Air France 447 - Interesting article
08-28-2017, 11:53 AM
#21
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Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Originally Posted by badflaps
I'm just lost on why the skipper wouldn't be on the flight deck when entering 50,000+ft. C/B's. Starts there, gets worse. Bringing the chick along didn't help.
08-28-2017, 12:18 PM
#22
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Joined APC: Jul 2007
Position: 767 Captain
Posts: 3,988
Originally Posted by ptarmigan
Yes, easy to say that. Much is missing from your understanding of the entire scenario. I recommend you read the book!
There are far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy. I've always been a proponent of a balance between automation and manual operations. I've been told by fellow crew members on many occasions that autopilot and/or auto-throttle use is smarter, safer, etc. In the same discussion, they also opine that making a personal choice to reduce automation use when conditions permit shows poor judgement and any number of similar statements. I know for a fact that my hand flying habits have aided me in the aircraft and the sim. I'm constantly amazed at the lack of confidence some pilots show when presented with an opportunity or requirement to hand fly more than the last 500 feet on final.
I'm also a HUGE critic of ab initio programs and FOs Bonin and Robert, as evidenced by their actions on AF 447, are the exact reason why. There is simply no excuse for what happened. The A3XX family of aircraft may have some ergonomic and systemic pitfalls but they're still just aircraft.
I know you want to sell your book but I don't see myself buying it. If you want to enlighten us about what we are failing to understand about this accident, I'm all ears. My guess is you want to build a case for the lack of visual cues on flight control inputs and throttle use, the startle factor, lack of visual inputs from outside and possibly an over-confidence in the aircraft's flight envelope protection features. Perhaps throw in some recency issues due to the nature of long haul flying and Robert's position in the company. There are probably some additional excuses that could be added from external sources like company training syllabi and procedures, Airbus manuals and maybe even company culture issues.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation. The PIC stood behind these two clowns and watched it happen. Those are the facts. I'm not saying a critical analysis of the event won't provide lessons and possible beneficial changes in the industry or at least procedurally on Airbus flight decks. However, if an airline staffed by professional pilots has to change it's training regimen to teach those pilots how to fly at altitude and handle a basic event like a stall or even approach to stall, then I submit the problem lies elsewhere. Hiring pilots with minimal experience and putting them into a highly automated airliner is where the issue starts. The fact that a pilot can get into a major airline's A330 cockpit without the fundamental and instinctive skill set necessary to recognize and recover from a stall (or avoid it in the first place) is the root cause of this in a nut shell.
08-28-2017, 02:37 PM
#23
Moderate Moderator
Joined APC: Mar 2008
Position: Curator at Static Display
Posts: 5,681
Shack.
And on this: agree +1000
And on this: agree +1000
Originally Posted by Adlerdriver
"...........There are far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy. I've always been a proponent of a balance between automation and manual operations. I've been told by fellow crew members on many occasions that autopilot and/or auto-throttle use is smarter, safer, etc. In the same discussion, they also opine that making a personal choice to reduce automation use when conditions permit shows poor judgement and any number of similar statements. I know for a fact that my hand flying habits have aided me in the aircraft and the sim. I'm constantly amazed at the lack of confidence some pilots show when presented with an opportunity or requirement to hand fly more than the last 500 feet on final.
....................
....................
08-28-2017, 02:59 PM
#24
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Joined APC: Aug 2006
Position: B777 Captain
Posts: 566
Originally Posted by badflaps
I'm just lost on why the skipper wouldn't be on the flight deck when entering 50,000+ft. C/B's. Starts there, gets worse. Bringing the chick along didn't help.
The decision is very standard. With weather generally in the region all the time, when would YOU have rested? Perhaps you'd have waited until only an hour was left before top of descent? Nothing looked unusual and, actually, very few pilots would have had the background in meteorology or weather radar to know that it was an issue at all.
08-28-2017, 03:01 PM
#25
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Joined APC: Aug 2006
Position: B777 Captain
Posts: 566
Originally Posted by Adlerdriver
I've read the accident report. I've read Mr. L's vanity fair article which does a very good job relating the accident events and appears to match the accident report. I don't see much about his article on which I disagree.
There are far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy. I've always been a proponent of a balance between automation and manual operations. I've been told by fellow crew members on many occasions that autopilot and/or auto-throttle use is smarter, safer, etc. In the same discussion, they also opine that making a personal choice to reduce automation use when conditions permit shows poor judgement and any number of similar statements. I know for a fact that my hand flying habits have aided me in the aircraft and the sim. I'm constantly amazed at the lack of confidence some pilots show when presented with an opportunity or requirement to hand fly more than the last 500 feet on final.
