Originally Posted by
slowplay
I know folks who have. See the additional info in the follow-on post to FtB.
Of course he does, so do you and I. Those who watch Bill Swelbar, can follow the changes in his blog posts:
The Delta Nuance
The Delta PWA was negotiated under the watchful eye and focused leadership of Captain Lee Moak. I have written about Capt. Moak many times. What seems to set Moak apart is an understanding the industry has undergone significant structural change and the Delta agreement needs to embrace that change. For example, because Delta serves many small and medium-sized markets in the U.S., there are few limits on the use of regional jets 76 seats and smaller. Continental is the only legacy carrier that does not permit use of regional jets with more than 50 seats. This line in the sand keeps Continental at a domestic competitive disadvantage relative to the industry.
Mainline pilot scope has been quite the topic here at
Aviation Articles and Commentary - Swelblog / Swelbar on Airlines over the past week. Some have suggested I drew the line – or heard what they wanted to hear - at 50 seats. I did not. To me the line begins with the next generation of small jets that are bigger than the current aircraft platforms doing 76 seat-and-less flying within networks. The domestic scope issue is but one scope concern at Continental. The real issue of significance is that Continental cannot implement the joint venture with United, Air Canada and Lufthansa without the relaxation of language contained in the existing Continental pilot agreement. There is a regulatory deadline to complete aspects of the joint venture and anti-trust immunity agreements. Scope is not just domestic.
This is where the Continental situation gets a little murky. Moak understands that the globalization of the airline industry will drive his carrier’s success. Further, he demonstrated his understanding of such when he negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement for the merged Delta and Northwest pilots. Moak accomplished something extraordinary in the history of merger negotiations in the U.S. airline industry.
Originally Posted by Bill Swelbar, 16 June 2011
Last month I had the honor of being invited by Wolfe Trahan’s Hunter Keay to participate on a Labor and Policy Panel at the firm’s Global Transportation Conference. I shared the dais with Dave Bates, President of the Allied Pilots Association; Lee Moak, President of the Air Line Pilots Association; and Sharon Pinkerton, Senior Vice President for Legislative and Regulatory Policy at the Air Transport Association.
and we watch Swelbar's published opinions continue to morph.
Originally Posted by Bel Swelbar
Airline unions are just like the airline companies before restructuring; trying to be everything to everyone. Unions have become too democratic. Decision paralysis creeps in because an agreement must satisfy so many disparate interests – at least in the eyes of the leadership who may represent workers with a wide variety of skills, experience and education. With few exceptions at the local levels, airline union leadership simply does not lead. Rather they succumb to the pressures of the most vocal factions.
Unions need to start relying on professionals at the negotiations table who have an ability to divorce themselves from the rhetoric and the politics and instead focus on reaching agreement. They need to lengthen the terms of their elected leaders so that leaders will be less likely to overpromise during their campaigns and be accountable to members for the hard work of negotiations. Anyone can make bold promises. Real leaders set realistic expectations and perform accordingly.
This type of internal chaos every two years can occur because the union, at least in collective bargaining, is a monopolist. Monopolists have power. But the days of union monopolies wielding power as in the past are quickly coming to an end... .
... We accuse Swelbar of becoming a management shrill. Go way back, look at his posts, and figure out for yourself.
http://www.swelblog.com/