #2 engine. As I glanced down at the EGT, I saw that the temperature read 1000 degrees. (This often occurs during a max power takeoff with the A300. The procedure requires the pilot to retard the throttle slightly to maintain the EGT within limits.) As I attempted to retard the #2 throttle, I discovered, after several firm pulls, that it could not be moved from the max power position. (It turned out that the high stage bleed air duct had malfunctioned, which allowed super hot air to weld the throttle cables in place.) As I relayed this information to my First Officer, we immediately began to receive intermittent and alternating
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overtemp and #2 engine fire warnings. (The #2 engine continued to produce normal thrust.) At this point, it became painfully obvious to me that we were going to have to shut down this engine and return to Miami. We declared an emergency, leveled at 3,000 feet and performed the ECAM actions, which included shutting down the engine, firing both extinguisher bottles, and continuing with the QRH procedures. Since I had briefed at the gate that we would return for a landing on runway 9 at MIA in case of an engine failure, and had set up the radios accordingly, my First Officer made this request while declaring the emergency with tower. The many years of "schoolhouse" simulated engine fire/failure emergencies really paid off as we split duties and my First Officer ran checklists and I began to coordinate with the flight attendants, passengers and appropriate outside agencies, all the while thinking, "Is this for real?!" Miami Tower was great. I was given clearance for a visual approach to runway 9 as I turned downwind. The light in the #2 engine fire handle remained illuminated during this entire ordeal. (This is supposed to indicate that the fire is NOT out.) This concerned us greatly and we called for one of the flight attendants to check and see if they saw any indications of fire. They saw none. We were just completing all required checklists when I turned base leg turn. I notified the tower to inform the CFR personnel that we would be stopping straight ahead on the runway for a checkout.
Our approach speed was 165 knots (roughly 25 knots faster than normal) and our landing weight was 369,000 lbs (approximately 6,100 lbs heavier than max landing weight). I elected to use the low autobrake setting for landing. The touchdown was normal; however, our deceleration rate, with one thrust reverser, as expected, was not very effective. I started getting on the brakes at about 120 knots to ensure that we would be able to stop within the remaining runway. The brake temperatures on the right main tires reached 700 degrees. We came to rest with approximately 3000 feet remaining. The CFR personnel were quick to arrive and reported to us that they saw no indications of fire, but that the right main brakes were glowing. Due to the high temperatures, the two aft main tires on the right side deflated. We called maintenance for a tow, and were informed that they would have to change the two main tires before they could move us. Rather than have the passengers wait onboard for this to happen, Flight Services sent out some mobile stairs and a couple of buses to transport the folks back to the gate area.
The First Officer attempted to get to Lima twice on this particular evening. The first paragraph below describes his first flight with a different captain and the second paragraph describes his second flight.
First Officer?s Debrief
My day began on flight 917 with a scheduled 16:46 departure to Lima. After a lengthy delay due to a ramp closure, we pushed back, started up and taxied to the Runway. Since the aircraft was filled to capacity with 267 passengers and crew, the takeoff weight was just under max gross weight. We elected to depart runway 9 after briefing all the performance factors if a return, to the same runway, was required. The runway at the time of takeoff was still somewhat wet following the earlier thunderstorms. The power was advanced to standard power and the aircraft accelerated normally. Just prior to V1, maybe five knots but no more than 10, the master warning, CRC, and EICAM alerted that the speedbrakes were not retracted. I quickly brought up the Flight Control page on the ECAM to verify speedbrake/spoiler position (they were in the normal position) while simultaneously backing up the Captain in continuing the takeoff. The aircraft climbed and accelerated normally as we climbed to 7000 feet to trouble shoot. All seemed normal except the land ASAP message and warning unknown message on the ECAM status page. We returned to Miami for an overweight uneventful landing to
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runway 9. After taxiing to the gate and parking the Captain called it a day and I, unfortunately, decided to stay.
Flight 917 to Lima, now six hours late, pushed off the gate with a new airplane and taxied to runway 8R for a max power Takeoff. The performance data was just about identical to the data for the first departure. As the aircraft began the takeoff roll all seemed normal, but late in the takeoff roll, just prior to V1 the number 2 EGT climbed to 960 degrees, max for takeoff on the A300, with the flickering of the EGT amber alerts. Just after V1 as the nose lifted from the runway the #2 EGT climbed to over 1000 degrees with the master caution light, ECAM Engine overtemp status message along with intermittent engine fire lights, master warning and CRC. As the Captain attempted to reduce the throttle to bring the temperature below 1000 degrees, he noticed that the throttle would not reduce below the takeoff power setting. By this time the fire warning for number two was on steady. I declared an emergency as we climbed to a safe altitude and airspeed prior to shutting down the engine. I ran the ECAM action items for an engine fire and discharged the first bottle of agent followed by the second bottle and then referred to the QRH. The fire light in the fire handle remained illuminated. I called the flight attendant to scan the number two engine for any visible signs of fire for which she reported no indication. The Captain continued to fly and coordinate for the return to runway 9 while I double checked the emergency checklist for completeness. We set up for an overweight 369K single engine landing with an approach speed of 165 knots. Touchdown was normal and the aircraft stopped with 3000 feet remaining. The Captain advised the flight attendants and passengers to remain seated while the fire chief scanned #2. We were advised that the engine scanned clean but that our right brakes glowed red. The #7 and #8 tires deflated as we waited for the brakes to cool so that the parking brake could be set. The air stairs arrived along with buses to deplane the passengers. Maintenance informed us that the 14th stage high pressure bleed duct blew up and ruptured the aft turbine cowl to the point that the bottom of the aft part of the engine was exposed with the remainder of the turbine cowl forced up towards the aft engine pylon. The intense heat from the bleed air melted the throttle cable preventing any throttle movement. Kudos to the Captain for excellent airmanship under unusual circumstances! I was done for the night.
I submit that this crew exhibited the highest level of professionalism and superior airmanship under very challenging circumstances. They methodically assessed the event and applied proper emergency response procedures. They protected their passengers and cabin crew while maintaining a professional demeanor. I commend them for their example of expert composure and believe they represent the spirit of the Lieutenant General Harold L. George Civilian Airmanship Award.
Colonel Bellion, thank you for your consideration of this worthy crew.

