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Martinaire Caravan crash

Old 12-20-2015, 07:22 PM
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Originally Posted by Kepi View Post
The NTSB believed that since the propeller had damage from rotation, that the engine must have had power.
The extent of the damage to the prop can often give an idea whether it was under power or not. Rotation not under power generally doesn't have any force behind it, so it will typically be light damage, as far as the rotational aspect is concerned. There are other witness marks though, like inside the propeller hub. If there is a sudden stoppage at full power, the propeller hub can often be used to corroborate the theory, as there are very specific marks made in specific spots if there is sudden stoppage at high power, besides governors, fuel linkages, any engine logging equipment, and all the other things used to determine if it producing power. The NTSB also gets highly involved in computer modeling and simulation, they'll take the flight and re-create it from the beginning, same load, fuel, weather conditions, etc, taking off from the same spot, then they'll cut out the engine and see how far it will go, vs. continuing to the spot under power.

The NTSB uses the parties involved to conduct the investigation, that means the airframe manufacturer, the engine manufacturer, the company, etc. These entities want to know if they are to blame, because it cuts their litigation costs, rather than going to a lengthy trial and then having to pay out a bunch of money on top of everything else. Of course each one hopes they aren't to blame, but these companies always have credible, educated and accredited investigators that they send to the NTSB investigation, for one reason, to help identify the probable cause.

Of course, the NTSB are humans too and could have made an error, but they try to establish probable cause, not "beyond all doubt", because it's unfortunately not possible.
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Old 12-21-2015, 02:33 AM
  #52  
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Originally Posted by Kepi View Post
The NTSB believed that since the propeller had damage from rotation, that the engine must have had power. The whole flight was 58 seconds and my son achieved an altitude of about 250 feet. I've been told that the propeller will continue to spin after an engine failure. This could have caused the propeller damage as it hit the trees and ground. It was evident that he was making a controlled emergency landing according to my aviation lawyer, who is a very experienced pilot. The NTSB went to interview the mechanic of the airplane and he happened to be having surgery that day. No further followup as far as I know. The there is no mention of the maintenance logs in the NTSB report. We are fighting the defense to get those logs now. They are refusing to give them to us as they also were refusing to allow us to inspect the aircraft and engine. My lawyer says the NTSB can use whomever they want to help with the investigation. They can choose the manufacturer of the engine and there is nothing anyone can do about it. As it was obvious power turbine wheel failure to my expert investigator, something is not adding up. I don't know exactly who is responsible for everything in the report, but it needs to be reopened with this new evidence brought to light. Thank you for the information and your interest in this case.
In the world of piecing together aviation mishaps; determining whether an engine was producing power upon impact is a fairly easy study/answer. You are correct that the propeller very well might still be spinning even if the engine has failed - a term called windmilling that I'm sure you have heard before. The damage from a windmilling propeller and a propeller being turn by engine power are very different, then there is the other evidence of damage to other engine parts/mechanisms that lead investigators to the facts.

As JNB states - the NTSB has no dog in this investigation for or against you son or the company. They are widely recognized as one of the premier accident investigation organizations worldwide. If there is evidence that the 'turbine wheel' failed, then I personally feel that there would be no chance that the NTSB would not have reviewed the companies maintenance records. It is one of the primary areas of any investigation.

One of my new co-workers is a former NTSB investigator. I'll ask him today if I see him if he might envision any circumstance where there would be evidence of such an engine failure that you describe where the NTSB would NOT look into maintenance actions/records/history of the aircraft as part of the investigation.
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Old 12-21-2015, 04:36 AM
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Other pilots on this site have mentioned the human factor and I certainly understand we all can make mistakes under stress and pressure. It's no different than how good drivers may make a mistake and have a car accident. When I first read the NTSB report it was believable to me. I know the NTSB has no interest in proving fault or taking sides. My wife never believed my son was completely at fault. But now, I believe when my son realized the engine was failing or showing evidence of a problem, he tried to turn around since the GPS showed evidence that he made an immediate right bank and had some power to continue climbing to hopefully finish turning back to the airport. The engine only got him to 260ft AGL before he started to descend. My wife and I went to the crash site. Pictures I took of the crash site, that I showed to a military pilot friend, showed it was a controlled landing in his opinion. The path of the crash landing took off tops of trees first then eventually hit the lower trunk of trees and ground. This was over the area of land equal to a football field. He didn't dive straight into the ground.

