What Training/Checking Standard Should Exist
 

Today, the FAA is wrapped up in a couple of rulemaking efforts. Included in these efforts are:
1) A revision to the training and evaluation requirements; and
2) The issue of crew rest.
Both of these issues seemingly arose from the controversies that developed after the Colgan accident in Buffalo in 2009. Of course, there are other examples where at least one of these issues played a prominent role ... but this one seems to have been the catalyst for all the current flurry of activity from the Feds.

I’m going to stay away from the “crew rest” issue simply because I believe it is almost impossible to develop a meaningful set of regulations to “ensure” that pilots are well rested before the beginning of each sequence. Outside of being able to identify those who are cavalier about closing the bar at 2AM with a lobby show time of 08:00, or flaunting ski-lift tickets for the last run of the night with a similar show time, I can see virtually no way for anyone to determine if a crew member is or is not “well-rested” before flight. So, I’ll stick to the first issue – that of training regulations.

Today there seems to be more than one way that an airline may approach training program development, approval, and application. First, there is very little chance of applying any training program without the Feds granting approval ... but that approval can be achieved in one of essentially 2 ways. First, there is the existing regulations that lay out what has to be trained and tested initially and then revisited during recurrent checks. I can rather easily find what I’m going to be checked on ... but, other than my instructor’s outline, where can I look to find out what I’m going to be trained on? When I asked the last Fed who graced our jump seat, he said to “…check 121 appendix E.” That does answer some of my question … but the material in that appendix seems to be terribly high level and completely avoids almost all specificity for anything described. How does any company know for sure that what they are proposing for training is going to be in compliance with regulations that are so vague?

Second, if my company chooses to do things differently, they may find it beneficial to seek approval under the AQP. For some time now, I’ve never really looked to see what that meant – but I’ve recently taken the time to research it a bit more. According to the material I’ve read, almost anything will be considered as long as the Feds are given something on which to hang their regulatory “hat;” and from what I’m told, that means essentially hiring a staff of behavioral psychologists to provide all the necessary “buzz” words. The almost immediate result is an increase in the training intervals for some crew members and a rather significant departure from what the rules have been requiring for some time. For example, under this approach, the airline is apparently allowed to set their own objectives for the individual functions that are included in the “approved” training program – although the caveat here continues to be that these staff psychologists can convince the Feds that what they describe really does what they say it does. Under this approach, the content of what is actually “checked” can be reduced to only “sample” the functions that have been trained - again, depending on those psychologists' ability to achieve agreement with the Feds. Additionally, the number of functions required during each recurrent training session can be reduced by having the FAA agree that some of the normally required functions are “routine” and can be observed during the regularly scheduled "line check." Of course, with each reduction in what the crew members are exposed to during recurrent training, there is at least some savings in time (read that as “expenses”) that benefits the corporate structure. The justification for this is that these reductions are described as "adjusting the training program to conform to the individuality of the specific airline’s operation." I’m aware that any two companies are very likely to do some things a bit differently, but I am not at all sure that our operation of a B-737NG is decidedly different from any other company operating the same airplane type.

My question then becomes … what happened to the concept of everyone having to meet the same standards? A standard set of regulatory requirements not only should ensure that the minimum knowledge and proficiency has been achieved by everyone involved, it should prevent anyone from being granted a “more streamlined path” to achieve what they have described as "proficiency." And, if we re-define that “end point” for everyone, we effectively allow everyone to follow a different "path," allow everyone to achieve their own individual goals, and effectively eliminate any "regulatory standard." Is this a good thing?

I’m not trying to be “picky” and I’m certainly not trying to get any airline management into some kind of trouble … but I AM curious as to what is so good about doing things differently from everyone else. So ... I ask ... what should be trained and checked that will help ensure a safe operation?

Well - quite a post. Anyway - AQP allow the training/checking function to be focused on the problem areas. Most of us don't need training and checking on flying a normal, all-engines ILS. We see that in the line constantly - thus, many AQP programs don't focus much on that. At my airline, the Safety department uses FOQA data (anonymous data from the FDR) to see where each fleet is having problems.

For example, the Safety department sees many unstable approaches at MCO, landing on 18R. So this year we spent some time with unstable approaches at, you guessed it, MCO.

Airline Y that also flies into MCO and flies the same approach might have different procedures (configured by a different altitude, different flap settings, different engines) so they don't have the problem at MCO. So they focus on say, RNAV approaches to EWR instead.

As I see it this way, everyone is meeting the standard of a "safe operation", but working on their individual problems rather than a boiler-plate approach.

Well, first, it seems that the example you cite prompts a different set of questions. While few would argue the logic behind training pilots on what controls to use to correct any instability at any time during flight, it seems that if the instability you describe was or could have been caused by the timing of any configuration change, an adjustment in the location or timing of gear, flap, and/or speed brake deployment would be warranted. Sorry, I just don’t see how using different flap settings or having different engines might cause anyone to either have, or not have, stability problems. If there is a geographic anomaly that regularly or irregularly contributes to turbulent air or visibility problems, an awareness program supplemented by control application suggestions and an opportunity to see demonstrated and perhaps practice such applications, might be all that is necessary.

Secondly, if “most” folks don’t need training and checking on “fill-in-the-blank,” does that not imply that there are at least some who DO need that kind of training and checking? If that answer is “yes,” how might those persons be identified? One could also ask about the purpose of recurrent training. Should recurrent training be applicable only to those tasks that crew members see less than some specific number of times per year? Traditionally, recurrent training programs call for 2 precision approaches and 2 non-precision approaches. I know that most airlines, if not all of them, are authorized and actually fly many more than 2 of each of these kinds of approaches. I get from your comments that you may believe that this requirement is too much, leading me back to the question above … what is the purpose of recurrent training? The reason it’s called “recurrent” is that it is supposed to recur, or happen again, at least periodically.

Going through “recurrent” training is not a sign of pending doom or demonstrated failure. Each year sports professionals regularly go through a “pre-season” training camp of some sort. No one believes they do this because the players have forgotten how to hit a baseball, field a “hot” grounder, roll in a lay-up, or make a corner kick. They do it because muscles have memory and eye-hand coordination is a beautiful thing when done correctly. Besides, it provides for the coach to notice anything that may be starting to go askew, and offer corrective advice or suggestions. I can’t help but believe that pilots have the same muscle memory, use eye-hand coordination the same way, and can periodically use an objective review of their rather large set of skills … just in case “the coach” (the instructor/check airman) notices something that could make the difference in doing or not doing something that could become important at some critical phase of flight.

There is "Testing" and there is "Training".

Any nit-wit can fly a 10 mile final straight in ILS to CAT 1 mins.... I hope! But the FAA still needs to see you do it as part of your annual certification. There is also the V1 cut, the hand flown engine out ILS, missed approach, and of course your non-precisions approaches, all "Required" by the FAA. First you train it, then you fly it, every body has to do it, from the RJ driver to the Whale. No biggie. If that freaks you out, you are in the wrong business. But there is always that 5% that will have trouble with those simple things. You can't get away from that fact, I don't know what you do with those guys...maybe make them Office Guys?

Then there's all the "other stuff" we actually might run into, in the real world. This is what the more fleet specific training at recurrent is aimed at, or at least it should be.

I have always enjoyed going to recurrent TRAINING, because that's the time we get to see some of the new 'problems', and the new airports, new SID's, STARS, etc. in a safe environment, before you actually have to go out and deal with it on the line.

But there are only so many hours in a sim period. (4 usually, and the first two are used up doing the required stuff). They can't show you every possiblitiy in a limited amount of time, so they focus on what the feedback from the line tells them they need to focus on, what are the most common problems the line guys are having? Let's do that and see what's up with that in a non-threatening environment, ie. the sim.

