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Old 11-16-2010, 02:51 PM   #1  
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Default UAL DEN Vice Chair Letter

The JCBA and Seniority List Integration Process

By Rob Hebinck, DEN C33 F/O Representative

From a historical perspective, the UAL pilots are (once again) in bold, new, and uncharted territory in the airline industry- the merger of two large airlines in the industry’s post-“lost decade.” For decades, the forces of regulation, unionized labor groups, and government anti-trust concerns (to name a few) blocked what many analysts considered the inevitable evolutionary fate of the airline industry- consolidation into a few large mega-carriers. With the tide of globalization rising steadily, the consolidation game of mega-merger musical chairs began in earnest. We first saw the US Air with AWA merger for fitness, and then the DAL with NWA and the UAL with CAL mergers for domination.

For most of the mergers of the past, the integration of the pilots at merging airlines involved a two step process in which the pilot groups first integrated their seniority lists (usually by arbitration), and then negotiated a Joint Collective Bargaining Agreement (JCBA). This two-step model worked with varying success until the first real mega-merger occurred in 2005 with US Air + AWA. In that case, one side found the arbitrated Integrated Seniority List (ISL) so distasteful that it blocked the negotiation of a JCBA as a means of overturning the ISL. The US Air contingent held the JCBA “hostage” in order to influence (in this case overturn) the ISL decision. The arbitrator rendered an ISL decision in May 2007, and the two pilot groups never achieved a JCBA. In April 2008, the pilot groups (voting together under NMB rules) rejected ALPA and voted for representation by USAPA. Now more than five years later, that airline is not fully merged, and both pilot groups continue to work under two of the worse bankruptcy contracts in the industry.

In the face of this debacle, interested parties in the industry- not just pilots, but senior management, analysts, and financiers- reexamined the role of pilots in the merger process, and tried to develop a better model. First, most realized that pilots should receive a substantial share of the merger benefits to recognize the key role they play in the merger process. Second (and important to this discussion), ALPA re-examined the traditional SLI-then-JCBA model with the intent to avoid another US Air debacle. Many believed that a “dual path” approach to the SLI and JCBA processes would facilitate the best result- i.e. a new contract that recognizes the critical role that pilots play in a merger, and an ISL that both pilot groups accept because they accepted the fairness of the SLI process. This idea was not meant to intermingle the two issues during a merger, but rather by dual tracking the SLI and JCBA process neither could be used as leverage against or to influence the other. Specifically, to avoid what occurred in the past, one pilot group could not hold a JCBA as hostage against (in their minds) an undesirable ISL.

As mega-merger mania reached a feverish pitch in late 2007, these issues were foremost in the minds of all the airline industry’s principle decision makers. Seeking the advantage of first-mover, DAL and NWA agreed to merge in early 2008. The corporations, however, would not proceed until they ensured the support of their pilot groups and their commitment to a smooth integration process so that the merged airline could take immediate advantage of merger synergies and assure Wall Street that the merger would be successful. To achieve this, the corporations withheld announcing a merger while the DAL and NWA pilots and company negotiators engaged in months of negotiations to produce a consensual “package deal” that included both an ISL and JCBA. Ultimately, however, this effort failed over the ISL issue. The two pilot groups could not achieve a consensual list.

At that point, the DAL pilots made the decision that the merger was too important to fail, and decided to support and facilitate the merger under certain conditions. Namely, the DAL pilots and DAL Corporation agreed to a significant contractual improvement for the DAL pilots and an equity stake in the new company in exchange for their support of the merger (LOA 19). The pilots agreed to facilitate the merger by waiving scope clauses that would allow extensive code-sharing between the two companies after merger announcement date (MAD) and during the merger transition process. The DAL pilots also assured the company that they would continue to work with the NWA pilots to produce a truly merged pilot group, and later kept to that commitment by signing a unique “Process Agreement” with the NWA pilots that ensured 1) that a JCBA would be promptly negotiated and 2) only after it was ratified would the SLI process proceed to an expedited arbitration (assuming the pilot groups were not successful in negotiating a consensual list). With LOA 19 in hand, DAL and NWA announced their merger in April 2008. Ultimately, the DAL CBA, along with the improvements of LOA 19, and a few changes agreed to with the NWA pilots, became the merged pilot group’s JCBA, and both pilot groups ratified that agreement in August 2008. The two pilot groups then again tried to negotiate a merged SLI, again failed, and the arbitration panel rendered its decision in December 2008 pursuant to the terms of the Process Agreement.

