Pinnacle #3701 and Colgan #3407
09-15-2009, 04:52 PM
#11
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2007
Position: CRJ
Posts: 2,356
Originally Posted by rickair7777
IMO you are completely off base here...
The pinnacle pilots were screwing around. They KNEW they were pushing the envelope and they did not want to get in trouble with ATC by descending to break an imminent stall. Instead they tried to power out of it, but being on the back of the curve they eventually experienced a full high-altitude stall. They took a risk to stay out of trouble and it cost them everything. They delayed notifying ATC every step of the way...until it was too late.
The pinnacle pilots were screwing around. They KNEW they were pushing the envelope and they did not want to get in trouble with ATC by descending to break an imminent stall. Instead they tried to power out of it, but being on the back of the curve they eventually experienced a full high-altitude stall. They took a risk to stay out of trouble and it cost them everything. They delayed notifying ATC every step of the way...until it was too late.
HOWEVER you are incorrect in saying that their immediate response was to keep the plane at altitude to try and avoid getting caught. Do you know who was flying the plane at the time? It was the FO. After seeing the videos and reading the transcripts I can promise you that they were just as suprised about that shaker and pusher going off as the colgan crew was. The FO's first thought when the plane started violently pushing over was not, "gee I better not lose altitude and get a violation", his first response per the tapes and fdr info was that of surprise, fear, and not knowing what to do and performing a knee jerk reaction to the plane doing something he didn't think it should be doing.
They didn't try and cover their tracks till they had regained control of the airplane and were in a descent. But that part is another story.
09-15-2009, 09:54 PM
#12
Organizational Learning
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: Directly behind the combiner
Posts: 4,948
This is gonna be a long post, so I hafta break it up. This will be part 1 of 4.
And I believe you are way off base. They were pushing the envelope, they were acting up, and they were not following procedures or profiles. That is something we can all agree on.
HOWEVER you are incorrect in saying that their immediate response was to keep the plane at altitude to try and avoid getting caught. Do you know who was flying the plane at the time? It was the FO. After seeing the videos and reading the transcripts I can promise you that they were just as suprised about that shaker and pusher going off as the colgan crew was. The FO's first thought when the plane started violently pushing over was not, "gee I better not lose altitude and get a violation", his first response per the tapes and fdr info was that of surprise, fear, and not knowing what to do and performing a knee jerk reaction to the plane doing something he didn't think it should be doing.
They didn't try and cover their tracks till they had regained control of the airplane and were in a descent. But that part is another story.
I disagree. The stall of Flagship 3701 was no surprise at all, and I don't know which CVR transcript you could have read which would have given you that impression. Here are some excerpts from that CVR transcript:
We'll begin on page 12 as they climb through FL400 for FL410. By this point, they've already swapped seats in flight (with the assistance of the autopilot), so the Captain is in the right seat, and the F/O is in the left seat.
[To be continued]
Originally Posted by Airsupport
And I believe you are way off base. They were pushing the envelope, they were acting up, and they were not following procedures or profiles. That is something we can all agree on.
HOWEVER you are incorrect in saying that their immediate response was to keep the plane at altitude to try and avoid getting caught. Do you know who was flying the plane at the time? It was the FO. After seeing the videos and reading the transcripts I can promise you that they were just as suprised about that shaker and pusher going off as the colgan crew was. The FO's first thought when the plane started violently pushing over was not, "gee I better not lose altitude and get a violation", his first response per the tapes and fdr info was that of surprise, fear, and not knowing what to do and performing a knee jerk reaction to the plane doing something he didn't think it should be doing.
They didn't try and cover their tracks till they had regained control of the airplane and were in a descent. But that part is another story.