Why waste sim time flying approaches to some airport your fleet doesn't even go to when you can actually do the stuff that's giving guys a problem, and work on that instead. But that means every program, in every fleet, at every airline, will be a bit different, as it should be. I don't need to train to fly a single engine departure out of Jackson Hole, when my airplane will never be anywhere near Jackson Hole. The Hong Kong engine out sid is something I would like to look at though, or the Tel Aviv visual, or what ever else my fleet actually does. So it shouldn't be a 'one size fits all' because the fleets all have different issues that need to be focused on.

Oh, and the only "Problem" in MCO is driven by ATC airspace limitations. MCO approach has to keep you high when landing south to stay out of the Executive Airport's airspace until you are in close, then you have to dump everything to get down quickly. Once you've seen it, you'll remember to slow down and configure and be ready to drop it in as soon as you're south of the VOR, next time. But it will catch some guys high and hot the first time they do it. That's the kind of stuff they could put in the recurrent program, so you get to play with it in the sim, before you do it out on the line.

As far as the Colgan accident, well, how much training did they already have built into their recurrent, about airframe icing and how to deal with it? And stall recovery? And how much training did the Air France guys get on dealing with "Un-reliable Airspeed" at night, in the weather, over the ocean?

I'll bet they are training for it now! We are even doing it in my fleet (777) and there's not been a 'problem' in either of those two areas...yet.

But to answer your question, "What should the standards be..." well, I think they should be the same as when you got your ATP in the first place, plus or minus 10 knots, 5 degrees and 50 feet. Or were you talking about something else entirely?

You're missing part of the picture here. Like you said, there are two basic ways that crew are trained/checked at 121 carriers - the standard 121 program covered in appendicies E,F, and H - and AQP. The structure of these programs can be quite different, but to suggest that one (or both) does not have set standards for training and checking is not correct. And neither is the suggestion that the requirements of an AQP program are made up by a bunch of psychologists to meet FAA buzz words.

You seem to be critical of the AQP program specifically - have you been through an AQP training program? There is a sim day during the typical AQP training and recurrent programs called the MV, or maneuvers validation. During the MV, all of the normal check ride type events are evaluated and must be preformed for the same set of standards as you would find in the more "traditional" check ride. The big difference is that if a maneuver does not meet standards, that it can retrained until it does.

A little extra background here - there is much more to 121 training/checking than the afford mentioned FAR references. First of all, there's the ATP PTS, which sets the basic STANDARDS that are applied to all checking events including the "validations" conducted in an AQP program. In addition to the PTS, there is a document called the Flight Standardization Board report, or FSB. The FSB is aircraft specific and is created during the aircraft certification process. The FSB outlines all of the specific training/checking that must be completed by pilots who will operate that equipment. For example, if during certification, it is found that maybe zero flap landings can be tricky, then the FSB might contain a requirement that all pilots of that type be trained and checked on zero flap landings. And guess what, if you fly that plane (even if it for a company for a company that has an AQP program), you will be performing zero flap landings, and they must be preformed to standards.

The great benefit of the AQP program has already been mentioned by others - that is, the ability to integrate focused training for problems that are occurring out on the line. In this way, AQP fits right in with other programs such as ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, and others.

I am getting the feeling that BTDTB4 isn't flying in a 121 environment, or may not be a pilot.

I think one of the points that he/she is missing is cost. Sure, a recurrent training program could go over every item and procedure that we *could* do. "OK, we did the left gen failure, I'll reset everything and we'll work on the right gen failure"

But an airline is trying to make money - at some point, at every airline, there is a cost/benefit analysis. I imagine Recurrent training is constantly evaluated to make sure we're getting the right training at the right time.

AQP is trying to focus our training - take it from the shotgun approach down to a sniper shot. ASAP, FOQA, LOSA and all that stuff help the training department focus on the items they think are important.

Well, actually, I am a pilot ... having flown several “types” in my career ... and my first approach and landing at the controls of a US Part 121 operator was in June of 1980. I don’t like braggarts who proudly proclaim the numbers of hours they have logged – so suffice it to say I have more than enough to be aware of and comfortable with what it is I’m saying.
It is “he,” thank you … and I don’t think I’m forgetting “costs” – what I am interested in is the possibility of having my company (or any company for that matter) give-in and adopt an AQP (or an AQP-style) training approach. Apparently you are not aware of the differences in training program requirements between operators conducting training under AQP. Were you aware that until the Colgan accident there were some part 121 airlines authorized to NOT train OR check on recoveries from approaches to stall BECAUSE they were authorized to train on Windshear encounters? The justification was that a windshear and approaches to stall occur in the same portion of the flight envelope; therefore, you were authorized to choose one and forget the other. Were you aware that AQP operators are encouraged to exercise “...judicious analysis of training requirements and training equipment...” and there from “...enable a participant to significantly reduce the need to use a full simulator for training and checking? I presume you are aware of the merger arguments between CO (authorized to conduct LOEs in Level 6 FTD) and UA (required to do LOEs in a Level D simulator).

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Originally Posted by iaflyer

AQP is trying to focus our training - take it from the shotgun approach down to a sniper shot. ASAP, FOQA, LOSA and all that stuff help the training department focus on the items they think are important.

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Sorry, but for me, the “focus” is on only 2 things: 1) how little can be done and still convince the Feds that whatever is done is “enough;” and 2) how much management can save by cutting down on the training expenses.
Oh, I agree that both programs have set standards for training and checking – that is not the issue on which I am focused. My concern is the fact that the standards for pt121, E,F, and H have the same standards, and that the standards authorized under the AQP are different – and may very well be different from every other AQP operator’s standards – and, in fact, many are different from all other AQP operators. Are you aware that the operator is authorized to establish “terminal training objectives (TPOs)” that, when developed, replace the FAA’s traditional compliance requirements and from there the airline is then authorized to make “additions, deletions, or changes” to these TPOs as needed. I am aware that the AQP staff includes psychologists – which is all well and good, perhaps even beneficial to some extent – as long as they don’t get involved in approving or disapproving training programs applicable to piloting an airplane. I have had one such person tell me that the reason a Level 6 FTD is authorized to be used the way it is in some cases has to do with the fact that it is the same as a Level D simulator without a motion system. That’s when I turned him “off.”

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Originally Posted by Dash8widget

You seem to be critical of the AQP program specifically - have you been through an AQP training program?

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I wasn’t necessarily critical of an AQP program initially – but once I began reading what it was, what it demanded, and what it authorized, I began to get more than a little concerned and suspicious. And, no I have not been “through” an AQP program, but I have observed quite a few ... up close and personally ... and am currently formulating a recommendation to management as to our recommendations with respect to seeking approval under AQP. So far, I’m impressed … but not in a positive way.

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Originally Posted by Dash8widget

There is a sim day during the typical AQP training and recurrent programs called the MV, or maneuvers validation. During the MV, all of the normal check ride type events are evaluated and must be preformed for the same set of standards as you would find in the more "traditional" check ride. The big difference is that if a maneuver does not meet standards, that it can retrained until it does.

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Are you aware that not in all cases is the MV session conducted in a Level C or D simulator – if what I am told is correct, there are some who use (and others who are petitioning for use of) simulation equipment all the way down to Level 5 and Level 6 FTDs for this purpose? There are some now who are authorized to perform their Line Operational Evaluation (LOE) in Level 6 FTDs and others are petitioning to use Level 5 FTDs for that check (see above comment on UA and CO merger).

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Originally Posted by Dash8widget

A little extra background here - there is much more to 121 training/checking than the afford mentioned FAR references. First of all, there's the ATP PTS, which sets the basic STANDARDS that are applied to all checking events including the "validations" conducted in an AQP program. In addition to the PTS, there is a document called the Flight Standardization Board report, or FSB. The FSB is aircraft specific and is created during the aircraft certification process. The FSB outlines all of the specific training/checking that must be completed by pilots who will operate that equipment. For example, if during certification, it is found that maybe zero flap landings can be tricky, then the FSB might contain a requirement that all pilots of that type be trained and checked on zero flap landings. And guess what, if you fly that plane (even if it for a company for a company that has an AQP program), you will be performing zero flap landings, and they must be preformed to standards.

