NTSB Interview of Colgan Chief Pilot
 

Just a couple of interesting things that came out of the interview between the NTSB and the chief pilot of Colgan. I’m certainly not saying that I could have done a better job answering all these questions (see the full report on the NTSB website), all I know is that I wouldn’t want to do his job.

Some great information from all these briefings. Yes, I know we’re all getting saturated by all the information regarding this tragedy, but it’s interesting and informative and I have a long boring overnight.

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Q & A with the Colgan Chief Pilot (from the NTSB briefings)


Q. Sick policy.

A. Usually, I just track the sick calls and if necessary, I'll give the guy a call and say hey, you know, make sure you're aware of the policy and it's pretty much all -- come down to. I don't think we've actually terminated anyone -- the sick policy or anything.

Q. Is a doctor's note required when a crew member calls in sick?

A. It's at the discretion of crew scheduling -- but yeah. Sometimes yeah, sometimes no. I've had crew members call me and say hey, I can't get to the doctor and I'll tell them don't worry about it.

(Wow, leaving the discretion of a sick note up to a crew scheduler)
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(A recent stick shaker)

Q. Okay, yeah. Just a few questions here. Bill, with regard to the stick shaker event, the day before yesterday I believe you said or probably.

A. Yeah, the days have blended together, so -- it was in
the last day or two.

Q. Sure. With regard to that event, did -- when were you notified?

A. I got a call at eleven o'clock at night saying hey, you got this from a check airman saying -- an unsat checkride.

Q. And was he calling you from the arrival station?

A. Yeah.

Q. Would that suggest that that event had happened --

A. On approach.

Q. On approach, okay. So how long in minutes do you estimate, just roughly, after the actual event that you were getting the phone call?

A. Probably not much after he shut the airplane down.

Q. Okay. And do you know if the voice recorder was protected or looked at, preserved?

A. Not that I'm aware of.

Q. Okay. Did you ask for it to be preserved?

A. I didn't. I called the operations duty officer at that point and let him take over from that point because it was -- he was on duty.

Q. Do you know what he did?

A. I haven't spoke to him since then, no.

Q. Do you know --

A. The Director of Operations was handling it this morning, I know that, but --

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(Another Stick Shaker????)

were there ever any events which involved the stall prevention system shaker coming on?

A. From an ASAP report? No, not that I'm aware of.

Q. Have you had any such reports from any other source?

A. You mean a report of a pilot inadvertently?

Q. Um-hum.

A. Well, yes.

Q. Can you give me an example?

A. Well, there was one instance. I don't even recall the exact date. I remember there was a line check that was done and the stick shaker went off and they were removed from flight status.

Q. Which airplane was that?

A. It was on the Q.

Q. Can you tell me anything more about it?
MR. JAQUES: Let's go off the record for a second.
(Off the record.)
(On the record.)
BY MR. COX:

Q. Just speaking of that particular event, it took place on a line check.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Can you describe, in a little bit more detail, what happened?

A. Well, all I really know is what I got from the check airman on that one is that it was recorded as an unsatisfactory line check and that the crew got too slow on the approach and had the shaker and the recovery from it.


Q. Do you know at what point during the approach that happened?

A. I believe it was the initial approach phase.

Q. Do you know at what airport?

A. I don't recall at this point. I believe -- it wasn't Buffalo.

Q. That's all right.

A. It's up north somewhere. It might've been Albany or Burlington.

Q. Do you remember whether they may have been in icing conditions or not?

A. I'm not aware of whether they were. I believe they may have been, but I'm not positive.

Q. Do you recall who the check airman was?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me who that is, please?

A. His name was
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I can’t tell if this is two separate incidences or just the wording on the time frame is off (when the incident occurred vs. when this report was taken/ filed)

It seems to me that this incident has been a result of the aircraft slowing down during approach…just normal approaches. I don’t fly the Dash 8, I don’t know how Colgan “bugs” their speeds, and/ or the working of their anti-icing system , so I don’t claim anything. I just find it odd.

Thats intense...I think I'm going to have to print all this material out so I can review it after my II check!

Wow..........

double wow...where can the info be found to read the whole transcript?

It seems a stick shaker activating at Colgan is a routine event. If they are activating that often during line checks, how many are occuring that they don't know about?

are they flying the Q at the same speeds as the saab or 1900? I know at CHQ they treat the 145 like its a Saab with thousands of memory items and they even make you put the gear pins in at night but atleast the profiles/speeds are accurate to the jets performance charachteristics.

The ref speeds for the Q are just fine.....its the pilots.

What's the landing gear operating and extended speed (Vlo and Vle) for the Q400?

Gear 200
Vle 215

I don't even know how to respond to this. An incident and ASAP about having a stick shaker would be one thing, but getting one during a line check?! It makes me wonder that the check airmen were doing since they didn't help the situation by also letting the aircraft end up in that position.

Scary.