Dover C-5 accident animation
10-02-2006, 10:33 AM
#21
Line Holder
Joined APC: Sep 2006
Position: Left Out
Posts: 47
Originally Posted by T-tail
Because they didn't know.
Didn't know..Didn't think...Didn't know to think?
Would love to see the official quote from the FE on what happened.
10-03-2006, 05:31 PM
#22
On Reserve
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: T-1 IP
Posts: 18
Originally Posted by agsbill
Guys, the fellows that did not appear to know where they were inflight were the flight engineers...(at least one)...The CDPIR .."crash data position and incident recorder"...( I think that is right...I'm old) or voice recorder records EVERTHING, yes everything that is spoken by anyone on the intercom system. It records conversations on "hot mike" even if it is not heard by the pilots.....that is why there was all that conversation that appeared to be stepping on each other....
The real shame is that a routine engine out landing turned into a 2 engine out approach for no real reason.
Had they used the recommended 40% flaps I'm sure they would have made the runway......selecting 100% flaps...a normal 4 engine configuration, put them severly behind "the power curve".
The AC was the junior officer of the year for the wing and the other 2 guys were the squadron commander and the senior civilian/militay officer..."OnT".
Hope this helps explain what made the tape sound like the pilots didn't know where they were.....and yes I was suprised how quiet the pilots were on Final...
Bill
The real shame is that a routine engine out landing turned into a 2 engine out approach for no real reason.
Had they used the recommended 40% flaps I'm sure they would have made the runway......selecting 100% flaps...a normal 4 engine configuration, put them severly behind "the power curve".
The AC was the junior officer of the year for the wing and the other 2 guys were the squadron commander and the senior civilian/militay officer..."OnT".
Hope this helps explain what made the tape sound like the pilots didn't know where they were.....and yes I was suprised how quiet the pilots were on Final...
Bill
Listen to the Audio it is a CRM nightmare! Engineers who continue training, and don't speak up about concerns they have. It is common practice in the heavies to "give" the engineers or loadmaster "hotmike" for training. The pilot and coplit just turn it off so they are not bothered.
Yes, the copilot sat on his hands, but the AC didn't really provide for the most communicative crew. I don't remember what it was, but the AC shot down the copilots first suggestion pretty quickly.
10-03-2006, 05:41 PM
#23
On Reserve
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: T-1 IP
Posts: 18
One other aspect of the accident.
The C-5 went through a cockpit mod recently. The older version I believe had tape gages the newer on had dials. Out of pilot training, I went from dials to tapes (C-141) and it was an adjustment. Going back to a glass cockpit with electronic dial (C-17) was even more of an adjustment. The crew was probably had little experience on the dial guages.
Someone asked about bringing the throttle over the hump so as not to use it. I believe over the hump in the C-5 is the thrust reverser. That is why the throttle is still available for use. I use the "matching throttle" technique... oh wait, the C-17 has autothrottles!
The C-5 went through a cockpit mod recently. The older version I believe had tape gages the newer on had dials. Out of pilot training, I went from dials to tapes (C-141) and it was an adjustment. Going back to a glass cockpit with electronic dial (C-17) was even more of an adjustment. The crew was probably had little experience on the dial guages.
Someone asked about bringing the throttle over the hump so as not to use it. I believe over the hump in the C-5 is the thrust reverser. That is why the throttle is still available for use. I use the "matching throttle" technique... oh wait, the C-17 has autothrottles!
10-08-2006, 07:04 AM
#24
New Hire
Joined APC: Aug 2006
Posts: 7
From the 6 OCT Air Force Times:
Five disciplined for C-5 crash
Associated Press
DOVER, Del. — Five Air Force crewmen have been disciplined for their roles in the crash of a giant C-5 cargo plane that investigators said was caused by human error, military officials said.
The identities of the five airmen and the actions taken against them were withheld, but an investigative report released in June blamed the April crash near Dover Air Force Base on a series of human errors by three pilots and two flight engineers.
Officials said the punishments were handed down within the past month.
“We have done some administrative actions and some actions are pending,” said Col. Darrell G. Young, operations group commander for the 512th Airlift Wing, a reserve group of which all 13 airmen aboard the plane were members.
Young said the pending actions involve the five reservists already disciplined. Administrative actions can range from a verbal reprimand to demotion or discharge, officials said.
Investigators said the crew tried to throttle-up an engine they had shut down while not utilizing a fully operational engine, used flap settings that resulted in too much drag, and selected the wrong type of approach for the conditions they faced.
