Flight IFO-21 that killed Ron Brown.
#11
A-model T-38 had no RMI, but it DID have a Tacan bearing-pointer, on the outside of the HSI compass-card.
Some were “head only” (sts), and some also had a Tail. (Sts).
Some were “head only” (sts), and some also had a Tail. (Sts).
#12
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jan 2014
Posts: 96
All of ours were head only. I can't remember what we trained students to do with the bearing pointer only but we did some kind of training with it. I was very happy to learn that I could "push the head AND pull the tail" when I got to the airlines.
#13
New Hire
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Aug 2010
Posts: 8
Thanks to everyone for their replies. I obtained most of my information from the Flight Safety Foundation/ Flight Digest/July-August 1996.
This plane only had one ADF and should not have been attempting this landing and I tend to agree with the person who said these pilots probably were pressured by superiors.
It's hard for me to believe that they might have used KLP in reverse sensing with mountains in the area above the MDA. . Using KLP that way, the distance they were off in the end would have only shown up as about 9 degrees on the RMI which isn't a whole lot when you consider all the errors the ADF is subject too.
Yet if they had tuned to CV, it would've shown about 100 degrees clockwise from the nose of the aircraft by the time they hit that mountain. They should've had plenty of warning.
With them wanting to fly a course of 119 degrees and a wind at 4,000 from 160 at 25 kts, they probably would've had to have flown a heading of about 124. That would've put the ADF needle to the left of center and with mountains to the left, they should have never let that needle get right of center, yet in the end, if they were tuned into CV, again, it would've been about 100 degrees right of center.
I said it puzzled me that they found the ADF tuned to KLP. One gentleman explained that when you execute a missed approach, in this case, you would tune back to the previous ADF which was KLP. The accident report said the gear and the flaps were down, but the engines were at a high power level which indicates to me that they just started the procedure for the missed approach, by applying power, but hit the mountain before they could clean up the airplane. Now is it possible that when one pilot was applying power, the other was tuning the ADF back to KLP, before bringing flaps and gear up?
A note here. The report said the warning profile of the GPWS was never penetrated, so the GPWS did not sound any warnings.
This plane only had one ADF and should not have been attempting this landing and I tend to agree with the person who said these pilots probably were pressured by superiors.
It's hard for me to believe that they might have used KLP in reverse sensing with mountains in the area above the MDA. . Using KLP that way, the distance they were off in the end would have only shown up as about 9 degrees on the RMI which isn't a whole lot when you consider all the errors the ADF is subject too.
Yet if they had tuned to CV, it would've shown about 100 degrees clockwise from the nose of the aircraft by the time they hit that mountain. They should've had plenty of warning.
With them wanting to fly a course of 119 degrees and a wind at 4,000 from 160 at 25 kts, they probably would've had to have flown a heading of about 124. That would've put the ADF needle to the left of center and with mountains to the left, they should have never let that needle get right of center, yet in the end, if they were tuned into CV, again, it would've been about 100 degrees right of center.
I said it puzzled me that they found the ADF tuned to KLP. One gentleman explained that when you execute a missed approach, in this case, you would tune back to the previous ADF which was KLP. The accident report said the gear and the flaps were down, but the engines were at a high power level which indicates to me that they just started the procedure for the missed approach, by applying power, but hit the mountain before they could clean up the airplane. Now is it possible that when one pilot was applying power, the other was tuning the ADF back to KLP, before bringing flaps and gear up?
A note here. The report said the warning profile of the GPWS was never penetrated, so the GPWS did not sound any warnings.
#14
I’m not sure what you mean by “reverse sensing”; that applies to a LOC, they were tracking outbound from the KLP beacon as called for on the approach. They needed TWO ADFs to fly the approach and continuously monitor both, so I don’t understand your reference to retuning KLP. The wind would have shifted as they descended, probably more toward the south, so their heading would have changed to maintain the 119 track.
GF
GF
#15
Scruffy - you have drawn some conclusions about this based on inaccurate information.
I apologize for the size of the approach plate. My upload kung fu failed. Here's a link:
http://code7700.com/leadership_styles.htm
You have to scroll down a bit to find it.
As Galaxy Flyer stated, there is no such thing as "reverse sensing" when using an NDB. You flying a course (technically called a bearing when using NDBs) either to or from the station. Doing one or the other creates no inherent problem for the pilot. As far as mountains go, if you look at the area, there aren't any between KLP and the runway. So terrain would have no effect on their use of KLP (or CV for that matter).
