Delta 747 adventures
07-03-2015, 09:16 PM
#13
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Originally Posted by gringo
While I'm not gonna comment on the first guy's decision to penetrate a thunderstorm simply because he wasn't given clearance not to, at first glance, it would appear that the Amsterdam crew probably did the right thing in delaying the landing.
Had there actually been a fire (and not just a perpetual indication of one) there would have been secondary clues that the cabin crew would have easily been able to detect; heat, smoke, something. If there had been a fire that was unextinguishable even when flooded with halon, both of those clues would have been present in abundance.
Had the airplane actually been on fire I'm certain the crew would have landed, but barring any actual evidence of a fire, they more than likely deduced (correctly) that it was an erroneous warning, and elected to continue dumping fuel in order to prevent another accident associated with a grossly overweight landing, but fully prepared to put it on the ground should actual smoke or heat have been detected by the cabin crew.
Had there actually been a fire (and not just a perpetual indication of one) there would have been secondary clues that the cabin crew would have easily been able to detect; heat, smoke, something. If there had been a fire that was unextinguishable even when flooded with halon, both of those clues would have been present in abundance.
Had the airplane actually been on fire I'm certain the crew would have landed, but barring any actual evidence of a fire, they more than likely deduced (correctly) that it was an erroneous warning, and elected to continue dumping fuel in order to prevent another accident associated with a grossly overweight landing, but fully prepared to put it on the ground should actual smoke or heat have been detected by the cabin crew.
Can a 747 not land overweight?
Cargo fires in a 747 usually haven't ended well. South African 747 combi, Asiana cargo 747, UPS 747, all ended up in fatal crashes. Although a fully pax jet is a different story than a freighter, does the pax airline carry hazmat? Is it loaded in that cargo bin? There are too many questions to just assume there's no fire. And if your gauge for measuring is cabin crew finding smoke or fire in the cabin, from a fire source originating in the cargo bin, by then you are already in serious trouble.
07-03-2015, 09:26 PM
#14
Da Hudge
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Position: Poodle Whisperer
Posts: 17,473
Originally Posted by Smokey23
According to this article, it appears that the recently unretired 744 was the Shannon aircraft!
Delta's unretired NWA Boeing 747 makes emergency landing in Ireland - Minneapolis / St. Paul Business Journal
Delta's unretired NWA Boeing 747 makes emergency landing in Ireland - Minneapolis / St. Paul Business Journal
07-04-2015, 01:06 AM
#16
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2005
Position: Under the Frog
Posts: 1,125
Originally Posted by ShyGuy
A Swissair crew tried that, it didn't go well.
Can a 747 not land overweight?
Cargo fires in a 747 usually haven't ended well. South African 747 combi, Asiana cargo 747, UPS 747, all ended up in fatal crashes. Although a fully pax jet is a different story than a freighter, does the pax airline carry hazmat? Is it loaded in that cargo bin? There are too many questions to just assume there's no fire. And if your gauge for measuring is cabin crew finding smoke or fire in the cabin, from a fire source originating in the cargo bin, by then you are already in serious trouble.
Can a 747 not land overweight?
Cargo fires in a 747 usually haven't ended well. South African 747 combi, Asiana cargo 747, UPS 747, all ended up in fatal crashes. Although a fully pax jet is a different story than a freighter, does the pax airline carry hazmat? Is it loaded in that cargo bin? There are too many questions to just assume there's no fire. And if your gauge for measuring is cabin crew finding smoke or fire in the cabin, from a fire source originating in the cargo bin, by then you are already in serious trouble.
I don't know which model aircraft this was, so we'll just be using generic Boeing numbers of MTOW of 910,000# and MLW of 652,000#. Right there there's a difference of 258,000#.
Assuming the aircraft took off near max takeoff weight and flew for less than two hours, burning 25,000pph, that still leaves an additional 200,000 that needed to be dealt with before a safe landing could be made. All of it in the form of highly flammable liquid, which tends to get messy when getting spread out on a runway at 140 knots due to ruptured fuel lines and broken wings and whatnot.
Boeing builds them good, but not 200,000 additional pounds good.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not. You can pop an engine on Fifi at MTOW, turn around and land overweight; it's just a logbook entry (plus associated maintenance inspections.)
You try that stunt on a widebody and people will die. Ever try to evacuate an airplane when it's surrounded by burning jet fuel?
You mentioned a list of cargo fire incidents, pointing out that they all ended poorly, and you're correct they did. But they all had one glaring difference to this particular Delta flight; they all had indication of fire followed by confirmation of fire.
