Airline Pilot Central Forums - PSA CRJ 200 Skids off Runway at CRW

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Quote:

Originally Posted by SrfNFly227 (Post 749151)

Well I have been reading this thread since it started, but I hadn't really felt the need to comment till now. Three things I would like add to this.

First, while it is difficult to clearly present intent in a post on a forum, the post you quoted to make this comment was very obviously sarcasm. Please learn to take a joke and laugh once in a while with the rest us.

Second, a few people have questioned aborting a take off for anti-skid. I would like to honestly ask why a person would feel safe continuing a T/O roll with that system now malfunctioned. Braking distance for the abort would be based on the anti-skid working. Now take this scenario. You start your T/O roll on a short runway while right at your runway limited weight. At 90 knots, anti-skid goes out but you decide to continue because that isn't a "loss of control/power". At 90 knots, the RJ can sometimes have 50 knots to go before rotation. Now lets say you are still rolling down the runway and something happens at 130 knots that you do need to abort for. Not likely, but could happen. Do you really think you could stop from that close to V1 with the anti-skid not working???

Now I want to say before someone points it out, that this caution may be inhibited. I would have to dig up my systems book to verify that, but the question still stands for those of you who have said that anti-skid failure wouldn't necessitate a rejected T/O. Just trying to understand the reasoning.

I can take a joke, but there is also a lot of rahtards out there as well, so it's hard sometimes to differentiate between the two.

Second, the situation you describe sounds plausible, but about as plausible as a double engine failure at 3000 ft in the middle of new york city. if the situation developed as you described, i would say a prayer while i used max reverse thrust and pumped my brakes hoping the big guy is looking out for me.

Pilot Guide to Takeoff Safety

Very good references there....thank you Winglet

Quote:

Originally Posted by winglet (Post 750040)

Perhaps it is time for some review:

Videos:

Ilyushin IL-18 Rejected takeoff

winglet

Can you say tailwind greater than 15 knots?

Thanks for the video links...

Quote:

Originally Posted by GauleyPilot (Post 749745)

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winglet

Some very interesting points here, and it's heartening to see this thread not turning into a p%#$ing contest.

There are always "gotcha's" out there like the EFIS CompMon being a nuisance message (i.e. at KLGA), except when it's not.

High speed aborts are likely to be more dangerous than taking the problem in the air...except when you make the quick determination she won't fly (i.e. TWA L-1011(?) at KJFK).

So, food for thought here. Another poster hinted at transferring controls during an abort to the Capt., which eats up valuable runway while the a/c accelerates and your making a positive transfer, eroding your options further. If the Capt. is the NFP, he's "inside", while the F/O's outside and on the controls. Although many reasons have been given for changing duties at this critical phase of flight (Captains authority, tiller on his side, the left seat makes you smarter;), etc.) it's one of those procedures that seems incongruous.

Quote:

Originally Posted by xj200capt (Post 749877)

I have to admit that aborting after V1 would be a cluster.

I wrote that line kind of quick. I meant to say "past 80 knts".

And while I have to verify the language or just admit I'm wrong, I think in our POM it says the Captain will call, initiate, and complete the abort. I always thought if the FO was doing a good job (keeping it straight, braking correctly, etc...) that a transfer of controls would be bad in a high workload environment. I was corrected during a PC or RFT. I do not agree.

Quote:

Originally Posted by NoStep (Post 750367)

Some very interesting points here, and it's heartening to see this thread not turning into a p%#$ing contest.

There are always "gotcha's" out there like the EFIS CompMon being a nuisance message (i.e. at KLGA), except when it's not.

High speed aborts are likely to be more dangerous than taking the problem in the air...except when you make the quick determination she won't fly (i.e. TWA L-1011(?) at KJFK).

So, food for thought here. Another poster hinted at transferring controls during an abort to the Capt., which eats up valuable runway while the a/c accelerates and your making a positive transfer, eroding your options further. If the Capt. is the NFP, he's "inside", while the F/O's outside and on the controls. Although many reasons have been given for changing duties at this critical phase of flight (Captains authority, tiller on his side, the left seat makes you smarter;), etc.) it's one of those procedures that seems incongruous.

Not beating you up or arguing with you, but the the historical data shows it is extremely more dangerous (not likely) to high-speed abort than to continue into the air.

Heck, a major number of DC-10 hull losses (I think around 20) are attributed to pilots aborting at high-speeds for nusance problems or aborting past V1.

Here's a FAA finding on RTOs published back in 1990s...

More than half the RTO accidents and incidents reported in the past 30 years were initiated from a speed in excess of V1.
About one-third were reported as occurring on runways that were wet or contaminated with snow or ice.
Only slightly more than one-fourth of the accidents and incidents actually involved any loss of engine thrust.
Nearly one-fourth of the accidents and incidents were the result of wheel or tire failures.
Approximately 80 percent of the overrun events were potentially avoidable by following appropriate operational practices.

Quote:

Originally Posted by NoStep (Post 750367)

So, food for thought here. Another poster hinted at transferring controls during an abort to the Capt., which eats up valuable runway while the a/c accelerates and your making a positive transfer, eroding your options further. If the Capt. is the NFP, he's "inside", while the F/O's outside and on the controls. Although many reasons have been given for changing duties at this critical phase of flight (Captains authority, tiller on his side, the left seat makes you smarter;), etc.) it's one of those procedures that seems incongruous.

If your hands are on the throttles, and your feet are where they need to be in order to assume directional control and hit the brakes, I really don't think there's necessarily an awkward transfer of control. For certain, there's a reversal of mindset, from go go go, to stop stop stop! This alone is awkward, and as someone pointed out already, you absolutely have to be correct. The underlying assumption is that the one who draws from a larger pool of experience is more likely to be correct on impulse, and is also likely to execute the maneuver more eficiently, having been to the simulator to pracice a few dozen more times than the other guy.

Back in my hometown Skywest has slid off the ramp twice in PIA in the last 13 months alone...be careful folks

Peoria airport briefly closes after jet slides off runway - Peoria, IL - pjstar.com

Sky West Airlines passenger plane skids of runway (December 23, 2008)