Lion Air 737 Max Accident
#71
#72
Anyway I think it is somewhat beyond this society to change course on its automation cheapening staff fanaticism, and so we need to be practical. Giving pilots access to all the AoA indicators onthe aircraft, their raw data (there are 4 I believe on the 737, 2 are on the wings) ... that would be good. And then having the concept of disabling all the computational inputs and knowing how to do that in 3 seconds flat ... which I am sure will arrive giving this accident. Also having a 3rd AoA tube outside would be good; if you have 2 and 1 fails ... that's not so much helpful when on instruments !
These 2 measures are cheap and idiot proof solutions.
btw are there any other control systems on 737 that need disabling ? Anything else ? Because pilots seem to only disabled the autopilot and navigation in the first instance.
First is the retractable landing gear. Yes, it saves fuel, increases speed, and lowers ticket prices; but at what cost??? There is a one in a ga-zillion chance it could not extend, cause the plane to flip over, burst into flames, and make me lose my laptop during the emergency egress.
Next, I would eliminate all AOA detection and reporting devices; they can be WRONG! I don't want anything that could feed me bad information! For that matter, air speed indicators, altimeters, and VSIs can fail too! Let's get rid of them.
And as for engines.....don't even get me started!
#73
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Joined APC: Nov 2018
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What else needs disabling ... in an emergency when you need to isolate the computer ?
It seems that these pilots should have disabled the STS in any case if they had wished to isolate computer direction control surfaces ... but they didn't. Anything else ?
Probably the pilots were trying to make jokes as well : which is fine, as long as you know the answer when you need it.
It seems that these pilots should have disabled the STS in any case if they had wished to isolate computer direction control surfaces ... but they didn't. Anything else ?
Probably the pilots were trying to make jokes as well : which is fine, as long as you know the answer when you need it.
#76
Got to love how the FAA looks the other way and claims ignorance by allowing operators to put new aircraft into service with multiple changes and system enhancements. A 3 hour differences course (no mention of this system or even a paragraph in the AOM). No simulators produced prior to service introduction.
The bribery tentacles run deep into the polyester brigade.
Boeing and the airlines have the feds on their knees like a $10 hooker.
The bribery tentacles run deep into the polyester brigade.
Boeing and the airlines have the feds on their knees like a $10 hooker.
#77
Here are a couple of articles I have written on this, the second one in particular raises critical aspects:
https://airlinesafety.blog/2018/11/1...ormation-news/
https://airlinesafety.blog/2018/11/1...n-do-about-it/
https://airlinesafety.blog/2018/11/1...ormation-news/
https://airlinesafety.blog/2018/11/1...n-do-about-it/
#78
I think it is deeper than this. For a LOT of federal agencies (FAA AND FDA come to mind), the technical skills of the agency personnel are markedly inferior to those producing the product and the agency DELEGATES a great deal of approval authority to employees of the organization much like they do with DPEs. And they do that despite the conflict of interest because the agency doesn't have, can't get, and could never hope to retain individuals with those skills. Not in the civil service system anyway.
Some government functions do require bleeding edge, and innovative work-arounds like DARPA can be devised (they developed both GPS and the internet). But in the case of FAA oversight the challenge for the government is to not to be the bleeding edge, but rather to simply not get snowed.
It can be done. Professional detectives are not typically mensa material, but experience and professionalism allow them to catch many criminals who may be quite intelligent and talented.
#79
I think it is deeper than this. For a LOT of federal agencies (FAA AND FDA come to mind), the technical skills of the agency personnel are markedly inferior to those producing the product and the agency DELEGATES a great deal of approval authority to employees of the organization much like they do with DPEs. And they do that despite the conflict of interest because the agency doesn't have, can't get, and could never hope to retain individuals with those skills. Not in the civil service system anyway.
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