The Delta flight only had indication of fire. At this time there is no evidence to support a theory that there was actual smoke, heat or associated other smells that would confirm the fire indication.
It's not a question of simply "assuming" that there's no fire. Fire produces heat and smoke, and lots of it. If there had been a fire both would have been present in the cabin (and flight deck) and the aircraft would have diverted for an immediate landing. (This was a U.S. trained crew after all; had it been an Asian crew then all bets are off.)
Since we don't know what the actual weights were for takeoff, it's safe to assume that this particular flight was anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 pounds over max landing weight during the incident.
It appears the captain did exactly the right thing delaying the landing, as there was no confirmation of fire, at any time. Had just one of the flight attendants smelled smoke or felt heat, or the flight crew detected smoke in the cockpit, the captain would have risked an overweight landing no doubt. But by getting no positive confirmation of fire, he did the right thing and prevented a potential landing catastrophe.
As for your last comment,
Originally Posted by ShyGuy
And if your gauge for measuring is cabin crew finding smoke or fire in the cabin, from a fire source originating in the cargo bin, by then you are already in serious trouble.
Last edited by gringo; 07-04-2015 at 01:22 AM.
07-04-2015, 02:14 AM
#17
You scratched my anchor
Joined APC: Feb 2011
Posts: 4,876
Originally Posted by gringo
There's a big difference between landing an A320 overweight and an overweight 747-400.
I don't know which model aircraft this was, so we'll just be using generic Boeing numbers of MTOW of 910,000# and MLW of 652,000#. Right there there's a difference of 258,000#.
Assuming the aircraft took off near max takeoff weight and flew for less than two hours, burning 25,000pph, that still leaves an additional 200,000 that needed to be dealt with before a safe landing could be made. All of it in the form of highly flammable liquid, which tends to get messy when getting spread out on a runway at 140 knots due to ruptured fuel lines and broken wings and whatnot.
Boeing builds them good, but not 200,000 additional pounds good.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not. You can pop an engine on Fifi at MTOW, turn around and land overweight; it's just a logbook entry (plus associated maintenance inspections.)
You try that stunt on a widebody and people will die. Ever try to evacuate an airplane when it's surrounded by burning jet fuel?
You mentioned a list of cargo fire incidents, pointing out that they all ended poorly, and you're correct they did. But they all had one glaring difference to this particular Delta flight; they all had indication of fire followed by confirmation of fire.
The Delta flight only had indication of fire. At this time there is no evidence to support a theory that there was actual smoke, heat or associated other smells that would confirm the fire indication.
It's not a question of simply "assuming" that there's no fire. Fire produces heat and smoke, and lots of it. If there had been a fire both would have been present in the cabin (and flight deck) and the aircraft would have diverted for an immediate landing. (This was a U.S. trained crew after all; had it been an Asian crew then all bets are off.)
Since we don't know what the actual weights were for takeoff, it's safe to assume that this particular flight was anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 pounds over max landing weight during the incident.
It appears the captain did exactly the right thing delaying the landing, as there was no confirmation of fire, at any time. Had just one of the flight attendants smelled smoke or felt heat, or the flight crew detected smoke in the cockpit, the captain would have risked an overweight landing no doubt. But by getting no positive confirmation of fire, he did the right thing and prevented a potential landing catastrophe.
As for your last comment,
That my friend, is called effective use of CRM. Using all available resources to make a decision, not just a flashing light in the cockpit.
I don't know which model aircraft this was, so we'll just be using generic Boeing numbers of MTOW of 910,000# and MLW of 652,000#. Right there there's a difference of 258,000#.
Assuming the aircraft took off near max takeoff weight and flew for less than two hours, burning 25,000pph, that still leaves an additional 200,000 that needed to be dealt with before a safe landing could be made. All of it in the form of highly flammable liquid, which tends to get messy when getting spread out on a runway at 140 knots due to ruptured fuel lines and broken wings and whatnot.
Boeing builds them good, but not 200,000 additional pounds good.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not. You can pop an engine on Fifi at MTOW, turn around and land overweight; it's just a logbook entry (plus associated maintenance inspections.)
You try that stunt on a widebody and people will die. Ever try to evacuate an airplane when it's surrounded by burning jet fuel?
You mentioned a list of cargo fire incidents, pointing out that they all ended poorly, and you're correct they did. But they all had one glaring difference to this particular Delta flight; they all had indication of fire followed by confirmation of fire.
The Delta flight only had indication of fire. At this time there is no evidence to support a theory that there was actual smoke, heat or associated other smells that would confirm the fire indication.
