So in number 2 you are stating that Airbus built a airliner that cannot be hand flown at altitude and ICAO and the FAA approved it's use. If that's the case I will just stick to the A300.

If there had been a piece of yarn on the outside of each side window, couldn't that have cleared up their understanding in time to recover?

Didn't say it could not be. We are just not training people to do so if they have not had previous outside experience. Same for the Boeings.

Unfortunately the flow is more complex than that, the short answer is "maybe". An uncorrected AoA would be difficult to sort out absent specific training. Like radar, absent training to interpret it there is only limited value.

Exactly. At some point the groupthink and overanalysis needs to stop. Many other crews encountered the same situation as this crew and did not get into a deep stall.

If you are rapidly losing altitude and your attitude is level, your AOA is high. Simple as that. Either accelerated stall, or regular stall (around 1G). Bonin was fixed on "vitesse fou" and was convinced of the overspeed, but ultimately this was a poor recognition of a situation that should be clear to all pilots, not just pilots of their caliber.

Regardless, I say it is nuts to enter a 50,000+ C/B and not expect anything but an exciting outcome.

So simple in hindsight, but an incredibly naive post.

So where would your radar have been tilted to identify the storm?

So what else could it be? The dozens of pilots that entered identical situations figured it out. Sometimes the simplest solution is correct, and the same stick and rudder principles apply no matter what you are flying.

As a professional I encounter myriad potentially confusing situations, and am not at the bottom few percent, and try to help those that are. Sorry you feel this is complicated!

A different scenario than the others encountered. The similarities end with the loss of airspeed.