I see your point as to how it turned out.

I think it's a "Crandallism" to say that "market share automatically leads to profitability." Under his tutelage, he would go head to head with smaller carriers in smaller markets just to drive them out of business. Selling fares below cost. (Virgin America is doing it as we speak out of DFW.) I also believe he thought it wise, and maybe the numbers showed it at the time, that by buying up smaller carriers, like the ones you mentioned, that you could reduce the total seats available and at the same time control the pricing power of that market. It was further exemplified by the multiple hub system he built up over the years. SJC, BNA and RDU were built up, then largely abandoned, except for code share, while AMR still controlled the gates. For a short while I lived in the RDU area, and I remember flying into BNA after the pull out. The AMR gates were a ghost town, while the rest of the airports was hopping.

You might say that Crandall built up expectations over his years at the head of AMR. Unions negotiated under those expectations and so did management. When they haven't come to pass, the "survivors" are left holding the bag. The TWA acquisition timed with 9/11 was a knock-down combination that's also greatly contributed. Obviously, the long-term strategy hasn't worked out so well.