In the wake of these two mergers- one viewed as successful and the other not- ALPA again rewrote its Merger and Fragmentation Policy language (MFP) in 2009. The 2009 version contains some important differences worth noting, even for those who find a policy language discussion morosely boring. In some instances, policy language is very important, and this is one of those cases.

In general, the current language spends more effort discussing the principles that facilitate a successful merger. For example, the policy rests on a number of premises, including:

A successful merger requires the full support of ALPA MEC and Local Council leadership for its implementation.

ALPA members will be kept informed and up to date through responsible communications, and an environment developed to foster unity and strength in negotiating the JCBA.

Unity of purpose, based on close cooperation among Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) members and between the participating MECs, is essential to bringing about a work force that will obtain benefit from the merger through successful negotiations.

The new language also strongly encourages a JCBA-then-SLI process when it states:

Negotiating sessions should be scheduled consistent with the high priority goal of concluding the JCBA prior to the date for conclusion of the seniority list integration process.

The policy intends to achieve a JCBA first that pilots will ratify and, assuming significant contractual improvements, ease any discomfort from or fallout after the ISL process. Supposedly, this puts the horse back in front of the cart, and prevents one party from holding the JCBA hostage against an unsatisfactory ISL. To help guarantee JCBA success, the new MFP language includes a dispute resolution process in case the pilot groups reach an impasse during JCBA negotiations. That process includes a number of mediation steps, but if those do not succeed, the Policy ultimately prescribes that ALPA’s “Executive Council may direct additional action to be taken with respect to negotiations.”

In summary, ALPA’s Merger and Fragmentation Policy emphasizes the importance of responsible leadership by the MECs, encourages a JCBA-first then SLI-second process, and provides the Executive Council with authority to resolve a bargaining impasse between the two MEC’s negotiators. In May 2010, the UAL and CAL pilots ventured into the new realm of mega-mergers with this new policy language to guide them. The two parties quickly agreed to a “Protocol Agreement” (much like DAL and NWA’s “Process Agreement”) that essentially reinforced the JCBA-first model by providing that the JCBA must be achieved prior to even beginning the SLI process. The two JNCs negotiated both an Expense LOA and a “Transition and Process Agreement”, and alacriously agreed to every section of a JCBA to proposal. Every section, that is, except one of critical importance- the pilots’ pay rates.

One circumstance not specifically addressed in the new ALPA Merger Policy language is the unintended consequences of the JCBA-first model. Specifically, this model creates the temptation for those overseeing the JCBA to insert parameters that they believe may be useful later in the SLI process. The decision makers might, for example, favor some parameter in the JCBA because they believe it will help sustain an argument presented in the event of SLI arbitration. This temptation is particularly keen with regard to different pay rates for different aircraft and arguments or conclusions about the proper categorization of aircraft types for status and category ratios based upon those pay rates. Despite not addressing this issue in their Process Agreement, the DAL and NWA pilots found it advisable to “carve out” JCBA pay rate issues from the SLI process, and did so with a separate agreement. In this short and to the point side-letter, the two sides agreed that any discussions, proposals, or agreements regarding pay rates in the JCBA negotiations (including the JCBA itself) cannot be used in the SLI process to argue that one aircraft is the equivalent of another. The technical language states:

The Delta and Northwest MECs and their respective representatives agree that any discussions, written or oral proposals or agreements, or other communications of any kind (including any documents, exhibits and data) between or among Delta, ALPA, the Delta MEC and the NWA MEC and their representatives, employees or counsel regarding pay rates on any aircraft type shall not be used nor in any way referred to either directly or indirectly in any seniority list integration negotiation, mediation or arbitration proceeding between the pilot groups for the purpose of attempting to demonstrate that one or more aircraft type(s) should be considered or not considered the substantial equivalent of any other aircraft type(s).

This agreement facilitated an expeditious JCBA negotiation and satisfied any concerns over SLI influences.

With the above historical facts in hand, it is time to examine where the current UAL + CAL mega-merger stands in the JCBA and SLI process.

