Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
05-15-2019, 08:15 PM
#631
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2009
Posts: 1,269
Mr Burke is living in a fantasy world where every pilot has tens of thousands of hours in the plane they’re flying, their training incorporates every possible scenario (even the unknown), all pilots throughout the world are well rested, and they’ve all had a nice cup of coffee and a healthy dump before showing up to the airplane.
The reality is, outside of some of the developed countries, this isn’t the case and Boeing knows this. I agree that a well trained and rested crew probably wouldn’t have ended with the same outcome as the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights. But stop acting like we are somehow immune to this here. There is plenty of bent metal from bone headed mistakes that we’ve made here in the US. Look at SWA going into LGA a few years ago or Burbank a few months ago, look at Delta landing on taxiways, or sliding off runways. Look at all the other moronic stuff we all hear about in recurrent every year that doesn’t end in an accident or on the news but was really damn close. My point is that given a weak/fatigued crew this could happen anywhere. Boeing knows this and they have the obligation to dumb down the system to the lowest common denominator.
To develop a major flight control system that relies on one input to function properly is ridiculous. To not tell airlines that this system even existed is ridiculous. Stop trying to make excuses for Boeing. It was a garbage implementation and it’s bit them in the butt twice. Hundreds of people have lost their lives including the pilots who tried their best with the tools they were given.
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The reality is, outside of some of the developed countries, this isn’t the case and Boeing knows this. I agree that a well trained and rested crew probably wouldn’t have ended with the same outcome as the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights. But stop acting like we are somehow immune to this here. There is plenty of bent metal from bone headed mistakes that we’ve made here in the US. Look at SWA going into LGA a few years ago or Burbank a few months ago, look at Delta landing on taxiways, or sliding off runways. Look at all the other moronic stuff we all hear about in recurrent every year that doesn’t end in an accident or on the news but was really damn close. My point is that given a weak/fatigued crew this could happen anywhere. Boeing knows this and they have the obligation to dumb down the system to the lowest common denominator.
To develop a major flight control system that relies on one input to function properly is ridiculous. To not tell airlines that this system even existed is ridiculous. Stop trying to make excuses for Boeing. It was a garbage implementation and it’s bit them in the butt twice. Hundreds of people have lost their lives including the pilots who tried their best with the tools they were given.
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05-15-2019, 09:05 PM
#632
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,001
I said nothing about tens of thousands of hours. You said that.
The pilots in the Ethiopian flight had a full night's rest and were on their first flight of the day, a morning, VFR departure.
The status of their bowel movements is irrelevant.
I said nothing of immunity. You said that.
What Southwest Airlines or Delta Airlines did in other aircraft in other circumstances is irrelevant. Particular when you're trying to paint a picture of a fatigued crew...which the Ethiopian crew was not. Your is a straw man.
Boeing wasn't "bit in the butt twice." Two different third world operators killed passengers when their crewmembers didn't do their job.
The truth is that even those who consider themselves systems mavens on Boeing or Airbus equipment seldom know much about the airplane beyond the basics found in their manuals. Even those waffling on about trim jackscrews here have likely never actually seen a jackscrew. In the case of the Ethiopian incident, a more in-depth understanding of the MCAS system wouldn't have enabled the crew to do something different, and the only action needed was the same action taught every 737 pilot regardless of whether it's a Max or not; the procedure is the same procedure for a runaway stab trim. Its' not obscure, it's not new, it's not different in the Max. Same procedure works. Stop the trim, cut it off, trim manually, fly the airplane, keep the speed. Not rocket science.
This was known to the crew of the Ethiopian flight. It was noted in their flight manuals. They verbalized it, identified the problem, and took the steps necessary to stop the problem.
Then the undid the step and accelerated beyond the certification limits for the airplane, beyond Vmo/Mmo, and took every one to their deaths.
That's the reality of it.
The pilots knew the procedure, said it aloud, and then did the opposite of what was required. The polar opposite. After a night of rest.
You can do your own research on their bowel movements, given your apparent fascination.
The pilots in the Ethiopian flight had a full night's rest and were on their first flight of the day, a morning, VFR departure.
The status of their bowel movements is irrelevant.
I said nothing of immunity. You said that.
What Southwest Airlines or Delta Airlines did in other aircraft in other circumstances is irrelevant. Particular when you're trying to paint a picture of a fatigued crew...which the Ethiopian crew was not. Your is a straw man.
Boeing wasn't "bit in the butt twice." Two different third world operators killed passengers when their crewmembers didn't do their job.