Base officials said about 500 parts have been salvaged from the wreckage of the plane, which still sits in a field just outside the base, and that they are preparing to receive bids on a contract to remove the remainder of the aircraft.
Five disciplined for C-5 crash
Associated Press
DOVER, Del. — Five Air Force crewmen have been disciplined for their roles in the crash of a giant C-5 cargo plane that investigators said was caused by human error, military officials said.
The identities of the five airmen and the actions taken against them were withheld, but an investigative report released in June blamed the April crash near Dover Air Force Base on a series of human errors by three pilots and two flight engineers.
Officials said the punishments were handed down within the past month.
“We have done some administrative actions and some actions are pending,” said Col. Darrell G. Young, operations group commander for the 512th Airlift Wing, a reserve group of which all 13 airmen aboard the plane were members.
Young said the pending actions involve the five reservists already disciplined. Administrative actions can range from a verbal reprimand to demotion or discharge, officials said.
Investigators said the crew tried to throttle-up an engine they had shut down while not utilizing a fully operational engine, used flap settings that resulted in too much drag, and selected the wrong type of approach for the conditions they faced.
Base officials said about 500 parts have been salvaged from the wreckage of the plane, which still sits in a field just outside the base, and that they are preparing to receive bids on a contract to remove the remainder of the aircraft.
05-08-2011, 03:50 PM
#25
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2007
Position: Legacy FO
Posts: 4,096
Originally Posted by Lizard2Barney
One other aspect of the accident.
The C-5 went through a cockpit mod recently. The older version I believe had tape gages the newer on had dials. Out of pilot training, I went from dials to tapes (C-141) and it was an adjustment. Going back to a glass cockpit with electronic dial (C-17) was even more of an adjustment. The crew was probably had little experience on the dial guages.
Someone asked about bringing the throttle over the hump so as not to use it. I believe over the hump in the C-5 is the thrust reverser. That is why the throttle is still available for use. I use the "matching throttle" technique... oh wait, the C-17 has autothrottles!
The C-5 went through a cockpit mod recently. The older version I believe had tape gages the newer on had dials. Out of pilot training, I went from dials to tapes (C-141) and it was an adjustment. Going back to a glass cockpit with electronic dial (C-17) was even more of an adjustment. The crew was probably had little experience on the dial guages.
Someone asked about bringing the throttle over the hump so as not to use it. I believe over the hump in the C-5 is the thrust reverser. That is why the throttle is still available for use. I use the "matching throttle" technique... oh wait, the C-17 has autothrottles!
Now I know many of you are going to say, "WHAT?!!!!!!!". The CRM was lousy, they were still "training" during a real emergency, they rushed to land and violated tech data yada yada yada.
What you don't know is, AMC (Air Mobility Command) did a modification to the C-5. At the time of this accident, NOBODY was given training on the new design. AMC rolled it out and the crews were to adapt to it. The crews were given a set number of hours to fly a modified jet, with an instructor of course, and once reaching those hours, they were signed off.
Well, there is this ugly thing called other time in the USAF (time when you're not in the seat flying),... for example, sleeping in the bunk or using the loo. Someone in the command decided C-5 pilots could use other time towards "modified jet" certification. Additionally, since there were only a few jets modified at the time, it was rare for a crew to fly one of the modified jets. Also, AMC acknowledged that there was a deficiency in the design of the instrumentation and quietly fixed it.
NOT ONLY THAT, the crew went back to their training that they were so accustomed to do. In the USAF, some airframes actually perform simulated emergency work in the aircraft during flight (probably not a smart thing to do in complex heavy aircraft). This type of training should be done in the simulator so you can conduct realistic training to set the example for what you want your crews to do in case it happens for real.
For the C-5 crews, they routinely flew around the pattern with one throttle at idle. The instructors would pull an engine to idle during the takeoff. The crews would then enter the downwind pattern, engineers running checklists, and then bring it back around to final and land. When in reality if you had a real engine failure, you should be getting your ducks in a row, not rushing, calling back to mom and dad, dumping fuel .. whatever the case, THEN shooting an approach and landing the aircraft. Very few emergencies require you to return to the runway immediately. However, this is not how the crews used to train and in this case, it came back to haunt them.
It is very easy to throw blame to the crew when you don't take into account how they were set up to fail from the beginning. AMC knew it was complicit in this accident, yet, everything was done to blame only the crew. Some accidents happen long before the crew ever shows to the jet.
