Hawaii808

what’s wild to me is that they didn’t even think to bring the one at idle to full power as they were clearly heading for the water.

https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/...8Zx4cqEItS8CiQ

captjns

Qualified on paper, but not with proficiency. As Shakespeare said, a 737 type rated pilot, a captain does not make.

JohnBurke

The captain's testimony was that the first officer told the captain that the left engine was failed, and the captain's explicit faith in the infallibility of the first officer was more than adequate assurance. The captain never actually looked, or verified. Different operators have slightly differing procedures, but the Boeing recommendation on the initial memory item actions is for the pilot flying to disengage autothrottle and move the thrust lever, with the pilot monitoring to pick it up from there. Regardless of who moves the control, I've never encountered a training program that didn't require confirmation of critical items such as verification of the engine, and subsequent actions such as correct fuel control, fire handle, etc.

Moreover, it's generally SOP to make a declaration of duty, such as, "I have the aircraft and radios, you have the QRH," or something to that effect.

Even were an engine on fire, descending into the surf with the EGPWS barking, it's hard to fathom not attempting use of all available engines. Or running a procedure. Any procedure. Or taking some action. Any action. When interviewed, the captain expressed annoyance at the investigator making repeat questioning references to the position of the left thrust lever, and stated that it was irrelevant, and asked why the investigator kept returning to that thrust lever.

To give full reliance on a report, whether it's the first officer or any one else, without any effort to verify, is abdication of authority from the captain.

Armchair quarterbacks in hindsight, and all, and dark stormy night in an ocean that never sleeps while the crew ponders life's persistent questions, is certainly a recipe for concern, stress, and focus, but when faced with a critical decision, we often have the rest of our life to sort it out, however many minutes or seconds that may be. I'm an advocate of sitting on one's hands with most contingencies, giving it a ten count, a deep breath, then taking deliberate action (fast hands kill), but indecisiveness and lack of procedure or action has a similar effect, by tossing the outcome in the hands of fate. We are paid for our judgement, not our monkey skills, and the most sincere prayer we can offer is that in review it is not our judgement that will be found wanting.

hopp

I actually witnessed this recently while giving a pre-check.. A very experienced captain, getting re-qualed. He got fast and high on a single engine rnav approach and had brought the good engine to idle trying to slow and get back on the path. As he approached the path and slowed close to approach speed, he advanced the thrust lever of the failed engine, ultimately to the stop trying to regain speed. Of course, the aircraft impacted short of the runway in a stalled condition.

I think he was a little fatigued and tried to salvage an unstable approach, rather than going around, when he got high and fast.

JohnBurke

Does your operation not make it a practice to restore both thrust levers to the pilot flying, once the failed engine is secured?

sailingfun

When you are going into the water I would have bent both throttles into the radar.

rickair7777

I've never seen that (multiple airlines). The procedure has always been to correctly secure the *bad* engine and then leave the lever at idle. Pretty sure that on one or two planes I flew the engine cutout switch was actually past a detent below idle so the lever had to be all the way back anyhow.

rickair7777

It's a thing. Slow is smooth, smooth is fast.

hopp

After watching numerous left seaters struggle with engaging the Go Around switch on the back of the right thrust lever, on a single engine missed with the left engine shut down and thrust lever at idle, or the opposite from the right seat, I do not have a problem with allowing both thrust levers to be used together.

The 757 and 767 designs have this problem, and maybe 737 (not sure never flew it). Problem was remedied on the 777 with GA switch on front (top side).

There is no technical reason to leave the failed thrust lever at the idle stop., after the engine is secured. Some argue it can be confusing…maybe, but certainly less confusing that trying to figure out why the airlpane is not responding the increased thrust input from the wrong lever, as you stall or impact terrain.

hopp

duplicated post