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Actually, the Practical Test Standards (PTS), as a whole, are supposed to be applicable to all testing of pilots ... and a specific PTS is supposed to be applicable to all pilots seeking certain specific levels of certificates or authorizations. The Flight Standardization Board Reports are also supposed to be applicable to any operator operating the referenced airplane type. However, neither of these documents (the PTS / FSB Reports) are regulatory – they are both documents written to FAA personnel for their action – unfortunately, there is precious little information to those folks about what “action” they can legitimately take. And when someone is authorized to establish their “own” terminal proficiency objectives – what is said in a particular PTS document is no longer relevant to the issue. You might be interested to know that I’ve been informed that there are pending issues today as to whether or not an FAA inspector or an FAA designee can require someone to do something on a check simply because it is referenced in the PTS, or that during a check an FAA inspector or an FAA designee may authorize a person to not complete something that is contained in the PTS. Apparently, it’s not quite as “cut-n-dried” as many have believed.

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Originally Posted by Dash8widget

The great benefit of the AQP program has already been mentioned by others - that is, the ability to integrate focused training for problems that are occurring out on the line. In this way, AQP fits right in with other programs such as ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, and others.

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This “ability” has been talked about quite a bit. However, there are several operators who regularly incorporate into their training programs those relevant issues that are been brought to their attention through those same programs – but none of the operators I’m referring to have an AQP approved training program. Obviously, having an AQP training program is not a necessity to exercise this “ability.”
I’m glad you brought this up – as this is part of what it is I am looking into. The most recent version of the proposed modification to the existing regulations addressing airline pilot training (the specific action to which I am referring is revising, and maybe replacing, the two subparts of part 121 that currently address training and qualifications). The rule that is being proposed includes a lot of what the US Congress has mandated as a result of the Colgan accident. It apparently includes a provision for more training time, and provides that at least some of that additional training is to be focused on recoveries from stall (not just approaches to stall), recoveries from “jet upsets,” and the potential problems that inadvertent encounters with icing conditions can cause, as well addressing the amount of flight time that has to be achieved prior to a pilot being hired by an airline for a flying position. Some of the “additional training time” that makes up some of the basis of this “new” rule, is apparently designed to be available to address the kinds of “other stuff” you describe that occurs in the real world.
Feed back from the line is definitely a good thing. But, I also think that being able to review some of the stuff that we do routinely shouldn’t be dismissed out of hand. Perhaps one of the reasons we don’t have a real problem with executing missed approaches – the few times we have to execute one in the real world – is because we regularly revisit them on recurrent training sessions. Additionally, I don’t necessarily want to argue about the amount of time that is available for simulator training. As far as I can tell there is no mandated minimum or maximum time that has to or should make up a simulator session. I do know that around the world there are simulator sessions that vary from 3 hours to 5 hours – not counting any breaks that might be taken. Perhaps this is where those psychologists can provide a more meaningful input ... how much “time on your butt” can one person take before the amount of information that goes into your head begins to decrease and eventually reach zero?
Wait a minute ... the training you see in a simulator is not necessarily designed to familiarize pilots with a specific airport (yes, there are some circumstances where a simulator has been used to qualify a pilot into a new or different airport ... but spending the bucks to develop and modify a specific visual model for a specific airport just to qualify new captains, could get exorbitantly expensive, very quickly) – the airport model is often selected because it is easy (i.e., relatively cheap) to acquire, it has the attributes that are more like the attributes of a majority of the airports into which a particular airline flies – and in many cases, if the airport model used in the simulator is patterned after a “real world” airport used by that airline, the flight crews can use their own Jepp plates. But there is nothing that guarantees if you see XYZ airport in the real world, that same XYZ airport in the simulator will be 100%, 80%, 60%, or only 10% accurate. Of course there are limits, and to verify that, just recently each airport model available in the simulators we use in our training programs had to be reclassified as either Class 1, 2, or 3 … where Class 1 is very much like the real world … and Class 3 may be authorized only for certain aspects where there just may be limitations placed on the use that visual model. This is a requirement found the new simulator rule. We’ve always treated the simulator as a training and evaluation tool – an expensive tool perhaps, but only a tool, used to train and evaluate the pilot.

Obviously, I can’t comment on the decisions made at your airline ... but it may be that the acquisition of models of the Hong Kong or the Tel Aviv Airports that approach Class 1 accuracy may be beyond the capability (or willingness) of the purse holder. My position is that doing training at the simulated Miami airport isn’t about Miami – it’s about the airplane performance and handling qualities at a sea level airport. The airplane is likely to be very similar in its performance and handling qualities at any sea level airport on the planet. If one of those sea level airports has a more challenging departure or arrival – the airplane will perform and handle through those required maneuvers just like it did at Miami, had Miami required a similar departure or arrival profile. If your airline goes to some high altitude, short runway, airport in Central or South America ... the airplane will likely perform and handle much like it would if you flew into a simulator model of Aspen, Colorado. It’s not about the airport ... it should be how you learn to manage the airplane and make it do what you what it to do, when, where, and how you want it to. If you had to train in the simulator on every airport you operate into, your simulator training would be several orders of magnitude longer! In fact, we’re considering structuring a completely fictitious simulated world where there are 5 or 6 fictitious simulated airports – collectively representing the kinds of variances our company sees on our route structure. Yes, it would be more costly up front – but those airports would change only when WE wanted them to change and no one could criticize the fact that the terminal wasn’t right, the intersections were not properly spaced, or the surrounding terrain was to flat or too mountainous.
Well, that is the question isn’t it? Based on what the CVR and the FDR show, the Colgan captain apparently fought the stick pusher all the way to the ground. Did he not know what was happening? What’s up with the F/O raising the flaps without being asked to do so and without coordination? Two years ago no airline was criticized for not training on stall recoveries, because it was thought that training on recoveries from approaches to stall was sufficient – and that loosing zero altitude was the desired outcome. Today, these are not the thoughts that are making their way through the regulatory and training industry hallways of the world. And as far as Airbus is concerned, I have heard that only recently (after how many Airbus stall accidents?) has the chief training guys at Airbus acknowledged that perhaps pushing forward on the side-stick to reduce the angle of attack might be an appropriate step when the stall warning sounds. Training is a powerful thing – and bad training, lack of training, missed training, training that wasn’t taken seriously, or training that was missed all together, often takes pilots to their graves. In the Air France tragedy, there is a good chance that both of the co-pilots on that flight were trained prior to the shift in Airbus training policy with respect on the “forward movement of the side sticks.” At the very least, not taught, taught and forgotten, or taught and not taken seriously – there is little doubt that the person at the controls held a nose up input for essentially the entire descent. Some have been reluctant to point a finger at this person ... but no one doubts that the training that was originally delivered ... i.e., “rely on the airplane to get you out of trouble” … is not the current way Airbus is training their clients. And in the words of the chief executive of the Flight Safety Foundation with respect to this particular accident, “We have to get back to the focus on automation as a tool to manage the aircraft. It should be serving us, not the other way around.” I couldn’t agree more.
Certainly, training on what is known to cause problems for a flight crew is a good thing – but training to be able to fly the airplane should have always been the most important parameter.
Thanks for that answer – but my concern is not what the specific values are – but rather from where would we get those specific numbers – and why those numbers – and considering AQP, why would we want to see those numbers altered because a particular airline believes it’s okay to change them? Do we need regulations ... or should we allow each airline to rely on their own professionalism and let them choose what they want and when they want to do it? From my research (which has been just asking questions of several training departments around the country) it would seem that AQP airlines are pretty much “free” to establish what they want to do. Is that healthy? Is that what we all want to do? I don’t mind meeting regulations IF those regulations are logical and evenly applied. I’m really nervous about dealing with the kind of regulatory oversight that is apparently left up to the individual airline – particularly when it is almost exclusively management at the airline that makes the final decisions.