CAM-1 is "Cockpit Area Microphone, Voice identified as Captain"
CAM-2 is "Cockpit Area Microphone, Voice identified as First Officer"
CTR-A is Kansas City Center
RDO is radio transmission from N8396A
# is expletive,
* is unintelligible,
( ) is questionable insertion
... is pause or interruption
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinn...VR_Factual.pdfCAM-2 is "Cockpit Area Microphone, Voice identified as First Officer"
CTR-A is Kansas City Center
RDO is radio transmission from N8396A
# is expletive,
* is unintelligible,
( ) is questionable insertion
... is pause or interruption
We'll begin on page 12 as they climb through FL400 for FL410. By this point, they've already swapped seats in flight (with the assistance of the autopilot), so the Captain is in the right seat, and the F/O is in the left seat.
2149:27 CAM-1 thousand to go.
2149:28 CAM-1 should be at eight thousand feet moving. slowly (going up).
2149:30 CTR-A Flagship thirty seven zero one would you like to go direct KASPR.
2149:30 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2149:33 CAM-1 sure.
2149:34 CAM-2 * might as well.2149:36 RDO-2 yeah that’ll be great thirty seven zero one direct KASPR.
2149:39 CTR-A all right cleared direct KASPR ah Flagship thirty seven zero one.
2149:44 RDO-2 thank you sir appreciate that thirty seven zero one going direct KASPR you saved us two minutes.
2149:28 CAM-1 should be at eight thousand feet moving. slowly (going up).
2149:30 CTR-A Flagship thirty seven zero one would you like to go direct KASPR.
2149:30 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2149:33 CAM-1 sure.
2149:34 CAM-2 * might as well.2149:36 RDO-2 yeah that’ll be great thirty seven zero one direct KASPR.
2149:39 CTR-A all right cleared direct KASPR ah Flagship thirty seven zero one.
2149:44 RDO-2 thank you sir appreciate that thirty seven zero one going direct KASPR you saved us two minutes.
[To be continued]
09-15-2009, 09:55 PM
#13
Organizational Learning
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: Directly behind the combiner
Posts: 4,948
Part 2 of 4
They've now leveled off at FL410, but they already have noticed performance issues. They've made comments about airspeed, power requirements, and fuel. They know it's on the edge of the performance envelope (they just don't realize they're on the wrong side of the edge yet) and that's what makes it so thrilling to be at four one oh, dude.
Time to sit back and relax. And accelerate...
[To be continued]
2149:48 CAM-1 [sound of laughing]
2149:51 CAM [sound of click]
2150:04 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2150:04 CAM-1 that # (crazy/funny).
2150:05 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2150:09 CAM-? **.
2150:28 CAM-2 aw yeah.
2150:30 CAM-? [sound of whistling]
2150:43 CAM [sound similar to paper rustling]
2150:59 CAM [sound similar to paper rustling]
2151:01 CAM-1 I’m saying don’t let it get below one seventy eh we’re leveling off here anyways so.
2151:18 CAM-2 dang. [sound of laughing] our arrival fuel’s supposed to be three point five.
2151:24 CAM-1 * I can’t believe that # man that’s crazy.
2151:26 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2151:27 CAM-1 we’ve saved a ton of # fuel.
2151:31 CAM-2 #. [sound of laughing]
2151:32 CAM-1 that’s what I mean. I’ll leave the power up ’til we get. (to level off) ***.
2151:39 CAM-2 we’re at V-T.
2151:41 CAM-? *.
2151:49 CAM-1 take a while for the thing to get started up.
2151:51 CAM-2 there’s four one oh my man.
2151:53 CAM-2 made it man.
2151:54 CAM-1 yeah.
2151:55 CAM-2 .(five thousand) (feet/complete).
2151:56 CAM-1 .(five/nine) thousand feet per minute.
2151:56 CAM-2 .(you) can see [sound of laughing]
2151:58 CTR-A Flagship thirty seven zero one contact Kansas City one two five point six seven.
2152:02 RDO-1 twenty five sixty seven you have a good night thirty seven oh one.
2152:04 CAM-2 [sound of laughing] this is * great.
2152:09 RDO-1 Kansas City center good evening Flagship thirty seven zero one four one oh.
2152:12 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one Kansas City center roger.
2152:12 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2152:16 CAM-1 you’ll get the you’ll do the next one to say four one oh. * yeah baby.