The truth is that even those who consider themselves systems mavens on Boeing or Airbus equipment seldom know much about the airplane beyond the basics found in their manuals. Even those waffling on about trim jackscrews here have likely never actually seen a jackscrew. In the case of the Ethiopian incident, a more in-depth understanding of the MCAS system wouldn't have enabled the crew to do something different, and the only action needed was the same action taught every 737 pilot regardless of whether it's a Max or not; the procedure is the same procedure for a runaway stab trim. Its' not obscure, it's not new, it's not different in the Max. Same procedure works. Stop the trim, cut it off, trim manually, fly the airplane, keep the speed. Not rocket science.
This was known to the crew of the Ethiopian flight. It was noted in their flight manuals. They verbalized it, identified the problem, and took the steps necessary to stop the problem.
Then the undid the step and accelerated beyond the certification limits for the airplane, beyond Vmo/Mmo, and took every one to their deaths.
That's the reality of it.
The pilots knew the procedure, said it aloud, and then did the opposite of what was required. The polar opposite. After a night of rest.
You can do your own research on their bowel movements, given your apparent fascination.
05-15-2019, 10:39 PM
#633
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2017
Position: CRJ9 CA
Posts: 4,083
Originally Posted by Hetman
I want to know more about this technique. 40 years in the business (four decades) and I have never seen it in any manual, general airmanship or type specific, much less "the manual." To what "the manual" do you refer?
I get unloading the stab to reduce aerodynamic loads thereby allowing manual trim, but does it involve, as the name implies, alternately and repeatedly sticking everything to the ceiling then slamming everything to the floor at low altitude and high speed?
Pangolin: I am specifically asking you, who brought it up, to explain this technique and to refer us all to "the manual" in which it is published. Thank you in advance for your specific reply.
I get unloading the stab to reduce aerodynamic loads thereby allowing manual trim, but does it involve, as the name implies, alternately and repeatedly sticking everything to the ceiling then slamming everything to the floor at low altitude and high speed?
Pangolin: I am specifically asking you, who brought it up, to explain this technique and to refer us all to "the manual" in which it is published. Thank you in advance for your specific reply.
https://theairlinewebsite.com/topic/473748-another-737-max-down/page/19/?tab=comments#comment-1784711
05-15-2019, 10:55 PM
#634
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2017
Position: CRJ9 CA
Posts: 4,083
Insults aside this guy knows way more than I do:
https://youtu.be/CshWIpB-8Mw
https://youtu.be/CshWIpB-8Mw
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
It really isn't.
You're a regional pilot, are you not? What's your experience training in (and flying) Boeing aircraft. From your commentary, zero.
No, it wasn't imperceptible. Clearly you've never been in a Boeing cockpit, let alone a 737.
There are two big wheels, right by each pilot's knee, with a big white stripe across them. Their motion is unmistakable. It's visual. It's tactile. It's audible. It can't be missed. If it's moving when you're not moving it, and the autopilot is disengaged, then it's unwanted trim, and this is an immediate indication that something is amiss.
Trim motion doesn't "sneak up" in any way, shape, or form. It was designed this way, for a reason.
In most platforms, with stabilizer trim, opposing motion will stop the trim; this is the first step. Opposing it with control wheel switch trim (thumb switches) on the control yoke will also stop the trim action. Finally, the cutoff switches. It's stoppable, immediately, and once it's stopped, there's no sneaking.
We train for realistic distractions from day one; the first moment the student gets to the airplane, before he ever opens the door, we use distractions and we never stop using them. Distractions in flying are a fact of life, and part of wearing big boy pants in the cockpit means we do our job, handle the distractions and fly the airplane.
What we don't do is allow the airplane to accelerate beyond it's maximum operating speed and re-engage pitch trim motors after it's clear (and we've recognized and verbalized) that the pitch trim is the problem.
Whereas we're talking about the Ethiopian mishap here, we're talking about a crew that had full information regarding MCAS (the reference is in the report, if you bothered to read it), and who stated, verbally, the problem, and the solution, and then did it. Then reactivated the pitch trim and accelerated to their deaths...neither of those two actions, the combination of which (in concert with their failure to fly the airplane) lead to their deaths and the deaths of all aboard. The aircraft WAS flyable and WAS controllable, and it WAS a VFR morning and they WERE at 7,000' when the evolution began. You really can't ask for more ideal conditions than that.
You have failed to read the report.
They DID turn the switches back on. This is a violation of the procedure. Once the switches are moved to the cutoff position, at no time is trim motor function to be restored: that's the point of the procedure. Don't apply power to the trim motors again. Ever. Don't. Just don't.
They did.
They did just what you say they should do. It enabled the trim to continue to move to a nose down position.