Ranger

Oh, boy. This is going to light up one or two resident pains.

It was not a good day for those guys. They deserve not only the Daedalian Award but every penny that they've ever made, what they will make and what they can coax out of their company in the future.

On another note, it's clear that they should have chosen another career path. Never mind.

fireman0174

I certainly wouldn't have attempted the second flight to Lima. Probably had someone special waiting ....... And of course, a Motel 6 would be just fine for them, after all, gotta save a few pennies on the ticket price.

I wonder if all those passengers felt the crew should only "rest" at a Motel 6?

Poundstone

This crew performed well. That being said, the emergency they faced was not a terribly complex one. They shut down an engine and landed shortly afterward. A one-engine approach and landing near max weight, with a long runway -- that's something every crew has practiced many times in the sim. No nav challenges, no unusual configuration requiring a computation-on-the-fly of approach and landing speeds, no evidence of a spreading fire or smoke, in fact no other unusual conditions at all. As far as in-flight emergencies go, this one was pretty benign.

But the main point I want to make is that this professional flight crew is but one of many thousands of equally-qualified professional flight crews in the US. And there are many more thousands of pilots or would-be pilots who are eager to go through the training and hiring process with the airlines. They are hungry. The younger ones have no illusions about the less-than-stellar compensation awaiting them -- but they want to fly professionally anyway. This is the reality for this flight crew and every flight crew: steady pressure from new entrants and the need of management to relentlessly seek out areas for cost cutting mean that pilots cannot argue they should receive increased compensation "for their professionalism." There are simply too many fully-qualified, equally professional pilots ready to work for the new, lower compensation rates.

Of course, all this is being driven by the flying public's demand for continued cheap fares. Airlines that can make a profit while still offering cheap fares will survive; those that can't, won't.

mike734

Not being able to reduce power on an engine is not a well practiced proceedure. It becomes interesting when you level off and start to blow through 250,270,300....You have to reduce power on the good engine (opposite thinking) and then shut down the bad one. Then you have to rapidly add power on the good one to replace the lost power of the bad one. It is counter intuitive and requires large rudder inputs. It is not really tough but is different and can turn in to a mess.

Poundstone

Mike, thanks for your post. I agree with you in all respects -- including your conclusion that the situation this flight crew faced was not tough.

SkyHigh

Poundstone you are my hero. First a complement but ending with a slam dunk on your main point.

Skyhigh

mike734

Yeah, I noticed that. I'm not sure he got my point. My point is that it was a confusing situation they handeled well. Not tough but different and rarly practiced.

We had a similar situation in our sim. eval. this year. I can tell you that it requires good CRM. For that, the crew deserves Kudos.

BURflyer

Whats up with aa and the a300?

ERJ135

I know someone who flew the A300 for AA. Said he is glad he not flying the A300 anymore and would never put his kids on one. Though he said maybe he would put his EX wife on one