2152:18 CAM [sound of clunk]
2152:18 CAM-2 [sound of laughing] * four one oh # four one oh.
2149:51 CAM [sound of click]
2150:04 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2150:04 CAM-1 that # (crazy/funny).
2150:05 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2150:09 CAM-? **.
2150:28 CAM-2 aw yeah.
2150:30 CAM-? [sound of whistling]
2150:43 CAM [sound similar to paper rustling]
2150:59 CAM [sound similar to paper rustling]
2151:01 CAM-1 I’m saying don’t let it get below one seventy eh we’re leveling off here anyways so.
2151:18 CAM-2 dang. [sound of laughing] our arrival fuel’s supposed to be three point five.
2151:24 CAM-1 * I can’t believe that # man that’s crazy.
2151:26 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2151:27 CAM-1 we’ve saved a ton of # fuel.
2151:31 CAM-2 #. [sound of laughing]
2151:32 CAM-1 that’s what I mean. I’ll leave the power up ’til we get. (to level off) ***.
2151:39 CAM-2 we’re at V-T.
2151:41 CAM-? *.
2151:49 CAM-1 take a while for the thing to get started up.
2151:51 CAM-2 there’s four one oh my man.
2151:53 CAM-2 made it man.
2151:54 CAM-1 yeah.
2151:55 CAM-2 .(five thousand) (feet/complete).
2151:56 CAM-1 .(five/nine) thousand feet per minute.
2151:56 CAM-2 .(you) can see [sound of laughing]
2151:58 CTR-A Flagship thirty seven zero one contact Kansas City one two five point six seven.
2152:02 RDO-1 twenty five sixty seven you have a good night thirty seven oh one.
2152:04 CAM-2 [sound of laughing] this is * great.
2152:09 RDO-1 Kansas City center good evening Flagship thirty seven zero one four one oh.
2152:12 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one Kansas City center roger.
2152:12 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2152:16 CAM-1 you’ll get the you’ll do the next one to say four one oh. * yeah baby.
2152:18 CAM [sound of clunk]
2152:18 CAM-2 [sound of laughing] * four one oh # four one oh.
They've now leveled off at FL410, but they already have noticed performance issues. They've made comments about airspeed, power requirements, and fuel. They know it's on the edge of the performance envelope (they just don't realize they're on the wrong side of the edge yet) and that's what makes it so thrilling to be at four one oh, dude.
Time to sit back and relax. And accelerate...
[To be continued]
09-15-2009, 09:56 PM
#14
Organizational Learning
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: Directly behind the combiner
Posts: 4,948
Part 3 of 4
2152:22 CAM-1 want anything to drink?
2152:24 CAM-2 aw yeah actually I’ll take a pepsi.
2152:26 CAM [sound of clunks]
2152:27 CAM-1 want anything?
2152:28 CAM-2 hmm?
2152:28 CAM-1 you do want?
2152:29 CAM-2 a pepsi if you don’t mind.
2152:30 CAM-1 a pepsi? I thought you said a beer man. yeah I’d like one too **.
2152:31 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2152:35 CAM-2 is that seal on the liquor cabinet? [sound of laughing]
2152:47 CAM [sound of click]
2152:49 CAM-? ***. [lower volume]
2153:01 CAM [sound of click]
2153:07 CAM [sound of thump]
2153:14 CAM-2 #. [sound of laughing] this is the greatest thing no way. [sound of laughing]
2153:19 CAM-1 you want a can you want a cup we don’t have any ice.
2153:20 CAM-2 that’s fine.
2153:21 CAM-1 .they’re cold as # dude.
2153:23 CAM-2 (yeah that’s cool).
2153:24 CAM-1 accelerating up at all?
2153:26 CAM [sound of click, similar to soda can opening]
2153:27 CAM-2 [sound of laughing] no man.
2153:28 CAM-1 nothing dude.
2153:28 CAM-2 .it ain’t speeding up worth #.
2153:28 CAM-1 .look how high we are.
2153:29 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2153:30 CAM-1 this # nose is. look at how nose high we are.
