Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
#782
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,008
It's a bit more than a "procedural mistake." Accelerating out of the envelope and killing everyone on board is a tad more than a bit of a procedural error. It's an outright failure to fly the damn airplane. This isn't debatable or within the realm of question. A procedural mistake, albeit a glaring one, was reversing the runaway trim procedure. Failing to fly the airplane, however, is not simply a procedural mistake. It's far, far beyond a procedural issue, and this is no matter of semantics.
The nations which initiated groundings of the type design did so illegally and without evidence, in violation of the Chicago Convention. The groundings were political. This has already been addressed.
We can read the report and see that the crew made an attempt to use the control wheel trim switch to move the trim, but barely, giving up right away, and who turned off the trim with the cutoff, then turned it back on and let it run away, knowing what was happening, verbalizing it and memorializing it, as they accelerated beyond control. The aircraft wasn't beyond control until they did that, but they made it so. This wasn't procedure. It wasn't even technique. It was a failure to fly the airplane.
Such depth, such input, such intellect. Twice now. Impressive.
One never tires of such meaty conversation as "yeah, what he said." Bravo. Brilliant. Such contribution!
This wasn't an upset.
This was a failure to fly the airplane.
Last edited by JohnBurke; 06-13-2019 at 03:12 PM.
#783
#784
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2015
Posts: 4,116
Oh ok. I was wondering if that reference was to a mistake made initiating the manuver.
Flight testing the low speed envelope of an airframe already identified as having undesired and unpredictable stall characteristics is a dicey proposition but one they got paid for.
Not sure if they had a briefed recovery or not for what happened. Maybe.
Lets hope md fixed the problem so no 717 line crew ever faces a similar departure.
Flight testing the low speed envelope of an airframe already identified as having undesired and unpredictable stall characteristics is a dicey proposition but one they got paid for.
Not sure if they had a briefed recovery or not for what happened. Maybe.
Lets hope md fixed the problem so no 717 line crew ever faces a similar departure.
#785
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: C47 PIC/747-400 SIC
Posts: 2,100
I wasn't responding to, nor quoting you. You quoted me quoting someone else, and responding to them. READ.
Having it does not good if you don't read it. Your contribution to date is largely to attack other posters, with little else to offer. Had you read it, despite your attempt to downplay it as "just a preliminary report," you'd see that it has more than enough information to clearly show what I've said thus far. I don't speculate. With the report, there is no need. It's VERY clear.
It's a bit more than a "procedural mistake." Accelerating out of the envelope and killing everyone on board is a tad more than a bit of a procedural error. It's an outright failure to fly the damn airplane. This isn't debatable or within the realm of question. A procedural mistake, albeit a glaring one, was reversing the runaway trim procedure. Failing to fly the airplane, however, is not simply a procedural mistake. It's far, far beyond a procedural issue, and this is no matter of semantics.
Precisely as I have said, in detail, and at length.
There is considerably more to glean from this event, and this will be done for some time yet to come. None the less, the report is also considerably more detailed than typically issued in a preliminary from the NTSB, and farther reaching, with adequate information from the CFR, FDR, and other data to paint a very clear picture. That picture isn't going to get washed away as additional investigation is done. It will only be clarified.
The nations which initiated groundings of the type design did so illegally and without evidence, in violation of the Chicago Convention. The groundings were political. This has already been addressed.
The "why" won't change the "what." That "something in their takeoff profile" that you allude to didn't interrupt the crew in any of it's other missions or cause them to crash or accelerate beyond the design envelope or operating limitations of the aircraft. An ab initio crew with no experience outside their own operation, one of who was deeply underqualified and inexperienced, this wasn't an issue of procedure, but of one pilot in far over his head, and the other who held ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight, but who failed to fly the airplane.
We can read the report and see that the crew made an attempt to use the control wheel trim switch to move the trim, but barely, giving up right away, and who turned off the trim with the cutoff, then turned it back on and let it run away, knowing what was happening, verbalizing it and memorializing it, as they accelerated beyond control. The aircraft wasn't beyond control until they did that, but they made it so. This wasn't procedure. It wasn't even technique. It was a failure to fly the airplane.
Such depth, such input, such intellect. Twice now. Impressive.
One never tires of such meaty conversation as "yeah, what he said." Bravo. Brilliant. Such contribution!
Irrelevant.
This wasn't an upset.
This was a failure to fly the airplane.