As for the crew, I'm told only one or two are back to flying. When the C-5 touched down, it drug its tail for a while, then the aircraft dug into the mud and slammed the nose down ... at 32Gs !!! ... causing the nose to break off and separate. Most of the people up front suffered broken backs and were paralyzed, while the people in the back of the aircraft thought the touchdown was almost normal.
Last edited by KC10 FATboy; 05-08-2011 at 11:25 PM.
05-08-2011, 05:01 PM
#27
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2010
Posts: 363
KC10-
I agree with all your points, especially about rushing back to the field. I still hear it in briefs by new guys fresh out of UPT and I cringe. It is one thing if your wing is completely on fire, yet due to the single seat mentality in pilot training, some think it is completely okay to go cowboy at the loss of a motor and start doing things in a hurry from memory. It will take a long time to change the culture.
Other BIG issue you touched on, the AF does a great time blaming individuals but never the system. Not sure about your -1, but ours is a catastrophe in terms of CRM. The AF is really good at transferring systemic risk onto flight crews. I've been to safety school and was astounded to find out (after being in the part 121 world for awhile) that you cannot find a checklist or manual guilty in an accident, only the person who wrote it, which is why nothing ever gets changed - nobody wants their career at risk.
It is what it is, this C-5 crew definitely screwed up, but I wish as a service we would fill out fewer ORM worksheets for awhile and start taking an honest look at itself. Next subject, fuel efficiency
KC
I agree with all your points, especially about rushing back to the field. I still hear it in briefs by new guys fresh out of UPT and I cringe. It is one thing if your wing is completely on fire, yet due to the single seat mentality in pilot training, some think it is completely okay to go cowboy at the loss of a motor and start doing things in a hurry from memory. It will take a long time to change the culture.
Other BIG issue you touched on, the AF does a great time blaming individuals but never the system. Not sure about your -1, but ours is a catastrophe in terms of CRM. The AF is really good at transferring systemic risk onto flight crews. I've been to safety school and was astounded to find out (after being in the part 121 world for awhile) that you cannot find a checklist or manual guilty in an accident, only the person who wrote it, which is why nothing ever gets changed - nobody wants their career at risk.
It is what it is, this C-5 crew definitely screwed up, but I wish as a service we would fill out fewer ORM worksheets for awhile and start taking an honest look at itself. Next subject, fuel efficiency
KC
05-08-2011, 11:41 PM
#28
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2007
Position: Legacy FO
Posts: 4,096
I was just having this conversation with a "WIC" 135 guy two days ago. I mentioned how screwed up the AMC is when it comes to fleet standardization, checkride/instruction standardization, and checklist/procedural safety. He just didn't get what I was saying.
Speculation on my part; however, I suspect this crash never would have happened had the crew been correctly trained on the new mod and had they not routinely practiced rushed three engine approaches in the pattern during training missions.
Speculation on my part; however, I suspect this crash never would have happened had the crew been correctly trained on the new mod and had they not routinely practiced rushed three engine approaches in the pattern during training missions.
05-09-2011, 03:15 PM
#29
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2010
Position: Baja Vermont
Posts: 5,177
FATboy
With 18 years in the C-5, absolutely agree we trained those guys the accident. That said, from what I have been told the A/C (IP qual'd) shouldn't have been upgraded. The 512th OG played faces with upgrades. Additionally, the SQ/CC and DO were in the jump and right seats, but never spoke up about the rushed approach.
Anyone now how the crew have done since, medically and professionally? My interest in medical is that I had a spinal compression fracture in an ejection, I feel for them.
GF
With 18 years in the C-5, absolutely agree we trained those guys the accident. That said, from what I have been told the A/C (IP qual'd) shouldn't have been upgraded. The 512th OG played faces with upgrades. Additionally, the SQ/CC and DO were in the jump and right seats, but never spoke up about the rushed approach.
Anyone now how the crew have done since, medically and professionally? My interest in medical is that I had a spinal compression fracture in an ejection, I feel for them.
GF
05-11-2011, 01:15 AM
#30
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Aug 2007
Position: I pilot
Posts: 2,049
Originally Posted by OldAg84
What kind of repurcussions would a crew have to deal with after an incident like this?
Air Force Blames Pilots for Fatal F-15 Mid-Air Collision - Local News | News Articles | National News | US News - FOXNews.com
He got reassigned immediately afterwards as an ALO (Army Liaison Officer, aka grunt type duty), and now he just got accepted into USAF test pilot school.
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