That, in concert with their increasing speed, well beyond the limitations of the airplane, led to their deaths. Not a little nose-down trim. It was flyable and controllable up until they let the speed run away instead of flying the airplane, and the trim wouldn't have moved nose down any more, had they not re-engaged the stab trim. They did the two things that the procedure forbids to do...and not surprisingly, it's just what you recommend: the exact opposite of what should be done.
You have an excuse. You have no idea what you're talking about. They were type rated in the airplane and have no excuse.
Moving the stab trim is irrelevant.
I R R E L E V A N T.
Fly the damn airplane. Nose is trimmed down a bit? Fly the damn airplane. Keep it at the speed where the trim became a problem, and fly the damn airplane.
Because you have no idea what you're talking about, you keep focusing on re-trimming the airplane. Perhaps you're so close to your primary flight training due to your level of experience that you can't let go of this idea, and you think that everything should focus on retrimming the airplane.
Fly the damn airplane. Whether you ever get it back in trim or not is irrelevant. I R R E L E V A N T. Fly the damn airplane.
You get the point? Obviously not.
It's not about reducing speed, though they should have. It's about keeping the speed where it is; eventually speed need to be reduced, but they're at a safe maneuvering altitude, they have time; all they need to do is keep it under control. Sit on their hands, count to ten, think about it. Breathe. Focus. Fly the damn airplane.
The F/O was inexperienced. A wet commercial and a few hours in the airplane, and his thinking was probably about on par with yours. Dangerous. Immature. Uninformed. Inexperienced. A little learning is a dangerous thing.
The captain, on the other hand, he didn't have nearly the excuse. You'll notice, if you ever actually read the report, that he didn't have a lot of experience, but he did have time in type, and all his experience was with the company. He did something telling, though; immediately engaged the autopilot, and he focused on repeatedly trying to engage the autopilot. This is also a dangerous line of thought; if one can't get away from the trivial and focus on flying the damn airplane, then one paints one's self into a corner. For you, it's an obsession with retrimming. For him, while he did suffer from that same misfocus, he kept returning to wanting the autopilot to handle the airplane for him.
Certainly in an emergency, sometimes using the autopilot can free you up to bring more attention to bear on the problem, but when the problem is a flight control issue with a trim issue, and the autopilot won't engage, the immediate concern is flying the airplane, not handing it off, and he focused on engaging autopilot immediately after takeoff, and during the course of the flight.
Recently we see an Atlas pilot who gets stuck in a confirmation bias loop and keeps pushing the nose down for what he perceives as a problem with the airplane trying to pitch up, and here we see a pilot who allows the airpalne to accelerate when he should have been focusing on the opposite.
The problem with the speed was NOT that it made the airplane harder to trim. You don't seem to understand this concept. The problem with increasing speed was that it exacerbated the existing trim force. The trim at 200 knots might be a nuisance. Do nothing but increase airspeed, and at 300 knots it could be a real problem, and at 500 knots, beyond control. The solution: keep the airplane flying at the speed where the problem occurred, but they didn't do that. They accelerated through 500 knots to a point where they ensured the airplane couldn't be controlled.
Forget "porpoising." You're stuck on this idea that they crew had to re-trim. It's good if one is able to retrim, but that is NOT the immediate problem, nor the immediate solution. Flying the damn airplane is the immediate problem. For you millennials, who love acronyms and cell phone speak, FTDA. Fly the damn airplane. FTDA. FTDA. FTDA.
By keeping control of the airplane, which includes roll, pitch, yaw, and airspeed and altitude, the crew would have had a flyable airplane. They did have a flyable airplane until they accelerated to an airspeed that made the airplane uncontrollable. This is the point you really don't seem to be able to grasp, and until you do, you'll go in circles ignorantly fixated on the wrong thing...just like the crew. It was that ignorant fixation, not MCAS or AoA vanes, that killed them, their crew, and all their passengers.
You're a regional pilot, are you not? What's your experience training in (and flying) Boeing aircraft. From your commentary, zero.
No, it wasn't imperceptible. Clearly you've never been in a Boeing cockpit, let alone a 737.
There are two big wheels, right by each pilot's knee, with a big white stripe across them. Their motion is unmistakable. It's visual. It's tactile. It's audible. It can't be missed. If it's moving when you're not moving it, and the autopilot is disengaged, then it's unwanted trim, and this is an immediate indication that something is amiss.
Trim motion doesn't "sneak up" in any way, shape, or form. It was designed this way, for a reason.
In most platforms, with stabilizer trim, opposing motion will stop the trim; this is the first step. Opposing it with control wheel switch trim (thumb switches) on the control yoke will also stop the trim action. Finally, the cutoff switches. It's stoppable, immediately, and once it's stopped, there's no sneaking.
