Flightcap

If the gear broke before they went off the runway they would have been more likely to turn towards the failed gear than away from it, yes? I take from the video that the gear failed around the time the right wingtip fell into the grass.

Swedish Blender

Actually, reverse thrust can be a great tool with weathervaning. You just have to know how to do it and modulate as necessary. If you yank them both back full...well, not so much.

AirBear

Article about tailwind and poor braking action:

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...45-exc-462158/

Preliminary indications suggest the Envoy Air Embraer ERJ-145 which suffered a runway excursion at Chicago O'Hare had landed with a tailwind in gusting conditions.

Braking action before the touchdown on runway 10L was "medium to poor" up to the N3 taxiway – just over halfway along the runway – according to tower controller transmissions to the crew.

The ERJ-145, arriving from Greensboro on 11 November, had already executed a go-around about 25min earlier.

A SkyWest Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 immediately preceding had similarly gone around, telling the controller that it was due to braking action, and diverted to Green Bay. Braking action at that point was given as 'medium'.

But the ERJ-145 crew opted to make a second approach to runway 10L. The tower controller gave the runway visual range as 4,000ft according to communications archived by LiveATC.

Meteorological data indicates freezing conditions, light snow, and winds from about 350° at 17kt, gusting to 25kt, which would have presented a tailwind component.

The ERJ-145 slid off the runway, coming to rest with its right wing in contact with the snow.

Chicago tower declared the runway closed, informing personnel that they "had an aircraft go off the runway".

American Airlines, on whose behalf flight AA4125 was operating, states there were 38 passengers and three crew on board.

Super27

I agree with this 100%.

Here's my other thought along similar lines. I think that current winter ops training at most air carriers discourages pilots from applying their own experience and common sense judgment to situations, in favor of making decisions solely based on an artificially generated number that may or may not actually reflect the level of risk inherent in a given landing. In saying that, I'm making an assumption that the crew in this case had some type of performance data that told them that the landing they attempted that day was legal.

But pilots should not be, nor should they be trained to be, mindless robots. Just because something is legal on paper, and therefore allegedly safe, does not mean it's actually safe or desirable in practice. I'd be willing to bet that if I presented commercial pilot certificate (or even ATP) applicants with the weather data from this occurrence during an oral exam, and asked them to make a go/no-go decision, a vast majority of them would tell me that they thought attempting to land at 4000 RVR with a gusty quartering tailwind on a contaminated runway without full flaps (assumed based on preliminary information) was a bad idea. As I'm typing it it even reads like a bad idea. But take that same pilot who said it's a bad idea during their commercial or ATP oral exam, run them through a 121 training program, indoctrinate them into the culture of a 121 carrier, and the majority of them will tell you that they would land whenever the numbers say they can. That's because we don't teach them to stop and question those numbers. We don't teach them to apply the common sense that they learned back in their private pilot days that kept them alive until they got to the structured world of an airline cockpit. Instead we hand them a neat little chart, we teach them that every risk can somehow be quantified, and we teach them to make judgments based solely on that data.

All of that said, please understand I'm not trying to bash the crew in this case. Until I see information from the FAA/NTSB to indicate otherwise, I'm operating with the assumption that they acted in accordance with their performance data, and had every belief that their actions were within the limits of safety and legality. All I am saying is that training programs should encourage pilots to first use all available resources and data to make a determination of performance capability and legality, but then take a step back and ask themselves "does what I'm about to do actually seem like a smart idea?"

rickair7777

I think ATC needs to implement a zero knots tailwind policy on contaminated runways.

10 kts, bone dry at LAX OK sure whatever. But not in snow country in the winter.

PerfInit

^^^ ATC and AFS has runway selection programs in place. Perhaps they do need a good revision as you suggest. See Order 8400.9 Runway Use/Selection Program and JO 7110.65, Section 3-5.

Adlerdriver

i think the problem was landing on a contaminated runway with a large crosswind component. Not the minor tailwind portion of an almost direct cross gusting to 25 knots. They didn’t go off the end. Anyone know if that type A/C has limitations on crosswinds with contamination? All the airplanes I’ve flown do.

sailingfun

ATC does not need to limit anything. The PIC should determine limits. The crosswind component in this case was well in excess of the company requirements for a report of poor braking action. The problem with pilots is we tend to be Lemmings. Never base your decision on the aircraft in front of you. Make your own choices within company limits. Outside those limits there is no choice.
I recently watched a E175 take off in heavy rain with a 16 gusting to 20 tailwind component after two aircraft in front of him refused. You don’t want to be following that guy!

rickair7777

I was talking more generally, not about this specific incident which as you say was apparently x-wind, not tailwind induced.

ATC normally uses a tailwind runway for their convenience, or for noise abatement. But once contamination comes into play there's typically a lot less certainty about performance and ATC will leave that added complicating risk factor in place until one (or more) crews refuse.

hydrostream