I have included the NTSB report:

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA135
HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 15, 2013, at 1958 eastern standard time, a Cessna 208B airplane, N1120N, collided with trees shortly after departing from Pellston Regional Airport of Emmet County (KPLN), Pellston, Michigan. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Aero Leasing and operated by Martinaire Aviation, L.L.C. under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a cargo flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight was originating from KPLN at the time of the accident and was enroute to Capital Region International Airport, (KLAN), Lansing, Michigan.

The pilot had flown from Chippewa County International Airport (KCIU) and landed at KPLN to refuel the airplane and pick up 570 pounds of cargo. The pilot interacted with 3 employees of the fixed base operator (FBO) who stated that he seemed alert and awake, but wanted to make a "quick turn" at KPLN. After the airplane was refueled and the cargo was loaded, the pilot taxied to runway 23 and departed.

An analysis of the data recovered from the pilot's Garmin 696 handheld GPS, revealed that the airplane entered a right bank almost immediately after takeoff, and climbed to an altitude of about 260 feet above ground level (AGL) before it began to descend. At the time that the last data point was recorded on the GPS, the airplane was at an altitude of about 175 feet AGL and traveling at 127 knots. The airplane impacted trees and came to rest in a heavily wooded area.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 26, held a commercial pilot certificate for airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane, which was issued on May 6, 2011. He also held a certified flight instructor certificate for airplane single engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot was issued a Class 1, Limited Medical Certificate with the limitations "Must wear corrective lenses", on August 9, 2012. On this medical application, the pilot reported that his flight experience included 2,000 total hours and 100 hours in the preceding six months.

According to the pilot's logbooks, he accumulated 1,921 total hours, 142 hours at night, 47 hours in actual instrument conditions, and 34 hours in the accident airplane make and model.

The pilot began training with Martinaire in the accident airplane make and model on November 26, 2012. He successfully completed the training and subsequent check ride on December 7, 2012. Upon completion of training, the pilot began his initial operating experience (IOE) with a Martinaire senior captain on January 7, 2013 and completed IOE on January 11, 2013. The pilot began flying solo flights for Martinaire on January 12, 2013. He was deemed proficient to fly in IFR conditions and was current during the accident flight.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Cessna 208B, two seat, high wing, fixed landing gear airplane, serial number 208B0386, was manufactured in 1994. It was powered by one Pratt & Whitney PT6A-114A, 675 shaft horsepower engine, equipped with a three bladed constant-speed McCauley propeller. The airplane was maintained on an approved aircraft inspection program. On December 31, 2012, an engine logbook entry revealed that the engine had 5,054.8 hours since overhaul, 7,527 cycles since overhaul, and 2,945.2 hours until the next overhaul. On January 14, 2013, an airframe logbook entry revealed that the airplane's total time was 10,132.1 hours.

On January 15, 2013, prior to departing KCIU, the accident pilot reported that the left side attitude indicator was inoperative. The attitude indicator was removed, replaced, and the airplane was returned back into service.

A weight and balance form for the accident flight was located at the accident scene. However, the calculations for the accident flight were not completely filled out.

Weight and balance computations were performed using four different scenarios provided by the operator. All four scenarios resulted in the airplane being within the center of gravity limits.




METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1854, the automated weather reporting station located at KPLN, reported: wind from 210 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 16 knots, visibility 10 miles, cloud ceiling broken at 3,600 and 4,800 feet, ceiling overcast at 5,500 feet, temperature minus 3 degrees Celsius (C), dew point minus 9 degrees C and the barometric pressure of 30.14 inches of Mercury. There was no automated report issued around the time of the accident. The next automated report was at 2054 and the conditions were: wind from 210 degrees at 12 knots gusting to 17 knots, visibility 10 miles, ceiling overcast at 5,000 feet, temperature minus 3 degrees C, dew point minus 8 degrees C, and barometric pressure was 30.10 inches of Mercury.

An interview was conducted with a pilot, flying the same make and model airplane as the accident airplane, who took off 5 to 10 minutes prior to the accident. The pilot described the conditions to be "bumpy" and that when the wind was out of the southwest there was usually turbulence. He noticed on his GPS that around 1,000 feet AGL the wind was "right on the nose at 36 knots." The pilot stated that he flew visual flight rules (VFR) to 6,000 feet and ice was not present. He described taking off from runway 23 at night as "a black hole" and would utilize his cockpit instruments after climbing above a couple hundred feet AGL.

According to statements provided by two of the FBO employees, the conditions were "windy" around the time of the accident. One of the employees stated that the engine sounded fine and was similar to the rest of the planes he encountered at the airport.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located at 45° 33' 50.7" N, 084° 49' 42.3" W, elevation 714 feet mean sea level (MSL), in a heavily wooded area covered in snow. The main wreckage was wrapped around 2 trees and mostly broken apart. The wreckage scene was about 330 feet long and began at the top of the trees on a heading of about 270 degrees. The wreckage began with portions of the wings, continued with scattered debris, then the main wreckage, more scattered debris, and finally the propeller. The initial impact points were the tree tops observed from the ground and confirmed with freshly cut pieces of the tree on top of the snow; 45° 33' 50.4" N, 084° 49' 37.2" W. The widest initial tree impact points were about 41.6 feet apart. The angle of descent through the tree to the resting position was between 14 and 20 degrees.



The main wreckage included most of the cockpit, the fuselage, empennage, horizontal stabilizer, a portion of the vertical stabilizer, the landing gear, and the engine. The fuselage and cockpit were wrapped around a tree and fractured from the nose of the airplane to the middle of the fuselage. The wings were detached from the fuselage and scattered in pieces throughout the wreckage path leading up to the main wreckage. The landing gear was located in the main wreckage and all three tires were no longer attached to their respective wheels. All three propeller blades remained attached to the propeller hub. The propeller blades were labeled A, B, and C for the purposes of the investigation. The blades exhibited s-bending, leading edge scoring, dents, and scratches. Blade A remained attached to the propeller hub, but was not fully intact and a small portion of it was found 200 feet north of the main wreckage. Blade B and C were intact and remained attached to the propeller hub.



Flight control continuity was confirmed for all flight controls. All flight control cables were fractured in overload. The flaps were found in the up position as confirmed by the position of the jack screw on the flap motor. The throttle quadrant received impact damage; the actual lever positions at the time of the accident could not be determined.



The instrument panel was mostly detached from the airplane and received impact damage. The instruments were scattered throughout the main wreckage. The attitude indicator gyro was examined and revealed rotational scoring on the inside of the gyro case and on the gyro.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy and toxicology test was performed on the pilot at Spectrum Health, Grand Rapids, Michigan, on January 17, 2013. The cause of death was multiple blunt injuries and the manner of death was an accident. The toxicology results revealed no drugs detected. The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute did not complete a Final Forensic Toxicology Fatal Accident Report because the specimens were not made available to them.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Engine

The engine was examined and disassembled at the manufacturer's facility by the investigative party members. The group agreed that there was no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

Garmin GPSMAP 696

The unit is a battery-powered portable multi-function display and GPS receiver. It sustained impact damage to the screen and casing. A chip level recovery was performed on the memory chip located inside the unit. The data extracted included 157 sessions from February 24, 2012, through January 16, 2013, and consisted of 20,724 total data points. The accident flight consisted of 20 data points and began recording at 19:54:28 and ended at 19:57:58 EST on January 16, 2013.