We train for realistic distractions from day one; the first moment the student gets to the airplane, before he ever opens the door, we use distractions and we never stop using them. Distractions in flying are a fact of life, and part of wearing big boy pants in the cockpit means we do our job, handle the distractions and fly the airplane.
What we don't do is allow the airplane to accelerate beyond it's maximum operating speed and re-engage pitch trim motors after it's clear (and we've recognized and verbalized) that the pitch trim is the problem.
Whereas we're talking about the Ethiopian mishap here, we're talking about a crew that had full information regarding MCAS (the reference is in the report, if you bothered to read it), and who stated, verbally, the problem, and the solution, and then did it. Then reactivated the pitch trim and accelerated to their deaths...neither of those two actions, the combination of which (in concert with their failure to fly the airplane) lead to their deaths and the deaths of all aboard. The aircraft WAS flyable and WAS controllable, and it WAS a VFR morning and they WERE at 7,000' when the evolution began. You really can't ask for more ideal conditions than that.
You have failed to read the report.
They DID turn the switches back on. This is a violation of the procedure. Once the switches are moved to the cutoff position, at no time is trim motor function to be restored: that's the point of the procedure. Don't apply power to the trim motors again. Ever. Don't. Just don't.
They did.
They did just what you say they should do. It enabled the trim to continue to move to a nose down position.
That, in concert with their increasing speed, well beyond the limitations of the airplane, led to their deaths. Not a little nose-down trim. It was flyable and controllable up until they let the speed run away instead of flying the airplane, and the trim wouldn't have moved nose down any more, had they not re-engaged the stab trim. They did the two things that the procedure forbids to do...and not surprisingly, it's just what you recommend: the exact opposite of what should be done.
You have an excuse. You have no idea what you're talking about. They were type rated in the airplane and have no excuse.
Moving the stab trim is irrelevant.
I R R E L E V A N T.
Fly the damn airplane. Nose is trimmed down a bit? Fly the damn airplane. Keep it at the speed where the trim became a problem, and fly the damn airplane.
Because you have no idea what you're talking about, you keep focusing on re-trimming the airplane. Perhaps you're so close to your primary flight training due to your level of experience that you can't let go of this idea, and you think that everything should focus on retrimming the airplane.
Fly the damn airplane. Whether you ever get it back in trim or not is irrelevant. I R R E L E V A N T. Fly the damn airplane.
You get the point? Obviously not.
It's not about reducing speed, though they should have. It's about keeping the speed where it is; eventually speed need to be reduced, but they're at a safe maneuvering altitude, they have time; all they need to do is keep it under control. Sit on their hands, count to ten, think about it. Breathe. Focus. Fly the damn airplane.
The F/O was inexperienced. A wet commercial and a few hours in the airplane, and his thinking was probably about on par with yours. Dangerous. Immature. Uninformed. Inexperienced. A little learning is a dangerous thing.
The captain, on the other hand, he didn't have nearly the excuse. You'll notice, if you ever actually read the report, that he didn't have a lot of experience, but he did have time in type, and all his experience was with the company. He did something telling, though; immediately engaged the autopilot, and he focused on repeatedly trying to engage the autopilot. This is also a dangerous line of thought; if one can't get away from the trivial and focus on flying the damn airplane, then one paints one's self into a corner. For you, it's an obsession with retrimming. For him, while he did suffer from that same misfocus, he kept returning to wanting the autopilot to handle the airplane for him.
Certainly in an emergency, sometimes using the autopilot can free you up to bring more attention to bear on the problem, but when the problem is a flight control issue with a trim issue, and the autopilot won't engage, the immediate concern is flying the airplane, not handing it off, and he focused on engaging autopilot immediately after takeoff, and during the course of the flight.
Recently we see an Atlas pilot who gets stuck in a confirmation bias loop and keeps pushing the nose down for what he perceives as a problem with the airplane trying to pitch up, and here we see a pilot who allows the airpalne to accelerate when he should have been focusing on the opposite.
The problem with the speed was NOT that it made the airplane harder to trim. You don't seem to understand this concept. The problem with increasing speed was that it exacerbated the existing trim force. The trim at 200 knots might be a nuisance. Do nothing but increase airspeed, and at 300 knots it could be a real problem, and at 500 knots, beyond control. The solution: keep the airplane flying at the speed where the problem occurred, but they didn't do that. They accelerated through 500 knots to a point where they ensured the airplane couldn't be controlled.