It's not a question of simply "assuming" that there's no fire. Fire produces heat and smoke, and lots of it. If there had been a fire both would have been present in the cabin (and flight deck) and the aircraft would have diverted for an immediate landing. (This was a U.S. trained crew after all; had it been an Asian crew then all bets are off.)
Since we don't know what the actual weights were for takeoff, it's safe to assume that this particular flight was anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 pounds over max landing weight during the incident.
It appears the captain did exactly the right thing delaying the landing, as there was no confirmation of fire, at any time. Had just one of the flight attendants smelled smoke or felt heat, or the flight crew detected smoke in the cockpit, the captain would have risked an overweight landing no doubt. But by getting no positive confirmation of fire, he did the right thing and prevented a potential landing catastrophe.
As for your last comment,
That my friend, is called effective use of CRM. Using all available resources to make a decision, not just a flashing light in the cockpit.
07-04-2015, 03:42 AM
#18
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Originally Posted by gringo
There's a big difference between landing an A320 overweight and an overweight 747-400.
I don't know which model aircraft this was, so we'll just be using generic Boeing numbers of MTOW of 910,000# and MLW of 652,000#. Right there there's a difference of 258,000#.
Assuming the aircraft took off near max takeoff weight and flew for less than two hours, burning 25,000pph, that still leaves an additional 200,000 that needed to be dealt with before a safe landing could be made. All of it in the form of highly flammable liquid, which tends to get messy when getting spread out on a runway at 140 knots due to ruptured fuel lines and broken wings and whatnot.
Boeing builds them good, but not 200,000 additional pounds good.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not. You can pop an engine on Fifi at MTOW, turn around and land overweight; it's just a logbook entry (plus associated maintenance inspections.)
You try that stunt on a widebody and people will die. Ever try to evacuate an airplane when it's surrounded by burning jet fuel?
You mentioned a list of cargo fire incidents, pointing out that they all ended poorly, and you're correct they did. But they all had one glaring difference to this particular Delta flight; they all had indication of fire followed by confirmation of fire.
The Delta flight only had indication of fire. At this time there is no evidence to support a theory that there was actual smoke, heat or associated other smells that would confirm the fire indication.
It's not a question of simply "assuming" that there's no fire. Fire produces heat and smoke, and lots of it. If there had been a fire both would have been present in the cabin (and flight deck) and the aircraft would have diverted for an immediate landing. (This was a U.S. trained crew after all; had it been an Asian crew then all bets are off.)
Since we don't know what the actual weights were for takeoff, it's safe to assume that this particular flight was anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 pounds over max landing weight during the incident.
It appears the captain did exactly the right thing delaying the landing, as there was no confirmation of fire, at any time. Had just one of the flight attendants smelled smoke or felt heat, or the flight crew detected smoke in the cockpit, the captain would have risked an overweight landing no doubt. But by getting no positive confirmation of fire, he did the right thing and prevented a potential landing catastrophe.
As for your last comment,
That my friend, is called effective use of CRM. Using all available resources to make a decision, not just a flashing light in the cockpit.
I don't know which model aircraft this was, so we'll just be using generic Boeing numbers of MTOW of 910,000# and MLW of 652,000#. Right there there's a difference of 258,000#.
Assuming the aircraft took off near max takeoff weight and flew for less than two hours, burning 25,000pph, that still leaves an additional 200,000 that needed to be dealt with before a safe landing could be made. All of it in the form of highly flammable liquid, which tends to get messy when getting spread out on a runway at 140 knots due to ruptured fuel lines and broken wings and whatnot.
Boeing builds them good, but not 200,000 additional pounds good.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not. You can pop an engine on Fifi at MTOW, turn around and land overweight; it's just a logbook entry (plus associated maintenance inspections.)
You try that stunt on a widebody and people will die. Ever try to evacuate an airplane when it's surrounded by burning jet fuel?
You mentioned a list of cargo fire incidents, pointing out that they all ended poorly, and you're correct they did. But they all had one glaring difference to this particular Delta flight; they all had indication of fire followed by confirmation of fire.
The Delta flight only had indication of fire. At this time there is no evidence to support a theory that there was actual smoke, heat or associated other smells that would confirm the fire indication.
It's not a question of simply "assuming" that there's no fire. Fire produces heat and smoke, and lots of it. If there had been a fire both would have been present in the cabin (and flight deck) and the aircraft would have diverted for an immediate landing. (This was a U.S. trained crew after all; had it been an Asian crew then all bets are off.)
Since we don't know what the actual weights were for takeoff, it's safe to assume that this particular flight was anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 pounds over max landing weight during the incident.