Aircraft Performance GPS and Simulation Study

The National Transportation Safety Board's Office of Research and Engineering conducted an Aircraft Performance GPS and Simulation Study. This study presents the results of using data from a portable GPS unit carried aboard the airplane, crash site information, and a simulator model of the Cessna 208B as the basis for a simulation that provides a physics-based estimate of the position and orientation of the airplane throughout the accident flight. The performance observations noted here are based on the results of this simulation.

The first GPS point showing the accident airplane clearly airborne was recorded at 19:57:19 as the airplane was climbing at 700 feet per minute (fpm) through about 730 feet MSL (14 feet AGL), on a track of about 223 degrees, and accelerating through 91 knots. The airplane continued accelerating while climbing at about 500 to 700 fpm to an altitude of about 960 feet MSL (240 feet AGL). The rate of climb then decayed, and after reaching a peak altitude of about 980 feet MSL (260 feet AGL) at 19:57:45, the airplane started to descend, and ultimately impacted terrain about 1 mile west-southwest of the departure end of the runway. The exact time of the impact is not known, but the simulation model flight time from the last recorded GPS position to the location and elevation of the impact site was estimated at 15 seconds, putting the time of impact at 19:58:13. The simulation rate of descent from 19:57:52 to the time of impact is about 650 to 680 fpm. The elapsed time from when the airplane became airborne at 19:57:19 to impact is 54 seconds.

The simulation indicated that the airplane was accelerating throughout the flight, from about 75 knots groundspeed shortly after liftoff to about 145 knots at impact. In addition, the airplane entered a right bank almost immediately after liftoff, and during the flight made a 42 degree right turn from the runway heading of 225 degrees to 267 degrees. The peak simulation bank angle during this turn was 12.3 degrees. At impact, the simulation indicated an airspeed of 156 knots, a pitch angle of negative 2 degrees, and a bank angle of 4.5 degrees.

Throughout the simulation, a constant power lever angle (PLA) setting of 72 percent was maintained. At the 72 percent PLA setting, the simulator reading results in a gas generator speed (Ng) of about 93 percent throughout the flight. This throttle setting resulted in the best match of the GPS and impact site data.

The load factors output by the simulation were used to compute "apparent" pitch and roll angles, defined as the angles that make the load factor vector in an unaccelerated reference system parallel (in airplane body axes) to the load factor vector in the actual accelerated reference system. These angles represent the attitude a pilot would "feel" the airplane to be in, based on a vestibular / kinesthetic perception of the components of the load factor vector in their own body coordinate system. Throughout the flight, the apparent roll angle was close to zero, and the apparent pitch angle was always greater than zero – even when the real pitch angle was less than zero.
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Old 12-21-2015, 05:56 AM
  #54  
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I worked for the first Caravan operator, Hermens Air in Alaska.
We were also the first to crash a Caravan not long after delivery.
Just after take off the airplane fell out of the air and hit the ground, killing
everybody onboard.
If memory serves right, a fuel valve was turned off.

In this case it seems suspicious that a new DG was installed after the last one failed. Perhaps it was not an instrument problem, but rather a power problem.
Too much of a coincidence that the airplane crashes at night on the very next flight?
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Old 12-21-2015, 06:25 AM
  #55  
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Originally Posted by Kepi View Post
The simulation indicated that the airplane was accelerating throughout the flight, from about 75 knots groundspeed shortly after liftoff to about 145 knots at impact. In addition, the airplane entered a right bank almost immediately after liftoff, and during the flight made a 42 degree right turn from the runway heading of 225 degrees to 267 degrees. The peak simulation bank angle during this turn was 12.3 degrees. At impact, the simulation indicated an airspeed of 156 knots, a pitch angle of negative 2 degrees, and a bank angle of 4.5 degrees.

