pangolin

If the airplane was an NG with no MCAS then they would not have died.

pangolin

Funny. I read the report. If I was in a situation where I could not override the trim with elevator and the Trim wheel could not be moved and the ground was coming up I might try the electric trim - against procedures - to try to save the plane.

You solely blame the crew. I don’t disagree that they should have reduced power. But I consider the mitigating factors of the actual AOA failure. MCAS was the majority contributing factor in the accident chain.

Back to the AOA failure it’s just recently that jet upset training has been mandated and introduced in the US. Our QRH now has tables for known power settings for various phases of flight. This is new. It’s needed. It’s TRAINING and that’s my other point that you continue to overlook as you kill this crew yet again. They were not unskilled. But training can improve and MCAS training in particular in this case. Had it been disclosed and had the full range of failure modes been anticipated and had crews been trained for them then these accidents could have been avoided.

You and Boeing can argue all day long that the runaway stab trim procedure was the same and it was. But the PRESENTATION was widely different. In a normal stab runaway you don’t have the multiple indication failures and stall indications. You don’t see it trim then stop. Then do it again. If I saw it I might say look it’s trimming. Wait. It stopped. I can see how this insidious failure was the primary cause. Not the only cause but the primary.

JohnBurke

Then, on a VFR morning at 7,000' with a flyable airplane, and your failure to throttle back and keep the speed in check (fly the damn airplane, remember?), you'd be an idiot. And you'd be just as dead, because you'd be just as wrong.

When a fatal mishap occurs and you ask someone what they'd do differently, and their response is "not a thing," then they're an idiot. You really would do the same thing, wouldn't you?

I have said no such thing. You just said it. These are your words, which mean it can only apply to you, as I didn't say that. You did. Speak for yourself, if you're able.

MCAS is such a minor part of it that it's nearly irrelevant. The ONLY thing that killed them was their failure to fly the airplane. MCAS didn't. An AoA sensor didn't. The combination of the two didn't. If the speed had been kept in check (fly the damn airplane, remember?), the down-force would have been controllable. Had they not re-engaged the stab trim, it would have been controllable. Had they kept the speed in check and re-engaged the stab trim, the stab was controllable with the control wheel pitch trim switch. They didn't do any of that. They simply accelerated to their death, and at the last moment, made it worse by reversing the stab trim motor cutoff switch position.

Good god. Just when it seems that you can't get any more wrong, you get more wrong. You quite literally can't say anything truthful.

Jet upset training has been in play for decades. It was called "unusual attitude" training prior to that. In fact, it's had several different names, and more recently there is a change in the way it's being addressed in training, but it's entirely irrelevant here, and the fact is that when headed down hill in an upset or unusual attitude, one of the FIRST things we do is REDUCE POWER!!!!!!! This has been taught far longer than you've bee alive, kiddo.

Ah, no.

You really don't know that pitch/power has been part of flying airplanes for many decades now, including pitch/power tables? This seems new to you? Do you actually have an ATP??

You still haven't read the report, despite your assertion to the contrary. If you did, you obviously didn't understand it. The report CLEARLY shows that the crew had been made aware of the MCAS potential issue; it's right there in the report, including a copy of the memo, and the crew verbalized it, meaning that they openly spoke the words in the cockpit, captured and recorded by the FDR, identifying the problem and the steps to overcome.

The training the crew needed had already been given in the first few hours of their first flights in an airplane. Go down hill, speed up. Go uphill, slow down. Just like a bicycle. Reduce power going down hill. Add power going uphill. Trim. Trim applies at a given speed. Trim forces increase with a speed increase; if it's hard to hold the nose up at X speed, it's going to be harder to hold the nose up at a faster Y speed. Really basic stuff, you see. It was failure to FTDA (an acronym for the millennials--fly the damn airplane) that killed them. Had they kept the speed, they had a flyable airplane, on a VFR morning, and they had the altitude the handle it.

Airplanes break. Parts fail. Engines fail. Hydraulics fail. Controls fail. Avionics fail. Pneumatics fail. Fuel systems fail. Antiskid fails. There are a lot of potential abnormal and emergency situations that we can be faced with as flight crews: our job, as you don't seem know it, is to fly the damn airplane. If you're worth your weight in wet salt, you'll fly it to a landing. Not just to the scene of the crash.

This crew had a flyable airplane. They flew it to the scene of the crash...but not as pilots. As passengers.

Pilots would have pulled the power back and followed the procedure.

Have you ever had a runaway stabilizer trim? Do you know what it looks like?

I have. I've had stabilizer trim that moved quickly. I've had it move slowly. I've had it move, stop, then move again. A broken wire making intermittent contact, or an intermittent ground will do that, you see.

Whether the stab moves it fits and starts, moves quickly, or moves slowly, the procedure is the SAME.

If the autopilot is off and there is no reason for the stabilizer trim to be moving, and the pilot isn't moving it, then it must be stopped. In the Boeing, there are three ways to do this with trim control, and one way to do it by removing power to the stab trim motors. One opposes the motion; first with control column movement, then with manual trim, and when efforts are not fruitful, the problem is prevented from becoming worse by cutting off power to the stab trim motors. Speed is held in check (fly the damn airplane). An attempt may be made to manually trim the airplane after the fact, but NOT by restoring stab trim motor power.

This practice, this procedure, these immediate action items, are not new. They are universal for any unwanted stab trim, be it fast, slow, intermittent, or even to the tune and cadence of yankee doodle dandy. This is very hard for you to comprehend, perhaps in part because you have no idea what you're talking about, and you keep lipping and parroting talking points best held out for the ignorant media...but completely unworthy of a professional. You've been hung up on the idea of retrimming the airplane, have insisted that you'd do exactly what killed the crew, and you have no idea what you're talking about, but are quite adamant about talking it anyway.

Trim motion is unmistakable: big cartoonish round wheels by each pilots' knee, big white stripe across the wheels. They're not quiet when they move. Really hard to miss, no matter if they move a little or a lot, fast or slow, continuously or intermittently. You wouldn't know about that, of course, but you sure seem to think you do.

Jet upset training is new, is it? Can't wrap your head around the concept of reducing power and maintaining airspeed? Really hard to comprehend the need to fly the airplane above all else? Pitch/power is a concept that's just been invented?

Are you sure you're a pilot, and not a passenger?

pangolin

I formally apologize for feeding the troll.

Mesabah

What does anything you just said have to do with defrauding the certification process? The crew screwing up exposed Boeing, the pilot's mis-actions don't absolve BA of anything.

JohnBurke

Speak English

727C47

This,.... the Monday morning quarterbacking by the self appointed experts ( not just on this forum ) has been sad to witness,when the full report ,adjudicated by investigators after a full review of the data is released then there will be some grounds for debate. In the meantime a little humility by all and sundry will go a long way . Cheers.

rickair7777

The tone of this meeting should be informative...

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1ST1T1

JohnBurke

The return process is being done via JATR, which the FAA convened, to ensure that each authority that was a participant in the "grounding" is part of the procedure for bringing it back online.

The Joint Authorities Technical Review for the B 737 MAX 8 CREATOR deserves the Collier Trophy | JDA Journal

Boeing Looks to Build Overseas Support for MAX Fix | JDA Journal

rickair7777

In hopes that everyone will kumbaya the proposed fixes. If they can get any easy consensus, perhaps with minor concessions, that will help smooth this all over.

But if the foriegn regulators hold out for more substantial ($$$) fixes, the FAA will likely have to go it alone, to get the US MAX's back in the air.