During the current fast paced negotiations, the JNC failed to reach a consensus on a pay rate proposal. In many respects, this roadblock is a culture issue between the two pilot groups. The UAL Pilots traditionally worked under pay-rates that were based upon a “pay to productivity” model. This tradition dates back decades in the airline industry, and originates from a 1934 decision regarding pilot pay rates under the old Civil Aviation Board (CAB) jurisdiction. This article does not intend to argue the merits of this system or others, but merely to note our contract history, and it is true that pay to productivity is the industry’s as well as UAL’s tradition. The UAL pilots often relate pay banding with their 2003 concessionary contract, and most do not regard pay banding as a contractual improvement. When the UAL MEC surveyed its pilots in 2008 in anticipation of section 6 negotiations (i.e. before the merger announcement), most pilots preferred that we un-band the pay rates in the next contract. Some local surveys (such as Denver C33’s survey) asked the same question and received a similar response. The UAL negotiating process has a clear procedure- based upon these surveys, local council resolutions, as well as other feedback and insight, the UAL MEC gives direction to its negotiating committee. The MEC gives direction through resolutions, and these Negotiating Committee (NC) resolutions are often “off the record” for obvious reasons. Regarding the current contract, the MEC received pilot guidance on dozens of issues (e.g. change the egregious 2.8 hours per day for vacation language, change the reassignment rules, etc.), and the Negotiating Committee resolutions include guidance on each of these issues. One of these many resolutions includes our pilots’ desire, as stated in the extensive surveys, to un-band the banded pay rates. This is the guidance from our pilots.

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Old 11-16-2010, 02:53 PM   #2  
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(continued)
The CAL pilots, on the other hand, have a more positive cultural experience with pay-rate banding. After their strike and before returning to ALPA, the CAL CBA actually paid to longevity- a single-band pay rate system that is in contrast to pay to productivity (Independent Association of Continental Pilots contract 1995). [Again this article does not argue the merits of either system, but merely recounts the different cultural histories of each pilot group.] The CAL pilots eventually left this system and based their current contract on banded pay rates. While it is unknown if the CAL MEC conducted a survey of its pilots, it is fair to assume that most CAL pilots are happy with pay rate banding.



It comes as no surprise, then, that when the UAL and CAL pilots on the JNC first broached this subject months ago, the two sides were (for the first and only time) far apart from consensus. The CAL negotiators proposed limited pay bands, and the UAL negotiators preferred a more traditional model (the DAL JCBA, for example, has thirteen pay rates). As they attempted to clear this roadblock, and reported to their MECs their progress, it became clear that something more than just a cultural difference separated the two sides. The entrenchment of one side was not explainable by just cultural issues; the arguments and discussions within the JNC and between the MEC Officers did not seem intended to find consensus, but more to justify an intractable position. Suggestions that we forge something similar to the DAL and NWA “carve-out” letter were also rejected. Fortunately, the two MECs were scheduled to meet jointly and promptly in September, and clearly an important goal of that meeting (at least in the minds of the UAL MEC) would be to find consensus and move forward.



At the September 20th meeting, however, the CAL MEC made its position clear to the UAL MEC in no uncertain terms- and with plenty of other witnesses. The CAL Master Chairman stated directly (and more than once) that the pay-rate issue was mostly about the SLI process and less about the JCBA process; he even quantified the issue as “70% SLI and 30% JCBA.” In brief, the CAL MEC stated that they “need pay-rate banding in the JCBA” because they intend to use it as a “principle argument” in the SLI process to benefit their pilots. The CAL MEC was remarkably insistent. While in session and with dozens of witnesses, one representative stated that the JCBA must have what they perceive as this CAL-advantaged SLI piece, and that he would not accept a JCBA without it, and that he was “prepared to work for years under my current contract” if this item is not in the JCBA. Without a doubt to the dozens in attendance, the CAL MEC was unabashedly unashamed of its position on this issue.



To say the least, the UAL MEC was disappointed with the CAL MEC’s statements. At that time, we did not see a lot of options around this dilemma. Fortunately, ALPA Merger and Fragmentation Policy includes a dispute resolution process, and the UAL MEC restated our belief that if we were at impasse over a joint pay proposal, then the proper next step would be to invoke that process. Again, the CAL response was clear- the CAL Master Chairman stated that CAL intended to use banded pay-rates in the JCBA as an SLI argument, and would do so even if the “ALPA President, Executive Council, or even the U.S. Attorney General” directed them otherwise. The CAL Master Chairman implied that the CAL Merger Committee is independent, and not bound to obey Executive Council guidance if it comments on this issue. His statement is particularly interesting considering the fact that the CAL Merger Committee Chairman was on the ALPA panel that rewrote the Merger Policy to include the dispute resolution process.