Having it does not good if you don't read it. Your contribution to date is largely to attack other posters, with little else to offer. Had you read it, despite your attempt to downplay it as "just a preliminary report," you'd see that it has more than enough information to clearly show what I've said thus far. I don't speculate. With the report, there is no need. It's VERY clear.
It's a bit more than a "procedural mistake." Accelerating out of the envelope and killing everyone on board is a tad more than a bit of a procedural error. It's an outright failure to fly the damn airplane. This isn't debatable or within the realm of question. A procedural mistake, albeit a glaring one, was reversing the runaway trim procedure. Failing to fly the airplane, however, is not simply a procedural mistake. It's far, far beyond a procedural issue, and this is no matter of semantics.
Precisely as I have said, in detail, and at length.
There is considerably more to glean from this event, and this will be done for some time yet to come. None the less, the report is also considerably more detailed than typically issued in a preliminary from the NTSB, and farther reaching, with adequate information from the CFR, FDR, and other data to paint a very clear picture. That picture isn't going to get washed away as additional investigation is done. It will only be clarified.
The nations which initiated groundings of the type design did so illegally and without evidence, in violation of the Chicago Convention. The groundings were political. This has already been addressed.
The "why" won't change the "what." That "something in their takeoff profile" that you allude to didn't interrupt the crew in any of it's other missions or cause them to crash or accelerate beyond the design envelope or operating limitations of the aircraft. An ab initio crew with no experience outside their own operation, one of who was deeply underqualified and inexperienced, this wasn't an issue of procedure, but of one pilot in far over his head, and the other who held ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight, but who failed to fly the airplane.
We can read the report and see that the crew made an attempt to use the control wheel trim switch to move the trim, but barely, giving up right away, and who turned off the trim with the cutoff, then turned it back on and let it run away, knowing what was happening, verbalizing it and memorializing it, as they accelerated beyond control. The aircraft wasn't beyond control until they did that, but they made it so. This wasn't procedure. It wasn't even technique. It was a failure to fly the airplane.
Such depth, such input, such intellect. Twice now. Impressive.
One never tires of such meaty conversation as "yeah, what he said." Bravo. Brilliant. Such contribution!
Irrelevant.
This wasn't an upset.
This was a failure to fly the airplane.
Definitely,not this : ) if one makes a cogent point there is no need to echo it, sometimes a simple “aye “ suffices, you disparage that WSJ journal article but I doubt you have read it, the AA check airmen cadre are quoted extensively, it’s a good informative read. It goes to what a lot of us think about the MAX ,and Boeing’s handling of it, which is a shame because I’m a Boeing guy at heart. God rest the crews and pax. Cheers .
Last edited by 727C47; 06-14-2019 at 02:43 AM.
#786
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2008
Posts: 1,075
I would like to read that article. Can you post a link?
#787
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: C47 PIC/747-400 SIC
Posts: 2,100
#788
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2008
Posts: 1,075
Paywall!
I did find this: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/b...ion-error.html
I won't be joining the "Tastes great/Less filling" debate, but I will add that the 777 memory item for uncommanded stabilizer movement says "Do not exceed current speed" after the stab switches are placed in cutout. No such instruction in the 737 QRH procedure I saw in the preliminary report.
I did find this: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/b...ion-error.html
I won't be joining the "Tastes great/Less filling" debate, but I will add that the 777 memory item for uncommanded stabilizer movement says "Do not exceed current speed" after the stab switches are placed in cutout. No such instruction in the 737 QRH procedure I saw in the preliminary report.
#789
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: B-737NG preferably in first class with a glass of champagne and caviar
Posts: 5,908
Paywall!
I did find this: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/b...ion-error.html
I won't be joining the "Tastes great/Less filling" debate, but I will add that the 777 memory item for uncommanded stabilizer movement says "Do not exceed current speed" after the stab switches are placed in cutout. No such instruction in the 737 QRH procedure I saw in the preliminary report.
I did find this: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/b...ion-error.html
I won't be joining the "Tastes great/Less filling" debate, but I will add that the 777 memory item for uncommanded stabilizer movement says "Do not exceed current speed" after the stab switches are placed in cutout. No such instruction in the 737 QRH procedure I saw in the preliminary report.
Airspeed and Trim.... “Establish correct airspeed and in-trim condition early on final approach.”
Higher than normal control column force may be needed to prevent unwanted pitch change.
#790
Line Holder
Joined APC: Mar 2019
Posts: 53
So I’m reading that the airspeed was unreliable? I’m not too sure what this means, does this work in favor of the airlines? Such as the crew having throttles at full speed? Or should they have reduced speed either way? Not too sure what to think of this.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post