2153:32 CAM-2 I know that’s #. dude the # ball’s way off man. dude the ball’s full off.
2153:39 CAM-1 no #. look at this (ball/bug) dude.
2153:40 CAM-2 it’s ***.
2153:42 CAM [sound of laughing]
2152:24 CAM-2 aw yeah actually I’ll take a pepsi.
2152:26 CAM [sound of clunks]
2152:27 CAM-1 want anything?
2152:28 CAM-2 hmm?
2152:28 CAM-1 you do want?
2152:29 CAM-2 a pepsi if you don’t mind.
2152:30 CAM-1 a pepsi? I thought you said a beer man. yeah I’d like one too **.
2152:31 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2152:35 CAM-2 is that seal on the liquor cabinet? [sound of laughing]
2152:47 CAM [sound of click]
2152:49 CAM-? ***. [lower volume]
2153:01 CAM [sound of click]
2153:07 CAM [sound of thump]
2153:14 CAM-2 #. [sound of laughing] this is the greatest thing no way. [sound of laughing]
2153:19 CAM-1 you want a can you want a cup we don’t have any ice.
2153:20 CAM-2 that’s fine.
2153:21 CAM-1 .they’re cold as # dude.
2153:23 CAM-2 (yeah that’s cool).
2153:24 CAM-1 accelerating up at all?
2153:26 CAM [sound of click, similar to soda can opening]
2153:27 CAM-2 [sound of laughing] no man.
2153:28 CAM-1 nothing dude.
2153:28 CAM-2 .it ain’t speeding up worth #.
2153:28 CAM-1 .look how high we are.
2153:29 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2153:30 CAM-1 this # nose is. look at how nose high we are.
2153:32 CAM-2 I know that’s #. dude the # ball’s way off man. dude the ball’s full off.
2153:39 CAM-1 no #. look at this (ball/bug) dude.
2153:40 CAM-2 it’s ***.
2153:42 CAM [sound of laughing]
[To be continued]
09-15-2009, 09:56 PM
#15
Organizational Learning
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: Directly behind the combiner
Posts: 4,948
Part 4 of 4.
Or, maybe not accelerate. I wonder why. Maybe ATC can offer some insight.
As my younger kids would say, “Well, DUH!”
They talked about it, they laughed about it, they bragged to ATC and each other about it -- no, they weren't surprised by it. When the stick shaker activated, the F/O's first words were, "What'd he say?" When the pusher activated, he said, "I got it." Go count the number of times the pusher activated after that. Did he handle the shaker or the pusher correctly? Absolutely not. Was he surprised by it? I really don't think so.
Read through the transcript to see where he finally confesses they've lost not one, but two engines.
.
Or, maybe not accelerate. I wonder why. Maybe ATC can offer some insight.
2153:42 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one are you a RJ two hundred?
2153:44 CAM [sound of clunks]
2153:47 RDO-1 thirty seven zero one that’s affirmative.
2153:49 CAM-2 forty four hundred.
2153:50 CTR-B I’ve never seen you guys up at forty one there.
2153:51 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2153:51 RDO-1 yeah we’re actually a ah. there’s ah. we don’t we don’t have any passengers on board so we decided to have a little fun and come on up here.
2153:58 CTR-B I gotcha.
2153:59 RDO-1 this is our actually our service ceiling.
2154:05 CAM-1 # thing’s losing it.
2154:06 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2154:07 CAM-1 .we’re losing here. we’re gonna be # coming down in a second here dude.
2154:09 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2154:10 CAM-1 this thing ain’t gonna # hold altitude. is it?
2154:16 CAM-2 it can’t man. we # (cruised/greased) up here but it won’t stay.
2154:19 CAM-1 yeah that’s funny we got up here it won’t stay up here.
2154:22 CAM-2 dude it’s # losing it. [sound of laughing]
2154:23 CAM-1 yeah.
2154:29 RDO-1 and center thirty seven oh one.
2154:31 CTR-B go ahead.