I'm also a HUGE critic of ab initio programs and FOs Bonin and Robert, as evidenced by their actions on AF 447, are the exact reason why. There is simply no excuse for what happened. The A3XX family of aircraft may have some ergonomic and systemic pitfalls but they're still just aircraft.
I know you want to sell your book but I don't see myself buying it. If you want to enlighten us about what we are failing to understand about this accident, I'm all ears. My guess is you want to build a case for the lack of visual cues on flight control inputs and throttle use, the startle factor, lack of visual inputs from outside and possibly an over-confidence in the aircraft's flight envelope protection features. Perhaps throw in some recency issues due to the nature of long haul flying and Robert's position in the company. There are probably some additional excuses that could be added from external sources like company training syllabi and procedures, Airbus manuals and maybe even company culture issues.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation. The PIC stood behind these two clowns and watched it happen. Those are the facts. I'm not saying a critical analysis of the event won't provide lessons and possible beneficial changes in the industry or at least procedurally on Airbus flight decks. However, if an airline staffed by professional pilots has to change it's training regimen to teach those pilots how to fly at altitude and handle a basic event like a stall or even approach to stall, then I submit the problem lies elsewhere. Hiring pilots with minimal experience and putting them into a highly automated airliner is where the issue starts. The fact that a pilot can get into a major airline's A330 cockpit without the fundamental and instinctive skill set necessary to recognize and recover from a stall (or avoid it in the first place) is the root cause of this in a nut shell.
There are far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy. I've always been a proponent of a balance between automation and manual operations. I've been told by fellow crew members on many occasions that autopilot and/or auto-throttle use is smarter, safer, etc. In the same discussion, they also opine that making a personal choice to reduce automation use when conditions permit shows poor judgement and any number of similar statements. I know for a fact that my hand flying habits have aided me in the aircraft and the sim. I'm constantly amazed at the lack of confidence some pilots show when presented with an opportunity or requirement to hand fly more than the last 500 feet on final.
I'm also a HUGE critic of ab initio programs and FOs Bonin and Robert, as evidenced by their actions on AF 447, are the exact reason why. There is simply no excuse for what happened. The A3XX family of aircraft may have some ergonomic and systemic pitfalls but they're still just aircraft.
I know you want to sell your book but I don't see myself buying it. If you want to enlighten us about what we are failing to understand about this accident, I'm all ears. My guess is you want to build a case for the lack of visual cues on flight control inputs and throttle use, the startle factor, lack of visual inputs from outside and possibly an over-confidence in the aircraft's flight envelope protection features. Perhaps throw in some recency issues due to the nature of long haul flying and Robert's position in the company. There are probably some additional excuses that could be added from external sources like company training syllabi and procedures, Airbus manuals and maybe even company culture issues.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation. The PIC stood behind these two clowns and watched it happen. Those are the facts. I'm not saying a critical analysis of the event won't provide lessons and possible beneficial changes in the industry or at least procedurally on Airbus flight decks. However, if an airline staffed by professional pilots has to change it's training regimen to teach those pilots how to fly at altitude and handle a basic event like a stall or even approach to stall, then I submit the problem lies elsewhere. Hiring pilots with minimal experience and putting them into a highly automated airliner is where the issue starts. The fact that a pilot can get into a major airline's A330 cockpit without the fundamental and instinctive skill set necessary to recognize and recover from a stall (or avoid it in the first place) is the root cause of this in a nut shell.
"Nonobvious breakdowns happen all the time…we tend to settle for the “first explanation” that makes us feel in control. That explanation turns the unknown into the known, which makes the explanation appear to be “true”.
-Weick and Sutcliffe.
08-28-2017, 05:22 PM
#26
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Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Originally Posted by Adlerdriver
I've read the accident report. I've read Mr. L's vanity fair article which does a very good job relating the accident events and appears to match the accident report. I don't see much about his article on which I disagree.
There are far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy. I've always been a proponent of a balance between automation and manual operations. I've been told by fellow crew members on many occasions that autopilot and/or auto-throttle use is smarter, safer, etc. In the same discussion, they also opine that making a personal choice to reduce automation use when conditions permit shows poor judgement and any number of similar statements. I know for a fact that my hand flying habits have aided me in the aircraft and the sim. I'm constantly amazed at the lack of confidence some pilots show when presented with an opportunity or requirement to hand fly more than the last 500 feet on final.
I'm also a HUGE critic of ab initio programs and FOs Bonin and Robert, as evidenced by their actions on AF 447, are the exact reason why. There is simply no excuse for what happened. The A3XX family of aircraft may have some ergonomic and systemic pitfalls but they're still just aircraft.
