Interesting Airbus / Air France read
#11
I have not flown the Airbus, and if I may ask:
Is it possible the speed sensing system of the airplane (pitots, air data computer, etc) malfunctioned and the airplane's rudder went from low-throw to high throw ?
Thanks in advance.
FF
Is it possible the speed sensing system of the airplane (pitots, air data computer, etc) malfunctioned and the airplane's rudder went from low-throw to high throw ?
Thanks in advance.
FF
#12
This is nothing but pure speculation, and fodder for future lawsuits against the manufacturer. This is an aircraft with an excellent safety record. There has been very little factual information released about the recovery effort so far- probably because there is very little actual information to report, rather than some already developed conspiracy between Air France, Airbus, the French Government ect. Put your tin-foil hats away people.
If the boxes are ever found, maybe that will provide some useful information- or at least some better material for amateur speculation.
If the boxes are ever found, maybe that will provide some useful information- or at least some better material for amateur speculation.
#13
#14
Fail-safe to low displacement
I'm not familiar with the Airbus rudder limiter, but he 767 has a component called the "Rudder Ratio Changer". If it fails, you get an EICAS message and the left hydraulic system rudder actuator is automatically depressurized.
This limits rudder displacement at high airspeeds. However, abrupt rudder input should be avoided at high speeds. At low airspeeds, the remaining rudder actuators can provide full rudder displacement.
--767 PRM
--767 PRM
#16
Interesting viewpoint!
Do you recall what happened when hundreds of innocent people died as a result of Boeing's "Highly unusual" rudder design?
I'll tell you. Not mutch!
If this is indeed an "Airbus rudder issue", I hope they take a lot more action than Boeing did after they designed and delivered disaster!
This isn't about national pride! This is about the lives of innocent people!
Al
#17
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Posts: 829
I talked to a mechanic that is quite familiar with Airbus products. He mentioned that there is a problem with skydrol/hydraulic fluid leaking from rudder actuators and causing eventual delamination.
As for the 737 vs Airbus thing, I'll point out that the 737 hardover rudder resulted in a loss of control and not a structural failure. The 737 hardovers appeared to happen at lower airspeeds, but I wouldn't automatically assume that a structural failure would have occurred had it happened at higher airspeeds.
To bring the American Airlines into the proper reference - the airspeed was a maximum of 251 knots, the rudder pedal traveled a maximum of 2.4 inches, the rudder traveled a maximum of 11 to 12 degrees, and the lateral load factor increased 0.2 g's. It's all in the NTSB report found here: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf. I know what the standard thoughts are on the factors surrounding the loss of that vert stab, but I don't know anyone who would have thought that those numbers at that airspeed should result in any sort of structural failure.
As for the 737 vs Airbus thing, I'll point out that the 737 hardover rudder resulted in a loss of control and not a structural failure. The 737 hardovers appeared to happen at lower airspeeds, but I wouldn't automatically assume that a structural failure would have occurred had it happened at higher airspeeds.
To bring the American Airlines into the proper reference - the airspeed was a maximum of 251 knots, the rudder pedal traveled a maximum of 2.4 inches, the rudder traveled a maximum of 11 to 12 degrees, and the lateral load factor increased 0.2 g's. It's all in the NTSB report found here: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf. I know what the standard thoughts are on the factors surrounding the loss of that vert stab, but I don't know anyone who would have thought that those numbers at that airspeed should result in any sort of structural failure.
#18
According to Aviation Week and Space Technology:
The early focus of the investigation has been on assessing the meaning of 24 Automatic Communications and Reporting System (Acars) messages to the A330-200 transmitted in a 4-min. period prior to all contact with the aircraft being lost at 2:14 UTC; 14 of the messages were received in the last minute alone.
. . . Around 2:10 UTC, not only was the autopilot disabled, the Acars messages indicate the aircraft defaulted to its alternate law flight controls, which doesn't provide the full automatic envelope protection. Failure messages also indicate that the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) or the rudder travel limiter failed, followed by those for the Air Data Intertial Reference Units (Adiru). Then, the alerts point to a fault in the primary and secondary flight computers ("F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT" and "F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT"). The final message, from the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor, signaled a change in cabin altitude at a rate greater than 1,800 ft. per min., Airbus states, adding that it "remains to be explained."
. . . The speed sensor anomaly occurred at 2:10 UTC after other fault warnings had already appeared.
. . . the Acars messages indicate that the autopilot was turned off at 2:10 UTC, either by the pilot or automatically.
. . . Around 2:10 UTC, not only was the autopilot disabled, the Acars messages indicate the aircraft defaulted to its alternate law flight controls, which doesn't provide the full automatic envelope protection. Failure messages also indicate that the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) or the rudder travel limiter failed, followed by those for the Air Data Intertial Reference Units (Adiru). Then, the alerts point to a fault in the primary and secondary flight computers ("F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT" and "F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT"). The final message, from the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor, signaled a change in cabin altitude at a rate greater than 1,800 ft. per min., Airbus states, adding that it "remains to be explained."
. . . The speed sensor anomaly occurred at 2:10 UTC after other fault warnings had already appeared.
. . . the Acars messages indicate that the autopilot was turned off at 2:10 UTC, either by the pilot or automatically.
Rudder travel linked to speed, but accurate speed indications lost.
Rudder travel linked to rudder travel limiter, but limiter lost.
Rudder doesn't move much if AP is on, but AP was disengaged.
Rudder travel now dependent on pilot inputs, and pilot is flying around turbulence and thunderstorms with not much horizon reference (dark, mid atlantic), suspect speed indications, and @ higher speed, as well as many bells and whistles going off.
IMO the situation certainly presents the possibility that the rudder could be manually over-controlled, similar to the AA accident (as 'LivingInMEM' wrote, the amount of input to get to an 'over control' situation is much more minute than most would suspect, or at least was in the AA accident), given what the ACAR's messages indicate.
--
If I am in the wrong, please feel free to correct my post. I'm no expert, just an interested observer, wondering, like many others, how a vertical stab escaped this disaster rather unscathed when the rest of the aircraft did not, and if anything can be learned from this.
Last edited by Sniper; 06-15-2009 at 12:42 PM. Reason: added comment re: LivingInMEM's post
#20
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