More training on UAVs than bombers, fighters
06-16-2009, 11:49 AM
#1
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More training on UAVs than bombers, fighters
Between the scaling back of the F-22 force and the ramping up of UAS's there are some seriously pi$$ed off UPT students(T-38 esp) out there, (I know, I know, "needs of the AF"), not to mention guys who learned their craft in a fighter or bomber only to see signs like this of what is to come. Sad, just sad.
More training on UAVs than bombers, fighters - Air Force News, news from Iraq - Air Force Times
By Tom Vanden Brook - USA Today
Posted : Tuesday Jun 16, 2009 11:23:13 EDT
WASHINGTON — The Air Force will train more drone operators than fighter and bomber pilots combined for the first time this year, signaling a fundamental shift for the 61-year-old service, records and interviews with top officials show.
The growing ranks of drone operators mark a turning point for the Air Force as it looks to a future that relies increasingly on unmanned aircraft. Over the next few decades, the Air Force plans to develop drones that would serve as fighters, bombers and tankers, the heart of its manned fleet, according to its Unmanned System Update. The document says piloted aircraft will be used in concert with drones.
The Air Force will train 240 pilots to fly Predator and Reaper drones compared with 214 fighter and bomber pilots for the budget year that ends in September. Overall, there are 550 drone pilots compared with 3,700 fighter and 900 bomber pilots. The current emphasis for drones reflects the need for persistent, eye-in-the-sky surveillance to track and kill insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
More training on UAVs than bombers, fighters - Air Force News, news from Iraq - Air Force Times
By Tom Vanden Brook - USA Today
Posted : Tuesday Jun 16, 2009 11:23:13 EDT
WASHINGTON — The Air Force will train more drone operators than fighter and bomber pilots combined for the first time this year, signaling a fundamental shift for the 61-year-old service, records and interviews with top officials show.
The growing ranks of drone operators mark a turning point for the Air Force as it looks to a future that relies increasingly on unmanned aircraft. Over the next few decades, the Air Force plans to develop drones that would serve as fighters, bombers and tankers, the heart of its manned fleet, according to its Unmanned System Update. The document says piloted aircraft will be used in concert with drones.
The Air Force will train 240 pilots to fly Predator and Reaper drones compared with 214 fighter and bomber pilots for the budget year that ends in September. Overall, there are 550 drone pilots compared with 3,700 fighter and 900 bomber pilots. The current emphasis for drones reflects the need for persistent, eye-in-the-sky surveillance to track and kill insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
06-16-2009, 12:31 PM
#2
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What I would like to see is an in-depth article on why the leadership is refusing to man this MWS like any other. Why can they send that many UPT IP's in and out on their 3-yr tours, that many staff guys, that many whatever and get them back on track? Why is it that it is only the UAV community that is a black hole and career ender?
Measured against every other rated officer assignment requirement, the importance of this one outweighs most any staff job and probably most UPT IP assignments. We could eliminate half or more of the rated staff assignments (especially the stateside ones) and no one would notice a change in capability, but put the wrong people in a GCS or fail to man the CAP completely and the guys on the ground will see the difference. Unfortunately, the USAF is talking out of both sides of their mouth on this one. They say that they are making it their highest priority to get the 50 caps - but they won't man to it and they send the wrong people to it. When they say that sending UPT grads to the Pred is a test, they don't say the cost of a wrong answer is the loss of US or allied lives - that employing ordnance improperly will either kill friendlies or allow the bad guys to get away to live another day (and kill more Americans).
Measured against every other rated officer assignment requirement, the importance of this one outweighs most any staff job and probably most UPT IP assignments. We could eliminate half or more of the rated staff assignments (especially the stateside ones) and no one would notice a change in capability, but put the wrong people in a GCS or fail to man the CAP completely and the guys on the ground will see the difference. Unfortunately, the USAF is talking out of both sides of their mouth on this one. They say that they are making it their highest priority to get the 50 caps - but they won't man to it and they send the wrong people to it. When they say that sending UPT grads to the Pred is a test, they don't say the cost of a wrong answer is the loss of US or allied lives - that employing ordnance improperly will either kill friendlies or allow the bad guys to get away to live another day (and kill more Americans).
