Planes Parked in Weeds in Kabul After $486 Million Spent
By Tony Capaccio - Dec 9, 2013

Sixteen broken-down transport planes that cost U.S. taxpayers at least $486 million are languishing among the weeds, wooden cargo boxes and old tires at Kabul International Airport, waiting to be destroyed without ever being delivered to the Afghan Air Force.

The special inspector general for Afghanistan is investigating why the refurbished G222 turboprop aircraft from Finmeccanica SpA’s (FNC) Alenia Aermacchi North America unit no longer can be flown after logging only 200 of 4,500 hours of U.S.-led training flights and missions required from January to September 2012 under a U.S Air Force contract because of persistent maintenance issues.

The unused transport planes are in addition to the billions of dollars in wasted U.S. funds documented by the inspector general’s office since American troops entered Afghanistan after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. They also compound the doubts about the Afghan Air Force’s capability to operate independently after U.S. forces withdraw by the end of next year.

“We need answers to this huge waste of U.S. taxpayer money,” John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, said in an e-mailed statement. “Who made the decision to purchase these planes, and why? We need to get to the bottom of this, and that’s why we’re opening this inquiry.”

Asked about the planes after they were photographed at the airport in Afghanistan by a Bloomberg News reporter, Sopko said he also saw them “sitting in the weeds” during a recent visit.

The G222 transports refurbished by the unit of Rome-based Finmeccanica were supposed to make up about 15 percent of the 105-aircraft Afghan Air Force, flying top Afghan civilian officials and combat troops and conducting medical evacuations.
Alenia ‘Struggled’

Instead, six of the planes already have been cannibalized for spare parts, a separate audit by the Pentagon inspector general found. In addition to the 16 planes in Kabul, there are four in Germany.

The U.S. Air Force didn’t renew Alenia Aermacchi’s maintenance contract in March because it “struggled to consistently meet contractual requirements,” Ed Gulick, a spokesman for the service, said in an e-mailed statement.

“Faced with long-standing and well-known issues with the program, Alenia did take action to improve their performance in some areas, but the Air Force was not convinced Alenia could meet and sustain all contractual obligations,” Gulick said.

Alenia spokesman Dan Hill said the company “is proud of its work” on the transports.

“At the time that the U.S. Air Force chose not to renew the contract,” the aircraft “were successfully performing missions in Afghanistan and exceeding the program objectives. While disappointed, we respect their decision not to continue,” he said in an e-mailed statement.
Averting a Repeat

Sopko’s investigation will review the decision to select the Alenia aircraft, determine the total spent to buy, sustain, and dispose of them and evaluate what procedures are in place to prevent similar failures with other purchases for the Afghan Air Force.

The inquiry was prompted by “the need to ensure that the U.S. government does not repeat the mistakes made throughout this nearly half-billion dollar program,” Sopko said in a Dec. 5 letter to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel.

Navy Commander Elissa Smith, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the G222 aircraft’s failings have “had no impact on the readiness of the Afghan Air Force” because it has been operating 26 Cessna Aircraft Co. 208 Caravan planes “exceedingly well during the last several years and has been able to compensate.”
‘Hotter, Dustier’

The G222s eventually are to be replaced by C-130H transports from Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT) that the Pentagon says won’t begin operating until 2016. The C-130H “will provide better range, as well as passenger and cargo movement” than the G222, Smith said.

U.S. training for the Afghan Air Force to fly the new planes may be affected by the fate of an agreement for some U.S. and allied forces to remain after 2014. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has balked at U.S. calls for him to sign that accord quickly.

The U.S. Air Force views the G222 as a “lesson-learned” case, said Lieutenant General Charles Davis, the service’s top military acquisition official,

“Just about everything you can think of was wrong for it other than the airplane was built for the size of cargo and mission they needed,” Davis said in an interview. “Other than that, it didn’t really meet any of the requirements.”

Once the planes were in Afghanistan it became clear that they were flying in a “hotter, dustier” environment than they could handle, he said.
No Buyers

“It was contractor performance,” it was difficulty finding capable pilots, “it was a very unsustainable airframe,” he said. “It was about everything you could think of that went into this.”

By the time President Barack Obama started to draw down forces in Afghanistan, training officials with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided that “these airplanes are never going to meet the needs of the Afghan Air Force, so we need to get rid of them,” Davis said.

“We looked for buyers, people to accept those, and nobody was interested in trying to maintain an airplane that was no longer sustainable, so that’s why” these aircraft “are sitting on the ramp and not going to fly,” Davis said.

Davis said he expected that at some point the G222s will be stripped of military gear “and destroyed and moved out of the country.”

In its Jan. 31 report marked “For Official Use Only,” the Pentagon inspector general said the NATO and U.S. training commands “have not effectively managed the program.”

In biannual reports to Congress on the status of the Afghan military, the Pentagon initially highlighted the aircraft as key to building the Afghan Air Force and then minimized its troubles.

A report in July said without elaboration that the G222 transport “has been removed from service.”

Questions Over $1 Billion U.S. Purchase Of Russian Helicopters For Afghan Military
WASHINGTON (AP) — The deal looked sketchy from the start.

To outfit Afghanistan's security forces with new helicopters, the Pentagon bypassed U.S. companies and turned instead to Moscow for dozens of Russian Mi-17 rotorcraft at a cost of more than $1 billion.

Senior Pentagon officials assured skeptical members of Congress that the Department of Defense had made the right call. They repeatedly cited a top-secret 2010 study they said named the Mi-17 as the superior choice.

