The report is 34 pages. Here's the first one:
April 8, 1998
Background
In December of 1996, the MEC passed a resolution forming a Negotiations Review Committee. The MEC’s direction to the Committee was clear—they wanted a comprehensive, full-disclosure report of the most recent Delta Pilot Contract Negotiations concluded in May of 1996. MEC Chairman (redacted) appointed a three pilot committee. Acting as a confirmed member of the Negotiations Review Committee, I was thereby empowered by the MEC to perform this review. Following 9 months of effort, the Committee Chairman issued a verbal report during the October 1997 MEC meeting which, I believe, fell short of fulfilling the Committee’s obligation to the MEC, and ultimately, the Delta Pilots. After presenting the report the Committee resigned.
In this report, information and analysis is tied together through a historical review. My research included extensive written documentation and 128 interviews throughout all levels of the ALPA structure, from National officers to Line Pilots. Conclusions derive from the preponderance of circumstantial evidence and testimony. Hopefully, individual readers will weigh the information and develop their own perspective. I urge special attention to the series of recommendations at the end of the report.
Many interviewees were extremely candid and deserve our thanks for their willingness to selflessly give their time. In this report, I upheld the Committee’s promise to hold confidential sources of information. Perhaps at a later date, a fully supported investigation will interview participants under oath. I believe we can best move forward as a Union by honestly confronting our past, learning the lessons, and making changes where necessary.
Executive Summary
The Delta Pilots concluded the 1996 Negotiations arguably possessing the most favorable negotiating leverage presented any Pilot group post-Deregulation. Five consecutive quarters of record corporate profits, Management raises, upbeat analyst’s projections, a Democrat in the White House and an Atlanta Summer Olympics all pointed toward a truly progressive Agreement. Many industry observers expected the Delta Contract to lead the Piloting profession toward substantial gains. In the aftermath, the Amended Contract is clearly the most concessionary witnessed on the Delta property–this report addresses why.
Overwhelming circumstantial evidence and testimony indicates that the Delta Pilots were ill-served by specific individuals, in positions to control the negotiating process, for philosophical and personal financial reason. The MEC Chairman, Negotiating Committee Chairman, Retirement & Insurance Chairman and a senior Negotiating Committee Member had a significant Conflict of Interest, which they substantially withheld from the MEC and Pilot Group for the duration of the Negotiations. Management joined the Pilot Negotiator’s in severely limiting public understanding and discussion of the Negotiation’s dominant focus.
The MEC Chairman was allowed to define standard negotiating procedures and used distinctive methodologies to conceal concessions and personal gains. Standard analysis was denied to the MEC and staff reports were directed toward supporting concessionary bargaining. Neither the Pilots nor the MEC was provided accurate data showing the Amendment’s cost in jobs, working conditions and wages.
The structure, magnitude and negotiability of retirement provisions associated with the Pre-72 Minimum Benefit were misrepresented and withheld from the MEC. The Amended Contract substantially enhanced the retirement benefits of a few Pilots, who subsequently retired, at enormous cost to those who remained. Protection of key individual’s retirement benefits underlies virtually all aspects of the 1996 Negotiations.
The MEC failed to exercise its responsibility to ensure a balanced and equitable Contract. While the corporation was able to achieve specific concessions with rapid implementation, promised contractual improvements went largely unrealized. The majority of the contract language dealing with pilot issues was unwritten at the time of ratification. After contract ratification and during the crafting of the final language, disagreements and dissatisfaction with the final product reflected the MEC’s shallow understanding of what had been negotiated, while bringing into question the accuracy of details provided to the MEC and the pilot group by the negotiators and MEC officers.
The pilot group as a whole failed in their responsibility to make an informed ratification decision and to hold their elected representatives accountable. Early and repeated alarms from members who questioned the direction of Negotiations went unheeded. Members who persisted in questioning the MEC Leadership and Negotiators at Local Council meetings were rebuffed by their Leadership and ignored by their fellow council members. The lack of contractual language prior to ratification gave little cause for concern. Only during the implementation stage did the rank and file members recognize the impact of what they had ratified.
The report concludes with a series of Findings and Recommendations.
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In fairness, this report was highly controversial. There are those who disagreed.
There is also at least 2 "rebuttals" to Ryan that defend the DALPA administration.
AIRLINEPILOT CENTRAL