You keep coming at this as if they had a choice in the navaids and how they used them. The fact that they could only tune one makes much of this discussion kind of silly. They never should have attempted this approach without the ability to tune both of the required NDBs.
However, I found the approach plate in use at the time (see below or the link up top) The primary navaid for this approach - i.e. the one providing final approach guidance is KLP. That's why the final approach course (119) is depicted outbound from that navaid with the black arrow. That's also why KLP is shown in the title header of the approach plate.
KLP is the navaid that was required to be used to provide final approach guidance. This is a fact and isn't an area open to interpretation or the whims of a particular pilot from one day to the next. It's possible that CV was designed exclusively to be what it's labeled on the approach - a Locator (Lctr). It's design and signal strength may not have been certified for any other use. It's only purpose on this approach is to identify the missed approach point (MAP). Period - dot.
It's perfectly acceptable to have a single NDB (CV for instance - if it was certified for that use) act as the IAF and MAP while also providing course guidance to the runway. Those types of NDB approaches are required to include a procedure turn using an on-airfield NDB. There is no FAF (final approach fix) in these types of NDB approaches. The pilot flies over the NDB away from the field, executes the procedure turn, reversing course and tracks inbound back toward the NDB (and the field). Station passage signals the MAP. However, that's not how this approach was built. In fact, it was not legal for CV to be used as the primary navaid for this approach because it was located too far away from the runway. In order for a single NDB to be considered "on airport" and used as the primary, it has to be within 1 mile of any portion of the runway.
Once an NDB approach is built with a FAF (like this one), there are different criteria involved in the requirements for the approach. One important difference is there must be a method of identifying the FAF. With this criteria comes added accuracy and lower minimums which I'm guessing was required in that area due to the surrounding terrain.
Sounds like someone's been using the Whiz Wheel.
My man..... you're passing an awful lot of judgement from that armchair at zero knots. But, you bet - there's a lot of things they "should have never" let happen. When they hit KLP at 220 clean, they should have just gone around, held, asked for a vector.
I think you're forgetting what was happening from KLP inbound as we now discuss 119 versus 124 degrees displayed on a 2.5" dial while flying almost 4 miles a minute and trying to pick-up a proper course after station passage. These two pilots were asses and elbows trying to get their jet slowed, configured while descending 2000 feet in less than 6 miles.
Everyone agrees they should never have been there in the first place. But if you think they were aware of the need for a 5 degree course correction at that moment in their lives, you simply do not have an appreciation of what they were experiencing.
I can almost guarantee you they never took the ADF control head off KLP. That was their REQUIRED method of final approach guidance. Have you ever used an ADF to tune an NDB. The set these pilots were using was all manual. You have to ID the station using the morse code identifier before you're legal to use it. You can't just dial in a frequency and switch back and forth on a whim.
You can see on the approach plate, there is in fact a timing block. Just a guess, but I'd say it's reasonable to assume they planned on using timing to identify the MAP while tracking the final approach course. While not legal, this would be the way I would have flown that approach if I had no other option. So, there was no one trying to retune KLP from CV during the missed approach.
That's possible. They were essentially abeam the MAP after drifting north of course, so it was probably about the time for them to go around. They could have also gotten a face full of mountain in the last few seconds and firewalled the power in an attempt to climb to safety.
I apologize for the size of the approach plate. My upload kung fu failed. Here's a link:
http://code7700.com/leadership_styles.htm
You have to scroll down a bit to find it.
However, I found the approach plate in use at the time (see below or the link up top) The primary navaid for this approach - i.e. the one providing final approach guidance is KLP. That's why the final approach course (119) is depicted outbound from that navaid with the black arrow. That's also why KLP is shown in the title header of the approach plate.
KLP is the navaid that was required to be used to provide final approach guidance. This is a fact and isn't an area open to interpretation or the whims of a particular pilot from one day to the next. It's possible that CV was designed exclusively to be what it's labeled on the approach - a Locator (Lctr). It's design and signal strength may not have been certified for any other use. It's only purpose on this approach is to identify the missed approach point (MAP). Period - dot.
