Originally Posted by
ColdWhiskey
I am an FO at a major airline with over 10K hours. I have flown both as FO and Captain at a regional airline before my current employment.
My posts may seem elementary to you, because that is exactly what this accident was. It was an elementary mistake and improper reaction to the stall by the crew.
Stall recognition and recovery IS elementary. It doesn't matter if the airplane is a Cessna, Bombardier, or Boeing.
I did reference in my earlier post that I believed training was a contributing factor. I have always thought the method previously trained at some of the regionals (no altitude loss while respecting the shaker) was incorrect training. I have witnessed some ugly stall demonstations in the CRJ sim where the stick pusher was pushing and the pilot was pulling. An ugly oscillation resulted and always with very excessive altitude loss and sometimes a crash. It is unfortunate that loss of lives had to occur before that training was changed.
I know that fatigue is a very real concern for all of us, and some reform is necessary in our work and rest rules. I also believe fatigue has been a contributing factor in many airline accidents, I just do not believe it was an issue in this one. I fully understand how important it is to be rested when you report for work. It is my understanding that this was the first leg of the trip for this crew (I could be wrong). If this was the case, these individuals bear the responsibility to report to work in a rested condition. If they did not, this was a disservice to the passengers they were paid to serve.
With that said, I still believe that poor airmanship and poor training were responsible for this accident. Once the stall occurred, adrenaline and training kick in. Crying "fatigue" is just a scapegoat to the real issues that caused this accident that need to be addressed.
I apoligize for my participation in this thread drift. If anyone wants to further debate the Colgan accident, please direct me to the proper thread to participate.
No.
Your earlier post volunteers that the fact that the Captain and FO were 'chatting it up' is the sole basis for the speed reduction. That is NOT the case.
The CVR shows from 3 minutes prior to LOC movement (the beginning of the approach procedure) that the cockpit was sterile. That is almost five minutes prior to the stick shaker that the airplane was being flown in accordance with all FARs and provisions set fourth in the Colgan Air FOM.
So, the question remains: Why did Capt. Renslow not notice that the speed was bleeding off?