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CRM can be loved or hated, but cannot be ignored. Like it not, it's here today, and here to stay. Or is it?

To answer that, other questions must first be answered. What is its purpose? Does it serve that purpose, and if so, how and at what cost? If not, why not? Are we overrating CRM or underrating it? Do we give it credit based on merit or because it's trendy? Does it have a future in its present form? These are only some of the questions that fuel heated debates in cockpits, pilot lounges and on the 18th floor of the Marriott. Professional debates, other than those held behind closed doors are rare; as it's politically incorrect to openly question the propagated merits of CRM. Such self-inflicted stifling then blocks the flow of valuable information. Dogmatic directives are conceived and issued to training departments and the line, and elevated to the power of SOPs, all without effective line input.

What follows are a few thoughts to revive this debate. Agree or disagree, it makes no difference. What matters is thought exchange and its benefits. Challenge these thoughts if you like, but back your arguments with examples if you can. For those interested, the industry's perception of CRM can be inferred from CAA document, CAP 737, ISBN 9780117907072.

And so the circus began. "Oh praise the savior, child prodigy of the nineties, who will wash away the sins of line pilots, convert the infidel, re-educate the misguided, rehabilitate the rebellious commander and wipe away the tears of airline managers everywhere." Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) was conceived as a cure-all for accidents and incidents for which by one definition or another the pilot was blamed. Since the vast majority of accidents are to some degree, the "fault" of the crew, CRM was to become not only the tool to assure conformance to social trend policy, but also the solution to aviation's image problem, the crash site.

Whatever its propagated purpose, CRM was developed in the vacuum created by the neglect and suppression of command and leadership skills training. As expected, it did not take long before it became obvious that CRM's fixation on mandatory processes not only failed to live up to its promise, but also created new problems, starting with its constant want of comprehensive redefinition. Cockpit Resource Management was reinvented as Crew Resource Management which is defined—at the time of writing—as
Except for the use of the new trendy term management,this definition suspiciously resembles certain principles of command and leadership. However, that one word turned the entire definition into an absurdity. Management of crew resources, judicious or not, cannot recognize circumstances which may lead to accidents because recognition of circumstances—better know as situation awareness—is a passive faculty like seeing or hearing: one cannot manage oneself or anyone else to see or hear. Further, management of crew resources cannot avoid circumstances which may lead to accidents because one cannot avoid—by management or otherwise—what one does not know exists. And management of crew resources cannot overcome—successfully or otherwise—circumstances which may lead to accidents for two reasons. One, as stated above, one cannot manage to recognize circumstances which may lead to accidents—or anything else for that matter. And two, management cannot overcome anything even if its object (circumstances which may lead to accidents) were defined because it is a process: one cannot manage a goal; only the processes needed to reach it. CRM has indisputably produced some encouraging results. But to deliver on its promise, it would have to reinvent and redefine itself as
Once so defined, the selected principles could become course subjects in formal pilot education.

But the reinvention did not happen. Consequently, CRM's absurdities became painfully obvious in due course. While the list of disastrous consequences of misguided CRM training is extensive, one example ought to drive the point home. During the nineties CRM training was pushing compliance and submission in the face of unlawful attempts to take control of aircraft. Crews were instructed to submit to the will of the perpetrators and to put up only passive resistance. They were specifically instructed not to resist pro-actively. Needless to say such directives created an uproar among seasoned line pilots. They knew the value of timely action—prohibited by CRM—repeatedly confirmed by such events as the pilot of a hijacked airliner on the ramp who refused to comply and submit—as required by CRM—and escaped through his side window moments before a grenade was tossed into the cockpit. On a grander scale, they also foresaw the catastrophic consequences of CRM-directed passive resistance on September 11, 2001. Yet their disapproval and warnings were, at best, ignored. More often, these pilots were criticized for having an "attitude," for "bucking the system," "rocking the boat." Although several lessons were learned on that fateful Tuesday morning, the most important lesson for aviation was not one of them: substituting management for command lays to waste all of the otherwise noble aspirations of CRM. Alas, when people, ignorant of flight operations, are put in charge of Flight Operations policy, be it translated into CRM or any other trendy concept, flights are lost.

Pilots' views on CRM policy vary from enthusiastic support to ridicule. Junior pilots, staff or line, generally believe, CRM was overdue. For them, CRM means formal recognition of subordinates' unconditional right to challenge the PIC's decisions. To those in staff billets, it also means "teaching the Old Man he is not God." To seasoned pilots, however, CRM is subversion of professional values and further denial of natural justice. Many seasoned line pilots believe that, contrary to the above proposition, CRM has nothing to do with replacing command skills or with improving flight safety. CRM, they argue, is a manipulative scheme(125) to further dilute the captain's authority. By forcing the captain to routinely seek the crew's "approval" of his commands, and by authorizing the crew to challenge his every decision, CRM effectively halves the captain's authority—in a two-man crew. Since the PIC is by law responsible for the safety of the flight, they opine, any dilution of his authority further upsets the responsibility-authority balance. Senior staff pilots also believe that CRM is a recipe for disaster but are either unable to block its implementation (Chapter 16) or, being too close to retirement to risk rocking the boat, are unwilling to try. The rest fall somewhere in between the two extremes. They might accept CRM with reservation, apply it with caution or, most often, "demonstrate CRM skills" only during recurrent simulator or PPC check rides to show compliance. For the most part, CRM turned out to be a dangerous delusion. It has drastically increased the volume of chatter in the cockpit, opened the door to arguments and, oftentimes, led to decisions based not on operational needs but on accommodation. CRM gave FOs authority without responsibility—a dangerous imbalance in any setting. Whereas subordinates' reports and recommendations are desirable and even necessary to safe operations, any challenge of the PIC's authority is an obstacle not only to operations but also to safety. Further, the birth of such distorted CRM notions as "joint command" and "co-captaincy" are warnings of impending disasters. So much on CRM.
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(125) For example, suggestive conditioning under the guise of personality testing. (Excerpt from "Beyond Stick-and-Rudder" p. 300-303)

There are other problems with CRM as well. E.g., even its proponents can't agree on a consistent interpretation of CRM. Some feel it's some sort of Human Relations skill. Others believe it might be a useful skill in multiple crew complements but serves no useful purpose in single pilot operations. Some are convinced it's a recipe to get every member of a crew to read the same sheet music; others contend it's a method to involve every member of the crew in decisionmaking.

It's probably safe to say that CRM has a future. But only if it reinvents and redefines itself as, e.g., Intangible Pilot Skills Application. Without that, it risks becoming an expensive self-serving notion of little practical value, and finding itself among the first to be cut when times are hard. If it contributes nothing or little to the bottom line, it's likely to be dropped.