It's perfectly acceptable to have a single NDB (CV for instance - if it was certified for that use) act as the IAF and MAP while also providing course guidance to the runway. Those types of NDB approaches are required to include a procedure turn using an on-airfield NDB. There is no FAF (final approach fix) in these types of NDB approaches. The pilot flies over the NDB away from the field, executes the procedure turn, reversing course and tracks inbound back toward the NDB (and the field). Station passage signals the MAP. However, that's not how this approach was built. In fact, it was not legal for CV to be used as the primary navaid for this approach because it was located too far away from the runway. In order for a single NDB to be considered "on airport" and used as the primary, it has to be within 1 mile of any portion of the runway.
Once an NDB approach is built with a FAF (like this one), there are different criteria involved in the requirements for the approach. One important difference is there must be a method of identifying the FAF. With this criteria comes added accuracy and lower minimums which I'm guessing was required in that area due to the surrounding terrain.
With them wanting to fly a course of 119 degrees and a wind at 4,000 from 160 at 25 kts, they probably would've had to have flown a heading of about 124. That would've put the ADF needle to the left of center and with mountains to the left, they should have never let that needle get right of center, yet in the end, if they were tuned into CV, again, it would've been about 100 degrees right of center.
My man..... you're passing an awful lot of judgement from that armchair at zero knots. But, you bet - there's a lot of things they "should have never" let happen. When they hit KLP at 220 clean, they should have just gone around, held, asked for a vector.
I think you're forgetting what was happening from KLP inbound as we now discuss 119 versus 124 degrees displayed on a 2.5" dial while flying almost 4 miles a minute and trying to pick-up a proper course after station passage. These two pilots were asses and elbows trying to get their jet slowed, configured while descending 2000 feet in less than 6 miles.
Everyone agrees they should never have been there in the first place. But if you think they were aware of the need for a 5 degree course correction at that moment in their lives, you simply do not have an appreciation of what they were experiencing.
You can see on the approach plate, there is in fact a timing block. Just a guess, but I'd say it's reasonable to assume they planned on using timing to identify the MAP while tracking the final approach course. While not legal, this would be the way I would have flown that approach if I had no other option. So, there was no one trying to retune KLP from CV during the missed approach.
The accident report said the gear and the flaps were down, but the engines were at a high power level which indicates to me that they just started the procedure for the missed approach, by applying power, but hit the mountain before they could clean up the airplane.
Last edited by Adlerdriver; 02-16-2018 at 08:43 AM.
#16
Adlerdriver,
Thanks for the link with the chart. He’s usually pretty on target, but I have to disagree with a couple of things.
“Eddie” of Code7700 says:
I spoke with Jim Terpstra of Jeppesen at an AFFSA conference several years later. Jim was Jepp’s expert on charting for decades. He confirmed that the procedure was correctly drawn, according to the PANS-OPS edition. He was clear on Eastern Bloc procedures designers frequently used multiple NDBs as a low-cost way of lowering minimums and was allowed under PANS-OPS, since deleted. IIRC, he was miffed that the AF termed the approach wrongly designed; it wasn’t, but was not a design found in the West. It was also a early PANS-OPS Edition, point being you can’t apply today’s standard to an earlier one. He added, in the course of defending suits over the years, Jeppesen reviewed procedures and rarely found errors, as long as they used the design standard the procedure was drawn to. Of course, Jeppesen always says they faithfully print what the host nation charts, they do not guarantee the validity of the design.
He wasn’t surprised at the crew’s, both of the flight and investigation interviewees didn’t understand it. It was unique to the Bloc. We had the money, in the West, to pay for VOR-DME, TACAN and widespread ILSs.
The issue of validation is correct, the regs extant did require MAJCOM review which was ignored in the haste to make Brown’s trip happen. Mission accomplishment over procedure. Now, an O-8 has waive the requirement.
One last thought, the “timing block” is there but timing to MAP is not presented, hence not authorized, just a GS, descent rate and the note, MAP at CV.
Alas, we all now have better knowledge of Eastern Bloc Ops. Before DS, Eastern Bloc AF flights required special training and crew quals. I was handed a flight plan thru the East to Turkey after the bombing started, asked about “Eastern Bloc qual”; “just go, not a problem” said the CP. While true at F330, a divert might have been a challenge.
GF
Thanks for the link with the chart. He’s usually pretty on target, but I have to disagree with a couple of things.