Throughout the simulation, a constant power lever angle (PLA) setting of 72 percent was maintained. At the 72 percent PLA setting, the simulator reading results in a gas generator speed (Ng) of about 93 percent throughout the flight. This throttle setting resulted in the best match of the GPS and impact site data.
This is what I was talking about. This usually takes a lot of time for the NTSB to run through all the plausible scenarios in simulation. I'm not sure how one can argue against the physics of this?
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Old 12-21-2015, 05:51 PM
  #56  
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Originally Posted by Kepi View Post
The NTSB went to interview the mechanic of the airplane and he happened to be having surgery that day. No further followup as far as I know. The there is no mention of the maintenance logs in the NTSB report. We are fighting the defense to get those logs now.
From the NTSB Narrative:

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Cessna 208B, two seat, high wing, fixed landing gear airplane, serial number 208B0386, was manufactured in 1994. It was powered by one Pratt & Whitney PT6A-114A, 675 shaft horsepower engine, equipped with a three bladed constant-speed McCauley propeller. The airplane was maintained on an approved aircraft inspection program. On December 31, 2012, an engine logbook entry revealed that the engine had 5,054.8 hours since overhaul, 7,527 cycles since overhaul, and 2,945.2 hours until the next overhaul. On January 14, 2013, an airframe logbook entry revealed that the airplane's total time was 10,132.1 hours.

On January 15, 2013, prior to departing KCIU, the accident pilot reported that the left side attitude indicator was inoperative. The attitude indicator was removed, replaced, and the airplane was returned back into service.

A weight and balance form for the accident flight was located at the accident scene. However, the calculations for the accident flight were not completely filled out.

Weight and balance computations were performed using four different scenarios provided by the operator. All four scenarios resulted in the airplane being within the center of gravity limits.
It seems that they did get this information. You should be able to request the full docket if it's not available online.

Again, truly sorry for your loss.
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Old 12-22-2015, 04:25 AM
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Well, for some reason, the aircraft owner refuses to give us the log books. If this report is accurate, why would they refuse our discovery? They also refused to allow us to inspect the engine. This NTSB report says that there was no problem with the engine as I have excerpted below. This was not true. How can we believe the rest of the report? What else could have caused damage to the power turbine wheel other than flying beyond its limit of use? My lawyer says that the PT6 can only be used up to 7200 hours. That is only allowed by Pratt Whitney after they inspect and sign off on it after it is rebuilt at 3600 hours. This aircraft had over 10,000 hours on it. He believes the engine may have had 8000 hours on it or close to it.

TESTS AND RESEARCH
Engine
The engine was examined and disassembled at the manufacturer's facility by the investigative party members. The group agreed that there was no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
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Old 12-22-2015, 06:35 AM
  #58  
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Originally Posted by Kepi
Well, for some reason, the aircraft owner refuses to give us the log books. If this report is accurate, why would they refuse our discovery? They also refused to allow us to inspect the engine. This NTSB report says that there was no problem with the engine as I have excerpted below. This was not true. How can we believe the rest of the report? What else could have caused damage to the power turbine wheel other than flying beyond its limit of use? My lawyer says that the PT6 can only be used up to 7200 hours. That is only allowed by Pratt Whitney after they inspect and sign off on it after it is rebuilt at 3600 hours. This aircraft had over 10,000 hours on it. He believes the engine may have had 8000 hours on it or close to it.

TESTS AND RESEARCH
Engine
The engine was examined and disassembled at the manufacturer's facility by the investigative party members. The group agreed that there was no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
Then your lawyer/investigator and the NTSB are at odds.

Without knowing anything else - personally I'd venture towards the NTSB's report - but I'm not you and you have a personal interest.

Legally I'm not sure that the company has any legal obligation to provide you (certainly not personally) the documents that you are asking for, and only a legal obligation to provide them to the court if you are actually in a legal dispute with the compnay (it sounds like you are but I don't know for sure if you are actually in the process of actively suing the company on some formal charge of ..........)