From above: Wait a minute ... the training you see in a simulator is not necessarily designed to familiarize pilots with a specific airport (yes, there are some circumstances where a simulator has been used to qualify a pilot into a new or different airport ... but spending the bucks to develop and modify a specific visual model for a specific airport just to qualify new captains, could get exorbitantly expensive, very quickly) – the airport model is often selected because it is easy (i.e., relatively cheap) to acquire, it has the attributes that are more like the attributes of a majority of the airports into which a particular airline flies – and in many cases, if the airport model used in the simulator is patterned after a “real world” airport used by that airline, the flight crews can use their own Jepp plates. But there is nothing that guarantees if you see XYZ airport in the real world, that same XYZ airport in the simulator will be 100%, 80%, 60%, or only 10% accurate.

I' talking about the training I've had over the past 26.5 years at Delta. We have always trained "airport specific" threats, with visuals to match, at least since I got on the 757+767 in 1989. Prior to that, in the 'old' 727 sims, generic was about all you could do.

With the newer sims (I don't recall what 'level' these sims are, but they have airport specific visuals) training is much better. The 777 sims we use have airport specific stuff and we train for all the 'problem' airports, as well as all the standard missed approaches, engine out, noise abatement climbs in TLV, slam dunks and last minute runway changes in LAX, all of that, and at my last recurrent we also did stall recoverys and a deep stall over water at night after unreliable airspeed, in effect, both the Colgan and A/F scenarios, minus the airframe icing. Seems Boeing just won't ice up like a (POS) Q400. I partly blame the FAA for ever certifying that thing.

I realize I've been lucky, Delta is one of the industry leaders, and many of the other 121's use generic airports for training, because as you point out, they can't (or won't) afford the better sims. I flew at another 121 ops and two 135 ops, and the Air Force prior to Delta, so yeah, I've seen 'other' training...I like what Delta is doing today.

Also from above: From my research (which has been just asking questions of several training departments around the country) it would seem that AQP airlines are pretty much “free” to establish what they want to do. Is that healthy? Is that what we all want to do? I don’t mind meeting regulations IF those regulations are logical and evenly applied. I’m really nervous about dealing with the kind of regulatory oversight that is apparently left up to the individual airline – particularly when it is almost exclusively management at the airline that makes the final decisions.

The bottom line is always Money. The FAA doesn't have enough money to hire enough oversight people, that's how they came up with allowing the airlines themselves to oversee their own training, which as you point out, is then again subject to "Cost Constraints" ie. do the absolute minimum to pass, and save as much money as possible. Training is expensive, just like good maintenance, so of course that will always be under -economic pressure- . I doubt the FAA will ever have enough money to hire more oversight people though, so...?

I want to second this BIG TIME. While our training pay sucks (something to be worked on in next contract) the training I have received in initial and recurrent has always been relevant and outstanding. AQP has made it much better.

YGTBSM! Holy Crap! Talk about a jotting down a few notes...... Just sayin!

I have trained at 4 different airlines using both methods. AQP is far superior because we don't have to spend time doing the vanilla maneuvers that we already know how to do. I won't hammer it too hard because the other guys have already covered it very well, but it's much more effective (read safer) in my opinion to use the data available (FOQA, ASAP, etc) to produce a tailored training program based on operational threats that DO exist for the specific airline/fleet as evidenced the the data collected from the REAL WORLD.

Another nice thing we've recently begun is targeting seasonal threats with our Quarterly recurrent training, via distance learning. That means every pilot will cover winter threats leading into winter, and summer threats leading into summer, in addition to the other stuff we receive. I remember doing recurrent an a different airline and reviewing Holdover tables and de-icing procedures in June, simply because the training program said we had to cover it. No pilot in that room was going to de-ice for at least another 4 months, and by then the info has been ram dumped.

Where I see a safety degradation is in self-teaching through distance learning during initial qualifications. In place of the "old way" where we received 2 weeks of systems ground school with a LIVE instructor, we now get to figure it out ourselves via CD's. See the whole cost vs. benefit discussion above for the reason this has come about. It saves the airlines a boatload of money, but I have personally felt much less prepared "right out of the box" as compared to initial qual courses where we had the full groundschool experience. JMHO.

I hear you brother and more power to you! I just dont have so much energy!

^^^^ +10 to all of the above, and to add one more thing I 'miss' about the good old days, not just a real, live instructor who would answer all your questions and give you a much better understanding of the systems (or Ops Spec, etc.) but I miss hearing the 'War Stories' from the other pilots in the room.

This web board is about as close as we can now come to sharing our experiences, good or bad, and trying to learn from other's trials and tribulations.

I know I learned a Whole Lot from those 'old guys' who had been there, done that. I always liked that part of the training, which is sadly missing now. For a while they even had some Flight Attendants mixed in with our CRM classes. That was very eye opening. I miss them too...just not as much as hearing the flying stories.

OK... I get the fact that there is some resistance to revisiting the tasks (the vanilla tasks, as you say) that pilots are supposed to know how to do. But, realistically, and not to be argumentative, just trying to get a handle on what you think, what tasks are you going to see in the simulated environment that you “don’t know how to do?” Do I understand you correctly to mean that doing something like an ILS with a crosswind is not something you should have to waste your time doing? I understand from AQP advocates that pilots do all (or most, anyway) of those vanilla tasks during their maneuvers validation session at the start of a recurrent training session. Is this true? And, if it is true, is this necessary or productive?

Right at the moment I’m not going to get into recurrent classroom subjects vs. “distance learning,” or some other alternative, but looking strictly at flight training ... what if there were 2 flight training sessions, one each on 2 consecutive days ... where one of the sessions looked at the vanilla tasks – perhaps some of them with some twists (with tail winds or with some interesting configuration anomaly) and the other one devoted to the kinds of things that may be brought to light from pilot comments or some FOQA data source – where each pilot would get something close to 2 hours at the controls each of the 2 days? And, since there is now a whole litany of recurrent schedules for any number of reasons ... where some are every 6 months (usually long-haul operations), some are every 12 months, and some split the difference at every 9 months. What gives you the most “bang” for your buck. If the recurrent flight training (with or without a Prof. Chk) were to be a 2-day affair, what frequency of doing it would be logical? How often should someone have to fly a Line Oriented Session ... and how “realistic” should this effort really be; and do both pilots have to be the pilot flying on such a Line Oriented Session? I’d also like to hear your thoughts on the logic of having 2 consecutive recurrent sessions (at whatever is the decided upon interval) where each session could be devoted to something that was not looked at or attempted during the last recurrent session (remember that each “session” is 2-days, with a simulator session each day) – whether that session was 6, 9, or 12 months ago. And the last question – should each of these simulator sessions be 3, 4, or 5 hours in duration – split between the 2 pilots – using a full crew concept (and if an F/E is involved – there might be 2 F/Es on-board).

It's not that I see the vanilla items as a waste of time, there just usually isn't ENOUGH time to do them and still leave room for the targeted training. I've been bouncing around so much here lately between aircraft that I can most recently speak to the initial qualification courses, but our Recurrent (Continuing Qualification, CQ) is set up so that each of these items is covered, just not in the "one-size-fits-all" approach.

To answer "what don't I know how to do?" I will point towards Airspeed Unreliable. Following the AF 330 accident, I went to CQ on the A-320 and a very similar scenario was given to us as a "first-look" item, that is it was not briefed and we were not expecting it. Let's just say I was less than impressed with my performance, and the instructor said he saw pretty much the same result every time he ran that scenario with a fresh crew. We didn't lose control of the aircraft, but it was a mess, and very easily could have ended badly. I consider myself well-prepared every time I step on the aircraft, as I'm sure the AF pilots did. We all KNOW what we're supposed to do, but I have a whole new perspective on that abnormal having seen it, been humbled by it, and then given the opportunity to try it again with a much better result. That in my opinion is very good training, and something I won't forget (hopefully) if I'm every faced with it in the real world.

I think it boils down to spending our training capital (time) in the most effective way, which it seems is the target of your inquiry on here. Neither way is wrong, I just think AQP provides the airline the ability to go above and beyond the standard to address their unique operational threats. Your concern seems to be the airline using AQP to avoid doing certain required maneuvers, and I have found, at least at Northwest and Delta, that it was the exact opposite.

