Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
#61
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Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 19,273
#62
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Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 19,273
I'm not defending Boeings approach to putting MCAS on the Max and blowing off proper communication.
But, it's not accurate to say they added a system that can fail catastrophically. They didn't. That's my the point. MCAS has no more potential for "catastrophic consequences" than the basic stab trim system or autopilot control on a 737-200 in 1967. Any of those systems can malfunction and the results of an IMPROPERLY handled malfunction would be the same. Boeing's not going to add "If the failure is determined to be MCAS, then blah, blah, blah........ to the Runaway Stabilizer procedures because it doesn't matter. The symptoms and solution of some kind of MCAS failure are basically the same as any other stab related malfunction. A pilot wouldn't need to know why his aircraft was pitching down uncommanded - just that it is and there are long established, proven procedures that he's supposed to follow.
Yes, and after you stated that "fact", you connected that fact to the crash which you have been implying and even outright saying was caused by MCAS.
I think you need to look up the word "indictment" because you seem to be making my use of it much more than it means in this case.
All I'm saying is that multiple write ups on a trim system over multiple flights followed by what appears to be a trim related crash looks a lot worse for that airline's maintenance practices than the aircraft manufacturer.
But, it's not accurate to say they added a system that can fail catastrophically. They didn't. That's my the point. MCAS has no more potential for "catastrophic consequences" than the basic stab trim system or autopilot control on a 737-200 in 1967. Any of those systems can malfunction and the results of an IMPROPERLY handled malfunction would be the same. Boeing's not going to add "If the failure is determined to be MCAS, then blah, blah, blah........ to the Runaway Stabilizer procedures because it doesn't matter. The symptoms and solution of some kind of MCAS failure are basically the same as any other stab related malfunction. A pilot wouldn't need to know why his aircraft was pitching down uncommanded - just that it is and there are long established, proven procedures that he's supposed to follow.
Yes, and after you stated that "fact", you connected that fact to the crash which you have been implying and even outright saying was caused by MCAS.
I think you need to look up the word "indictment" because you seem to be making my use of it much more than it means in this case.
All I'm saying is that multiple write ups on a trim system over multiple flights followed by what appears to be a trim related crash looks a lot worse for that airline's maintenance practices than the aircraft manufacturer.
#63
I think you're splitting hairs. No, I didn't think about tech reps when I made that statement because that's not relevant. If Boeing tech reps were involved, that's still a maintenance problems, which was my point. It's not a manufacturing problem if the local mechanics (regardless of who's writing their checks) can't ID and correct a chronic problem and still sign off the aircraft for revenue service anyway.
#64
#65
You try again. I’m not splitting hairs. “That airline’s maintenance practices” was your statement. That clearly places blame on the customer. The tech reps are agents of the manufacturer and only represent the manufacturer. They are often able to sign off and return aircraft to service. Their expertise is implied to be superior to that of the customer.
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#66
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Joined APC: Apr 2016
Position: 767
Posts: 132
MCAS has no more potential for "catastrophic consequences" than the basic stab trim system or autopilot control on a 737-200 in 1967.
I guess I shouldn't expect all of you to read between the lines regarding my "wise" statement. I was referring to the limited experience and cultural issues found at many Chinese airlines along with pilots who spend only the first and last minute of each flight with the autopilot off. Given the choice of asking them to handle a non-standard situation that might require some hand flying or grounding the fleet and calling it good - I'd go with the grounding too.
#67
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Joined APC: Jan 2006
Posts: 222
It's more than that, though. You now have a system in the MCAS that is designed to send stabilizer trim commands that CANNOT be interrupted with the control column displaced in the opposite direction. That increases the odds of a runaway trim significantly. Sure you can flip a switch, but there is a good chance you will fail to do so, as we've seen with Lion Air and possibly here.
#68
The control yoke breakout is an acceptable way to stop stab trim runaway. You don’t have to take your hands off the controls. Having to reach around for the two cutout switches isn’t ergonomically friendly. The CRJ 900 has the cutout in the yoke. At least in the 737 you can manually trim it afterward. To say the system is the same as it always was is wrong. The yoke can no longer be used to stop the runaway. Disabling this, in my opinion, is a major flaw with MCAS. I am in no way implying MCAS was at fault here any I’m very much saddened by the loss of life in this accident.
#69
You try again. I’m not splitting hairs. “That airline’s maintenance practices” was your statement. That clearly places blame on the customer. The tech reps are agents of the manufacturer and only represent the manufacturer. They are often able to sign off and return aircraft to service. Their expertise is implied to be superior to that of the customer.
If that's the case, then - you win. I wasn't considering Boeing tech reps when I made the statement.
I still contend that who is maintaining and signing off the a/c wasn't really the focus of my initial statement. The guy I was responding to was trying to use the multiple write-ups, the Lion Air crash and the similarities of the Egypt crash to point toward MCAS as the culprit (whereas I'm pointing at local mx - whomever that happens to be).
I was trying to point out that multiple uncorrected write-ups followed by "could not duplicate" type sign-offs involving a critical system like flight controls is a serious problem. Far more serious than Boeing choosing to equip the Max with MCAS or failing to inform users about it's specifics. Bad practice and bad business for certain, but hardly the safety fiasco of multiple unaddressed write-ups.
Now, if that happens to be on local Boeing reps, that's a separate issue but in no way related to any of the original points to which I was referring.
#70
Dude - I'm not sure why you've decided to focus on "indictment". I wish I had chosen another word now because you're off on a tangent. I wasn't accusing you of an indictment. I was trying to say that your statements about the write-ups and the crash indicated a bigger problem with local maintenance than manufacturer choices or design. That's all.
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