It certainly seems to be a fairly easy question to answer. Did the 'turbine wheel' fail or not? You sound like you lawyer/private investigation has irrefutable proof of such a failure and the NTSB, and all representatives to the investigation, clearly report that there was no mechanical failure prior to impact.

But now, I believe when my son realized the engine was failing or showing evidence of a problem, he tried to turn around since the GPS showed evidence that he made an immediate right bank and had some power to continue climbing to hopefully finish turning back to the airport. The engine only got him to 260ft AGL before he started to descend.
But no pilot, especially at night, is going to be trying to return to the airport immedaitely after takeoff with an engine failure when they haven't even reached a few hundred feet in altitude.

According to the pilot's logbooks, he accumulated 1,921 total hours, 142 hours at night, 47 hours in actual instrument conditions, and 34 hours in the accident airplane make and model.
A respectable amount of total time, though fairly low on the night, instrument, and certainly type hours; especially when couple with this description:

The pilot stated that he flew visual flight rules (VFR) to 6,000 feet and ice was not present. He described taking off from runway 23 at night as "a black hole" and would utilize his cockpit instruments after climbing above a couple hundred feet AGL.
...a well known and dangerous situation

Good luck in your future course of action with this investigation Kepi; and remember that no matter the outcome of a report, we are all human and flying can be a risky endeavor:

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect. - Captain A. G. Lamplugh
Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, ......
— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. c. early 1930's.
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Old 12-22-2015, 08:12 AM
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Originally Posted by Kepi View Post
What else could have caused damage to the power turbine wheel other than flying beyond its limit of use? My lawyer says that the PT6 can only be used up to 7200 hours.
Overhaul and rebuilding limits are not finite numbers, they vary depending on the operation, inspections, data logging and maintenance programs actually used by the certificate holder. If it was found that a turbine wheel was to blame, you could expect the FAA to roll back their time between overhaul limits and start picking apart their maintenance program. One huge issue though is how does a caravan, which is not an aerodynamic aircraft that speeds up easily, rotate at 75kts, climb to 260', and impact terrain at 150kts? At most, you are climbing initially at 90-100kts, and then the engine cuts out? The airplane would get slower, not faster, and to bring it to where it impacted requires a certain amount of energy, energy the NTSB deemed required engine power being produced (around 93% I believe is what it said, which is not very ambiguous).

The maximum TBO in relation to the cost benefit and savings will depend on various factors. Economic considerations and operational conditions should be evaluated. If the engine is operated in a hot and high, highly corrosive or very dry (dessert) environment where operation results in compressor erosion then all these factors reduces the economic benefit of an extended TBO. Furthermore a calendar limit of 12 years applies to the TBO extension making it an option best suited for an annual utilization of 300 hrs or higher. For the PT6A -114 on the Cessna Caravan there is a possibility to extend the TBO in one go to 8.000 hrs and 9.000 hrs for the 67D on the Beech 1900D without the need of the escalation program. It requires the engine to be of a certain SB modification status and the aircraft must have an Aircraft Data Acquisition System installed to recorded data for Engine Condition Trend Monitoring.
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Old 12-22-2015, 10:23 AM
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Yes, this case is under litigation and the loss of engine power from failure of the of the power turbine wheels is irrefutable. The compression turbine wheel was intact.

Gravity will cause acceleration of an object as it falls. This is basic physics. Maybe this caused the acceleration before impact?

(In physics, gravitational acceleration is the acceleration on an object caused by force of gravitation. Neglecting friction such as air resistance, all small bodies accelerate in a gravitational field at the same rate relative to the center of mass.[1] This equality is true regardless of the masses or compositions of the bodies.
At different points on Earth, objects fall with an acceleration between 9.78 and 9.83 m/s2 depending on altitude and latitude, with a conventional standard value of exactly 9.80665 m/s2 (approximately 32.174 ft/s2). Objects with low densities do not accelerate as rapidly due to buoyancy and air resistance.)

I'm just trying to make sense of this..... Any help is appreciated.
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