From above: Right at the moment I’m not going to get into recurrent classroom subjects vs. “distance learning,” or some other alternative, but looking strictly at flight training ... what if there were 2 flight training sessions, one each on 2 consecutive days ... where one of the sessions looked at the vanilla tasks – perhaps some of them with some twists (with tail winds or with some interesting configuration anomaly) and the other one devoted to the kinds of things that may be brought to light from pilot comments or some FOQA data source – where each pilot would get something close to 2 hours at the controls each of the 2 days?

That is exactly what we do now at Delta. Our recurrent is 2 consecutive days, 4 hours in the box each day, but each sim session starts with a 90 minute briefing on what we are going to do in the box, and some schooling on what's the hot toppics of the day, then we go do it. As mentioned above, they will always throw in a couple "First Look" maneuvers just to see what happens, they are using these manuevers to collect data, see where the weakness' are, and train accordingly. Then we debrief for 30 minutes (or more) afterwards.

We do all the FAA required manuevers, all the required approaches, the NP, GPS, PRM, VOR/NDB, ILS, etc. with missed approaches, and engine outs, V1 cuts, etc. and every fleet has to do that same stuff. Also stalls and windshear, aborted take offs, etc. When that's done, we take a break, then we do a "Line Oriented Training" event, where you do everything you would on a normal flight.

On this training event, you start from getting in the jet just like you would on the line. You check the log book, might be a write up you have to get signed off, or a procedure you need to comply with (1 pack out for example) then preflighting the cockpit, load the FMS, brief the Flight Attendant (for this you brief the IP, who when playing the F/A role, usually goes by 'Peter in the Rear') then you run checklists, pushback, start, taxi out, take off, fly the SID, everything you would do on a "normal" flight, to a real destination for your specific aircraft.

Then the fun begins. At some point in the flight a situation develops, could be a mechanical, like flaps won't retract past 5. Or it might be a pax issue, a heart attack, the Doctor on board says LAND NOW! But you are overweight, must dump gas, etc. Then the two of you deal with it, all the way to a landing, but the weather is crap, and the ILS is out...so you deal with it, real time, until you are on the ground and the parking brake is set, but then you might have to do an evacuation too...

It's all run in real time, start to finish. Then you get critiqued. They will also film it sometimes, and you get to watch yourself in the de-brief. Great fun that!

One thing I will say, every IP I've ever had, in every airplane I've flown at DL (727, MD-88, 757-767, MD11, 777) before we get out of the box, has ALWAYS asked us, "Is there anything else you guys want to see?"

And a few times I have said, "Yeah, I'd like to see This and That." They will happily stay as long as you want to stay there...until the next IP calls him on the sim phone and says, "Hey, it's OUR TIME NOW!"

I don't know what they are doing at other airlines, but I've got no complaints with what we are doing at the D. And any time I've wanted to see something unusual, they always take the time to do it until we are both happy. I have never felt the crush of Saving Money at DL, when it comes to recurrent training, but I have heard it exists at some other operations.

Where we have seen a huge cutback, as mentioned above, is in Initial training, ever since they got rid of the ground school systems instructors and put it all on a CD for you to watch at home. I don't like that part at all. That is 100% about saving money. I have a very hard time studying at home, where my kids are going in and out, the wife is yacking at me, the dogs are barking, the phone is ringing, and there's nobody to ask for clarification if there's a question about something on the CD. Too many distractions and the pace of the CD puts me to sleep.

Well, I’m not sure I’d think it “great fun” to watch myself fumble around in a darkened cockpit trying to find my backside with one or both hands, but I DO, very much, appreciate your candid comments. This is exactly the kind of information I was seeking. The irony of it, however, is that what you have described as your recurrent “format” is exactly the kind of application I would like to see our company provide … but interestingly, several of our management believe that this cannot be achieved outside of an AQP authorization. What I described was taken directly from the most recent material published by the Feds in their Supplement to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (they call it an SNPRM) for how they would propose to rewrite the current training and evaluation rules while staying away from AQP. Their proposal calls for recurrent sessions every 9 months (that’s why I was seeking comments on preferences for 6 months, 9 months, or 12 months) likely in response to the NTSB and US Congress reactions to the public outcry for an increase in training after “Colgan.” Clearly, requiring 2 simulator periods on 2 consecutive days every 9 months is an increase in training – but it would also be an increase to have 2 simulator periods on 2 consecutive days every 12 months – and I think that deserves some consideration with respect to “increasing the training” that flight crew members get on a regular basis. And, if I’m reading that material correctly (and I think I am), the program I’ve described (and the program you are apparently living) does not need an AQP authorization to exist!

Perhaps my concern has more to do with what an enterprising airline manager may be able to do with an authorization granted by the FAA. I see no particular benefit to me if such a policy is instituted at my company that allows a lesser level of performance to be met for the individual crew members, disregards a substantial amount of the training that had been seen as “routine,” made easier for a “harry-numb-nuts” to get through the program, trumpets the “modern advances in training application,” while publically (and dramatically) de-riding the necessity to hire “psychologists” to meet the Fed’s requirements for being able to converse in Orwellian “double-speak” and quietly adding up the cost savings of bringing crew members in for training less frequently.

Apparently, it is obvious to some, and actually experienced by others, that having an AQP program does not mandate such an approach – but, from what I’ve seen, AQP certainly doesn’t appear to be focused on stopping it. Several of the programs I’ve researched have had rather major adjustments … first written, then reviewed and accepted, and ultimately “government approved” that actually makes it easier to achieve what is necessary to consider someone “qualified.” Some programs have such differences in authorizations that it’s hard to recognize they are operating under the same rules. In fact, I know a couple of FAA inspectors who attempted to correct some of the “over the top” foolishness that was becoming more evident … unfortunately one guy was actually reprimanded for his actions, and is now no longer assigned to that airline. That is really too bad … for him (as he had a pretty good reputation) and for the industry. The others have apparently either gulped the “Kool-Aid” or have simply moved on to other issues and are waiting for government retirement eligibility.

I believe in this industry and I want to see it made better – not used as a pawn for wealth building for a select few at the top. I am acutely aware that the days of airline pilot “play-boys,” tripping around the world with gorgeous ladies on their arms and keys to their Ferrari in their pocket, without a care or concern – as blithely portrayed on the new TV series “Pan Am” – while probably more fondly remembered than actually lived … but even then … are G-O-N-E … and are gone for good. No problem. That’s not why I am where I am – and it certainly isn’t why I’m doing what I’m doing … and I firmly believe I’m not alone in that attitude.

We've had several different time lines for recurrent over the years. Many years ago it was once per year, 12mo. cycle plus or minus 1mo. from your 'base month'. Then (due to a UAL 747 takeoff incident I'm told) it was changed to once every 6mo. for the international categories, now we are at 2 days of consecutive sims, every 9mo. for everyone, domestic and international.

Who runs your flight training dept? Is he/she a former line pilot, with a seniority number, who still goes out and flys line trips?

Ours always has been a former line pilot, usually a guy who has worked his way up the ladder through the training dept. as a sim instructor and a line check airman. I've never felt like we were being shorted any simulator training, maybe that's why. But if there was a bean counter in charge, a -non-pilot, I would bet we'd be getting the absolute minimum in training, no doubt. It's always about money with them.

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Originally Posted by Timbo

We've had several different time lines for recurrent over the years. Many years ago it was once per year, 12mo. cycle plus or minus 1mo. from your 'base month'. Then (due to a UAL 747 takeoff incident I'm told) it was changed to once every 6mo. for the international categories, now we are at 2 days of consecutive sims, every 9mo. for everyone, domestic and international.

Who runs your flight training dept? Is he/she a former line pilot, with a seniority number, who still goes out and flys line trips?