It appears the captain did exactly the right thing delaying the landing, as there was no confirmation of fire, at any time. Had just one of the flight attendants smelled smoke or felt heat, or the flight crew detected smoke in the cockpit, the captain would have risked an overweight landing no doubt. But by getting no positive confirmation of fire, he did the right thing and prevented a potential landing catastrophe.
As for your last comment,
That my friend, is called effective use of CRM. Using all available resources to make a decision, not just a flashing light in the cockpit.
My comment was tongue in cheek regarding landing above max landing weight.
You're being dramatic without acknowledging what is required for certification of an aircraft. What are you talking about "not 200,000 lbs" good? An aircraft that comes a smoking pile landing at close to max landing weight will not be certified. Observing the published flap speeds, recommended flap setting, appropriate approach speed, and minimal sink rate (grease it on) at touchdown...
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...icle_03_3.html
"
Overweight landings are safe because of the conservatism required in the design of transport category airplanes by FAR Part 25.
FAR criteria require that landing gear design be based on:
* A sink rate of 10 feet per second at the maximum design landing weight; and
* A sink rate of 6 feet per second at the maximum design takeoff weight.
Typical sink rates at touchdown are on the order of 2 to 3 feet per second, and even a “hard” landing rarely exceeds 6 feet per second. Additionally, the landing loads are based on the worst possible landing attitudes resulting in high loading on individual gear. The 747-400 provides an excellent example. The 747-400 body gear, which are the most aft main gear, are designed to a 12-degree nose-up body attitude condition. In essence, the body gear can absorb the entire landing load. The wing gear criteria are similarly stringent: 8 degrees roll at 0 degrees pitch. Other models are also capable of landing at maximum design takeoff weight, even in unfavorable attitudes at sink rates up to 6 feet per second. This is amply demonstrated during certification testing, when many landings are performed within 1 percent of maximum design takeoff weight.
When landing near the maximum takeoff weight, flap placard speeds at landing flap positions must be observed. Due to the conservative criteria used in establishing flap placard speeds, Boeing models have ample approach speed margins at weights up to the maximum takeoff weight (see fig. 1).
"
Boeing builds them good, but not 200,000 additional pounds good.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not.
Which is why the Whale has fuel dump valves and Fifi does not.
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...icle_03_2.html
FAR 25.1001 — Requires a fuel jettison system unless it can be shown that the airplane meets the climb requirements of FAR 25.119 and 25.121(d) at maximum takeoff weight, less the actual or computed weight of fuel necessary for a 15-minute flight comprising a takeoff, go-around, and landing at the airport of departure.
To comply with FAR 24.1001, the 747 and MD-11, for example, require a fuel jettison system. Some models, such as the 777 and some 767 airplanes have a fuel jettison system installed, but it is not required by FAR. Other models such as the DC-9, 717, 737, 757, and MD-80/90 do not require, or do not have, a fuel jettison system based on compliance with FAR Part 25.119 and 25.121(d).
It appears the captain did exactly the right thing delaying the landing, as there was no confirmation of fire, at any time. Had just one of the flight attendants smelled smoke or felt heat, or the flight crew detected smoke in the cockpit, the captain would have risked an overweight landing no doubt. But by getting no positive confirmation of fire, he did the right thing and prevented a potential landing catastrophe.
As for your last comment,
That my friend, is called effective use of CRM. Using all available resources to make a decision, not just a flashing light in the cockpit.
As for your last comment,
That my friend, is called effective use of CRM. Using all available resources to make a decision, not just a flashing light in the cockpit.
07-04-2015, 05:11 AM
#19
Line Holder
Joined APC: Sep 2014
Posts: 47
Gringo, I think Shy makes some pretty good points here. With a fire indication and an actual fire, 5 minutes could mean losing the ability to control the airplane. Whereas an overweight landing if executed properly should cause hot brakes and some MX inspections, not a burning catastrophe. I'm not second guessing the crew because I wasn't there, but isn't the overweight landing scenario you're describing a little bit dramatic?
Also maybe some whale drivers can chime in here, but a 74 doing a trans Atlantic wouldn't be that heavy (relatively) would it?
-HP
Also maybe some whale drivers can chime in here, but a 74 doing a trans Atlantic wouldn't be that heavy (relatively) would it?
-HP
07-04-2015, 06:48 AM
#20
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jul 2009
Posts: 82
Originally Posted by Hotel Pen
Also maybe some whale drivers can chime in here, but a 74 doing a trans Atlantic wouldn't be that heavy (relatively) would it?
-HP
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