2154:32 RDO-1 yeah just as you said it looks like we’re not even going to be able to stay up here ah look for maybe ah three nine oh or three seven.
2154:38 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven oh one stand by.
2154:38 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:39 CAM [sound similar to auto pilot disconnect]
2154:43 CAM-2 what’d he say?
2154:44 CAM-1 I dunno.
2154:45 RDO-1 say again for thirty seven oh one.
2154:47 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:48 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2154:49 CAM-1 #.
2154:51 CAM-2 I got it.
2154:52 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:52 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2154:53 CTR-B and Flagship thirty seven zero one. I was off frequency say again?
2154:53 CAM [sound of tone, similar to altitude alert]
2154:55 CAM [sound of triple chime, similar to master warning alert]
2154:56 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:56 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2154:56 CAM-1 #.
2154:57 CAS engine oil.
2154:59 CAM-1 #.
2154:59 CAS engine oil.
2155:00 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning, continues for nine seconds]
2155:00 CAM [sound of increased background noise]
2155:01 CAS engine oil.
2155:01 CAM-1 come on. come on.
2155:03 CAS engine oil.
2155:02 CAM [sound of unidentified chirps]
2155:04 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one say.
2155:05 CAM [sound of chime, similar to master caution alert]
2155:06 RDO-1 declaring emergency. stand by.
2155:07 CAM [sound of tone, similar to altitude alert]
2155:08 CAM-1 aw #.
2155:09 CAM [sound of triple chime, similar to master warning alert]
2155:11 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2155:11 CAS engine oil.
2155:12 CAM [sound similar to decreasing engine RPM]
2155:12 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one.
2155:13 CAS engine oil.
2155:14 CTR-B .descend at pilot’s discretion maintain.
2155:15 CAS engine oil.
2155:15 CTR-B .flight level two four zero.
2155:17 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2155:17 CAS engine oil.
2155:19 CAS engine oil.
2155:19 CAM-1 two four zero flight two four zero.
2155:21 CAS engine oil.
2155:22 CAM-1 the important thing is.
2155:23 CAS engine oil.
2155:23 CAM-? we don’t have any engines.
2155:24 CAS engine oil.
2153:44 CAM [sound of clunks]
2153:47 RDO-1 thirty seven zero one that’s affirmative.
2153:49 CAM-2 forty four hundred.
2153:50 CTR-B I’ve never seen you guys up at forty one there.
2153:51 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2153:51 RDO-1 yeah we’re actually a ah. there’s ah. we don’t we don’t have any passengers on board so we decided to have a little fun and come on up here.
2153:58 CTR-B I gotcha.
2153:59 RDO-1 this is our actually our service ceiling.
2154:05 CAM-1 # thing’s losing it.
2154:06 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2154:07 CAM-1 .we’re losing here. we’re gonna be # coming down in a second here dude.
2154:09 CAM-2 [sound of laughing]
2154:10 CAM-1 this thing ain’t gonna # hold altitude. is it?
2154:16 CAM-2 it can’t man. we # (cruised/greased) up here but it won’t stay.
2154:19 CAM-1 yeah that’s funny we got up here it won’t stay up here.
2154:22 CAM-2 dude it’s # losing it. [sound of laughing]
2154:23 CAM-1 yeah.
2154:29 RDO-1 and center thirty seven oh one.
2154:31 CTR-B go ahead.
2154:32 RDO-1 yeah just as you said it looks like we’re not even going to be able to stay up here ah look for maybe ah three nine oh or three seven.
2154:38 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven oh one stand by.
2154:38 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:39 CAM [sound similar to auto pilot disconnect]
2154:43 CAM-2 what’d he say?
2154:44 CAM-1 I dunno.
2154:45 RDO-1 say again for thirty seven oh one.
2154:47 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:48 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2154:49 CAM-1 #.
2154:51 CAM-2 I got it.
2154:52 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:52 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2154:53 CTR-B and Flagship thirty seven zero one. I was off frequency say again?
2154:53 CAM [sound of tone, similar to altitude alert]
2154:55 CAM [sound of triple chime, similar to master warning alert]
2154:56 CAM [sound similar to stick shaker]
2154:56 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2154:56 CAM-1 #.
