Air France 447 - Interesting article
#41
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2008
Posts: 1,075
#42
#43
#44
Maybe, maybe not. What the wing experiences is fairly close to the pilot experience in a fairly rigid tactical airplane. Big airplanes are different as you have a harmonic frequency for the fuselage that has its own mode. For example, on the A330 you would actually see +/- up to 2.0 g at a frequency of 2-4hz. Not like a stall in any tactical airplane. This is coupled around a baseline of 0.5 g due to the descent, of course. There is also an induced lateral mode, figure +/- 0.6g,so you have a combination far outside most pilots experience.
#46
If you've never experienced it, are not expecting it, and in turbulence, I think you are utilizing a fair bit of hindsight bias here!
#47
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Joined APC: Apr 2011
Posts: 1,465
One of the basic tenants of aircraft operation is the use of known pitch and power settings. Pitot static malfunctions can create confusion but only if they are viewed as a singular event with no knowledge of events leading to them. An aircraft in level flight holding a stable airspeed at FL350 doesn't just start to overspeed or stall spontaneously.
Heart of the matter as far as I can tell. Perished not a clue as to why.
#48
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Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
You're biased too, writing off every other pilot input on this accident. They messed up bad. They correctly identified the problem "we have bad speed indications" and then didn't follow procedure for it. After yanking back and stalling, all the FO in the right seat did was pitch for the Flight Director bars. That's fact, and shown in the accident animation created by the investigators. You seem to ignore all that, and make some argument for how the Gs and buffer they felt apparently threw them off too much to know they were stalled.
#49
You're biased too, writing off every other pilot input on this accident. They messed up bad. They correctly identified the problem "we have bad speed indications" and then didn't follow procedure for it. After yanking back and stalling, all the FO in the right seat did was pitch for the Flight Director bars. That's fact, and shown in the accident animation created by the investigators. You seem to ignore all that, and make some argument for how the Gs and buffer they felt apparently threw them off too much to know they were stalled.
#50
I'm sorry to be harsh. I've been flying bit airplanes for over 30 years, as well as investigating accidents. I have participated in evaluating aircraft performance, human performance, operations and numerous other factors. I have been a check airman and instructor on several types of large transport airplanes, worked in both management and in ALPA positions. I have spent the past 20 years also working on handling quality issues and researching based on the most recent understandings of human factors, including control feedback theory and cognitive factors.
I used to be like many of the respondents in this thread. I have learned better. We are all too quick to blame our fellow pilots as being weak. We also, in conjunction, believe that humans are the "weak point" in aviation safety, and also like to tell laypeople that "flying is easy". Then we are shocked when people tell us we're overpaid and not necessary.
The evidence, on the contrary, is overwhelming, that pilots are what keep flying safe, but we are now encountering areas for which we are not training pilots. That needs to be fixed. I have presented several examples here, and there are a lot more. We have not fixed exposure to microbursts really (although we are somewhat protected by MIT's LL algorithm at 67 U.S. airports and HKG), as a quick additional example.
I used to be like many of the respondents in this thread. I have learned better. We are all too quick to blame our fellow pilots as being weak. We also, in conjunction, believe that humans are the "weak point" in aviation safety, and also like to tell laypeople that "flying is easy". Then we are shocked when people tell us we're overpaid and not necessary.
The evidence, on the contrary, is overwhelming, that pilots are what keep flying safe, but we are now encountering areas for which we are not training pilots. That needs to be fixed. I have presented several examples here, and there are a lot more. We have not fixed exposure to microbursts really (although we are somewhat protected by MIT's LL algorithm at 67 U.S. airports and HKG), as a quick additional example.
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vagabond
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02-20-2007 02:16 PM