06-18-2009, 05:36 PM
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I don't want to stop the humor trend here, but I figure I would throw out two examples of how direct an impact the individual UAV crew can make on the war without going classified.
In one situation, a pilot was looking for suspicious activity (not tasked to do it, they were un-tasked and were being pro-active). After noticing something that caught their eyes, they decided to watch a while. What they saw was a group setting up to undertake offensive operations (and actually getting a shot off) with large caliber indirect-fire weapons. They proactively contacted the JTAC and received clearance to fire - taking out the offenders. This would not have been possible with traditional assets.
In another instance, the pilot was in contact with friendly forces on the ground. He was not working with the individuals on the ground or with anyone associated with those individuals, he pro-actively initiated contact to maintain SA on them despite the fact that he was tasked to a completely separate mission. While in contact, they came under sniper fire. He knew where the friendly position was, was told where the sniper fire was coming from based on their position, and elected ON HIS OWN to PID the snipers (meanwhile, the A-10's supporting the troops under fire were unable to find the snipers in the urban environment). He found the snipers, was able to PID them, and talk the A-10 eyes on due to the technology available. The A-10's strafed the sniper's positions.
I have many more stories that can be told in the appropriate environment. The point is that there is a real role for these assets, saving real friendly lives - both by being an extra set of eyes for SA and by killing the bad guys that pose a threat to them. How effectively the system works depends on how effective the crew is, and this is not a place for a "test". There are plenty of success stories that wouldn't be success stories had the new inexperienced guys been sitting in the seat.
As we speak, the USAF is sending officers to the same useless staff jobs where they will have absolutely NO impact on this war or the future of the USAF. As unfortunate as it may be, in THESE two wars there are plenty of airborne assets in theater that, if they were not there, wouldn't appreciably affect the outcome of the war. The failure to man experienced decision-makers to 3-yr tours in a war-fighting role while continuing to mis-allocate manpower to useless staff positions is incompetence at best and negligence at worst. The damage caused by sending the wrong person to be a UPT IP is more easily repaired than sending the wrong person to these combat positions.
The UAV community needs sweeping reform. Not surprisingly, the USAF leadership is behind the times on how to best employ the assets or man them so that the troops on the ground gets the best support possible. Right now, there is probably no community in the USAF that is treated worse when it comes to promotions (to busy doing their jobs to check the boxes), to assignments (to busy doing their job to be allowed to go to another assignment), to career broadening opportunities (too busy doing their job to be allowed to take staff jobs or pursue educational opportunities), to the daily ops tempo (granted when they deploy individually as LRE crews it is not as often as some other MWS's but more than others, but when they are home they are pulling up to 12-hr shifts / 10-12 days every 14 days / 24-hrs a day / 365-days a year for (for some) 5 or more years straight), etc.
So, here we have this ground-breaking technology that can be used to fulfill our most important mission of the war (protecting the troops on the ground) with unlimited potential - but we can't get them used most effectively because we are driving the operators into the ground and manning them with the most inexperienced rated personnel we can find.
Don't get me wrong, I enjoy the humor as much as anyone else - but don't let that distract you from the reality of the mission, the potential of the mission, and the scale of how the leadership is STILL dropping the ball on this one. The story is not the fact that we are training more UAV operators than we are fighter or bomber pilots. The story is how the incompetence of the USAF leadership is still going to be paid for with the lives of the forces on the ground.
In one situation, a pilot was looking for suspicious activity (not tasked to do it, they were un-tasked and were being pro-active). After noticing something that caught their eyes, they decided to watch a while. What they saw was a group setting up to undertake offensive operations (and actually getting a shot off) with large caliber indirect-fire weapons. They proactively contacted the JTAC and received clearance to fire - taking out the offenders. This would not have been possible with traditional assets.
In another instance, the pilot was in contact with friendly forces on the ground. He was not working with the individuals on the ground or with anyone associated with those individuals, he pro-actively initiated contact to maintain SA on them despite the fact that he was tasked to a completely separate mission. While in contact, they came under sniper fire. He knew where the friendly position was, was told where the sniper fire was coming from based on their position, and elected ON HIS OWN to PID the snipers (meanwhile, the A-10's supporting the troops under fire were unable to find the snipers in the urban environment). He found the snipers, was able to PID them, and talk the A-10 eyes on due to the technology available. The A-10's strafed the sniper's positions.