Turns out the study told a very different story, according to unclassified excerpts obtained by The Associated Press.

The U.S. Army's workhorse Chinook, built by Boeing in Pennsylvania, was found to be "the most cost-effective single platform type fleet for the Afghan Air Force over a twenty year" period, according to the excerpts.

Lawmakers who were following the copter deal were stunned.

Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, the Senate's No. 2 GOP leader and one of the most vocal critics of the contract, said the Defense Department "repeatedly and disingenuously" used the study to prove the necessity of buying Mi-17s.

More than two years since the Mi-17 contract was signed, a veil of secrecy still obscures the pact despite its high-dollar value, the potential for fraud and waste, and accusations the Pentagon muffled important information.

The unprecedented arms deal also serves as a reminder to a war-weary American public that Afghanistan will remain heavily dependent on U.S. financial support even after its combat troops depart.

"So why are we buying Russian helicopters when there are American manufacturers that can meet that very same requirement?" Cornyn asked.

As recently as September, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter cited the study in a letter to House members defending the decision. Carter left his job this past week.

Last year, Frank Kendall, the Pentagon's top acquisition official, and policy chief James Miller pointed to the study in a written response to questions posed by Cornyn.

Just a few weeks after the secret study was completed, Army Secretary John McHugh wrote in a 2011 memo "that the Mi-17 stands apart" when compared with other helicopters.

The Pentagon denies it misled Congress.

A senior department official said the study was focused on long-term requirements and not the immediate needs of the Afghan military, which were best met by the Mi-17. Also, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan wanted the Mi-17 because it is durable, easy-to-operate and the Afghan forces had experience flying it, according to the official, who was not authorized to be identified as the source of the information.

There's no dispute that heavy-duty helicopters capable of quickly moving Afghan troops and supplies are essential to accomplishing that mission. But the decision to acquire them from Russia has achieved the rare feat in a deeply divided Congress of finding common ground among Republicans and Democrats.

Why, lawmakers from both political parties have demanded, is the U.S. purchasing military gear from Russia?

After all, Russia has sold advanced weapons to repressive government in Syria and Iran, sheltered NSA leaker Edward Snowden, and been criticized by the State Department for adopting laws that restrict human rights.

On top of all that, corruption is rampant in Russia's defense industry, they say, heightening concerns that crooked government officials and contractors are lining their pockets with American money.

"The lack of straightforward information from the Pentagon on the ability of American-made helicopters to meet the mission in Afghanistan is but another factor severely undermining their credibility and justification for pursuing this sorely misguided procurement," said Rep. Rosa DeLauro, a high-ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee.

Overall, 63 Mi-17s are being acquired through the 2011 contract. It was awarded without competition to Russia's arms export agency, Rosoboronexport, even though the Pentagon condemned the agency after its weapons were used by Syria to "murder Syrian civilians."

No Pentagon official was made available to speak on the record for this story. The department declined AP's request that it release unclassified portions of the 2010 study and other records supporting the decision to buy Mi-17s instead of Chinooks or other helicopters.

The armed Mi-17s being purchased for Afghanistan from Rosoboronexport will replace older and less capable Mi-17s the U.S. and other countries had purchased from brokers and contractors through the open market and then donated or loaned to the Afghans.

The fact that the Afghan forces had years of experience flying the Mi-17 figured prominently in the Pentagon's decision.

Carter and other U.S. defense official contended that adding the Boeing helicopter to the mix would unnecessarily burden the Afghans with having to learn how to operate and maintain an unfamiliar helicopter.

The 2010 study "specifically analyzed the opportunity for DOD to provide a US alternative to the Mi-17 for Afghanistan," according to the excerpts.

It outlined a transitional approach in which Chinooks being retired from the U.S. military's fleet would be available in late 2013 to be refurbished and then replace older Russian helicopters in the Afghan fleet, according to the excerpts. A combination of Mi-17s and renovated Chinooks, known in the Army's nomenclature as the CH-47D, could work as well.

Proceed with caution, the study advised. Shifting too quickly away from the Mi-17s already in use could undermine progress in training the Afghan air force, the excerpts said. But the study recommended a plan for converting the Afghan forces from a "pure" Mi-17 fleet to one that uses U.S. helicopters.

The Chinook option never materialized.

An extensive analysis of both helicopters concluded a refurbished Chinook would cost about 40 percent more overall to buy and maintain than the Russian helicopter, the senior defense official said.

That is hard to fathom.

Boeing executives informed congressional staff during a meeting held in late September that the cost of a refurbished CH-47D would be in the $12 million to $14 million range, according to a person knowledgeable about the discussion but not authorized to be identified as the source of the information.

That would make an overhauled Chinook $4 million to $6 million less than what the department is currently paying for Mi-17s, according to a Pentagon document listing the prices it is paying for the Russian aircraft.

The figures also show the average cost of each new Mi-17 has increased with each successive order, from $16.4 million to $18.2 million. The Pentagon has assured Congress that the prices were "fair and reasonable."

But an internal Defense Contract Audit Agency document shows the department could not conduct a comprehensive cost comparison because Rosoboronexport wouldn't allow U.S. auditors to look at its books.

Rosoboronexport's Director General Anatoly Isaykin said in statement late last month that his agency was "completely transparent" in negotiating acceptable Mi-17 prices with the U.S., but provided no details on costs or any examples of transparency.

Last month, the Pentagon changed its mind. After reevaluating, officials decided to cut 15 copters out of the 78 they had planned to buy from Moscow.

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Associated Press writer Vladimir Isachenkov in Moscow contributed to this report.
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