Unfortunately, the meeting ended without consensus, but the UAL MEC looked forward to the upcoming ALPA BOD meeting as another opportunity to find a solution. The company intended to present a comprehensive counter proposal the week after the BOD, and this was the last chance for the JNC to pass a pay rate proposal ahead of that event. At the October meeting, the UAL and CAL MECs agreed to charge the JNC with resolving the issue from a cultural perspective rather than a SLI perspective. The UAL MEC agreed to “pretend” that CAL was not intending to use the JCBA against our pilots in the SLI process, and then consider what the JNC produced. The JNC came back in two days and presented a tentative pay rate proposal. That proposal was clearly more akin to CAL’s banding preference than to UAL’s un-banding preference, and it grouped aircraft types together in a way that did not seem necessarily appropriate. The proposal was, however, the product of compromise on both sides, and compromise is the way forward. In addition, the proposal would still likely undergo revisions during negotiations with the company. In the spirit of compromise, the UAL MEC approved the proposal with the condition that the CAL MEC agree to “carve-out” any JCBA agreements from the SLI process (as was done between the DAL and NWA pilots). The UAL MEC reported this agreement to the pilots in its October 15th communication. Again the answer from the CAL MEC was clear and unambiguous- No.



For now, the UAL Executive Vice President intends to floor a resolution to the ALPA Executive Council at its next meeting, and ask the Council to rule on the interpretation of ALPA Merger Policy with regard to the separation of JCBA negotiations and the SLI process. This interpretation may provide the first step in clearing the air on this issue. The UAL MEC believes that separating the JCBA and SLI process allows the JNCs to negotiate the best possible JCBA for the merged pilot group without the outside distraction or temptation of interjecting parameters that supposedly might later influence the SLI arbitration (if the SLI goes to arbitration). This resolution does not harm nor advantage either party, and follows the precedent set by the DAL and NWA pilots during their successful merger. We expect to hear from the Executive Council in the near future.



Unfortunately, it is no longer fair to say that this issue does not induce some minimal delay in the JCBA process, and that is a true tragedy. The MEC’s caution and patience, however, is well warranted. While this issue is better managed discreetly, it is clear that the pilots deserve a factual explanation of the events to date. It is also clear that the CAL MEC has not been discreet about these issues with their pilots. In fact, some of our own UAL representatives receive emails from CAL pilots openly discussing these issues (albeit from a CAL-centric perspective), and sources report that CAL openly discusses these issues during council meetings and conference calls. Last week our Master Chairman published a letter to the UAL pilots that succinctly and factually explained the issues that prevent the UAL and CAL MECs from agreeing to an entire pay rate proposal for our Joint Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Master Chairman’s letter is careful to be factually correct and not judgmental, but it is not bashful with the facts. The next day, the CAL master Chairman published a rebuttal letter to the CAL pilots making several statements intended to “clear up some of the many inaccuracies in yesterday’s UAL communications.” The CAL Master Chairman’s statements, set out below in italics, warrant examination:



We are taken to task for being honest about our intent to hold firm in our insistence that a fair and equitable seniority list integration process be followed. They cry foul that we have adamantly held that ALPA merger policy must be adhered to and that the Protocol agreement agreed to by both MECs be followed in its entirety.



The UAL MEC seeks the same goals. The CAL Master Chairman’s earlier quotes concerning the ALPA Merger Policy dispute resolution process, however, speak for themselves- and to the many witnesses in attendance. The UAL MEC also agrees that the Protocol Agreement must be followed. CAL believes that “adherence” and “followed in its entirety” means no other agreements are allowed or appropriate- a position contradicted by the DAL and NWA example.



We were told several months ago by UAL MEC members that they had passed a resolution mandating that the B-747 be given premier aircraft status when the aircraft pay groupings were designed. In short, the UAL MEC wanted the B-747 to be the singular aircraft in the highest aircraft category for pay purposes.



This is factually incorrect; no such resolution exists. Based upon extensive pilot surveys conducted prior to the merger, the UAL MEC did direct its Negotiating Committee to un-band the bankruptcy-banded pay rates on all aircraft, and that guidance carried into the JCBA guidance. That resolution was not specific to the 747 aircraft (or any other aircraft), and the above statement by the CAL Master Chairman is provably false.

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Old 11-16-2010, 02:54 PM   #3  
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(continued)


We had different ideas and insisted that an approach that created the most pay for the most pilots be considered.