Forget "porpoising." You're stuck on this idea that they crew had to re-trim. It's good if one is able to retrim, but that is NOT the immediate problem, nor the immediate solution. Flying the damn airplane is the immediate problem. For you millennials, who love acronyms and cell phone speak, FTDA. Fly the damn airplane. FTDA. FTDA. FTDA.
By keeping control of the airplane, which includes roll, pitch, yaw, and airspeed and altitude, the crew would have had a flyable airplane. They did have a flyable airplane until they accelerated to an airspeed that made the airplane uncontrollable. This is the point you really don't seem to be able to grasp, and until you do, you'll go in circles ignorantly fixated on the wrong thing...just like the crew. It was that ignorant fixation, not MCAS or AoA vanes, that killed them, their crew, and all their passengers.
05-16-2019, 09:14 AM
#636
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2017
Posts: 162
The other workhorse of the airlines has windows that open on old and new aircraft. No need to remember.
So, a little off subject. The THS on a 320 has three separate electric motors that can individually control two independent hydraulic motors that turn the jack screw. Either one can do the job. Those electric motors are controlled by flight control computers with redundancy. Additionally, the hydraulic motors can be activated by a mechanical linkage to a wheel in the cockpit. The mechanical input will over ride any other input. And the force on the trim wheel in the cockpit is not related to the forces on the stabilizer. The wheel can be turned easily with the tip of your thumb and index figure. How does this compare to the setup on a 737?
So, a little off subject. The THS on a 320 has three separate electric motors that can individually control two independent hydraulic motors that turn the jack screw. Either one can do the job. Those electric motors are controlled by flight control computers with redundancy. Additionally, the hydraulic motors can be activated by a mechanical linkage to a wheel in the cockpit. The mechanical input will over ride any other input. And the force on the trim wheel in the cockpit is not related to the forces on the stabilizer. The wheel can be turned easily with the tip of your thumb and index figure. How does this compare to the setup on a 737?
Last edited by Xjrstreetcar; 05-16-2019 at 09:58 AM.
05-16-2019, 10:31 AM
#637
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Position: Cessna 150
Posts: 655
If you’re under the impression the QRH procedure would have worked for the Ethiopian crew, please read this. If you’re also under the impression I think they did everything right, please stop.
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stab...and-range.html
This article describes the porpoising aka Yo-yo aka roller coaster technique. There is one sentence in the 737 manual at the carrier by which I’m employed addressing this, and it’s vague and misleading.
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stab...and-range.html
This article describes the porpoising aka Yo-yo aka roller coaster technique. There is one sentence in the 737 manual at the carrier by which I’m employed addressing this, and it’s vague and misleading.
05-16-2019, 12:26 PM
#639
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,001
Originally Posted by pokey9554
If you’re under the impression the QRH procedure would have worked for the Ethiopian crew, please read this. If you’re also under the impression I think they did everything right, please stop.
This article describes the porpoising aka Yo-yo aka roller coaster technique. There is one sentence in the 737 manual at the carrier by which I’m employed addressing this, and it’s vague and misleading.
This article describes the porpoising aka Yo-yo aka roller coaster technique. There is one sentence in the 737 manual at the carrier by which I’m employed addressing this, and it’s vague and misleading.
The crew did everything just wrong. It killed them.
They did what they should have done, by removing power to the stab trim motors, but then re-engaged them, and accelerated beyond the limits of the aircraft.
"Porpoising" wasn't a necessary action: stopping the stab trim was, and that procedure hasn't changed in donkey's years.
The crew simply failed to fly the airplane, and this demonstrates that the chances of a successful outcome are far less when passengers occupy the cockpit, rather than pilots.
05-16-2019, 02:22 PM
#640
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2017
Posts: 162
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
If you're under the impression that you know what you're talking about, read the actual report, previously linked. Your comments don't jive.
The crew did everything just wrong. It killed them.
They did what they should have done, by removing power to the stab trim motors, but then re-engaged them, and accelerated beyond the limits of the aircraft.
"Porpoising" wasn't a necessary action: stopping the stab trim was, and that procedure hasn't changed in donkey's years.
The crew simply failed to fly the airplane, and this demonstrates that the chances of a successful outcome are far less when passengers occupy the cockpit, rather than pilots.
The crew did everything just wrong. It killed them.
They did what they should have done, by removing power to the stab trim motors, but then re-engaged them, and accelerated beyond the limits of the aircraft.
"Porpoising" wasn't a necessary action: stopping the stab trim was, and that procedure hasn't changed in donkey's years.
The crew simply failed to fly the airplane, and this demonstrates that the chances of a successful outcome are far less when passengers occupy the cockpit, rather than pilots.
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