Ours always has been a former line pilot, usually a guy who has worked his way up the ladder through the training dept. as a sim instructor and a line check airman. I've never felt like we were being shorted any simulator training, maybe that's why. But if there was a bean counter in charge, a -non-pilot, I would bet we'd be getting the absolute minimum in training, no doubt. It's always about money with them.

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Yeah, I remember the UA-744 “incident” … it was a long-haul out of SFO, headed “down under,” with the FO flying. Just after takeoff (but the term, “just after,” isn’t fully explained) there was a problem with the #3 engine. Not much information was available specifically but it’s thought that the engine experienced a compressor stall, and apparently the FO shut it down. (OK – insert opinion here - there have been engine compressor stalls that have been quite dramatic and some so dramatic that they warranted shutting down the engine, but, as a routine procedure? … come on!..) maybe that would have been warranted, but … none-the-less, instead of maintaining coordinated flight by using those terribly-difficult-to-use, and dangerous-to-use, flight controls on the floor – called rudder pedals – when the airplane yawed to the right (with Numbers 1, 2, and 4 at TO power and number 3 gone, that’s what the airplane is supposed to do) the FO deftly applied left down aileron to correct. (!) Yeah, my thoughts exactly! Stuck the roll control spoilers into the breeze (just as that flight control application is supposed to do…), the airplane slowed, both in airspeed and climb capability (just as you would expect – given those circumstances), the stick shaker started (just as that airplane system is supposed to do…), horns were apparently blaring (just as those airplane systems are supposed to do…) – you’ve seen it all, I’m sure – resulting in just barely clearing the San Bruno ridge (with a bit over 100 feet of air between the aluminum and the rocks – less than ½ a wing-span). So, who’s at fault for this demonstration of aviation prowess? Of course … it’s the fault of that dastardly piece of hydraulically powered junk passing itself off as an airplane – the simulator! You see, this was a long-haul FO who, by nature of the route structure, wasn’t getting his 3 takeoffs and landings every 90 days, so he completed that requirement in the simulator. The fact that he apparently shut down an engine that just may have coughed a bit and (it is thought) could have, may have, caught up with itself, then cross-controlled that beautiful lady, caused her to almost loose her complexion, and very likely caused the remainder of the flight deck occupants (the PIC and both of the relief crew members) to have to change their shorts, goes essentially to the back burner. Of course we can’t blame the FO – and we certainly can’t blame the company’s training program, as they operate under AQP – so, what’s left? That inanimate structure we all visit regularly, the friggin’ simulator! So, the correction is to send ALL pilots into the simulator more frequently. Makes perfect sense to some; but I truly believe those "some" prefer their Jack Black mixed with Diet Coke and a marshmallow! ................ OK. Sorry. Got carried away.

We’ve had a mix of training folks – but management is still management – and they call the shots. That’s why I’m working so hard (a good share of it on my own time) to make sure we have all the facts. To me, having an AQP program is a blank check for some to trod all over meaningful training for the most part … granted there are some aspects that sound good until you read what they actually allow. When you read, “structured training for each airline’s own operation…” it sounds like something anyone could accept. But what it means is that the training objectives (i.e., piloting standards of performance) can be altered to suit whatever is desired. Some tasks can be substituted for having accomplished “other” tasks that were not accomplished. As an example, I give you those airlines that had been authorized to train on Windshear and never have their crews see Stalls or Approaches to Stall. That one still escapes me! Because Line Oriented training takes a lot of time to accomplish just a few tasks, the time that IS available becomes more critical. Solution? Do less … but don’t describe it that way. Describe it as designating some tasks as “routine” and therefore you should not have to address those tasks during training (…ever again…). Besides, the effect of accomplishing those tasks can be seen during Line Checks given to the Captain. More training time is allocated by doing less, making the Line Oriented approach to training more “do-able” … and … of course, it sounds better to say the training is done in a “realistic, line environment.” Anyone ever play football? Remember blocking practice? Remember training on “hand-offs?” Over and over and over, again! How long would it have taken those players to get their foot work down right if the only time they practiced it was during a real “game-like” scrimmage. Sure, there is a time to “see” that stuff during a “game setting” – so it is with piloting … but learning the basics, reviewing the basics, polishing the basics, is not, and in my view, cannot be, adequately done in a “line environment.” Using that football analogy … I see pilot recurrent training much like “spring” and “pre-season” practice is to football. No one thinks that the star full back forgot how to take a hand-off or forgot how to block. But, there he is, every spring, and every preseason, working on footwork, eye-hand coordination, over and over and over, again. I wonder why? Could it be to sharpen the edge? … to polish familiar feelings? … to examine what he could do better or more easily?

I have an idea! Let’s propose that an AQP program be introduced into professional football. It could be called Advanced Quality Plays. We all know that blocking an on-coming opposing player, trying to get to your team’s ball carrier, is very much like fending off the block of an opposing player trying to keep you from getting to the other team’s ball carrier – we’ll be able to train offense and defense at the same time – look at the time that will be saved! We can also easily see that running to the side lines while keeping your body facing the end-zone, is done exactly the same way when moving to the right AND to the left … one entire direction eliminated … saving even more time. Also, this business of differentiating between the “tackle” and the “guard” positions is much ado about little. Both positions are on the line of scrimmage, both start from the 3-point stance, and both attempt to get into the opposing teams backfield - more savings by training offense and defense simultaneously! More streamlining! More valuable time saved! And, to top it off, ALL of the training would be conducted in “simulated games!” What better way to get prepared to play an actual game?

OK ... Sorry ... AGAIN! Drat ... it seems the issues sometimes "get a life of their own."

I agree...so what's the solution you would like to see?

All that training takes time and to a bean coutner, Time = Money.

So...where does the FAA draw the line between spending enough time to train, vs. spending too much money?

I have noticed a degredation in my own flying skills ever since I left domestic, getting two landings a day, four days in a row, 3-4 trips a month, vs. flying International, getting one landing a month, maybe. Oviously I'm doing a lot less hand flying and a whole lot more sitting and sleeping.

Flying is a learned skill just like Football, Golf or Tennis, or racing catamarans (my drug of choice). The more you practice, the better you get, no doubt. 1 landing a month isn't enough to keep me happy with my skill level, so I get my butt out of the house and fly a taildragger often, just so I can remember how to use the rudder!

Like my highschool football coach used to tell us; "What you do in Practice, you WILL DO IN THE GAME, so Practice like it's THE GAME!" I guess that's why I ask for extra V1 cuts when it's my 'turn in the box'.

Where do you work? If you're that distrustful of what your management might do given the "blank check" of an AQP program then it may be time to move on to greener pastures. If they're that intent on cutting corners, you probably already have a training department problem AND they probably won't be able to get their AQP program approved anyway.

I admire you trying to gather information in an effort to promote safety, but it seems you had come to your conclusion prior to coming on this thread. You have heard several pilots give their impression of the AQP way of training/checking and it's been all positive. Your time may be better spent focusing attention on what's wrong within your own training department, rather than condemning simulators and AQP.

Training is a tradeoff. Would it be better for every pilot to have "practice" (to run with your football theme) prior to every trip? Sure! How about a thorough oral every time they sign in for a trip? Why not? I'll tell you why . . . there are only so many training hours to be allocated per pilot and still have the airline's human resources (that's really all we are) be efficient and productive. Again, it's a tradeoff of time invested vs cost vs risk. It probably would be safer for pilots to drill constantly until they dream of V1 cuts and Approaches to Stall in the Landing Configuration, but it's not a viable option.

Sooooo, we make the best of the situation and try to maximize our bang for the buck/limited time available. AQP is a compromise. The FAA has allowed certain airlines that follow the program to emphasize certain hot items that others do not. We have a very well-developed data collection system that identifies operational threats that ARE happening on a routine basis in the real world. Some of these threats may eventually lead to an accident/incident if not corrected through our training program. As the operation evolves, some of these will go away and new threats will appear. Our environment is dynamic and AQP allows us to target our training as real operational threats dictate.