This statement infers that the UAL MEC’s position is irrational because it lowers the pilots’ pay. This article is not intended to debate the merits of banding or un-banding pay rates; however, for those familiar with contract negotiations and the arguments for and against banding, the above statement carries little weight. Most negotiators recognize that every CBA has a finite financial value, and the corporation is willing to accept a certain financial cost for a contract. For every CBA, the financial “pie” is only so big, and different pay schemes do not affect the size of that pie, only its distribution. If, as in the CAL model, paying a smaller airplane at a pay rate equal to a larger airplane “creates the most pay,” then where does that money come from? While banded pay rates may reduce training events and produce minimal cost savings and theoretical benefits to a contract, these benefits cost-out marginally. Most experienced negotiators reject the idea that banding pay rates somehow creates a significantly larger financial pie. More importantly, the statement above intends to imply that the UAL MEC’s position for un-banding is not rational because it supposedly creates less pay for pilots- and that inference is not correct.



…we favored allowing the Joint Negotiating Committee to work, unfettered by SLI considerations, on a solution that would be best suited for all CAL and UAL pilots.



The UAL MEC did direct its negotiators to produce a proposal while pretending that SLI issues do not exist, but the UAL MEC cannot rationalize the CAL MEC’s statements at the September meeting and naively pretend that they are “un-pregnant” with SLI concerns. The CAL MEC now accepts the JNC’s work “without SLI considerations” because the JNC’s unpassed proposal included SLI parameters that CAL desires.



The JNC agreed on the solution, the two MEC chairs agreed on the solution and the CAL MEC agreed on the solution. The UAL MEC said no.



The solution partially reflects the CAL banding position, and the UAL MEC was prepared to move forward with this solution (despite some unusual banding compromises), as long as the CAL MEC agreed not to use our willingness to move forward against us in the SLI process. The CAL MEC rejected that compromise.



The problem rests solely with the UAL MEC and their insistence that the compensation proposal enhance their SLI argument.



To further complicate matters, the UAL MEC has proposed a resolution to the ALPA Executive Council suggesting that the Council mandate that the JCBA cannot be used in the SLI arbitration.



These two statements are contradictory. The UAL MEC’s proposed resolution suggests that neither party should use the compensation proposal to enhance an SLI argument. In a related comment, the letter states:



The CAL MEC is upholding our agreement – to leave the SLI and JCBA as separate processes. To carve out pay rates (or anything else for that matter), would be the antithesis of those agreements.



The facts and events make it very clear that the best way to ensure that SLI considerations do not taint the JCBA process is to put it in writing with a “carve-out.” Such an agreement is a natural complement to the earlier agreements with a successful precedent in the DAL and NWA merger.



This issue is not centric to the B-747 as reported by the CAL Master Chairman and more recently by the press. Instead, it is about the entire pay structure on the combined fleets of both airlines. More importantly, it is about keeping the SLI process out of JCBA negotiations and not holding the JCBA hostage to supposedly advance one side’s position over the other. A union-family squabble in the midst of JCBA negotiations is not ideal, but prompt solutions do exist. As in most consequential matters, reason and rational are usually not the first and loudest to speak, but if enough listen when they do come forward, they usually carry the day. The UAL and CAL MECs will find a timely solution, and the pilots will become united; we do not have any other choice.
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Old 11-16-2010, 07:11 PM   #4  
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Default Age and longevity.

As much as I respect the effort and thought that went into Rob's analysis, he has utterly and wholly missed the central issue. If one reads the Nicolau decision as well as the counter analysis of the independent pilot, one finds that time and again the US Air pilots came back to the fact that a pilot hired in 1988, who was furloughed at the time of the merger, would end up behind a two year hire at Am West. Two decades of "longevity" were trounced by two years of what? or so the US Air thinking went. No amount of economic reality could help US Air's pilot group come to terms with the "unfairness" of that dichotomy.

The current UAL/CAL situation in no way compares. From the stand point of an independent viewer we are much like DAL/NW except that our "ratios" are not quite as similar. Both MECs need to do their utmost to advocate in favor of their pilot group and if the CAL MEC chooses to grandstand now and again who can blame them since they have fewer pilots and fewer wide bodies.
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Old 11-16-2010, 07:19 PM   #5  
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Originally Posted by Sunvox View Post
As much as I respect the effort and thought that went into Rob's analysis, he has utterly and wholly missed the central issue. If one reads the Nicolau decision as well as the counter analysis of the independent pilot, one finds that time and again the US Air pilots came back to the fact that a pilot hired in 1988 who was furloughed at the time of the merger would end up behind a two year hire at Am West. Two decades of "longevity" were trounced by two years of what? or so the US Air thinking went. No amount of economic reality could help US Air's pilot group come to terms with the "unfairness" of that dichotomy.