“Eddie” of Code7700 says:
First, the approach procedure was designed in error. The descent altitude was too low, given the length of the final approach. Second, the approach plate had not been validated by the major air command.
He wasn’t surprised at the crew’s, both of the flight and investigation interviewees didn’t understand it. It was unique to the Bloc. We had the money, in the West, to pay for VOR-DME, TACAN and widespread ILSs.
The issue of validation is correct, the regs extant did require MAJCOM review which was ignored in the haste to make Brown’s trip happen. Mission accomplishment over procedure. Now, an O-8 has waive the requirement.
One last thought, the “timing block” is there but timing to MAP is not presented, hence not authorized, just a GS, descent rate and the note, MAP at CV.
Alas, we all now have better knowledge of Eastern Bloc Ops. Before DS, Eastern Bloc AF flights required special training and crew quals. I was handed a flight plan thru the East to Turkey after the bombing started, asked about “Eastern Bloc qual”; “just go, not a problem” said the CP. While true at F330, a divert might have been a challenge.
GF
Last edited by galaxy flyer; 02-16-2018 at 10:52 AM.
#17
I'm a bit confused about what he is saying the crew and investigator interviewees didn't understand.
#18
That they didn’t grasp the required TWO beacons. In the investigation, they ran doming asked crews in that squadron about how to fly it, what was required, how to define the MAP. He had some real, if privately held, differences with the chart issue. Some, no doubt, could be attributed to his position at Jeppesen.
Very knowledgeable and easy to talk with. I asked some obscure question about high level charts, he thought and said, “there’s a jet route near LA that...”. It was like he memorized every peculiarity of the charts.
He was a legend, Tom Letts I think was his successor and JeppView guru.
GF
Very knowledgeable and easy to talk with. I asked some obscure question about high level charts, he thought and said, “there’s a jet route near LA that...”. It was like he memorized every peculiarity of the charts.
He was a legend, Tom Letts I think was his successor and JeppView guru.
GF
#19
New Hire
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Aug 2010
Posts: 8
Thanks again for everybody's input. I think if pilot's here could answer this 'hypothetical' situation, I'd better understand the situation.
For this, throw the rules and regulations out the window. You're approaching this airport from the northwest from an airport about 110 nautical miles away, coming up in a few miles on the KLP NDB, with just enough fuel to make it to this airport, heading for runway 12 (119 degrees). One thing that would be different for this situation is when you crossed KLP, you were fully configured for landing, but all you have is the RMI with one ADF receiver, INS, and a compass. You have the same weather conditions with overcast around 2,000', the top of which is obscuring the mountains. Winds at 4,000' @ 25 kts from 160. You have the same two NDBs, KLP 12 miles from the airport and CV 2 miles from the airport. You don't have enough fuel to do a missed approach. How would you navigate to the airport?
For this, throw the rules and regulations out the window. You're approaching this airport from the northwest from an airport about 110 nautical miles away, coming up in a few miles on the KLP NDB, with just enough fuel to make it to this airport, heading for runway 12 (119 degrees). One thing that would be different for this situation is when you crossed KLP, you were fully configured for landing, but all you have is the RMI with one ADF receiver, INS, and a compass. You have the same weather conditions with overcast around 2,000', the top of which is obscuring the mountains. Winds at 4,000' @ 25 kts from 160. You have the same two NDBs, KLP 12 miles from the airport and CV 2 miles from the airport. You don't have enough fuel to do a missed approach. How would you navigate to the airport?
#20
Here’s the pilot’s answer:
I wouldn’t let myself get into this position.
I’d like to know why you have become so possessed with this accident and details of the approach flown. You seem to have some goal in mind. That and you refuse to take the explanations given by those of us well versed in the event and the investigation. Until you can give an answer to my question, that’s my answer.
Can your hypothetical be flown, yes, but for the event, the rules can’t be thrown away. Like many people unfamiliar with aviation, it seems, for you, the rules are an obstacle, not an explanation.
GF
I wouldn’t let myself get into this position.
I’d like to know why you have become so possessed with this accident and details of the approach flown. You seem to have some goal in mind. That and you refuse to take the explanations given by those of us well versed in the event and the investigation. Until you can give an answer to my question, that’s my answer.
Can your hypothetical be flown, yes, but for the event, the rules can’t be thrown away. Like many people unfamiliar with aviation, it seems, for you, the rules are an obstacle, not an explanation.
GF
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