2154:57 CAS engine oil.
2154:59 CAM-1 #.
2154:59 CAS engine oil.
2155:00 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning, continues for nine seconds]
2155:00 CAM [sound of increased background noise]
2155:01 CAS engine oil.
2155:01 CAM-1 come on. come on.
2155:03 CAS engine oil.
2155:02 CAM [sound of unidentified chirps]
2155:04 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one say.
2155:05 CAM [sound of chime, similar to master caution alert]
2155:06 RDO-1 declaring emergency. stand by.
2155:07 CAM [sound of tone, similar to altitude alert]
2155:08 CAM-1 aw #.
2155:09 CAM [sound of triple chime, similar to master warning alert]
2155:11 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2155:11 CAS engine oil.
2155:12 CAM [sound similar to decreasing engine RPM]
2155:12 CTR-B Flagship thirty seven zero one.
2155:13 CAS engine oil.
2155:14 CTR-B .descend at pilot’s discretion maintain.
2155:15 CAS engine oil.
2155:15 CTR-B .flight level two four zero.
2155:17 CAM [sound of warbler, similar to stick pusher warning]
2155:17 CAS engine oil.
2155:19 CAS engine oil.
2155:19 CAM-1 two four zero flight two four zero.
2155:21 CAS engine oil.
2155:22 CAM-1 the important thing is.
2155:23 CAS engine oil.
2155:23 CAM-? we don’t have any engines.
2155:24 CAS engine oil.
As my younger kids would say, “Well, DUH!”
They talked about it, they laughed about it, they bragged to ATC and each other about it -- no, they weren't surprised by it. When the stick shaker activated, the F/O's first words were, "What'd he say?" When the pusher activated, he said, "I got it." Go count the number of times the pusher activated after that. Did he handle the shaker or the pusher correctly? Absolutely not. Was he surprised by it? I really don't think so.
Read through the transcript to see where he finally confesses they've lost not one, but two engines.
.
09-15-2009, 10:15 PM
#16
Da Hudge
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: Poodle Whisperer
Posts: 17,473
TonyC,
I'll fully agree with you, however if you look at the flight data... he tried to maintain altitude during the stall. Exactly as we were trained.
I was the last FO to fly with the Captain... I got to do the dance before the NTSB, Company, and ALPA.
While they screwed up 100%, they acted like little children... they responded to the instinct from their training. They were not as smart as most of us, they were the lowest common demoninator, which we are trained to- education, prior experience, insight, and professionalism will typically bridge the gap. They responded exactly as trained, as they were the lowest common demoninator.
Colgan 3407 was an identical result, although with a different leadup... which was a bit more professional in demeanor but it all boiled down to the lowest common denominator being at the controls.
No one was flying the plane, and the response to the airplane calling them stupid was just as disasterous.
There will be more like these, as the culture has no changed....
I'll fully agree with you, however if you look at the flight data... he tried to maintain altitude during the stall. Exactly as we were trained.
I was the last FO to fly with the Captain... I got to do the dance before the NTSB, Company, and ALPA.
While they screwed up 100%, they acted like little children... they responded to the instinct from their training. They were not as smart as most of us, they were the lowest common demoninator, which we are trained to- education, prior experience, insight, and professionalism will typically bridge the gap. They responded exactly as trained, as they were the lowest common demoninator.
Colgan 3407 was an identical result, although with a different leadup... which was a bit more professional in demeanor but it all boiled down to the lowest common denominator being at the controls.
No one was flying the plane, and the response to the airplane calling them stupid was just as disasterous.
There will be more like these, as the culture has no changed....
09-15-2009, 11:18 PM
#17
Organizational Learning
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: Directly behind the combiner
Posts: 4,948
The question raised by rickair7777 was not whether they attempted to maintain level flight, but why. He postulated the crew were trying to not give away the fact they were having problmes maintaining the altitude -- they had just bragged to ATC after ATC observed they'd never seen one of those that high.
