04-28-2024Quote:
Let’s Get Some Southwest Non-fiction on the Table
In its submission, Southwest complains that at LGA, "instead of an airport balanced among three airlines of roughly equal size, the slot swap would catapult Delta into a dominant position more than twice the size of the nearest competitor." But Southwest does not ever mention anything pertaining to its size within the U.S. domestic market. In 2008 there were only 6 airport markets with more domestic origin and destination (O&D) traffic than LGA. Southwest is the largest carrier in three of those six markets. At the 48 domestic airports where Southwest is the largest carrier of O&D traffic, it is at least twice the size of the next largest carrier in 27.
At Dallas Love Field, Southwest controls 94.3 percent of O&D traffic and the second largest carrier has 2.2 percent. At Houston Hobby Airport, Southwest controls 86.2 percent of O&D traffic versus 5.2 for the nearest competitor. At Chicago Midway, Southwest has 79.1 percent control while the next largest competitor has 8.8 percent. At Love Field, Houston Hobby and Chicago Midway the average fares rose at those airports 36.2 percent, 21.8 percent and 29.4 percent respectively between 2005 and 2008. In each of the 48 airport markets where Southwest is the number one competitor, fares on average increased 17.5 percent between 2005 and 2008.
Southwest would have us all believe that their presence at an airport is the ultimate discipline on fares and they claim it in every regulatory filing and certainly on every advertisement. Despite what Southwest likes to say, it is not the same Southwest that sprinkled the “Southwest Effect” on markets in 1992. The claims of low fares stimulating new demand just do not hold today - because everyone offers low fares.
During the period between 2005 and 2008, wasn’t Southwest enjoying the benefits of a fuel hedging program that provided the carrier with a most significant cost advantage relative to an industry that had largely restructured itself? I assumed that cost advantage benefit garnered from a fortuitous bet on the price of oil was being passed on to the consumer. Instead Southwest was raising fares. In their filing they actually go as far as calculate the cost saving their low fares would bring to each the DCA and LGA markets. The calculation is performed after including a $25 bag fee on top of the fare of the competition. B. Swelbar
Southwest will be a tremendous marketing competitor to Delta in Atlanta. I have not looked, but I'm sure Clark Howard and the media cognoscenti a just a twitter.Let’s Get Some Southwest Non-fiction on the Table
In its submission, Southwest complains that at LGA, "instead of an airport balanced among three airlines of roughly equal size, the slot swap would catapult Delta into a dominant position more than twice the size of the nearest competitor." But Southwest does not ever mention anything pertaining to its size within the U.S. domestic market. In 2008 there were only 6 airport markets with more domestic origin and destination (O&D) traffic than LGA. Southwest is the largest carrier in three of those six markets. At the 48 domestic airports where Southwest is the largest carrier of O&D traffic, it is at least twice the size of the next largest carrier in 27.
At Dallas Love Field, Southwest controls 94.3 percent of O&D traffic and the second largest carrier has 2.2 percent. At Houston Hobby Airport, Southwest controls 86.2 percent of O&D traffic versus 5.2 for the nearest competitor. At Chicago Midway, Southwest has 79.1 percent control while the next largest competitor has 8.8 percent. At Love Field, Houston Hobby and Chicago Midway the average fares rose at those airports 36.2 percent, 21.8 percent and 29.4 percent respectively between 2005 and 2008. In each of the 48 airport markets where Southwest is the number one competitor, fares on average increased 17.5 percent between 2005 and 2008.
Southwest would have us all believe that their presence at an airport is the ultimate discipline on fares and they claim it in every regulatory filing and certainly on every advertisement. Despite what Southwest likes to say, it is not the same Southwest that sprinkled the “Southwest Effect” on markets in 1992. The claims of low fares stimulating new demand just do not hold today - because everyone offers low fares.
During the period between 2005 and 2008, wasn’t Southwest enjoying the benefits of a fuel hedging program that provided the carrier with a most significant cost advantage relative to an industry that had largely restructured itself? I assumed that cost advantage benefit garnered from a fortuitous bet on the price of oil was being passed on to the consumer. Instead Southwest was raising fares. In their filing they actually go as far as calculate the cost saving their low fares would bring to each the DCA and LGA markets. The calculation is performed after including a $25 bag fee on top of the fare of the competition. B. Swelbar
But, overall, AirTran's employee costs will rise. Hopefully this will also help keep them from selling out scope (which had been rumored at the 86 seat line).
"Fight's on" ... in a friendly sort of way.