The current UAL/CAL situation in no way compares. From the stand point of an independent viewer we are much like DAL/NW except that our "ratios" are not quite as similar. Both MECs need to do their utmost to advocate in favor of their pilot group and if the CAL MEC chooses to grandstand now and again who can blame them since they have fewer pilots and fewer wide bodies.
Ratios of what? Furloughed pilots to active pilots? Or ratio of active pilots receiving higher payrates than the other airline?
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Old 11-16-2010, 07:22 PM   #6  
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Default Slice of pie.

Oh and yeah I forgot . . . it has nothing to do with JCBA/SLI/FAA/POS/***?.

It is all about gettin' your slice of the pie, and the boys at CAL are doin' the best they can to get their slice and our MEC better be doin' all they can to get their slice since nothin' they do is gonna make the pie any bigger, but it could make the pie a whole lot smaller if they don't start working together at some point.
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Old 11-16-2010, 07:25 PM   #7  
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Ratios of what? Furloughed pilots to active pilots? Or ratio of active pilots receiving higher payrates than the other airline?


Ewwwww! I smell a debate!


And pray tell young padawhan (is that the right spelling?!) where in any document does one find mention of current pay scales in reference to ALPA merger policy or the UAL/CAL TA?
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Old 11-16-2010, 07:42 PM   #8  
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Default Payscales.

Dear Mr. Arbitrator,

On the day the merger occurred, I was earning a mere $109 per hour as compared to $116 an hour for my compadres at CAL, but I just know that my MEC was working diligently on my behalf, and I am certain that I would have been returned to my original pay of over $150 that I received in 2001 before those fateful days that everyone in America remembers. I, of course, do feel sorry for my poor CAL brothers who have always sold themselves short, but I am certain that had we not merged I would have had a much better life style with a much higher pay rate than my poor enslaved CAL brethren and I hope you will bear that in mind when you consider where to position my humble little "butt" in your great new list.

Sincerely,

Ima Grubb, IAD-FO
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Old 11-16-2010, 08:39 PM   #9  
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IMO, there is one major difference when looking at this SLI...UAL pilots were absolutely furloughed to pave the way for this merger, that is a fact. Whether it will be treated as a fact when the time comes and how this will be viewed by an arbitrator, no one really knows.

This key difference is the thing that bugs me most when I'm told UAL furloughees deserve to be stapled, that we had no career expectations. Thanks for that pearl of wisdom, but if weren't for this merger, I wouldn't have been furloughed. While it's true, there would have been some furloughs (just like there were at CAL), it never would have gone as deep as it did. It irks me that so few people at CAL are even willing to acknowledge how it went down, and yet, when the final furloughs were announced at UAL, some CAL folks chimed in on this very board "so now the merger?" So clearly, at the time, some folks understood that the stage was set. Why is it so hard to admit it now?

No, no one is blaming CAL pilots for the plot, (or the merger) that blame clearly falls on management's doorstep, but why is it so hard to admit that many UAL furloughees were sacrificial lambs? And seriously, if I have to hear one more time how eager and excited UAL folks were for this merger to happen, I just might puke. Why don't you ask the 1437 that question?

When it comes down to it, I'm not going to sweat what the SLI ends up looking like, it will be as it will be and it will probably look like a staple, oh well, that's life. But will someone please tell me why folks can't admit that is how it went down?

When, and if, I'm ever back in the cockpit at UAL, and I find myself flying with former CAL folks, I can assure you I will never be resentful, bitter or crappy to you, you did not create this mess. Having said that, a little empathy on your part goes a long way.

Last edited by SKMarz; 11-16-2010 at 08:42 PM. Reason: typo
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Old 11-16-2010, 08:51 PM   #10  
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Having said that, a little empathy on your part goes a long way.


SK,


You are right. Sleep well knowing you couldn't have done anything different, and deep down everyone knows you're right. Plus here's a small bonus, if we ever fly together I'm buying all the beers


Joe Peck - 164511
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