To me, it makes perfect sense to target these issues that ARE occurring on the line. These events are actually happening and need to be fixed. Do we need to know how to recover from a stall, or appropriately apply rudder pressure after a V1 cut? Absolutely, but there aren't enough hours in the training plan to do everything every time. Eventually, you have to choose what's going to get the biggest return for the time invested.

Not sure I can say it any clearer than that, but mark me down as a fan of AQP. Hope that helps clarify where we're coming from.

Well, the answer to your first question (what would I like to see) is simple – but it’s hard to achieve. That answer is “a system that works.” Your second question (where does FAA draw the line between enough time and too much money) is an even easier one to answer. They should require only what is necessary. The tricky part is determining what is “necessary” and what is “nice to have.” This is the part where I get amused (well … amused is perhaps not the right word – perhaps dismayed … or disillusioned may be better descriptors), anyway, what is emotionally elevating (describe it as you may) when I see some of the discussions centering on the merits and demerits of traditional vs. AQP training emanating from the hallowed halls in Washington (and, yes, I have stopped there as well, seeking information and advice – well … it couldn’t hurt, right?). The “traditionalists” in the FAA decry the costs of an AQP program, and the “AQPers” toss back that it’s an optional program that no one is forced into doing – and then they add “besides, AQP pilots are better trained, more competent, and therefore safer than their traditionally trained counter parts because they each exceed the minimum standards set by the traditional regulations.” So, here we have the FAA – at least a good portion of it – saying that they know how to provide better trained pilots, more competent pilots, safer pilots … but they’ve decided to not require everyone to do the same thing – and the reason is because they … what? … they feel that AQP costs too much money to require everyone to participate? … they believe that AQP pilots are not sufficiently safer to justify the additional costs for everyone? … So, what then? Either such a statement is true or it is not.

From what I’ve read from the responses posted here, all of the “value” that folks believe is due to an AQP program is exactly the same stuff that is available in the current rules and will be available under the new rules that are being written. The FAA should make decisions based on safety and competency issues. Period. Either something is or should be included in pilot training because it is necessary that it be included. Is there any doubt that when an airline opts to do something that it is not required to do there is something more involved in the decision than competency and safety. I don’t want to be the bearer of consistently critical comments about those in whose industry I am employed, but, as they say, “facts is facts.” The concept of having management of those airlines voluntarily participate in AQP when to do so costs more than what can be justified for smaller airlines and the only return is a more competent pilot, frankly, borders on unbelievability … and may actually tip-toe across that boundary. From what I can gather, initially if an airline agreed to participate in AQP for one airplane in that company’s fleet of airplanes – the FAA would grant that entire airline an approval to participate in the “single visit exemption” – allowing all flight crew members to return for recurrent training every 12 months instead of the regulatory-required every 6 months for Captains and every 12 months for First Officers and Flight Engineers. For an airline with several different types of airplanes – one could get AQP approved for the smallest, and reap the benefits of having everyone immediately under the single visit process. Of course this only saves a lot of money when you have a lot of Captains at the airline. The more Captains, the larger the savings because the less numbers of people the airline has to bring in for recurrent training at the 6-month point.

Additionally, the inverse of those situations is true as well … the smaller the number of Captains, the less advantageous it was to go the single visit route. However, for those first in line for AQP approvals, from what I’m told and what I’ve seen, not only was this a savings, but a savings to more than substantially offset the requirements to hire a staff of the few data specialists that seemed to be the sticking point with some of the PhDs on staff at the FAA. Anyone can see who the AQP participants were at the start – and they weren’t the smaller operators. Once the program was underway, new and different methods of “savings” were developed. Under the “name your own proficiency objectives” program the airline was granted the authority to define its own terminal proficiency objectives for each task. These objectives replaced the regulatory requirements, and once approved, the airline was allowed to add to, delete from, or simply alter those newly established requirements. Following that came the “identify the routine tasks” program. Here, the airline developed a list of tasks that were identified as “routine” and therefore not required to be conducted during recurrent training – and the justification was that when a check airman was aboard a line flight conducting the regulatory required line check for the captain that CA could verify the satisfactory accomplishment of all those “routine” tasks for everyone. Now it seems that the interest lies in being authorized to use Flight Training Devices (FTD) instead of Full Flight Simulators (FFS) for some (and in some cases All) of required evaluation of pilots – the difference? FTDs are cheaper – they’re good – for what they were intended, but they aren’t fully representative of the airplane – where the FFS is a lot closer – for several reasons that I could point out – but you all probably know most of those reasons.

As the folks responding to this thread have indicated, pilots are getting trained – and trained on issues that are important to them – whether AQP or not. The AQP approach to training is not very, if any, different from what was used in “pre-AQP” training programs. In fact, you have said that you “also did stall recoverys and a deep stall over water at night after unreliable airspeed, in effect, both the Colgan and A/F scenarios, minus the airframe icing.” I’ve talked with pilots at non-AQP airlines who say they’ve done the same thing. So, it isn’t AQP that’s allowing that – its diligent training program managers doing what is required of them in accordance with the existing rules. As long as the training is just like what used to be done, and its done in a simulation device that was designed, built, and tested to be able to support those tasks – fine. But, the trend under AQP is away from all of that. The tricky part is getting everyone to believe that its just as good – or even better – than in doing it the “old fashioned way.” What I’m saying is that sometimes, perhaps not all the time, but certainly some of the time, the old fashioned way really IS the best way.

I do thank you for the conversation and the information. Please keep it coming.

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Originally Posted by LeineLodge

I think it boils down to spending our training capital (time) in the most effective way, which it seems is the target of your inquiry on here. Neither way is wrong, I just think AQP provides the airline the ability to go above and beyond the standard to address their unique operational threats. Your concern seems to be the airline using AQP to avoid doing certain required maneuvers, and I have found, at least at Northwest and Delta, that it was the exact opposite.

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In response to your comment, above, I made a phone call to an acquaintance of mine ... a former Delta instructor. I just got off the phone with him this morning and in his view, the thought that the Delta AQP was “the exact opposite of avoiding doing certain required maneuvers” is most assuredly NOT true. His specific example was that Delta was one of the airlines that was conducting recoveries from windshear INSTEAD of conducting recoveries from stall or approaches to stall during recurrent training – as allowed under AQP. That particular circumstance is apparently no longer the practice at Delta, but it apparently played a significant part in this acquaintance’s leaving their employment. Please understand, my intent is NOT to impugn the integrity or the reputation of any US airline – particularly one that has the public reputation that Delta has ... but the facts are hard to deny. Regardless of the airline, when given the opportunity to do something that will save money and is judged to be legal by the Feds – in fact, may be encouraged by the Feds – it would hard for any airline to “stay the course.” According to this friend of mine, the relationship that the Delta instructors had (and I guess still have) with the local FAA office was/is pretty good. That FAA office had apparently worked diligently with the appropriate personnel at the airline – but, in addition, some of the individual inspectors worked even harder with individual instructors at the airline to bring certain issues to light. No, my friend would not get specific, but Delta apparently no longer substitutes windshear training for recoveries from approach to stall training (and, it looks like that will be replaced in the rule by recoveries from stall...). He didn’t say, but reading between the lines, I would suspect that there may still be persons involved who might get caught in any reaction that might still be possible if some things were made public – and it’s not worth that kind of concern.

I had often mused that it would be nice to be able to have an open “round-table” discussion (a la Charlie Rose) where everyone would be honest in voicing their opinions and offering their suggestions ... but ... it seems that on-line forums, such as this one, are going to be the closest thing we get to having such a capability. I really hope it continues.

8 hours of ground school = 3 hours of instruction (according to Delta study but I'm inclined to believe it).
3 hours of CD/DVD instruction = 3 hours of instruction and you have quality control and a rewind button.

As to AQP?
I'm used to low vis takeoff, intercept a course fly out to an area, break off do all three stalls to the shaker and recover, steep turns (be ready for an engine failure during it), return for ILS and land. V1 cut on takeoff, return for non precision approach to a go around in the flare, return for ILS approach and land. Engine back takeoff into windshear and recover, return for no flap no G/S no VASI approach. Add in the easter eggs at will and at least an MEL and a hung or hot start. One time I was told no slewing and as always ATP mins.