I have many more stories that can be told in the appropriate environment. The point is that there is a real role for these assets, saving real friendly lives - both by being an extra set of eyes for SA and by killing the bad guys that pose a threat to them. How effectively the system works depends on how effective the crew is, and this is not a place for a "test". There are plenty of success stories that wouldn't be success stories had the new inexperienced guys been sitting in the seat.
As we speak, the USAF is sending officers to the same useless staff jobs where they will have absolutely NO impact on this war or the future of the USAF. As unfortunate as it may be, in THESE two wars there are plenty of airborne assets in theater that, if they were not there, wouldn't appreciably affect the outcome of the war. The failure to man experienced decision-makers to 3-yr tours in a war-fighting role while continuing to mis-allocate manpower to useless staff positions is incompetence at best and negligence at worst. The damage caused by sending the wrong person to be a UPT IP is more easily repaired than sending the wrong person to these combat positions.
The UAV community needs sweeping reform. Not surprisingly, the USAF leadership is behind the times on how to best employ the assets or man them so that the troops on the ground gets the best support possible. Right now, there is probably no community in the USAF that is treated worse when it comes to promotions (to busy doing their jobs to check the boxes), to assignments (to busy doing their job to be allowed to go to another assignment), to career broadening opportunities (too busy doing their job to be allowed to take staff jobs or pursue educational opportunities), to the daily ops tempo (granted when they deploy individually as LRE crews it is not as often as some other MWS's but more than others, but when they are home they are pulling up to 12-hr shifts / 10-12 days every 14 days / 24-hrs a day / 365-days a year for (for some) 5 or more years straight), etc.
So, here we have this ground-breaking technology that can be used to fulfill our most important mission of the war (protecting the troops on the ground) with unlimited potential - but we can't get them used most effectively because we are driving the operators into the ground and manning them with the most inexperienced rated personnel we can find.
Don't get me wrong, I enjoy the humor as much as anyone else - but don't let that distract you from the reality of the mission, the potential of the mission, and the scale of how the leadership is STILL dropping the ball on this one. The story is not the fact that we are training more UAV operators than we are fighter or bomber pilots. The story is how the incompetence of the USAF leadership is still going to be paid for with the lives of the forces on the ground.
06-19-2009, 09:15 AM
#8
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I agree with you in that UAVs are extremely valuable to the mission and that 24 hr overhead coverage is critical to mission success. I am just waxing a little nostalgic, seeing the end of the manned airplane approaching so quickly.
06-19-2009, 10:20 AM
#10
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Dude, I am all about the humor in the way the USAF treats the UAS like an airframe. UAS pilots still have an IRC requirement, the flight physicals are the same (waivers are probably easier), and they have the same exact DNIF process as active flyers! They take checkrides, they fill out 781's, they complete TAR sheets, they track hours, and they have the same mishap investigation process.
Of course, the USAF does not treat them the same in the crew manning ratio. If tankers or fighters had to man a 24-hr continuous presence, they would have at least triple the manning of a UAS squadron. The squadrons go into surge ops, and a year and a half later they go into surge ops again. No I didn't forget to write that they come out of surge ops - they maintain it for that year and half and just get more piled on top when everyone gets used to the pace (yet, they still will call it surge ops - I don't think anyone has looked up the definition of surge ops). It's kind of funny how they pick and choose where to apply the same rules as manned aviation.
It will be a long time before the UAS can completely replace manned aviation, and even the next generation UAS's won't be viable in certain environments. Unfortunately, the USAF leadership doesn't know those limitations because none of them know anything about the reality of the UAS. Gen Deptula can't articulate why the complexity of the mission demands experienced rated personnel, he only references the FAA requirement of having rated pilots flying in controlled airspace (news for the general - manning the UAS based on cruise flight in controlled airspace is like choosing who flies the F-22 based on getting the aircraft to and from the airspace). Gen Schwartz is talking about having all UAS pilots flying more than one UAV at a time, a move that will even dumb down the capabilities of the system even more (Schwartz: Crews will operate multiple UAVs - Air Force News, news from Iraq - Air Force Times). He says one pilot with one aircraft is "a very Neanderthal way of operating" - I'd like him to explain how one pilot could perform CAS with one aircraft, follow a moving target with another, and avoid thunderstorms with another, and do them all effectively. He says "it is achievable", he doesn't even know the UAS community already has experience with the multiple UAV thing and NO ONE thinks it's a good idea - except for the CSAF apparently. Who thinks that when he says these things, he's thinking about the mission? Anyone want to take bets on the fact that the ONLY reason Schwartz mentioned that was because he thought it was a possible solution to not having enough UAS pilots?