Airsupport disagrees, suggesting that the crew of Flagship 3701 was just as surprised by the stall as the crew of Continental 3407.
So, we agree that they maintained, or at least attempted to maintain, their altitude even when the stick shaker and stick pusher activated. One theory is they were surprised by the stall and they reacted (incorrectly) as they had been trained. The other theory is they were intentionally attempting to take the airplane beyond the envelope of normal flying, and had to bask in the glory of four-one-oh-ing it. I subscribe to the latter theory.
The crew of Continental 3407 had no intention of operating their airplane on the fringes of the normal operating envelope, and were no doubt surprised, startled, upset, maybe even disoriented or confused by the stick shaker and the stick pusher. Their response was likely from reflexes and a result of their training. They had little time to think.
The crew of Flagship 3701 had every intention of operating their airplane on the edge of the normal operating envelope, and were in no way surprised, startled, upset, disoriented, or confused by the stick shaker and the stick pusher -- they had seen it coming before they ever got to four one oh. They had all kinds of time to think. Their responses were driven by an obsession with not getting caught screwing up.
The results of the two stall encounters were not identical, either. Yes, each flight ended with the death of all souls aboard. However, Continental 3407 apparently impacted the ground in the stall, whereas Flagship 3701 eventually broke the stall, pointed the airplane down, and attempted to restart the engines.
When they began their descent, there were at least 3 airports within gliding range. They could have landed and danced the carpet jig, probably lost their jobs, but still enjoyed their families. Instead, they kept that a secret until they were out of range of any airports. It wasn't the stall, or the improper recovery from the stall, that killed them.
I think all that goes to the OP's original question. Could more emphasis have been placed on proper stall recovery in that accident which might have benefited the crew of Continental 3407?
I think he may have a good point. At the time, the improper response to the shaker and the pusher didn't stand out as singular deficiencies -- it was just another symptom of a much broader problem with crew discipline. I think it was assumed the reason they didn't respond correctly to the shaker and pusher is the same reason they did everything else that day -- they were being stupid.
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Airsupport disagrees, suggesting that the crew of Flagship 3701 was just as surprised by the stall as the crew of Continental 3407.
So, we agree that they maintained, or at least attempted to maintain, their altitude even when the stick shaker and stick pusher activated. One theory is they were surprised by the stall and they reacted (incorrectly) as they had been trained. The other theory is they were intentionally attempting to take the airplane beyond the envelope of normal flying, and had to bask in the glory of four-one-oh-ing it. I subscribe to the latter theory.
The crew of Continental 3407 had no intention of operating their airplane on the fringes of the normal operating envelope, and were no doubt surprised, startled, upset, maybe even disoriented or confused by the stick shaker and the stick pusher. Their response was likely from reflexes and a result of their training. They had little time to think.
The crew of Flagship 3701 had every intention of operating their airplane on the edge of the normal operating envelope, and were in no way surprised, startled, upset, disoriented, or confused by the stick shaker and the stick pusher -- they had seen it coming before they ever got to four one oh. They had all kinds of time to think. Their responses were driven by an obsession with not getting caught screwing up.
The results of the two stall encounters were not identical, either. Yes, each flight ended with the death of all souls aboard. However, Continental 3407 apparently impacted the ground in the stall, whereas Flagship 3701 eventually broke the stall, pointed the airplane down, and attempted to restart the engines.
When they began their descent, there were at least 3 airports within gliding range. They could have landed and danced the carpet jig, probably lost their jobs, but still enjoyed their families. Instead, they kept that a secret until they were out of range of any airports. It wasn't the stall, or the improper recovery from the stall, that killed them.
I think all that goes to the OP's original question. Could more emphasis have been placed on proper stall recovery in that accident which might have benefited the crew of Continental 3407?
I think he may have a good point. At the time, the improper response to the shaker and the pusher didn't stand out as singular deficiencies -- it was just another symptom of a much broader problem with crew discipline. I think it was assumed the reason they didn't respond correctly to the shaker and pusher is the same reason they did everything else that day -- they were being stupid.