That's normal, not a problem and even understandable. The Delta program is easier by far, systematic and well, get's the job done with no fluff you'll forget anyways because you never use it. I mean it's odd I no longer have to no the number of rivets required to hold the windshield on or have to diagram every system from a blank sheet of paper but I guess that doesn't do anything for you.

They like to say your knowledge should be an inch deep and 10' wide, about the width of the cockpit and the depth of a button push. Everything else will be at your fingertips (in 12 manuals), or you can call or just divert. But fly the airplane. That's the focus now- flying. Not useless maintenance for pilots.

I've grown to accept it.

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Originally Posted by forgot to bid

”... fly the airplane. That's the focus now- flying. Not useless maintenance for pilots. I've grown to accept it.

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We’ve been getting farther and farther away from requiring a pilot to be able to disassemble and reassemble their airplane in the manner required of an Army infantryman to disassemble and reassemble his/her M-4/M-16, and simply saying I agree with you falls way short of how much I agree with your statement of what today’s focus should be ... “fly the airplane.”

I continually try to keep a balanced understanding of what role the Feds, the airlines, the pilots, the mechanics, and the unions play in today’s aviation environments. My suspicion is that if each of those organizations were to be completely honest (in my view, a key word in this discussion) with all of the issues that each brings to the table – there would be little disagreement among those folks. What’s more, I’m not at all sure that the resulting aviation environment would be something we would want, and certainly we wouldn’t feel good about subjecting our lives in it, if any of these organizations were no longer invited to “the table,” or if any one at that table tried to gain “the upper hand” or the “default” leadership role. I don’t want to get into who has the most knowledge or the best view or any of that. Either these folks belong at the table or they don’t. If they belong – whatever they bring – one thing or a hundred things – is something that is necessary. If it is necessary – it’s necessary. We also have to recognize that each of those organizations has a constituency to whom they are each responsible – to some degree. Personally, I believe that if everyone’s actions while at the table, and while doing what was agreed at the table, maintains the honest approach I described above, the constituency issues should not be a problem.

The challenge is what to do – and I think it’s a challenge because I know there are training programs out there now that run the gamut of content and standards. We think that the ones we know and are familiar with actually work – at least until something happens. You know what they say about hind-sight. What would we have said about Colgan’s training programs or about the training at Air France if we were to have had such a discussion in June of 2008? We know that as long as humans are involved, there is the likelihood of human error. That is a given and will likely be “a given” as long as there are humans. That is why your statement of the focus on which pilots should be riveted – i.e., fly the airplane – being as “on-point” as it is, should be the end-point goal of whatever is decided to do. We must determine how we can best provide those folks with the knowledge and skills they need to have to do that job the way ALL would have it done. That certainly implies “training” of some sort, and would have to include the content and the frequency of such training. Then we need to determine if there should be one set of standards that should apply to the various companies who decide to participate in this industry – or if we should find some way to allow each one to create and use their own standards. As this is a profit oriented business, and because whatever “standards” are agreed to will result in some level of cost – if those standards are altered, the costs are very likely to be altered as well. With that, I’ll revisit the goal ... determine first, if there should be one set of standards, and second, determine what standards should exist. IF it is determined that one standard should exist, I would submit two things – first, it would have to be a “neutral” body at that “table” that maintains (i.e., evaluates, approves, etc.) this single standard, AND second, an AQP approach simply won’t do.

Well, my fresh Mai Tai has arrived (sans umbrella, thank you very much). Vacations on Key Biscayne DO have their valuable moments!

I'll say this as a comparison purposes, me and my regional buddies in my new hire Delta class were looking at the syllabus excited over how many training sessions were built into it. It's a lot. I think my new hire at the regional was 4+1 in the sim and 2+1 in the airplane. It may have been 5+1 but not any more than that for sure, 4 seems right.

I don't think they're saving money. Don't quote me but going from instructor based systems and orals to computer based ones saved I want to say 60-75% and that's including 4 to 8 sessions in a FTD and 9 in a level D sim. The added bonus is every pilot has seen the exact same material whereas before it was instructor and check airman dependent.

There are some things I'd love to suggest about training, but not here and they wouldn't further your cause anyways. More internal stuff and in the grand scheme of things inconsequential.

As to the FAA, I think it's a big deal personally to a POI to have an incident free operation. If there are FAA people here who'd like to chime in it'd be appreciated. I can say for sure I never like seeing the FAA because you never know who you'll get but if you think about the Colgan crash, to me, all fingers point to FAA oversight.

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Originally Posted by forgot to bid

I'll say this as a comparison purposes, me and my regional buddies n my new hire Delta class were looking at the syllabus excited over how many training sessions bere built into it. It's a lot. I think my new hire at the regional was 4+1 in the sim and 2+1 in the airplane. It may have been 5+1 but not any more than that for sure, 4 seems right. I don't think they're saving money. Don't quote me but going from instructor based systems and orals to computer based ones saved I want to say 60-75% and that's including 4 to 8 sesssions in a FTD and 9 in a level D sim. The added bonus is every pilot has seen the exact same material wheras before it was instructor and check airman dependent.

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Well, let’s look at the training you were excited about. I am presuming that when you say you received “4+1 in the sim” and “2+1 in the airplane” you mean 4 simulator training periods and 1 check period in the simulator, followed by 2 training periods followed by a check period in the airplane. I’ll also presume that the simulator training periods were scheduled for 4 hours – splitting the time between the two occupants and the check ride was over as soon as the tasks were all completed – and I’d guess that the check portion took each pilot about 1:20 to complete. I’ll also presume that the airplane time was somewhere between 20 and 30 minutes for each pilot, for both of the training stints as well as for the check. Am I close?

If I am, what we have is the following:
4 X 2 hours at the simulator controls for training: = 8.0 hours training in the simulator.
1 X 1.3 hours at the simulator controls for the check: = 1.3 hours check in the simulator.
2 X 0:30 at the airplane controls for training: = 1.0 hour training in the airplane.
1 X 0:30 at the airplane controls for your check: = 0.5 hours check in the airplane.

For a grand total: = 10.8 hours

Also, let’s look at a typical traditional training program using a Level D simulator (or Level C with appropriate experience). This example uses 11 simulator training periods, 1 period for the check, and 1 period for the LOFT.
11 X 2 hours at the simulator controls for training: = 22.0 hours training in the simulator.
1 X 1.3 hours at the simulator controls for the check: = 1.3 hours check in the simulator.
1 X 2 hours at the simulator controls for the LOFT: = 2.0 hours LOFT in the simulator.

For a grand total: = 25.3 hours

And, let’s also look at a typical AQP training program, almost all of which also use Level D (or, again, Level C with appropriate experience). This example uses either a full flight simulator with motion and visual systems OFF, or a training device for a period devoted to a “systems procedures validation” at the conclusion of the ground school courses. This period is not included in the simulator/FTD calculations.
This particular approach uses 4 simulator training periods, a simulator period for a “maneuvers validation,” or “MV,” and 4 additional simulator training periods. These training periods are followed by a LOFT session. The last period is conducted for the “type rating” or “proficiency” check ride, and is called the Line Oriented Evaluation, or LOE, and is conducted in “real time” between actual departure and arrival airports depicted in the simulator.

4 X 2.0 hours at the simulator controls for training: = 8.0 hours training in the simulator.
1 X 2.0 hours at the simulator controls for “MV:” = 2.0 hours of MV in the simulator.
4 X 2.0 hours at the simulator controls for training: = 8.0 hours training in the simulator.
1 X 2.0 hours at the simulator controls for LOFT: = 2.0 hours training in the simiualtor.
1 X 2.0 hours at the simulator controls for LOE: = 2.0 hours LOE in the simulator.

For a grand total: = 22.0 hours

Not saving money? Hmmm.