The UAS needs to stop being thought of as an end to manned aviation and become a supplement to manned aviation. The USAF can't figure out how to make it an additional capability vs a replacement capability. No one bemoans a 3-yr non-flying staff tour, but they will scoff a 3-yr non-flying UAS tour - which is probably most of the reason why the USAF leadership has not been able to recognize how in the world they can fulfill that manning requirement. There is absolutely no reason why UAS pilots can't be in and out (sts) in 3 years. It costs WAAAAY more money to train a UPT IP and it takes (or should take) longer - but they are still out after 3-yrs. The USAF sends more people to staff than they do to fighter or bomber RTU, but that doesn't make headlines. For some reason, the UAS is different and they have to find all of these creative mission-depleting alternate solutions. You know that USAF short-sightedness that caused them to get rid of all of their air-air assets, etc so they could afford a couple more F-22's - but then the F-22 was canceled, so they were left with too few F-22's and not enough of the other assets? This is that same short-sightedness.
Of course, the USAF does not treat them the same in the crew manning ratio. If tankers or fighters had to man a 24-hr continuous presence, they would have at least triple the manning of a UAS squadron. The squadrons go into surge ops, and a year and a half later they go into surge ops again. No I didn't forget to write that they come out of surge ops - they maintain it for that year and half and just get more piled on top when everyone gets used to the pace (yet, they still will call it surge ops - I don't think anyone has looked up the definition of surge ops). It's kind of funny how they pick and choose where to apply the same rules as manned aviation.
It will be a long time before the UAS can completely replace manned aviation, and even the next generation UAS's won't be viable in certain environments. Unfortunately, the USAF leadership doesn't know those limitations because none of them know anything about the reality of the UAS. Gen Deptula can't articulate why the complexity of the mission demands experienced rated personnel, he only references the FAA requirement of having rated pilots flying in controlled airspace (news for the general - manning the UAS based on cruise flight in controlled airspace is like choosing who flies the F-22 based on getting the aircraft to and from the airspace). Gen Schwartz is talking about having all UAS pilots flying more than one UAV at a time, a move that will even dumb down the capabilities of the system even more (Schwartz: Crews will operate multiple UAVs - Air Force News, news from Iraq - Air Force Times). He says one pilot with one aircraft is "a very Neanderthal way of operating" - I'd like him to explain how one pilot could perform CAS with one aircraft, follow a moving target with another, and avoid thunderstorms with another, and do them all effectively. He says "it is achievable", he doesn't even know the UAS community already has experience with the multiple UAV thing and NO ONE thinks it's a good idea - except for the CSAF apparently. Who thinks that when he says these things, he's thinking about the mission? Anyone want to take bets on the fact that the ONLY reason Schwartz mentioned that was because he thought it was a possible solution to not having enough UAS pilots?
The UAS needs to stop being thought of as an end to manned aviation and become a supplement to manned aviation. The USAF can't figure out how to make it an additional capability vs a replacement capability. No one bemoans a 3-yr non-flying staff tour, but they will scoff a 3-yr non-flying UAS tour - which is probably most of the reason why the USAF leadership has not been able to recognize how in the world they can fulfill that manning requirement. There is absolutely no reason why UAS pilots can't be in and out (sts) in 3 years. It costs WAAAAY more money to train a UPT IP and it takes (or should take) longer - but they are still out after 3-yrs. The USAF sends more people to staff than they do to fighter or bomber RTU, but that doesn't make headlines. For some reason, the UAS is different and they have to find all of these creative mission-depleting alternate solutions. You know that USAF short-sightedness that caused them to get rid of all of their air-air assets, etc so they could afford a couple more F-22's - but then the F-22 was canceled, so they were left with too few F-22's and not enough of the other assets? This is that same short-sightedness.
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