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09-16-2009, 04:17 AM
#18
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2007
Position: CRJ
Posts: 2,356
Originally Posted by TonyC
So, we agree that they maintained, or at least attempted to maintain, their altitude even when the stick shaker and stick pusher activated. One theory is they were surprised by the stall and they reacted (incorrectly) as they had been trained. The other theory is they were intentionally attempting to take the airplane beyond the envelope of normal flying, and had to bask in the glory of four-one-oh-ing it. I subscribe to the latter theory.
The crew of Flagship 3701 had every intention of operating their airplane on the edge of the normal operating envelope, and were in no way surprised, startled, upset, disoriented, or confused by the stick shaker and the stick pusher -- they had seen it coming before they ever got to four one oh. They had all kinds of time to think. Their responses were driven by an obsession with not getting caught screwing up.
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The crew of Flagship 3701 had every intention of operating their airplane on the edge of the normal operating envelope, and were in no way surprised, startled, upset, disoriented, or confused by the stick shaker and the stick pusher -- they had seen it coming before they ever got to four one oh. They had all kinds of time to think. Their responses were driven by an obsession with not getting caught screwing up.
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As far as the rest of your post no one is disagreeing there either. We all know they over flew good airports and they lied to atc. Thats not what the post was about. The post was about the stall. Yes 3701 guys were suprised about the stall. Yes they reacted incorrectly. Was it the training? Not sure. I can tell you this however. These two pilots had no idea what was about to REALLY happen to them, they just thought they knew.
Originally Posted by 80ktsClamp
Colgan 3407 was an identical result, although with a different leadup... which was a bit more professional in demeanor but it all boiled down to the lowest common denominator being at the controls.
Last edited by Airsupport; 09-16-2009 at 05:53 AM.
09-16-2009, 05:15 AM
#19
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2008
Position: none ya...
Posts: 1,154
So mabye someone should take a poll. Lets face it we all were taught and know that you dont power out of a stall in a primary trainer, you lower the nose. The question the poll should ask is since we all started flying turbine 121 how many of us have taught ourselves to hold positive pitch as we apply power in a stall series, and then fly out of it. I venture to say the longer we fly 121 ie more Recurrent sim sessions, the more our muscle memory would dictate that if we were tired or just not at 100% we would try to hold positive attidtude if surprised by a inadvertant stall in the real world. One point to consider guys, every time we recover from a stall in training WE ARE EXPECTING IT. When stalls happen in the real world it a whole diferent ballgame. My personal opinion has always been that a loss of altitude in a stall recovery in most cases should not be an issue, unless your at 500 feet, so they should dump that requirement to maintain altitude within 50 feet. Just MHO
09-16-2009, 06:33 AM
#20
Organizational Learning
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Position: Directly behind the combiner
Posts: 4,948
Originally Posted by Airsupport
Tony you are missing the point.
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And if you had seen the animation you would see the pusher go off 3 times in succession and each time the fo fought the controls and pulled back causing the plane to enter its stall. I can promise you the FO and Captain where suprised when the plane started bucking.
The crew of Continental 3407 never saw it coming. They reacted based on training ... reflexes.
The reactions of the crew of Flagship 3701 were not based on trainig or reflexes. They were based on something more sinister -- a desire to hide what they were doing, and a belief they could do so. Consequently, their reaction to the problem did little to serve as a training moment for future crews, such as that of Continental 3407.
Originally Posted by Airsupport
Exactly 80ktsClamp. The only difference between the 3407 and 3701 is what lead [sic] up to the crash.
zero, because it was never broken
How much time between stall broken and impact in Flagship 3701?
Read the CVR transcript, linked above. Make note of two things. First, make note of the times annotated (all Central Daylight Time) and do the math. Then, make note of the time it takes you to read everything between the beginning of descent and the final words spoken, "aw #. we’re gonna hit houses dude."
(For readers not inclined to study the CVR, the answer to the first question is 2155:17 to 2215:06 -- almost 20 minutes.)
The only thing identical is they died.
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