MySaabStory

Time to use the “lemon law” and return those POS to Boeing.

dera

Isn't that a speed on elevator thrust mode on the Boeing? So AT would only command climb thrust, and it will overspeed if you can't get the plane to climb.

PNWFlyer

2.3 to 2.1 is measurable. .2 to be exact.

Why were there electric trim inputs before placing the switches in cutout so short and so few? If you have pressure on the flight controls trim the pressure off. Hold the trim. They used small quick inputs then quit. All the time the throttles are at T/O Trust.

They sure had time to talk on the radio a lot during this but not to trim?

flydrive

Seems to be the case after moving the cutout switches back to normal as well. Only two quick clicks and then nothing, even after the last MCAS command. I also notice that their altitude appears to be under control, even slowly increasing, until they turned the electricity back on.

dera

There are quite a lot of things going on in that cockpit. Even after cutting out the trims, they were still only barely able to control the airplane. Per the FO's comment, the manual trim wasn't working. Wouldn't surprise me if you can't move it to the other direction at those speeds. Investigation will reveal more about this.

Main reason will be pilot error - they let the trim run away a bit too far, and they let their speed climb way too high. But the fact is - Boeing's design allowed a single failure degrade the handling to a point where it clearly was very, very difficult to keep the plane under control. Under Part 25, this should be "extremely improbable" - defined as 1 event in 1 billion flight hours, or never in the expected life of the whole fleet. Clearly that requirement is not fulfilled with the 737 MAX.

To slightly adjust an old saying, Boeing put the pilots in a position, where only superior skills could have saved them.

Flightcap

Some thoughts on this?

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...vvkO0T60ENyldE

trip

Checking your history seems you and your family have quite a vested interest in Boeing, that explains why you're slamming and slandering these dead pilots. Really in poor taste and lacks any kind of professional character.

flydrive

Proactively trimming off control forces and basic power/airspeed management don't sound like advanced level skills.


It sounds like these guys were in over their heads from the start. They activated the autopilot even with the stick shaker active. The overspeed clackers start going off and they're still messing with the guidance panel and talking to ATC. Timid to non-existent effort to keep the trim under control. Zero power management...

Mesabah

Startle Response degrades performance significantly. The loud noise of the shaker constantly on, will also significantly degrade task performance. They may not have even heard the clacker.

airlinegypsy

I’m not sure what you mean by speed on elevator thrust mode. The report says at 1,000 feet the autopilot was engaged (on the 3rd attempt) and 20 seconds later level change at 238kts was selected. This climb mode the auto throttle will hold the N1 limit and the auto pilot will pitch to maintain airspeed. 18 seconds later the autopilot is off and MCAS is engaged.
But yes good point that it will overspeed the aircraft with the nose now coming down. But that still doesn’t relieve the crew from being pilots and not dangerously letting the speed run away.


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