I know you want to sell your book but I don't see myself buying it. If you want to enlighten us about what we are failing to understand about this accident, I'm all ears. My guess is you want to build a case for the lack of visual cues on flight control inputs and throttle use, the startle factor, lack of visual inputs from outside and possibly an over-confidence in the aircraft's flight envelope protection features. Perhaps throw in some recency issues due to the nature of long haul flying and Robert's position in the company. There are probably some additional excuses that could be added from external sources like company training syllabi and procedures, Airbus manuals and maybe even company culture issues.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation. The PIC stood behind these two clowns and watched it happen. Those are the facts. I'm not saying a critical analysis of the event won't provide lessons and possible beneficial changes in the industry or at least procedurally on Airbus flight decks. However, if an airline staffed by professional pilots has to change it's training regimen to teach those pilots how to fly at altitude and handle a basic event like a stall or even approach to stall, then I submit the problem lies elsewhere. Hiring pilots with minimal experience and putting them into a highly automated airliner is where the issue starts. The fact that a pilot can get into a major airline's A330 cockpit without the fundamental and instinctive skill set necessary to recognize and recover from a stall (or avoid it in the first place) is the root cause of this in a nut shell.
There are far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy. I've always been a proponent of a balance between automation and manual operations. I've been told by fellow crew members on many occasions that autopilot and/or auto-throttle use is smarter, safer, etc. In the same discussion, they also opine that making a personal choice to reduce automation use when conditions permit shows poor judgement and any number of similar statements. I know for a fact that my hand flying habits have aided me in the aircraft and the sim. I'm constantly amazed at the lack of confidence some pilots show when presented with an opportunity or requirement to hand fly more than the last 500 feet on final.
I'm also a HUGE critic of ab initio programs and FOs Bonin and Robert, as evidenced by their actions on AF 447, are the exact reason why. There is simply no excuse for what happened. The A3XX family of aircraft may have some ergonomic and systemic pitfalls but they're still just aircraft.
I know you want to sell your book but I don't see myself buying it. If you want to enlighten us about what we are failing to understand about this accident, I'm all ears. My guess is you want to build a case for the lack of visual cues on flight control inputs and throttle use, the startle factor, lack of visual inputs from outside and possibly an over-confidence in the aircraft's flight envelope protection features. Perhaps throw in some recency issues due to the nature of long haul flying and Robert's position in the company. There are probably some additional excuses that could be added from external sources like company training syllabi and procedures, Airbus manuals and maybe even company culture issues.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation. The PIC stood behind these two clowns and watched it happen. Those are the facts. I'm not saying a critical analysis of the event won't provide lessons and possible beneficial changes in the industry or at least procedurally on Airbus flight decks. However, if an airline staffed by professional pilots has to change it's training regimen to teach those pilots how to fly at altitude and handle a basic event like a stall or even approach to stall, then I submit the problem lies elsewhere. Hiring pilots with minimal experience and putting them into a highly automated airliner is where the issue starts. The fact that a pilot can get into a major airline's A330 cockpit without the fundamental and instinctive skill set necessary to recognize and recover from a stall (or avoid it in the first place) is the root cause of this in a nut shell.
Well said!
08-28-2017, 05:52 PM
#27
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Joined APC: Jul 2005
Posts: 248
Originally Posted by Adlerdriver
I know you want to sell your book but I don't see myself buying it.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation.
But in the end, they're all just that.... excuses. 2 supposedly competent and qualified pilots mishandled a perfectly good aircraft into an unrecoverable situation.
08-28-2017, 07:18 PM
#28
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Joined APC: May 2010
Position: Baja Vermont
Posts: 5,171
Adlerdriver,
In all too many instances, you are making the assumption they had the skills in the first place. I've seen pilots who do find when it's clear and a million and start coming apart with a near limits crosswind, a new airport with weather, etc.
GF
far too many pilots who are content to become reliant on automation while letting their flying skills atrophy.
GF
08-28-2017, 08:27 PM
#29
Prime Minister/Moderator
Joined APC: Jan 2006
Position: Engines Turn Or People Swim
Posts: 39,190
Originally Posted by galaxy flyer
Adlerdriver,
In all too many instances, you are making the assumption they had the skills in the first place. I've seen pilots who do find when it's clear and a million and start coming apart with a near limits crosswind, a new airport with weather, etc.
GF
In all too many instances, you are making the assumption they had the skills in the first place. I've seen pilots who do find when it's clear and a million and start coming apart with a near limits crosswind, a new airport with weather, etc.
GF
I used to make them turn that crap off on downwind, but lately I've been letting it play out just to see what happens.
08-28-2017, 09:43 PM
#30
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Joined APC: Sep 2008
Posts: 1,075
OMG, yes! Oblivious to the situation, blowing through the final; fast, high and not configured while head down programming the box to ensure they get it right.
Dude! Here are the throttles, there is the runway. Make it work.
Blank stare.
Dude! Here are the throttles, there is the runway. Make it work.
Blank stare.
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